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Abstract. 
The thesis is a sociological investigation of the export meat industry of 
New Zealand. It is concerned with the complex relations established 
between family farmers and agribusiness firms. The thesis demonstrates 
how these relations have been secured to the advantage of family 
farmers by a producer board which acts on their behalf. It is 
suggested that the politics of the producer board operated first to 
constrain agribusiness firms, but more recently to support their 
operations. The reasons for this change are explored through two 
case studies of processing firms. The industrial relations within these 
firms are also traced. The thesis plays off the specific case against 
more general sociological arguments about the triumph of 
agribusiness and the subordination of family farmers. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction. 
For sociologists biography, or as Bourdieu (1977) would term it habitus, 
is a crucial resource. How that resource is utilised, whether in 
sentimental or analytical form, for example, is not given. I began with 
the sentimental. 
My first and enduring interest in the export meat industry is 
undoubtedly the result of being a meatworkers' son. My father 
worked in the casings department at Canterbury Frozen Meat's 
processing plant at Belfast, soon after his arrival in New Zealand, from 
England, in 1951 until his retirement in 1993. While I can recall only a 
handful of visits to my father's place of work on the outskirts of 
Christchurch, these visits left a lasting impression. I can most clearly 
remember the terrible smells as well as the vast size of what must have 
been the plant's cold stores. Thankfully, I was spared a visit to the 
slaughterboard. At home, my parents seemed to talk and to argue 
endlessly about the industry. They discussed the favouritism of 
individual supervisors and the machinations of union delegates, 
worried about impending strikes, bemoaned the greed of farmers and 
the meat firms, damned the biased reporting by the media of troubles 
in the industry, and deeply resented the injustices perpetuated by 
Government. 
What I wanted when I began my research was to place my father's 
experiences in some sort of context and at the same time to 
understand the contemporary reworking of the industry (largely, it must 
be said, to condemn the seeming flood of plant closures and 
redundancies). In other words, the thesis was intended as a tribute to 
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meatworkers like my father and to the way things used to be for men 
and for the union that represented them, There are many such 
sociological accounts of male work, unions and their communities 
(Beynon, 1975; Beynon and Austrin, 1994; Dennis, Henriques and 
Slaughter, 1969; Lane and Roberts, 1977; Upset Trow and Coleman, 
1962; Williams, 1981), However, my intended starting point was not to 
be operationalised in the thesis, That is, the questions I first set out to 
answer are not the ones which, finally, are addressed in the thesis, 
although there is a relationship between them, I had shifted to more 
analytical concerns, 
Part of the revision of my original intentions lay in the realisation that 
the export meat industry, or more correctly the players that comprised 
it including the men who worked on the slaughterboards and casings 
departments, were confronted by a multifaceted and a recurring set 
of dilemmas rather than by any singular crisis, Further, the more I 
uncovered the history of events in the industry the more I became 
convinced of the need to document both the relationships between 
the different actors in the industry and the ways in which deals 
between them were forged and brokered. Inevitably this interest was 
to take me beyond the walls of types of processing plants that my 
father had worked in, 
My intended starting point then had been to study the struggles that 
embroiled management and labour within the processing plants and 
which, I imagined, were somehow defining of the entire industry, But, 
at the same time as I discovered that the history of the industry 
approximated a constant state of crisis, came the recognition that of 
paramount importance was the nexus of deals involving producers 
(farmers) and processors which structurated the markets in the export 
meat industry, Many of these political deals were guaranteed by the 
state, Further, I discovered that these deals have generally been to 
the considerable benefit of farmers, rather than to processing firms, 
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Thereafter my interest in what could be loosely termed the sphere of 
industrial relations (in processing plants) came to reflect a broader 
argument about the networks that positioned the struggles between 
management and workers within the processing plants (freezing 
works). As a result, one of the arguments presented in the thesis is that 
the confrontation between capital and labour in processing was not 
only shaped by, but was of a second order of importance to, the 
statutory arrangements and deals which brought together farmers 
and food processors in the industry (see chapter 6). 
In many regards, my belated appreciation of the centrality of farming 
returned me to a set of understandings which are common to New 
Zealand. Many New Zealanders (my parents included!) would argue 
that, at least at times, 'farmers run the country'. Thus, the actions of 
farmers who were employed by the state as special constables to 
break the general strikes of 1913 and 1951 are important components 
in the popular lore and labour history of New Zealand. Similarly, is the 
position of the tax concessions and import licenses given by successive 
National Governments in the post-war period which allowed farmers 
new cars, second cars, washing machines, televisions and other 
consumer durables at a time when city dwellers were still being 
exhorted to ration. 
Once I had discovered the centrality of farmers they became central 
to shaping my research. The task of the thesis became to identify both 
the diverse forms of governance and the effects of the enduring and 
yet shifting state-sponsorship of family farming on the relationships 
between the actors and their networks in the export meat industry. I 
became fascinated with a set of quite simple questions. Firstly, how 
have farmers retained centrality in the export meat industry? Secondly, 
what are the consequences of this centrality for the other actors in the 
industry? Thirdly, and in particular, I wanted to account not only for the 
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success of farming but also for the recurring failure of agribusiness 
firms. 
This shift in focus involved a shift in the type of analysis that I adopted. 
I was to shift from a labour process type of approach (Braverman, 
1974; Knights and Willmott, 1990; Thompson and Ackroyd, 1995), with its 
emphasis on managerial control over production, to a new institutional 
approach (diMaggio and Powell, 1991; March and Olsen, 1989, 1995). 
This latter approach includes the concerns of the labour process 
analysis but embeds them (Granovetter, 1985) within a wider concern 
for the relations between actors and the networks that they are able 
to construct in order to pursue their diverse sets of interests. On the 
one hand, I wished to capture the complexities confronting the 
diverse sets of actors within the industry and at the same time to 
account for different types of governance as an inherently partial and 
unstable set of solutions (Campbell, Hollingsworth and Lindberg, 1991; 
Hollingsworth, Schmitter and Streeck, 1994). On the other hand, I 
wished to avoid a discussion of the industry in terms of its outright 
restructuring (Britton, Le Heron and Pawson, 1992). 
The rhetorics associated with restructuring have dominated writings on 
the industry in the last decade (Cammock and Inkson, 1988; Evans, 
1985; Garway Investments Limited, 1988; Hartley, 1989; Lawrence, 
Share and Campbell, 1992; Le Heron, 1988b; McKinsey and Company, 
1988; Meat Industry Study and Trade Union Education Authority, 1988; 
Nolan, 1994; Savage, 1990; Sutherland, 1989; Weir, 1992; Zwart and 
Martin, 1988). Although these accounts are drawn from the range of 
actors and differing perspectives on the industry, they share a 
portrayal of events which emphasises the recent past. This focus is 
largely at the expense of an appreciation of the dilemmas, and the 
(partial) resolution of these dilemmas, which have always dogged the 
protagonists of the export meat industry. 
5 
My time-frame for study was not determined by the events which 
other authors identify as watersheds, such as, the termination of the 
Bulk Purchase Agreement (1954), or Britain's application of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (1973), or delicensing (1981), or the 
elimination of price support (1985). At the same time, it was not my 
desire to write a chronological history of events from the beginnings of 
the export trade (1882). Rather, I wished to produce an historically 
informed institutional analysis. This analysis was to involve the 
development of a narrative connecting a representation of the broad 
sweep of events with analysis of the politics and strategy of specific 
actors (Wierviorka, 1992). This means that the thesis retains a 
sequential element insofar as the discussion of dilemmas which 
confronted sets of actors in the industry and their (partial) resolution is 
used to construct an account across time. However, this sequential 
account is positioned at odds with assumptions drawn from rural 
sociology and the political economy of agriculture that portray the 
industry in terms of the unfolding of linear forms of development (see 
chapter 2). 
The thesis attempts to steer a course between the overriding 
assumptions of the two literatures that position appreciations of 
farming. One the one hand is much of the contemporary focus of 
rural sociology on the decline of family farming (Buttel and Newby, 
1980; Carter, 1990; Marsden, 1992; Marsden, Lowe and Whatmore, 
1990b). On the other hand is a vaunted reworking of the concerns of 
political economy. The latter is identified by a host of book editors as 
constituting the 'new' political economy of agriculture (Burns, 
Mcinerney and Swinbank, 1983a; Butte!, Larson, and Gillespie, 1990; 
Cox, Lowe, and Winter, 1986a; Dahlberg, 1986; Friedland, Busch, Buttel 
and Rudy, 1991 a; Redclitt, 1984; Shanin, 1987; Twillis and Hollist, 1986). 
This literature is concerned with the opposite, the rise of agribusiness. 
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The relationship between the literatures of decline and rise is one of 
partial convergence or, more precisely, the colonisation of debates in 
rural sociology by the conceptions of political economy. Hence, rural 
sociology has a fascination with farming as a craft or as an 
occupation which it portrays as being doomed, whereas political 
economy uses formulations based in generalised socio-economic 
categories to proclaim the ascendancy of agribusiness firms. The 
crystallisation of this convergence is found in efforts to develop a 
conceptual subdivision that is pertinent to family farming in 
industrialised societies (Goodman and Redclift, 1985). There are 
numerous examples. Some writers contend that modern forms of 
farming are unambiguous in their capitalist orientation (Frankel, 1983; 
Friedland, Barton and Thomas, 1981; Ghorayshi, 1986). Friedland and 
Pugliese (1989) make claims to petty commodity production as 
encapsulating the appropriate class composition of farming in 
industrialised societies. Of greater influence is Friedmann (1978a, 
1978b, 1980, 1985, 1986) and others (Reinhardt and Barlett, 1989) who 
proffer accounts of farming which try to operationalise the concepts 
of simple commodity production. 
The orientation of this thesis is of a different order of abstraction, in that 
I seek to deal with the politics and strategies of the relationships 
entangling forms of business in an industry (Senker, 1988; Wells, 1984). 
My account takes as its main concern not the class position of farmers 
but rather the actors and network which comprise an industry 
(Grabner, 1983a; Hollingsworth, 1991), or, put another way, farmers as 
men and women engaged in business but willing at all times to use 
the state to their advantage. I argue that neither rural sociology nor 
political economy really appreciates the patterns of power relations 
that are assembled in the industries where farmers and agribusiness 
firms come into contact. In particular, neither literature appreciates 
farmers as political agents. For this reason, the thesis has its institutional 
focus and emphasises the interplay of actors; farmers with meat firms, 
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statutory bodies and unions that constitute the diverse co-operative 
and antagonistic networks in the export meat industry. 
The thesis will demonstrate through its institutional focus that farmers' 
access to the state secured them and constrained agribusiness firms. 
In this respect, the securing of the occupation of farmers is taken as 
the explanation for the subsequent rises and falls of agribusiness firms. 
That is, throughout the history of the export meat industry agribusiness 
firms have tended to fail while the occupation of farming has 
endured. The thesis is therefore a discussion of the politics of 
agriculture which positions the occupation of farming 'off-farm' as 
much as it is an account of the direct sponsorship by the state of 
farming. 
The thesis is structured as follows. Firstly a discussion of the pertinent 
debates with the literature is presented in chapter two. In this chapter 
I discuss and criticise the key assumptions of the sociological literature 
relevant to agriculture. In particular, I take issue with its dismal 
prognostications for family farming. This review leads to an attempt to 
provide an account of politics of farmers in the export meat industry. 
This account breaks with linear and determinist assumptions underlying 
both accounts of family farming and typologies of core and 
peripheral societies in the world system (Shanin, 1988; Wallerstein, 
1979). 
Chapters three, four and five investigate attempts to regulate and 
control product markets. The regulation of two interlinked products 
(stock and meat) and two markets (localised and global) are 
addressed. These product markets combine as a field where farmers 
and agribusiness firms most significantly come into contact. The deals 
made in these product markets consequently facilitate the 
displacement of farmers or their linkage with agribusiness firms. 
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Chapter three concentrates on the political deals and arrangements 
which characterised the networks in the industry during its formative 
decades (1882-1923). It is argued that these deals facilitated the 
autonomy and prosperity of farming. The pivotal set of actors in the 
analysis in this chapter are farmers, co-operative firms and 
international agribusiness firms. The political deals made around 
consignment and auctions of stock are discussed in some detail, as is 
their engendering of over-capacity in the processing sector and what 
amounted to the inherent instability of firms in the processing sector. 
These political deals stymied any rationalisation of the industry that 
was considered as unfavourable to farmers. Historical events -in the 
form of the slump in agricultural prices after the First World war- were 
to disrupt the uneasy balance achieved in the period. These events 
simultaneously unshackled the international agribusiness firms and 
stimulated a political mobilisation by family farming. It is argued that 
the formation of a statutory board of control, the Meat Producers' 
Board, was the result. 
Chapter four deals with the composition and activities of the Meat 
Producers' Board (established in 1923 and renamed as the Meat 
Board in late 1995). The chapter examines the role of this, farmer 
dominated, statutory body as the key institution of policy-making and 
administration (Smith, 1990) in the export meat industry. The Board is 
portrayed as the farmers' agent, and as ensuring the continued 
autonomy and prosperity of farming. The Board's activities as an 
inspector (of export product and processing), as shipping agent as 
licensing agency for the activities of processing and export, as 
guarantor of processing capacity to farmers, and as the promoter of 
classification for the trade in stock are examined in considerable 
detail. 
Chapter five extends the analysis of the activities of the Board, but this 
time in the setting connected with the loss of the Board's control in the 
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British market. The pivotal set of actors in this analysis are the Board, 
local processing firms and international agribusiness firms. The local 
firms are examined in terms of challenging their enforced marginality 
in the industry. The international agribusiness firms are considered as 
withdrawing from the industry. This twinned process was to unfold in a 
circuitous manner and for a period involved the reinforcement by the 
Board of the unequal shares of processing and the export trade 
enjoyed by domestic and international agribusiness firms. The 
introduction of price support and subsidies for farmers are also 
examined. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the change of 
the Board's activities, made in the context of the worsening situation in 
overseas markets. This change saw a reversal in its opposition to 
rationalisation of the processing sector and the development of new 
attempts to franchise the overseas markets. 
Chapter six discusses the regulation of labour markets in processing. 
The key actors in this chapter are the unions and the firms they 
opposed. The control by a craft form of the unions of an Australasian 
labour market and subsequently by an industrial union of regional 
labour markets is explored in terms of seasonality, seniority and piece 
rates. It is argued that the continued federated character of the 
meatworkers' unions is explained, in part, by its embeddedness in the 
networks of the export meat industry. The role of union delegates both 
in the processing plants and in the federated unions is emphasised in 
the configuration of union control. 
Chapters seven, eight and nine investigate the processing sector. The 
processing sector is emphasised as crucial, because within its plants 
livestock becomes meat. It is argued that the establishment of a 
Producer's Board in favour of farmers provoked problems of control of 
both product and labour markets for processing firms. These problems 
are investigated through case studies of two firms, Waitaki 
International and Fortex Group. 
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Chapter seven draws on archival research to present a study of the 
rise and fall of Waitaki International (1920-1990). The pivotal set of 
actors in this chapter are the Waitaki company, its competitors, 
farmers and the Board. It focuses on the firm's efforts, after 1964, to 
become an integrated agribusiness firm and to displace the 
international agribusiness firms. Details of aborted and successful 
takeovers of its competitors are presented and the changing 
responses of the Board to the agenda of rationalisation pursued by 
domestic interests are reviewed. It is noted how the Waitaki company 
in its last years of operation was entangled with some of New 
Zealand's largest corporations and Freesia Meats (the investment arm 
of the Board). The unexpected collapse of Waitaki International, the 
exit of the corporations, and the enlargement of the co-operatives 
posed major problems for the Board which are examined in the 
concluding remarks. 
Chapter eight and chapter nine together offer another account of the 
rise and fall of a prominent local processing firm, the Fortex Group 
(1971-1994), The pivotal set of actors in the former chapter are all 
located within the firm: marketing managers, production managers 
and the representatives of the Meatworkers' Union. The chapter 
focuses on the firm's efforts, after 1982, to achieve a new form of 
integrated agribusiness firm, based on added value processing. The 
tensions of being market led and of working out a new deal with the 
union at Fortex are explored in depth. The chapters demonstrate that 
at Fortex there was an attempt to fuse control over product and 
labour markets. An account is offered of attempts at shift working, 
new forms of remuneration and changes to supervision. It is argued 
that these innovations generated something of a fusion of interests at 
the plants, but were unsuccessful. The latter chapter addresses the 
failure of Fortex. The pivotal set of actors in this analysis are outside the 
firm; financiers, farmers, co-operative firms and the Board. Finally, the 
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emergent problems which confront farmers and their enlarged co-
operative firms are touched on in the concluding remarks. 
Chapter ten makes concluding remarks about the politics of 
agriculture. The roles of farmers, the Board, agribusiness firms and 
unions are considered. A shifting constellation of policies, responses 
and counters, are presented as a process by which farmers co-existed 
with and secured control, over other actors in the industry. It is argued 
that, explanations of farmers' control are not found in any linear or 
determined understandings, but rather that local and global markets 
were structured through a series of political interventions by farmers. 
Appendix one characterises and provides an overview of the firms 
and processing plants that have operated in the export meat industry. 
It lists the shifting mix of international agribusiness firms, the farmers' 
firms and proprietary firms and the export slaughterhouses they 
owned. 
Appendix two maps the information from appendix one, for the period 
after 1960 until 1995. It is hoped that the charting of this information will 
aid an appreciation of the wax and wane of international agribusiness 
firms, proprietary firms and farmers' firms. 
Appendix three provides some reflections on the research process. 
Chapter :2 
Beyond rural sociology and political economy: the debates 
on family farming, agribusiness firms and food chains. 
Introduction. 
12 
In the introductory chapter I sketched my interest with the export meat 
industry and some of the considerations which consolidated my 
approach to this research. To reiterate, the questions I wish to address 
are: Firstly, how have farmers retained centrality in the export meat 
industry? Secondly, what are the consequences of this centrality for 
the other actors in the industry? Thirdly, what is the relationship 
between the success of family farming and the recurring failure of 
agribusiness firms (Juchau, 1992). I consider these queries throughout 
the narrative of the thesis and, in particular, in the context of the 
recent and recurring dilemmas which confront different actors in the 
networks of the export meat industry (Wierviorka, 1992). In doing so, I 
believe this thesis offers a partial redress to a lack of sociological 
research into an industry which the first New Zealand Official Yearbook 
rightly claimed would be a lucrative field for men (Department of 
Statistics, 1892: 122-123). At the same time the focus of the research is 
different from the established sociological literature on farming. This 
requires some explanation. 
Rural sociology and the political economy of agriculture. 
A fascination with the fate of the family farm lies at the core of rural 
sociology (Cox, Lowe and Winter, 1986b; Hamilton, 1985, Kenney, 
1989). In this regard, Nolan (1994) notes that the contemporary 
accounts of family farming centre on notions of its survivalism or its 
subsumption. Family farming is expected by writers either to subsist in 
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misery or to be ruined and displaced by capitalist farming and its 
practitioners cast down into the rural proletariat. Clearly both of these 
themes explore the effects of a supposed 'capitalist penetration of 
agriculture' and the passivity of family farming (Shanin, 1990). 
Accounts of family farming tend to explore its decline and have 
entailed discussions of the forms and stages of this disintegration, 
including the phenomena of part time farming or pluriactivity (Gasson, 
1986; Zabawa, 1987) and the resurgence of share-farming (Well, 1984). 
These debates provide an opening into arguments about the role of 
women and unpaid domestic labour in family farming which are 
interesting but, do so largely at the expense of appreciating the 
household form of production as being actively embedded in 
industries (Shanin, 1988). 
Rural sociology deals with many of the institutions (Cleary, 1989; Dupre, 
1990) which are central to forms of governance in the export meat 
industry, although these institutions appear in the literature largely as 
subordinated and transitional assemblages. For example, informal 
forms of co-operation (Hedley, 1985) and co-operative firms are well 
documented as busy in food processing and in the marketing of 
produce but, in each case a dynamic is also identified for the political 
arrangements which are sustained by farmers to be pressured and 
marginalised. Thus, Burns, Mcinerney and Swinbank (19830) offer 
accounts of the food industries in Britain as series of sites across which 
the tide is turning against all forms of small business. Similarly, Friedland 
and others (Friedland and Barton, 1976; Friedland Barton and Thomas, 
1979; Friedland Barton and Thomas, 1981) explore fruit and vegetable 
production in California in terms of the victory of capitalist farming. 
Similarly, Little and Watts (1994) describe aspects of a like 
transformation to agriculture in northern Africa. 
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Farmers' appeals to the state which are consolidated as boards of 
control or other regulatory bodies for food industries have also 
received attention. Nevertheless, assumptions of marginality 
permeate these assessments of the political interventions of farmers. 
Hence, Goodman and Redclift isolate the perceived instability of such 
arrangements: 
"The capitalised family producer has sought and in large 
measure achieved, political legitimacy by seeking to 
distance himself from 'capitalism' at the ideologicalleve!, 
while fully embracing it at the economic level. " 
(Goodman and Redclift, 1985: 242). 
European writings discuss the agricultural policies of the state that 
result in boards of control chiefly in terms of corporatism (Hamilton, 
1985; Coulomb and Delorme, 1989; Cox, Lowe and Winter, 1989). The 
North American writings privilege the New Deal (Kenney, 1989; 
Tubiana, 1989). In both cases emphasis is placed on the demise, or at 
least the impending demise, of these state sponsored arrangements 
(Butte!' 1989). The farming lobby is portrayed as being successful 
formerly in linking state support for family farming, mainly in terms of 
non-capitalist appeals, but these statutory arrangements are now 
taken as being imperilled by events (Smith, 1990). In other words, 
farmers become the victims of unintended consequences of earlier 
successes. Hence, subsidised agricultural sectors are presented as 
effectively promoting the growth of large-scale farming (Hamilton, 
1985). 
Clearly the marginalisation of farmers, especially of family farmers, and 
of the political deals they might make to further their interests is largely 
the norm in this literature (Shanin, 1988). In this debate family farming is 
pitted against a trend towards agribusiness. The latter, according to 
the argument have technology on their side (Busch, Bonanno, and 
Lacy, 1989; Leopold, 1985). It is not surprising then that the arguments 
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that support this supposed trend are a version of technological 
determinism (Buttel, 1988). 
In this literature the constraints of technology are assumed to form the 
constraints on agribusiness firms and/or capitalist farming (Goodman 
and Redclitt, 1981; Reinhardt and Barlett, 1989). I n this regard, the 
continuing reliance of farming on land (Buttel, 1989; Goodman and 
Redclitt, 1985; Mandel, 1987) and biology (Goodman, Sorj and 
Wilkinson, 1984, 1987; Mann and Dickinson, 1978) are presented as 
constituting a barrier to capitalism and to capitalist forms of 
production. As a result, the focus in the literature is to account for the 
articulation (effectively its subordination) of forms of farming, which 
are conceived of as sheltered and ultimately backward, with those, 
supposedly more active enterprises that are based off-farm (Reinhardt 
and Barlett, 1989). 
Braverman engaged in this form of determinist reasoning when he 
looked at the labour processes which linked farming and food: 
"Industrial capital has thrust itself between farm and 
household, appropriated all the processing functions of 
both, thus extending the commodity form to food in its 
semi-prepared or even fully prepared forms" (Braverman, 
1974: 274). 
This literature has generated important accounts about the erosion of 
the presumed 'technology barrier' by the actions of agribusiness firms. 
The common argument in the literature tends to. emphasise the 
development and dissemination of new technologies (Goodman and 
Redclitt, 1989a, 1991; Redclitt, 1984, 1986; Sorj and Wilkinson, 1985) and 
to position what remains of family farming as merely occupying a 
niche that is unattractive to agribusiness firms (Mottura and Pugliese, 
1980; Sanderson, 1986). 
The "tendency (is) for agribusiness to withdraw from the 
process of production in agriculture, focusing its profit-
making activities on credit, supply of inputs, contracting, 
and selling, while leaving farming to small holders and 
'skimming' rather than replacing them" (Shanin, 1990: 
323). 
16 
The realm of family farming is described then as an already narrow 
range of food producing activities which is further diminished by the 
appropriationist and substitutionist strategies of agribusiness firms 
(Goodman and Redclitt, 1991; Goodman, Sorj and Wilkinson, 1984, 
1987). For Goodman, Sorj and Wilkinson: 
"The agro-industrial 'complex' represents an incomplete, 
transitional phase in the industrial appropriation of 
agriculture." (Goodman, Sorj, Wilkinson, 1984: 196). 
In their strong version of the argument farming is everywhere 
presented as being hemmed in by new technologies which engender 
greater costs of production and indebtedness (ButteL 1989; Frankel, 
1983; Lawrence, 1990). Over the long term, appropriationist and 
sUbstitutionist strategies prefigure a complete transformation of food 
production through the deployment of biotechnologies (Goodman 
and Redclitt, 1991; Goodman, Sorj and Wilkinson, 1984, 1987; 
Vergopoulos, 1985). Further, even those new technologies which fall 
into the hands of producers are represented as being leased to them, 
rather than sold to them, by agribusiness firms. 
An important moment in the playing out of this dual process of the 
decline of the family farm and the rise of agribusiness is posited when 
farmers retain the land they farm but not the technologies or inputs 
(seeds, plants, livestock, etc) they use to do so (Commins, 1990; 
deJanvry and LeVeen, 1986; Leopold, 1985; Redclitt, 1984, 1986; 
Sanderson, 1986). Both the outright ownership of farmland by 
agribusiness firms (Hunt, 1983; Leopold, 1985) and the contracting of 
farming by these large corporations are presented as arrangements 
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by which agribusiness ultimately 'conquers' agriculture (deJanvry and 
LeVeen, 1986; Little and Watts, 1994; Sanderson, 1986). 
The accounts grounded in political economy resonate with 
assumptions of the marginality of farmers and tend to recycle Marx's 
initial dismissal of the peasantry (Marx, 1977). This recycling is 
commented on by many writers of whom most then proceed to do 
the much the same (Busch, Bonanno, and Lacy, 1989; Cox, Lowe and 
Winter, 19860; Friedland, 1991; Hamilton, 1985, Kane and Mann, 1992; 
Kenney, 1989; Marsden, Lowe and Whatmore, 19900). The rediscovery 
of Marx's writings was also used by Levine (1982), Shanin (1973, 1990), 
Mann and Dickinson (19780), and Friedmann (19780, 1978b, 1980) to 
generate very influential explanations for the continued existence of 
family farming in industrialised societies. This originating body of work 
also drew on insights from Chayanov (Harrison, 1979; Hunt, 1979; 
Patnaik, 1979) and Kautsky (Banaji, 1990) and emphasised the 
internalised features or 'logics' of family farming. Nevertheless, they 
too worked to extend rather than to disrupt Marx's paradigmatic 
contention that family farming is a vestige of pre-capitalist modes of 
production (Chevalier, 1983; Mandel, 1987).1 
The political economy of agriculture also became intertwined with 
discussions about the global crisis of fordism and its forms of regulation 
(Aglietta, 1979, 1982; Boyer, 1988; Liepitz, 1987). This research moved 
beyond the family farm and the occupation of farming to draw on the 
insights offered by the proponents of regulation theory (Brenner and 
Glick, 1991; Hirst and Zeitlin, 1991; Jessop, 1990; Marsden, 1992) to 
account for the mounting dilemmas that confront farmers, food 
processors, exporters, consumers, policy-makers and tax-payers (Butte I, 
and Goodman, 1989; Friedland, Busch, Buttel and Rudy, 1991 b; 
1 Shanin (1990) notes that for some inexplicable reasons the attempt by 
Marx to reprise his assessment of the peasantry (Marx, 1970) is either 
overlooked or disregarded as the rambling of an old man by later writers. 
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Friedmann and McMichael, 1989; Kenney, 1989). The multitudinous 
issues facing the protagonists in farming, food industries and 
administrations in the states of both the First and Third Worlds were 
addressed through such concepts as 'peripheral fordism' (Uepitz, 
1987). In this literature agriculture was reworked as fordist agriculture 
(Raynolds, 1994). 
The work of Harriet Friedmann, from her ground-breaking efforts in 
creating a new political economy of agriculture (Friedmann, 1978a, 
1978b, 1980, 1982, 1985, 1986) to her engagement with regulation 
theory (Friedmann, 1987), appear as representative of the inclination 
of this literature towards building models. The notion of fordist 
agriculture is precisely such a model. It is used by writers as a 
surrogate for the complexities of agriculture in nations (Commins, 1990; 
Goodman, Sorj and Wilkinson, 1987; Kenney, 1989) and the 
international order (Buttel, 1989; de Janvry and Le Veen, 1986; 
Friedmann and McMichaeL 1989; McMichael and Myhre, 1991; 
Tubiana, 1989). These accounts try to order an understanding of 
agriculture in terms of Aglietta' s guiding principle, that is, the 
harmonisation of production and consumption. However, the main 
accomplishment of this approach has become a fascination with 
styles of consumption and with food (Goodman and Redclitt, 1991). 
Food chains and actor-networks. 
Notably absent from the discussion is the state or what I call the politics 
of agriculture. For an opening into arguments about politics we have 
to look elsewhere, to the study of food chains. The study of food 
chains (Friedland, 1984; Le Heron, 1988a, 1988c) constitutes an 
important elaboration in the sociology of agriculture. In this regard, 
the development of a food (agro-commodity) chain approach 
formed part of an effort for a 'new economic geography' 
(Fitzsimmons, 1986; Wallace, 1985) from which sociologists then 
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borrowed. While the sociological study of food chains has its origins in 
French scholarship (Senker, 1988), William Friedland pioneered its 
broader application in studies of the networks of farms, factories and 
agribusiness firms involved in Californian fruit and vegetable 
production (Friedland and Barton, 1976; Friedland, Barton and Thomas, 
1979, 1981). These studies are notable for their attention to the political 
component of the relationship between producers, processors, and 
distributors. 
Friedland posited that a food chain can be understood as a complex 
of sequential processes differently located in space (Friedland, 1984). 
He suggested that the study of food chains (stretching from forming 
into retailing) offered a potential synthesis of research, perhaps like the 
re-centring of sociology desired by Carter (1990), because it could 
incorporate studies of production practices, grower organisations, the 
deployment of research and development, the construction of 
marketing and distribution and account for labour relations. Further, 
the conception of sectors of commerce as food chains is an 
especially attractive proposition for investigations of export-oriented 
industries (like the export meat industry) and the approach has gained 
considerable favour (Gereffi and Korzenienic, 1994). In short, the 
conception of food chains allows an emphasis on the interpenetration 
and diversity of the global and the local networks of family farms and 
agribusiness firms which is otherwise blurred by the essentially 
determinist accounts of the eclipse of family farming by agribusiness 
firms. This appreciation is achieved largely by privileging the physical 
product and its transportation to, and transformation in, sites which 
may be scattered across the globe. 
There is, for example, considerable utility in conceiving of the export 
meat industry as representing an international 'chain from form to 
supermarket' (Le Heron, 1988d: 2). Certainly the enterprises and 
activities comprising the industry are sometimes separated by many 
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thousands of kilometres, The scattering of the sites which materially 
constitute the industry is most obvious in the vast distances between 
the sites of producing stock (farms) and of terminal markets 
(supermarkets, restaurants and butchers' shop), However, the 
conception of an industry as a food chain imparts its own biases, The 
focus in the study of food chains on the linkage of sites and, what is 
most important on what happens to the physical product at those 
sites has tended to a fascination with elements of the labour process 
and the entanglements of corporate strategy (Chandler, 1978), The 
study of food chains are thereby narrowed somewhat in their potential 
sweep, and tend to emphasise the confrontations of capital with 
labour and to reconsider the workings of 'agro-industrialisation' (Ufkes, 
1995), 
capitalist food and fibre production incorporates the 
basic features of capitalism, especially the wage-relation, 
This holds for farming (sic) through to distribution and 
retailing, Critically, lines of antagonism are likely to 
appear at any site of production (eg, processing plants) 
or in some relational form within the chains (eg, farmers 
contracted to agribusiness companies)," (Le Heron, 
1988b: 8), 
The narrowing of focus effectively reintroduces much of the bias of 
classical theory, insofar as it simply defines modern examples of 
farming as capitalist forms of production, For example, the use of 
'producing firm' by Friedland, Barton, and Thomas (1981) to define the 
enterprises engaged in agricultural production is later acknowledged 
as an oversight in review of the sociology of agriculture by the 
principal author (Friedland, 1984), 
By contrast my research utilises what I consider to be the strongest 
elements from the food chain approach, I take these to be centrally 
concerned with the study of actor-networks and the embeddedness 
of social action (Grabner, 1993a; Granovetter, 1985, 1990; Hakansson 
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and Johanson, 1993), The writings about actor-networks have a 
diversity of roots, but most obviously fall within the recent debates 
between sociologists and economists, or more properly the 
sociological critique of economic modelling (Hirsch, Michael, 
Friedmann, 1990), that is usually described as constituting a new 
institutional sociology (Dimaggio and Powell, 1991; Friedland and 
Robertson, 1990; Grabner, 1993b; March and Olsen, 1989, 1995; 
Smelser and Swedberg, 1994), For my purposes, it is grounded in 
critiques of the business efficiency models of organisations (Chandler 
1978, 1990; Williamson, 1975),2 
The study of actor-networks eschews claims about best ways of 
organisation or logics of agriculture and, instead, focuses on the 
differing constraint and enablement of actors (March and Olsen, 1995; 
Sewell, nd), That is, in a multitude of industries the integrated firm and 
their forms of hierarchy remain only one among many forms of 
business (Baron and Bielby, 1980), Further, the study of actor-networks 
breaks with the approach of political economy insofar as the latter 
replicates arguments about the universal ability of large-scale forms of 
2 Chandler and Williamson are accused of making contributions that merely 
extend utilitarianism, "The transaction-cost approach ultimately is an 
extension of micro-economic theory, and its capacity to describe reality is 
bounded by the limits of the theory -that is, by the very institutional 
constraints that (it) would attempt to explain" (Robins, 1987, quoted in 
Hopper and Armstrong, 1991: 409), In something of a retrospective of his 
work, Chandler attempts to distance his writings on the growth of the US 
multi-divisional industrial corporation from the arguments of efficiency 
recycled by Williamson, "The basic difference between myself and 
Williamson is that for him (1985, p, 41): 'The transaction is the basic unit of 
analysis', For me, it is the firm and its specific physical and human assets, If 
the firm is the unit of analysis, instead of fhe transaction, then the specific 
nature of the firm's facilities and skills becomes the most significant factor in 
determining what will be done in the firm and what by the market" 
(Chandler, 1992: 85 - 86), This is surely an artificial distinction based more on a 
growing sensitivity to claims about the social construction of efficiency than 
any real difference with the tenets of transaction cost analysis, After aiL the 
start-point (and the main innovation) of Williamson's work is the 
acknowledgment of bounded rationality, asset specificity and opportunism, 
That is, precisely the 'specific nature of the firm's facilities and skills', 
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business to benefit from technological innovations (Chandler, 1978; 
Leopold, 1985) and to ignore politics (Fligstein, 1990). By extension 
then such an approach to actor-networks constitutes an investigation 
of the actual historical process by which family farming is linked to, or 
displaced by agribusiness firms. 
The New Zealand case. 
" .. .the undiluted abstractions of Marx and Weber... after 
all were formulated to explain the development of old, 
large and heavily industrialised societies. U (Brooking, 1979: 
80). 
Carter (1990) argues that one way forward from a dearth of 
sociological writings about farming and the agricultural-based export 
industries in New Zealand is that it might become more like a sociology 
of agriculture. Thus, sociologists might do themselves a great service 
by shedding any stipulation to study the abstracted issues of rurality as 
opposed to the social relations that are located in or have their origins 
in activities done in rural areas (Cloke and Little, 1990; Marsden, Lowe 
and Whatmore, 19900). In the case of New Zealand, which is a small 
society and lacking in researchers, such a reorientation would 
necessarily entail an openness to other disciplines and would include, 
on the one hand, 'geographers, political scientists, economists and 
sociologists' and, on the other hand, 'disciplines like history, English 
literature and art history' (Carter, 1990: 66). Therefore, while the 
inclusion of fresh perspectives might help extend the sociological 
agenda, it would involve a recognition on the part of sociologists that 
the most comprehensive work in recent years on trade and agriculture 
in New Zealand has, like the international efforts (Friedmann, 1982), 
focused on its political economy and been undertaken chiefly by 
writers in the discipline of human geography (Britton, Le Heron and 
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Pawson, 1992; Le Heron, 1989, 1993; Le Heron and Park, 1995; Le Heron, 
Roche and Anderson 1989; Roche, 1992).3 
My argument is, in part, a response to the call by Carter (1990) for a 
sociology of agriculture which is pertinent to New Zealand in the 1990s. 
It offers an analysis in terms of institutional specificity which seeks to 
comprehend the local and global processes that produced and then 
continually reproduced the export meat industry. 
The relationships of the sorts of actors in the export meat industry, and 
especially those entangling family farming and agribusiness firms, are 
very different to the ones posited by the family farming and 
agribusiness models of development. The overriding assumption in the 
literature as I have suggested is of the survivalism or subsumption of 
family farming (and indeed all forms of farming) as a requisite of 
capitalist development. By contrast, networks in the export meat 
industry and the forms of embedded ness enjoyed by family farming in 
New Zealand, constitute this sector of commerce as one of the 
manifold examples of what Shanin has labelled 'expoliary economies' 
(Shanin, 1988). In this case, it is important to explain the success of 
family-labour forms of production (Austrin and Curtis, 1992; Curtis, 
1992). 
My argument therefore constitutes a critique of those literatures which 
envisage linear and / or converging forms of development. In its 
place it attempts to secure a politics of craft and household forms of 
production. Further, it is my contention that an analysis of centrality of 
farmers in the export meat industry, that is, of the politics of agriculture 
3 Insofar as human geography has traversed a watershed of self-doubt and 
self-criticism (Cloke, Philo, Sadler, 1991), its protagonists now may be ideally 
placed to reap the benefits from further incorporating the insights of other 
disciplines (Fitzsimmons, 1986; Wallace, 1985) and especially from use of the 
actor-networks approach (yeung, 1994) in the development of a 
'sociology' of agriculture that opens notions of 'local and global'. 
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presents a way of understanding how a society that is reliant on the 
production and export of agricultural commodities could obtain and 
maintain a standard of living at times ranked the first in the world 
(Crocombe, Enright and Porter, 1991; Denoon, 1983; Font, 1990). 
Certainly, the (selected) theorisation of development in industrial 
societies of Western Europe and North America cannot account 
adequately for the circumstance in New Zealand. The ramification is 
that such understandings also misrepresent development of even the 
industrialised societies.4 
Hence, my investigation of the export meat trade describes forms of 
business, networks in the industry, and forms of governance which are 
not an important part of the historical experiences of the industrialised 
societies (Wright, 1993). Rather, they are products of a particular 
organisation of an export-oriented economy and small society. They 
can be regarded, as partial solutions to sustaining an export trade 
(Coulomb and Delorme, 1989) arrived at by actors (predominantly 
farmers) who faced significant disadvantages in terms of accessing 
markets in the international order. In this regard, the forms of business 
(Hill, 1974), networks in the industry, and forms of governance 
described in my thesis must be appreciated primarily for their 
outstanding durability and flexibility (Katzenstein, 1985). 
4 A body of writing makes passing comment on the associated centrality of 
family farming and the export meat industry in New Zealand, although its 
main concern is to account for issues of economic history (Simkin, 1951; 
Stone, 1967; Toynbee 1979) and of 'socio-historical development' (Font, 
1990), and of how New Zealand is located in the international order. The 
unfolding of statehood, officially expressed in the attainment by New 
Zealand of administrative (1907) and formal (1931) independence from 
Britain and the role of New Zealand's founding statesmen in these 
developments are of concern to the most prestigious of indigenous historians 
(Condliffe and Airey, 1957; Oliver, 1960; Sinclair, 1961). The latter aspect of 
study is grounded in Marxist formulations and especially those of imperialism 
(Leibman, 1980; Lenin, 1977). Its authors make repeated and, I believe, 
ultimately unsuccessful attempts to account for the relatively privileged 
position of New Zealand in the international order (Armstrong, 1978, 1980; 
Beddgood, 1978; Bertram, 1976; Boreham, 1988; Coleman, 1958; Ehrensaft 
and Armstrong, 1978; Steven, 1978, 1985). 
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My argument is directed at an explanation of the fortunes of family 
farming in New Zealand which may account for the success of this 
form of production in more fluid and non-determined terms than 
merely its survivalism or subsumption. Moran, Blunden and 
Greenwood (1993) provide an example of this approach. These 
authors return, in part, to the challenge of an earlier wave of research 
which criticised the determinism of Marxists and instead intended to 
"relate types of agricultural enterprises and patterns of class relations 
in rural social life" (Stinchombe, 1961: 167). Similarly, Bremner and 
Brooking, (1993), Cloke (1989) and Perry (1992) have offered 
sociological accounts of governance which attribute farmers in New 
Zealand with creativity in the fabrication of networks. That is, rather 
than being portrayed as the seemingly passive victims of change, 
farmers are counted among its principal agents. 
This body of work helps focus my inquiry, insofar as my overarching 
queries are centrally concerned with issues of governance and 
institutional frameworks. I seek to trace the shifting deals, statutory 
arrangements and institutions by which family farmers enjoyed (and 
enjoys) autonomy and prosperity in its activities on-farm and, 
furthermore, by which it became closely involved in food processing 
and in the supply of international markets (Cornish, 1995). Much of this 
account leads back to the chief institutional form of state sponsorship, 
specifically the significance of the New Zealand Meat Producers' 
Board and the deals it brokered between farmers and meat firms. 
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Chapter 3 
Family farmers and agribusiness firms: Consignment and auctions, 
over-capacity and instability in processing. 
Introduction. 
"The economies of meatpacking required integration 
from production through wholesale distribution. In this 
case, moreover, the development of new technology led 
to extensive reform, not only of the transportation and 
production systems, ... but also of the distribution and 
marketing systems. II (Piore and Sabel, 1984: 59) 
Piore and Sabel (1984) and business historians (Chandler, 1978, 1990; 
Hounshell, 1984) have identified how a handful of large North 
American manufacturing firms internalised the activities of distribution 
and supply in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. This 
process combined mass production manufacturers with wholesalers 
and resulted in multi-divisional and international firms (Cornish, 1995). 
In this new business success was secured in and through the building 
of hierarchies of control for coordinating production, distribution and 
supply. This model of business is regarded as constituting a prototype 
for all large firms and moreover for their study (Fligstein, 1990; Piore and 
Sabel, 1984). This type of account continues to provide an exemplar 
for corporate action (Baron and Bielby, 1980) which is frequently put to 
use in discussions of industrial development and is freely related to 
other types of firms, other industries, other places and other times 
(Chandler, 1992). For example, the portrayal of industries and their 
political deals as a process which cUlminates in the hegemony of 
integrated firms prefigures the literature about agribusiness firms and 
the fate of farmers (Frankel, 1983; Leopold, 1985). 
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This argument is critical for the discussions of 'agro-industrialisation' 
(Ufkes, 1995) as it took place in the local markets of the United States 
of America. It is prevalent for example, in discussions of meatpacking 
and the international facets of the meat industry. By way of illustration, 
the manner Swifts of Chicago used the railroads and refrigerated 
railcars to establish both an infrastructure for the distribution and sale 
of frozen meat and to secure dominance over that infrastructure 
(Kujovich, 1970; Sorj and Wilkinson, 1985) constitutes the archetypal 
case study of the pursuit of forward integration and of a hierarchical 
organisation of local markets (Portz, 1991). 
By contrast a very different trajectory in the development of 
agribusiness firms was described in Britain (Critchell and Raymond, 
1912; Senker, 1988). In Britain, it was the wholesalers acting as 
importers from global markets rather than the meatpacking firms that 
initially dominated the trade in frozen meat as a result of their proximity 
to the final market. 
"Britain had no great herds of cattle to provide the basis 
for giant meatpacking plants comparable to those in 
Chicago and other American cities on the edge of the 
cattle frontier. On the other hand, the rich British market 
attracted an ever-increasing flow of beef, veal, mutton, 
lamb, bacon and ham from overseas. This demand led to 
the formation of specialised transportation and storage 
intermediaries, such as Union Cold Storage (Vesteys) and 
the Smithfield Docks. Moreover, the demand was met not 
by meat processors, as in the United States, but by new 
mass retailers, particularly the multiple shops. These 
retailers made the investment in supplementary facilities 
to assure high-volume flow of perishable products from 
the meat growing regions of Ireland, the Continent South 
America, Australia, New Zealand and the United States" 
(Chandler, 1990: 274-275). 
In this British case, the construction of international agribusiness firms 
around the processing and importation of frozen meat from external 
global markets was to take the form of backwards integration (Burns, 
28 
1983; Burns, Mcinerney, and Swinbank, 1983b). Thus, Harrison's (1963) 
chronicle of Borthwicks and Knightley's (1981) attack on the business of 
the Vestey family can be read to illuminate, albeit indirectly, the 
construction and operation of very large, international and thoroughly 
integrated agribusiness firms. These firms linked the butchers' shops 
and depots in Britain with the far-flung freezing works and farms of the 
Argentine and Australasia (Critchell and Raymond, 1912; Roche, 1992). 
These contrasting cases of organising local and global markets point 
to an analysis which makes the agribusiness firm problematic rather 
than given. The working out of local and global political deals, and 
the actors in the industrial networks identified in this research as the 
export meat industry, challenges any broad generalisations 
concerning the development of agribusiness. Instead, a number of 
problematics are identified. For example, international agribusiness 
firms existed in New Zealand from the outset of the export meat 
industry in 1882. However these integrated firms were very constrained 
in their ability to marginalise the other players or the political deals 
favoured by farmers and local firms to furnish meat to the wholesalers 
based in Britain. 1 Local farmers enjoyed prosperity and autonomy in 
the early industry (1882-1912) which chiefly expressed a form of 
governance based on political deals that were for more 'grown' than 
'made' in terms of their state sponsorship (Hayek, 1991). That is, 
farmers flourished in the industry largely because of the character of 
exchanges which linked them to the other interests who operated off-
farm, and especially to the international agribusiness firms. In practice, 
farmers were secured by the structuring of political deals which 
mediated the connections between them and agribusiness firms within 
local and international markets. These political deals prevented 
1 For example, none of the international firms to operate in New Zealand 
achieved any substantial holdings of land, although a number of them did 
so in Australia and the Americas (Harrison, 1963; Knightley, 1981; Roche, 
1992). 
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agribusiness firms from obtaining closure over the activities that 
coupled farmers in New Zealand with the markets in Britain. 
I will argue in this chapter that the political deals made around the 
movement of product from the farms into the freezing works in New 
Zealand and then into the depots and shops in Britain established 
what may be considered as a field for the playing out of the struggle 
of farmers with agribusiness firms. This field was structured through the 
deals which were worked out between local farmers and agribusiness 
firms. This focus on deals illuminates the fashioning by farmers in New 
Zealand of intense and generalised competition for stock by 
agribusiness firms, and of a means of securing access to processing 
plants, and the markets in Britain by farmers. 
The issues that troubled farmers in the early meat industry (1882-1923) 
pertained to who would profit, and to what extent, from the clearance 
of the export product along the food chain. In this regard, their main 
concern was to constrain the agribusiness firms which combined 
manufacturers and wholesalers, and especially the international 
agribusiness firms. This constraint on agribusiness firms involved farmers 
in firstly, the restraint of attempts (mainly by international agribusiness 
firms) at controlling markets, and secondly, the patterning of these 
markets (primarily the stock auctions and auctions of frozen meat) to 
their advantage. Their aim was that the supply of 'insatiable' markets 
in Britain was to be worked to their (farmers) advantage. As family 
farmers they were very conscious of staying in and operating in a 
global business environment. 
For farmers the most important deals they set up were those facilitating 
the transitions of product, firstly, from farm to freezing works and 
secondly, from freezing works to depots and shops. The first set of 
exchanges required the advance of beasts into processing. The 
second set of exchanges involved the export and shipping of frozen 
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meat to Britain. Both sets of deals constituted sites where the capacity 
of farming and of agribusiness firms to mould and to influence the 
networks in the industry were forged and where, in particular, the use 
of agribusiness solutions (to move product along the commodity chain 
and to the exclusion of other players) were stymied. 
Farmers were to achieve this by their local control of auctions (for 
stock and meat) and the links between these auctions and the 
intermediate firms in New Zealand and Britain. This form of control was 
exercised through the practices of consignment. Farmers were also to 
invest in the construction of their own freezing works. These works were 
established in all the farming districts around New Zealand and, before 
the First World War, processed roughly one half of meat exports from 
New Zealand (Critchell and Raymond, 1912; Macdonald, 1957). The 
former set of deals covering distribution or marketing acted in contrast 
to the dynamic suggested by Chandler (1978) and Piore and Sabel 
(1984), in that they were not so much a marginalised form of 
exchanges as they were an alternative to the integration of buying 
and distribution arrangements proposed by large-scale agribusiness 
firms (Shanin; 1988). The practice of consignment facilitated access 
for farmers to the network beyond the farm-gate. The second set of 
deals, the construction by farmers of freezing works, was one of many 
examples in the world of farmers moving into the sphere of processing 
(Friedland and Barton, 1976; Friedland, Barton and Thomas, 1979, 1981) 
and constituted a direct challenge to the international agribusiness 
firms, which sought to do the same. It also significantly, and perhaps 
paradoxically, advantaged farmers by enhancing all competition for 
stock. On the other hand, the combination of the deals made around 
consignment and the farmers' firms established a disposition to over-
capacity in the processing sector and impeded the closure of under-
utilised freezing works. Together these local deals allowed various 
intermediary firms and family farmers to operate on their 'own 
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account' (Loach, 1969) when they engaged in the export of frozen 
meat to international markets. 
The operation of businesses under contract and on own account. 
When considering the local deals farmers made around stock and 
frozen meat, it is important to note that nearly all businesses engaged 
in the export meat industry could operate, often simultaneously, under 
contract or on their own account. The differentiation of activity, into 
that undertaken under contract or on own account, centred on 
whether a business handled product principally for a fee (often in the 
form of a commission) or to accrue revenues from its sale. In other 
words, it related to whether a business handled the farmers' product 
because of a contract to supply its services to another business or 
because of its ownership of those goods. 2 
The most significant two branches of business endeavour was found in 
the operation of the freezing works. Indeed, this splintering of what 
supposedly was to become the ambit of industrial capitalism 
(Braverman, 1974), of the integrated firm (Chandler, 1978, 1990), and 
of international agribusiness firms, (Leopold 1985), was the defining 
feature of control that farmers exercised in the early export meat 
industry. 
The agribusiness firms that operated freezing works in New Zealand 
were commonly referred to as freezing firms or processing firms, I will 
use the latter term (Harrison, 1963; Knightley, 1981; Lind 1981, 1985; 
Loach, 1969; Macdonald, 1957; Perriam, 1989; Scott, 1973; Strang, 
2 Furthermore, farmers could use their pastures and their other fixed assets to 
raise the stock they owned and / or to fatten (to finish) stock on behalf of 
other farmers. The latter, contractual arrangements, constituted a form of 
sharefarming. However, farming in New Zealand was not characterised by 
the internal divisions normally engendered by sharefarming (Wells, 1984) and 
the fattening of stock belonging to others was merely a profitable sideline for 
many lowland farmers which continues today (interview, Farmer #1). 
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1960; Taranaki Producers, 1952). Processing firms normally levied 
'killing charges' (Loach, 1969; Strang, 1960) for the slaughter, dressing 
of stock and the bagging and freezing of meat. The payment of killing 
charges left the ownership of the product (the frozen meat and 
collateral by-products), made available by industrial slaughter, in the 
hands of the farmer-supplier. Many of the processing firms essentially 
contracted out their factories to farmers and to other agribusiness firms 
(Lind, 1981; Loach, 1969; Macdonald, 1957; Perriam, 1989; Scott, 1973; 
Strang, 1960). Hence, the processing firms, who leased out their 
freezing works, allowed farmers to gain further access to the food 
chain. 
From the perspective of local farmers, the more freezing works within a 
local farming district, the better (Bartley, 1987; Hayward, 1972; 
Stephens, 1936a, 1936c). The presence of a freezing works that 
contracted its services, in a local farming district, provided local 
farmers with the opportunity to extend their involvement beyond the 
farm-gate and to engage in the export trade. Local freezing works 
were, then, a necessary prerequisite for truly competitive bidding for 
stock to be undertaken by a range of prospective buyers (Perriam, 
1989; Strang, 1960, Taranaki Producers', 1952). On the other hand, 
without access to a local freezing works, farmers were debarred from 
any involvement in the export trade and greatly disadvantaged in the 
sale of their stock. 
The extent to which a processing firm would balance the use of its 
freezing works, to kill on own account or under contract for farmers, 
largely reflected its ability to procure stock and to then move the 
product into Britain. In the years before the First World War only the 
international agribusiness firms, Nelson Brothers (Critchell and 
Raymond, 1912) and Thomas Borthwick and Sons (Harrison, 1963), 
directly connected the activities between the farm-gate (immediately 
off-farm) and the final consumers in Britain. Nelson Brothers (Nelsons) 
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and Borthwicks were, from the outset of their association with the 
industry in New Zealand, almost entirely own account businesses, in 
which the linkage of procurement processing and export was secured 
internal to the firm. That is, Nelsons and Borthwicks purchased stock 
from farmers and intermediary firms, had them processed at their own 
freezing works (at Tomoana, Waipukurau, Woodville, Taruheu, Hornby; 
and Waitara and Paki-Paki respectively) and then retained ownership 
of frozen meat to supply their depots and chains of butchers' shops in 
Britain. These international agribusiness firms pursued backward 
integration into New Zealand mainly to secure supply. Indeed, their 
involvement in the export meat industry constituted only one strand of 
their business interests that spanned the globe (Critchell and 
Raymond, 1912; Harrison, 1963) (see appendix 1). 
Firms owned by farmers and other interests in New Zealand also 
supplied markets in Britain. For example, the Southland Frozen Meat 
Company (Lind, 1981) and the Canterbury Frozen Meat Company 
(Macdonald, 1957) also operated their freezing works mainly on own 
account and thereafter retained ownership and exported the frozen 
product. However, these local firms (owned in New Zealand) were 
hampered in the building of their companies, in the form of forward 
integration, by their relatively late arrival in Britain and by the 
insurmountable difficulties they faced in matching the British firms' 'first 
movers' control (Chandler, 1978) over the depots and shops. In 
contrast to the international agribusiness firms, whenever the local firms 
undertook the movement of frozen meat into Britain they did so mainly 
through the auspices of deals that remained external to the firm and 
were centred on the use of consignment. Consignment allowed the 
largest of the New Zealand owned firms to brand and to export frozen 
meat (Lind, 1981; Macdonald, 1957), however, and what is more 
important consignment also allowed farmers to independently access 
the markets in Britain. 
Consignment: Securing access to Smithfield and to forward selling. 
" ... in Australia and New Zealand the grower (the farmer), 
whether he consigns or sells on the spot, takes a keen and 
personal interest in all the stages through which the meat 
passes." (Critchell and Raymond, 1912: 400). 
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The practice of consignment allowed farmers to defend and to 
extend their interests beyond the farm-gate. Indeed, the consignment 
of lots of frozen meat by farmers in New Zealand, and to a lesser 
extent in Australia, constituted what became the most important set of 
deals for the household form of production. The practice of 
consignment and, to a lesser extent, access to various loan and credit 
co-operatives (Condliffe and Belshaw, 1925; Guerin, Hawke and 
Sheppard, 1989; Johnson, 1989), was to become central to the 
fortunes of farmers (Critchell and Raymond, 1912). Consignment 
allowed family farmers, firstly, to enter into the export trade using their 
very small (and very batched) levels of production and, secondly, to 
sell stock while skirting any over reliance on the international 
agribusiness firms or on the workings of auctions. 
As a means of doing business by farmers, consignment predated the 
development of the export meat industry. The use of forms of 
consignment to link production with its eventual consumption was a 
feature of international trade in food and fibres (Fitzsimmons, 1986) 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Friedland, Busch, 
Buttel, and Rudy, 1991 b; Friedmann, 1987, 1988; Friedmann and 
McMichael, 1989; McMichael and Myhre, 1991; Sorj and Wilkinson, 
1985). It was used in New Zealand and Australia for the export of wool 
to Britain (Denoon, 1983; McMichael, 1984). In many respects, the 
practice of consignment operated as the mirror-image of 'putting out' 
(Jones, 1982; Szostak, 1989; Williamson, 1980), in that it allowed a 
decentralised and disaggregated form of household production to 
access markets 'downstream' (Cornish, 1995; Le Heron, 1988b). 
35 
Consignment involved the farmer, or some other 'shipper' (owner of 
the export product), retaining ownership of the export product while 
entering into contract with an intermediary firm, or agent, to facilitate 
the movement of the goods into the markets in Britain (Critchell and 
Raymond, 1912). Farmers were the industry's main shippers in the 
decades leading up to the First World War, although they were joined 
in this type of export of frozen meat by many of the local agribusiness 
firms and by some of the stock and station firms.3 A significant share of 
these consignments of frozen meat were destined to be sold at 
auction, at Smithfield (Metcalf, 1991) and at other sites in Britain. 
Nevertheless, from the point of view of all the types of shippers, these 
arrangements were necessarily somewhat speculative and remained 
risky ventures. For example, a good many of the pioneering cargoes 
resulted in losses to their owners (Loach, 1969). These and other, later, 
losses on the export of lots of frozen meat were partly the result of 
misfortune and mistiming in their arrival at auction and of malfeasance 
by agents and auctioneers in Britain (Critchell and Raymond, 1912; 
Department of Statistics, 1972; Harrison, 1963). 
Frozen cargoes of meat were usually sold immediately after they were 
unloaded on the docks at London or Liverpool and transported to the 
sites of auction. This practice was necessary by a paucity in cold 
storage that dogged the importation of frozen meat well into the 
twentieth century (Critchell and Raymond, 1912). Once a cargo of 
3 The stock and station firms were the descendants of the 'mortgage and 
agency firms' (Parry, 1964) that had played an enormously important role in 
shaping farming and the export trades in colonial times (Denoon, 1983; 
McMichael, 1984). Many of the pioneering finance and mercantile firms did 
not sUNive the changes unleashed by refrigerated exports and by the rise of 
the household form of production (Stinchcombe, 1961). Those that sUNived, 
did so by responding to the new types of demand for loans, credit (Bailey, 
1966; Condliffe and Belshaw, 1925; Guerin, Hawke and Sheppard, 1989; 
Johnson, 1989; Parry, 1964; Stone, 1967; Stevens, 1970) and farm 
merchandise (Evans, 1984) made by the new forms of sheep farmers and the 
dairy farmers. 
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frozen meat was unloaded from a refrigerated vessel it had a shelf-life 
of only several days. Meat not sold one day might be returned to 
auction on the next, however, once frozen meat had thawed out, it 
would soon after begin to perish. The rapid perishability of meat 
meant that its sale by auction usually tended to favour the prospective 
buyers rather than the farmers. Without access to cold storage the 
agents acting for farmers were more-or-Iess forced to choose from the 
prices offered for meat on the day it was unloaded. In this regard, the 
construction of cold stores in London, Liverpool and other major ports 
(by firms and by borough councils) allowed farmers, or more properly 
their agents, to hold back frozen meat at times of glut and to thereby 
improve prices received at auction. On the other hand, farmers were 
also often the victims of illegal and unfair practices on the part of their 
agents and of the auctioneers in Britain (Critchell and Raymond, 1912; 
Harrison, 1963). 
Attempts by farmers (and other shippers) to control these problems led 
to refinement in the methods of grading frozen meat. The grading of 
frozen carcases for both quality and weight was initiated by Weddel 
and Company in about 1890 (Critchell and Raymond, 1912; Hereford, 
1932). This type of grading of the export product improved the 
exactness of the contracts used in setting up consignment, in that, it 
allowed a clearer specification of the product desired by any 
prospective buyers (Dupre, 1990). It also provided a greater certainty 
in the supply of the product and, thereafter, prospective buyers of 
meat were able to contract directly with the owners of frozen meat 
and -more often- with their agents. Grading, then, facilitated a 
reduced reliance by farmers on good fortune and on the deliberate 
oscillations .in prices at Smithfield. 
These refinements promoted by farmers to retain control culminated in 
the standardization of the contracts used in the consignment of frozen 
meat and in the consolidation of firms that specialised as agents. The 
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grading of frozen meats by processing firms and, what is more 
important, by the firms that specialised as agents, allowed the largest 
of the prospective buyers of meat to bypass the auctions (held at 
Smithfield and elsewhere) and to secure their supplies with the use of 
contracts delimiting their requirements. In this regard, consignment 
became matched with a form of 'forward selling' (Critchell and 
Raymond, 1912). Retailers and wholesalers in Britain could therefore 
enter into forward contracts to buy frozen meat directly from the 
agents. 
"With the introduction of the grading process, about 1890, 
purchasing frozen meat forward became possible. Large 
retailers in London and the Provinces who have regular 
outlets for meat of a certain quality and weight at once 
saw that they could partly cover their requirements for 
many months in advance by means of contracting to 
buy ... " (Critchell and Raymond, 1912: 102). 
The use of contracts for forward selling gradually, but never 
completely, displaced the earlier and more speculative forms of 
consignment. It was however the most important mechanism by 
which farmers entered into the export of frozen meat. The grading of 
product and the development of forward selling also allowed some of 
their agents to act simultaneously as the representatives of buyers in 
Britain and of sellers in New Zealand. These agencies went on to 
control the bulk of the exports from New Zealand before the First World 
War (Critchell and Raymond, 1912). 
Both forms of consignment combined the payment of cash advances 
and of charges and commissions. Farmers (and other shippers) 
received an advance for their meat from their agent. This advance 
represented a share (normally 75%) of the prices being fetched for 
frozen meat at auction (usually at Smithfield) at the time when the 
refrigerated cargo left New Zealand. While the advance did not 
secure a transfer in ownership of product, from the farmer to the 
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agent it secured the right of the agent to earn commission in the 
eventual sale of the export product. The agent's commission was 
usually 1 % of the final sale. The farmer paid for all costs incurred by the 
agent. The balance of monies (if any) realised from the sale of meat 
minus the charges and commissions, were then remitted by the agent 
to the farmer. If these transactions resulted in a loss then the agent 
would bill the farmer (Critchell and Raymond 1912; Desmond 1951). 
In their review of the international trade in meat, made before the First 
World War, Critchell and Raymond (1912) are damning of the use of 
consignment by farmers in New Zealand and Australia. They draw a 
very unfavourable comparison between the industries in Australasia 
and the supposed efficiencies provided by the greater internalisation 
of markets by agribusiness firms in the Argentine. 
"Meat shipped from Argentina is the property of the 
freezing works, which, in all but a few instances, have their 
own offices in London, and depots, and a complete 
method for the sale of meat at various ports and 
important marketing centres throughout England ... In the 
case of all the South American meat shipped to Great 
Britain, the officials in England or the regular agents of 
those companies which have not English offices, take 
charge of and realise the goods in their own shops, on the 
market or ex store. There is much less forward selling in the 
South American than the Australasian trade... One 
important difference has marked the Argentine selling 
method as compared with the Australasian. In the former 
trade the meat is, as a rule, turned over quickly; the 
holders have averaged the market values and sold 
steadily right along, and have used the cold stores merely 
as receiving depots for their meat. Continuous supplies 
have enabled the Argentine companies (sic) to develop 
distribution pretty well on retail lines, and owing to regular 
and continuous imports into Great Britain the Argentine 
houses have been able to avoid, to a great extent, the 
embarrassing accumulations and scarcities which have so 
frequently caused disaster to those engaged in the 
necessarily more speculative Australasian trade, in which, 
unfortunately, there has always been a lack of continuity 
in supplies." (Critchell and Raymond 1912: 100-101). 
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Critchell and Raymond (1912) regard the use of consignment as a 
vestige of the pioneering, and necessarily more speculative, days of a 
trade dominated by farmers. In a similar vein, they bemoan the 
centrality of farmers in the unfolding of the networks in the industry. 
Throughout their account of the international trade they portray the 
ability of farmers to extend their interests well off-farm as a check to 
the 'development' of larger firms in the export meat industry in New 
Zealand. In doing so, they provide us with an early version of an 
evolutionary agro-industrialisation argument. In the making of this 
argument farmers are necessarily subordinated. 
Nevertheless, Critchell and Raymond miss a vital point. Events that 
might be assessed as enhancing the efficiency of the industry also 
often entail a furthering of differentials in power and may well 
prefigure the domination of one set of players by another. Family 
farmers fostered the practice of consignment not out of a sense of a 
nostalgia, but to preserve their autonomy and prosperity. Similarly, the 
drive by agribusiness firms to establish backward integration across the 
networks in the export meat industry arguably owed as much to the 
securing of supply through the subordination of farmers as it did to any 
reduction of transaction costs (Chandler, 1978, 1990). 
An array of freezing works and auctions. 
Nearly all the freezing works to function in New Zealand were originally 
financed and constructed by firms owned by local farmers (see 
appendix 1). Indeed, the wholesale conversion of pastures and the 
breaking in of native tussock and scrub lands to produce sheep for the 
export trade was inevitably associated with the start-up in operation of 
a farmers' firm in the farming district.4 Furthermore, not only were 
4 Much of the pattern of road and railroad construction in New Zealand 
during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century can be 
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farmers' firms important to the beginnings of the industry, but they 
continued to be established in farming districts all ready seNed by 
freezing works (Hunt 1975; Lind. 1985). Critchell and Raymond refer to 
these developments as an 'Australasian System' that: 
"with its numerous works scattered all over the place, 
compares unfavourably with the centralization which 
marks the Argentine freezing industry, as in the former 
there must be great waste in the various processes, both 
in erection and management of works, and in shipment 
etc. Looking at the total ability of the Australasian freezing 
works and those in Argentina, in relation to the total 
shipments for a given period from the two sources, we see 
how, relatively, much more economical is the Argentine 
than the Australasian plan... there was no possibility of the 
New Zealand freezing works and their collateral processes 
developing as did the Argentine, because the business 
was taken up in various districts of the colony, and 
farmers, not commercial men, were at the head of 
affairs." (Critchell and Raymond, 1912: 399-401). 
In this 'Australasian System' farmers' firms became an important 
mechanism, coveted by farmers, and put to use to intensify the 
competition for stock within a farming district raise prices at the farm 
gate, as well as to access the markets in Britain. 
Farmers' firms were to contribute to a recurring feature of the networks 
in the industry, noted as early as 1912 by Critchell and Raymond. In 
New Zealand there was inevitably more processing capacity available 
than there was stock to be processed. This excess of processing ability 
was found in nearly all farming districts and, when coupled with a 
surfeit of prospective buyers, generated premiums for stock. In other 
words, the agribusiness firms as well as the intermediary firms all 
struggled to fill their books. In more recent times, the owners of 
processing facilities were to become the foremost to bemoan the 
accounted for by the desire to facilitate the further development of 'fat 
lamb' farming (Department of Statistics, 1963). 
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difficulties and 'undue' costs they faced in finding adequate amounts 
of throughput. 
"There is no single factor more important to the processor 
than throughput. Because of this, the farmer has 
traditionally been 'courted' by processing companies to 
supply stock. This has been done by offering premiums 
and other incentives. As a result, the net has been cast 
far and wide to bring livestock in from outside the locality 
of the processing plant at the beginning and end of 
season for companies to maintain throughput." (New 
Zealand Freezing Companies Association, 1980: 28). 
The impact of this excess or, put another way, a very decentralised 
processing sector on the fortunes of family farmers is illustrated, in part, 
by comparison with the situation in Argentina during the first half of the 
twentieth century (Curtis, 1992). Smith (1969) shows that, chiefly 
through their exclusive ownership of processing facilities in Argentina, 
the international agribusiness firms were able to centralise all the 
activities of processing and of stock auctions in Buenos Aires: 
"Unlike New Zealand, stock owners in Argentina never 
combined to establish their own freezing works. The early 
presences of large foreign owned plants and the scale of 
capital required prevented this development. Indeed 
freezing (processing) companies resorted to on-ranch 
buying to ensure continuity of supplies of chilling beef, 
engaged in buying 'pools' and in the case of (US based) 
Swifts ultimately became a significant land owner in order 
to ensure works were supplied (Roche, 1992: 4-5)." 
This centralization of ownership and of operation was very detrimental 
to the multitude of small and medium sized farmers (ranchers) in 
Argentina who supplied the international agribusiness firms. Many 
ranchers were driven into very disadvantageous contracts, that bound 
all their output to the supply of individual agribusiness firms. Other 
ranchers sought better deals by selling their cattle at auction. 
However, these ranchers were required to drive their cattle to the 
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auction sites in Buenos Aires, where they invariably faced collusion on 
the part of the international agribusiness firms acting in this instance as 
prospective buyers. Portz (1991) suggests that a similar pattern of 
collusion existed between the integrated meatpacking firms of 
Chicago and Cincinnatti. In this Argentine case, then, the ownership 
of processing by the international agribusiness firms, firstly, enabled 
these firms to debar farmers (and other independent firms) from 
accessing the profitable markets beyond the farm-gate and, 
secondly, to reduce farmers to the status of subordinated sub-
contractors (Lorenz, 1991; Sanderson, 1986). 
By contrast, the farmer controlled meat industry in New Zealand 
featured an excess of processing plants and a multitude of auction 
sites. Auctions of stock played an important part in shaping the 
interlock of farming with freezing works in New Zealand and with 
exporters. Auctions are a very common mechanism by which prices 
are determined and a product is moved along its commodity chain 
(Friedland and Barton, 1976; Friedland, Barton and Thomas, 1979, 
1981). They are sites where prospective sellers confront prospective 
buyers and where, usually, the product is scrutinised and bids are 
tended in competition for a desired lot of goods. Auctions may take a 
multitude of forms that are revealed only in part by the insights of 
microeconomic theory (Smith, 1991). While auctions can seemingly 
epitomise the tenacity of external deals, of relatively atomised 
exchanges, it is necessary to also recognise their embeddedness in 
local context. Stock auctions in New Zealand were held, weekly or 
twice weekly, in the outskirts of all the cities and in most of the towns 
around New Zealand. The auctions took place at stockyards owned 
by stock and station firms, by borough councils, by farmers' 
associations, and by various combinations of these actors. 
These auctions of stock allowed a range of actors to readily acquire 
and to relinquish ownership of sheep and cattle. Indeed, the 
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overriding contribution of the widely dispersed and decentralised 
auctions was to foster a real heterogeneity among the prospective 
buyers. Unlike the situation in Argentina, family farmers in New 
Zealand faced a range of prospective buyers at the auctions, and a 
variety of firms, large and small, integrated and consigning, were 
forced to compete for stock. Put another way, the small-scale of firms 
and the sUNival of many of its players in the networks in the industry in 
New Zealand was secured, in part, by the workings of the deals made 
at local auction. As a result, the international agribusiness firms, the 
well documented proponents of backward integration and 
protagonists of various cartels, were precluded from achieving any 
genuine closure over the movement of stock into processing or of the 
movement of frozen meat into Britain. 
The auctions provided the most important sites for the transfer of all 
categories of stock. Apart from their part in linking farms and freezing 
works, the auctions also provided an important mechanism for the 
restocking of farms, the transfer of breeding stock and finishing stock 
(beasts that need to be fattened for some weeks or months before 
their slaughter) around the farming districts. The sales of these store 
stock were held mainly in the early spring and the autumn months and 
thereby provided another form of linkage, more significant than any 
variants of sharefarming, between the distinct patterns of animal 
husbandry and farming found in high country, hill country and lowland 
farms (Economic SeNice, 1956-1995; McLauchlan, 1981). 
The selling and buying of stock at the many auctions in New Zealand 
required a prospective buyer to first inspect the beasts on offer and to 
then bid for those he or she wanted in competition with other 
prospective buyers. This type of deal was commonly referred to as 
being made 'on the hoof' or 'per head' (Hartley, 1989; New Zealand 
Freezing Companies Association, 1980). Deals made on the hoof / per 
head were also transacted on-farm. In this case, the representatives 
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(called drafters) of agribusiness firms or of the intermediary firms 
routinely visited all the farms in a district, where they made offers to 
each farmer for stock. 
Businesses that bought stock, either for slaughter or for resale, always 
did so within relatively defined catchments for procuring the animals. 
The catchments of the firms which bought stock were formed by the 
perishable character of livestock and by the reliance of processors on 
rail and road transportation of all stock from the farms where they 
were bred or pastured to the processing plants and slaughter 
(Department of Statistics, 1963). Every single processing plant and firm 
in the country therefore procured stock within a relatively fixed territory 
and relied on the competitive markets for stock within its local 
catchment to secure throughput. This patterning of catchments for 
buying stock also reflected the constraints on firms to deploy drafters 
around the many hundreds of farms and numerous auctions located 
within its relevant farming district (interview, Manager #3). 
Although the transactions made at auction and with drafters 
accounted for the bulk of sales farmers entered into, they also sold 
stock by deals made 'on the hook' (Hartley, 1989; New Zealand 
Freezing Companies Association, 1980). Farmers made these deals 
directly with the agribusiness firms. Typically, the owners of freezing 
works advertised a price per pound for the categories of meat they 
wished to buy. For this type of sale, a price was calculated for each 
beast at the slaughterhouse where it was slaughtered and dressed. 
The price, normally, reflected the weight of each dressed carcass, 
and was calculated as it passed 'over the scales' (Hartley, 1989), all 
the other collateral commodities (the by-products) released by the 
slaughter of stock thereby accrued to the processor without charge.5 
5 "Only half the weight of a beast and 80 per cent of its value is dressed and 
sold as meat - the rest goes to provide slipe wool, pelts and hides, intestines 
for sausage casings, tallow for soap and candles, fertiliser and other by-
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Deals made 'on the hook' were similar to the more centralised 
arrangements found in the Argentine by which ranchers there were 
forced to find prospective buyers. However, in New Zealand the more 
usual practice was for all prospective buyers to scour the farming 
districts in the pursuit of stock. The difficulties and costs faced by 
prospective buyers in making deals with prospective sellers (especially 
with farmers) is, arguably, the clearest gauge of the ability of farmers 
to ensure an effective excess in the demand for stock over its supply. 
In other words, the prospective buyers of stock were continually forced 
to clamour for stock, and they did so to the very great advantage of 
family farmers. 
The review by Critchell and Raymond of farmers' practices in 
Australasia became the first of many that criticised the prevailing forms 
of arrangements that facilitated these types of relationships between 
players in the export meat industry. Later accounts (Crocombe, 1991; 
Crocombe, Enright and Porter, 1991; Evans, 1985; Garway Investments 
Limited, 1988; Hussey, 1992; McKinsey, 1988; McLean, 1978; Turkington, 
1979; Woods, 1988; Yerex, 1989, 1992) differ in many regards, but they 
all share a concern with the inefficiencies, or the supposed irrationality, 
of the control exercised by farmers in the export meat industry and, in 
particular, with the strictures they placed upon the processing sector. 
Each of these accounts offer their own remedy for the perceived ills of 
the industry, and the bulk focus on a reworking of the processing 
sector and on the elimination of what the authors regard as an over-
capacity of meat processing facilities. However, the apparent over-
capacity in the sites of industrial slaughter and in the multitudinous sites 
of stock auctions was ultimately purposeful. Over-capacity and the 
deals made at auction combined to secure farmers by extending its 
products. From this end of the business the Hellaby's sought their profits" 
(Scott, 1973: 20). 
46 
disaggregated forms of business well beyond the farm-gate (Curtis, 
1992; Salais and Storper, 1992). 
Co-operative firms: An ambiguous commitment by farmers. 
The construction of more freezing works than were required at least by 
the dictates of abstracted efficiency, represented a solution on the 
part of farmers to the problems of earning good returns on their output 
(stock) and of independently accessing the markets in Britain. This 
intervention by farmers into processing was made largely as a co-
operative effort (Stephen, 1984). The majority of what can be called 
the farmers' firms were established and run as co-operatives (Harrison, 
1963; Knightley, 1980, 1981; Lind 1981 r 1985; Loach, 1969; Macdonald, 
1957; Perriam, 1989; Scott 1973; Stephens, 1936b, Strang, 1960; 
Taranaki Producers, 1952).6 This co-operative initiative combined with 
the forms of consignment and of auction which configured the 
movement of product through the freezing works and along the food 
chain. Together these enterprises and deals stood against the rise of 
the integrated manufacturers and wholesalers, the international 
agribusiness firms. 
Through their membership (shareholding) in these co-operative firms, 
family farmers were readily able to engage in and to be responsible 
for the activities of industrial slaughter, and to intervene in a sphere of 
activity that become pivotal to the success of agribusiness firms in 
Argentina and the USA. These co-operative firms were created and 
run by informal and consensual agreements involving local farmers, 
rather than by recourse to a form of business secured by the law. In 
6 "A co-operative is an organisation of people, usually of limited means, 
who have voluntarily joined together to achieve a common economic end, 
through the formation of a democratically controlled business organisation 
making equitable contributions to the capital required and accepting a fair 
share of the risks and benefits of the undertaking." (quoted in Cameron, 
1990: 2). 
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1907 the Co-operative Dairy Companies Act established a register of 
co-operative businesses that was separate to the register listing all the 
proprietary firms established under the Companies Act (1903) and the 
subsequent Companies Act (1908). However, regardless of the 
precedent made in the dairy industry, the registration of other co-
operative firms was extended in a decidedly piecemeal fashion to the 
other sectors of agriculture. Desmond (1951) shows that the farmers' 
firms given legal status in the decades after the Co-operative Dairy 
Companies Act (1907) were enterprises involved in the supply of local 
markets. Thus, the Co-operative Pig-marketing Companies Act (1933) 
was the first such extension. The subsequent wording of this Act was 
nearly identical to the earlier Co-operative Dairy Companies Act. 
Other amendments to the legislation allowed the establishment of 
other farmers' co-operatives. Hence the Co-operative Companies 
Act (1956) established egg-marketing, fertilizer manufacturing, fish 
marketing, milk marketing, pig marketing co-operatives, and 'such 
other classes of companies as are from time to time declared by the 
Governor-general by Order-in-Council to be co-operative companies 
for the purposes of this Act.' 
The absence of any alternative to the forms of business established by 
the Companies Act (1908), at least pertaining to the meat processing 
sector of the export meat industry, meant that until the passing of the 
Co-operative Freezing Companies Act (1960) all farmers' firms were 
registered as proprietary firms,? and the co-operative character of 
these farmers' processing companies was preserved only by mutual 
agreement between their members. This could be gauged by the 
relative importance of 'wet' (farmer) shareholding over 'dry' (any 
other) shareholding (Strang, 1960). The farmers' co-operative firms 
7 The Auckland Farmers' Freezing Company operated for 57 years, and the 
Alliance Freezing Company for 16 years, before being formally constituted 
as a co-operative under special provisions in the Co-operative Freezing 
Companies Act (1960). 
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were established and operated around a set of political deals that 
typically included the majority of farmers within a local farming district. 
These localised deals provided farmers with access to and, to a lesser 
extent control of the services offered by the farmers' processing 
company. The deals enshrined the farmers' processing company as a 
form of business that mediated the collectivity of farmers as users of, 
and as shareholders in, the processing enterprise. 
The fusion of the roles of user and shareholder constitute the core of 
any co-operative effort (Stephen, 1984). Retaining the link of use and 
of shareholding by local farmers were crucial, wherever it was 
sundered then the firm lost its co-operative character and (if it 
survived) became a truly proprietary venture. For example, the New 
Zealand Refrigerating Company, the Southland Frozen Meat 
Company and the Waitaki Farmers' Freezing Company (Lind, 1981; 
Loach, 1969; Perriam, 1989; Strang, 1960),8 were three among many 
farmers' firms that experienced this slide in shareholding (see chapter 
7). 
The amalgamation of use and shareholding was achieved through a 
number of constraints and enablements in the issue and trading of 
shares, voting rights, and in the running of the firm.9 These rules ensured 
that the farmers who kept the firm supplied with stock had official 
control over its management. The user-shareholders were actively 
involved (by supplying it with stock) in the use of the factory and were 
issued with shares in its operation. Although there were often other 
users (who might not own shares) and even other shareholders (who 
might not supply stock), the user-shareholders typically accounted for 
8 'Control held by small investors in NZ Refrig.', Christchurch Star, 4/2/75. 
9 For example, the allocation of shares to members was made under the 
auspices of the firm's Board of Directors. Shareholding was issued to farmers 
in proportion to the amount of stock they supplied. Thus, the supply of 100 
sheep might result in the issue of 1 share, the supply of 200 sheep in the issue 
of 2 shares, the supply of 300 sheep in the issue of 3 shares, and so on. 
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no less than 80% of the issued shareholding in any farmers' firm. In 
most cases the articles of association of the firm required its Board of 
Directors to retain or to issue no more than one fifth of shares to any 
'dry' shareholders. While the farmers' processing companies 
frequently processed stock that was owned by outside interests, the 
user-shareholders always received priority in the scheduling of this 
industrial slaughter. This preferential treatment of user-shareholders 
was of most importance in the summer months when considerable 
savings accrue in the management of pasture lands by the timely 
sales of excess stock (Sheppard, 1982). 
In making any calculations about costings and charges ali co-
operative firms deployed a service orientation, in that they aimed to 
break-even each year in the balancing of incomes and of costs, 
rather than to accrue profits and dividends for their shareholders. By 
breaking even in their operations the co-operative firms achieved the 
goal of providing its services 'at cost' to farmers (interview, Director 
#1).10 Any surpluses of income over costs were returned (rebated) to 
user-shareholders at the end of each financial year (Desmond, 1951). 
These surpluses were rebated to farmers in strict proportion to their 
shareholding in the co-operative. This type of surplus (or revenue) was 
privileged, in that neither the firm nor the individual farmers were 
required to pay tax on it.ll 
10 This respondent was the director of a well established co-operative firm. 
He was the longest seNing member on Board of Directors of the firm. His 
involvement in the industry included terms in the Electoral College of the 
Board although he devoted most of his energies in lobbying on behalf of the 
co-operative movement. He was also a very successful farmer and his family 
had farmed in Canterbury for several generations. In many respects, the 
respondent presented himself as part of an old guard, that is, of men who 
had helped create a strong fusion between co-operatives and the Board 
and wished to protect this resource in the interest of future farmers. 
11 Prior to amendments made in 1989 to the relevant legislation, the co-
operative meat dairy, milk marketing, and pig marketing companies and 
their members (user-shareholders) were exempted from paying tax on all 
surpluses and rebates. This exemption reflected the 'mutuality principle'. 
"Under that principle a group of persons could not be regarded as deriving 
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Farmers could only retain their shares if they remained suppliers of the 
firm. Any user-shareholders that failed to supply stock to the firm for 3 
to 5 years were required to surrender all of their shares. The value of 
shares when they were first issued (and paid for by farmers) and 
surrendered (sold back to the firm) was determined solely by firm. This 
arrangement (called trading by par value) precluded any speculation 
on the holding and value of shares. 
The farmers' firms were a form of business that stood as an alternative 
to agribusiness firms. Individual farmers, by becoming user-
shareholders in any farmers' processing company, inevitably 
surrendered much of the responsibility for the day-to-day running of 
the firm and for their investment in it, but they did elect the members 
of the Board of Directors, and did so on the basis of one share one 
vote (with upper limits). However, they did not directly influence the 
decision-making that directly impinged on deals made by the firm. 
For example, the setting of killing charges and the means of disposal 
of any frozen meat bought by the firm were only reviewed (and 
criticised) by farmers at annual general meetings of the firm, and 
thereby well after these decisions were made. By becoming user-
shareholders in farmers' firms then the majority of farmers exchanged 
the risks and rewards of individualism for the ameliorated risks and 
rewards of a form of collectivism (Marx, 1970). 
Furthermore, the operation of farmers' processing companies along 
co-operative lines was inevitably constrained by a number of 
mechanisms that averaged and smoothed-out the revenues of 
individual farmers. Firstly, user-shareholders received a share of a co-
operative firm's annual rebate in direct proportion to their 
profits or gains liable to income tax where those profits or gains were 
attributable to transactions entirely within the circle of membership of the 
group." (Simcock, 1991: 905). 
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shareholding. Shareholding reflected the number of stock sent to 
slaughter with the firm in the current financial year and in 3 to 5 
previous years. Thus, membership in a co-operative required formers, 
at least partially, to overage their earnings across time. Secondly, on 
important feature of all the formers' firms was that they would buy all 
classes and kinds of stock offered to them by their members. Formers' 
firms would typically offer a price for all stock (including old, 
underweight, and fat beasts), even in conditions where they hod 
negligible worth at market. Thirdly, user-shareholders received shores 
and revenues from the firm regardless of whether they sold their stock 
to the firm or merely paid its killing charges. In other words, the 
immediate return to formers' shareholding was the some for the risk 
takers (formers who retained ownership of the product after 
processing) and the risk avoiders (formers who relinquished ownership 
of the product at the form-gate) (Hussey, 1992). 
A co-operative effort is, almost by definition, on endeavour in which 
the returns (if any) to its members tend to be averaged out (Cameron, 
1990). In this regard, the 'logic of operation' (Shanin, 1973) of the co-
operative (co-operativist) firms tended to overage the returns to 
individual formers from their investments mode in the enterprise and, 
what is more important, from the sale of their stock. This willingness on 
the port of family formers to accept averaged returns is yet another 
aspect of the industry that has been subjected to criticism. Some 
writers argue (somewhat disingenuously) that only the operation of on 
industry unfettered by such interventions can achieve a rational 
distribution of resources (Critchell and Raymond, 1912; Hussey, 1992). 
The fairly belated recognition by low-maker of this co-operative effort 
(by the Co-operative Freezing Companies Act, 1960) stands in contrast 
to the developments in the dairy industry, where the co-operative firm 
was given a distinct legal status within little more than a decode after 
the commencement of the export trade in refrigerated butter and 
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cheese. This difference in the timing of the statutory embodiment of 
co-operative firms, illustrates a divergence in the working out of two 
key export industries and, in particular, the proportioning of investment 
between farm and off-farm made by farmers. 12 
The interests of farmers were secured early on in the dairy industry, by 
the legal recognition of the co-operative firm (to the exclusion of all 
others) and by the nationalisation of the industry (Hill, 1974). In this 
regard, the ownership by farmers of co-operative firms and their 
involvement in processing and marketing coincided with the 
delimitation of most forms of competition. A corollary of this agenda 
was that, to engage in dairying, farmers effectively became required 
to own shares in their local co-operative dairy companies. 
Furthermore, their levels of investment in co-operative dairy 
companies and their other structures frequently outweighed what they 
made in farming. Thus, the working out of the forms of business and 
the deals by which farmers might maintain its centrality in the dairy 
industry necessitated the establishment, protection and heavy 
investment in co-operatives (Moran, Blunden and Greenwood, 1993; 
Woods, 1988).13 
Family farmers in the export meat industry certainly do not express a 
desire for collectivity per se, although at times the protagonists of this 
form of production gave the appearance of doing so (Hedley, 1985). 
12 "The dairy industry was largely co-operatively owned with the production 
and manufacturing sectors (farms and factories) under New Zealand 
control... In contrast, most dry stock farmers sold their produce to large 
proprietary firms which then performed processing and marketing functions." 
(Hill, 1974: v). 
13 "The ability of farm families to undercut capitalist organisations derives 
from the unity of household and enterprise and concepts of kinship. 
Although family farmers interact with the capitalist economy they are not 
fully exposed to the same external pressures as capitalist enterprises as on-
farm mechanisms of resistance, both within and between families and 
through the medium of co-operatives allow flexibility in the degree of 
integration." (Moran, Blunden and Greenwood, 1993: 26). 
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Rather farmers in the industry adjudge their investment in co-operative 
firms as a means to an end (inteNiew, Farmer #2). As a result, the 
relationship between the farmers' processing companies and their 
user-shareholders was characterised by its constant flux. 
Family farmers in the export meat industry display a decided 
ambiguity about their firms. On the one hand, there were usually 
good reasons for farmers to support their local co-operative initiatives. 
Not least of which was their relative openness to scrutiny. Local 
farmers (user-shareholders) could thereby ensure that their firm was 
genuinely providing its seNices at cost. On the other hand, there were 
often real benefits for individual farmers to leave the support of the co-
operative to others and -if the price was right on the day- to sell their 
stock to an outside buyer. Hence, as the director of one of the 
farmers' processing company noted when his co-operatively run 
enterprise faced a takeover by proprietary interests: 
"It would be fair to say that they (local farmers) were 
dismayed at the prospect of losing an asset which, 
unfortunately, so many of them had used only as a means 
of obtaining another farthing per pound from an outside 
buyer" (Strang, 1960: 15). 
Each of the farmers' processing companies operated in a very 
hazardous sector, while all the time acting to undo the need for their 
specific existence. Their instability reflected how farmers were secured 
in the networks in the export meat industry. That is, by the structuring of 
deals which mediated the connection of farmers and agribusiness 
firms with the local and the international markets, rather than by the 
early recognition (by law) and augmentation of co-operative firms (by 
the state). Hence, the activities of the processing and export of meat 
were crosscut by a multitude of deals and of players, all of who were 
in competition with all the others; and all of who were thwarted from 
any reworking or rationalisation of the networks in the industry. Thus, 
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farmers were served by the interplay of firms of varied types, wherein 
the supply of markets in Britain was kept open (accessible, above-
board and profitable). 
However, and like all other such interventions or solutions, this form 
farmers' control necessitated some costs on the actors who fostered it 
(Campbelt Hollingsworth, and Lindberg, 1991). The exigencies that 
faced farmers pertained mainly to the fragile character of the 
processing sector and, more immediately, to their shareholding in 
farmers' processing companies. The problems confronting farmers' 
firms, were, in part, shared by all the 'other proprietaries' (Hereford, 
1932; Stephens, 1936b), those enterprises owned by shareholders other 
than local farmers, and ultimately reflected the concentration of the 
bulk of dilemmas that recurringly confronted players in the industry into 
the sphere of processing. As a result the workings of the processing 
sector were to be regularly punctuated by bankruptcies among all the 
types of firms that laboured there, while the farmers' processing 
companies were especially prone to failure. 
Conclusion: The formation of a statutory Board of Control. 
The privileged position of farmers in the early industry was the result of 
an array of local and global deals. These political deals effectively 
enabled one set of players (farmers and agents) and greatly 
constrained another set (agribusiness firms). The deals made around 
consignment and the free access to processing secured a multitude 
of paths by which farmers were able to access the markets in Britain. 
Free access to processing in New Zealand and then on to buyers in 
Britain was decisive in underpinning the autonomy and prosperity of 
farmers. The range of local deals also reinforced the viability of a 
range of intermediate businesses. What is most important the inherent 
disaggregation of farmers was mirrored in the mix of firms that 
undertook processing and export (McLauchlan, 1981). In this regard, 
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the networks in the industry were characterised by an instability whose 
main feature was a making conditional of the operations of the 
international agribusiness firms. In this context unlike in Argentina or 
the USA, the international agribusiness firms functioned only as 'first 
among equals' and they were required to compete alongside local 
agribusiness firms and intermediary firms. The international agribusiness 
firms were able to buy stock and process them in New Zealand and to 
then engage in export, but they were prevented from deriving any 
real economies of scale while so doing (Chandler, 1978). 
The onset of the First World War represented a watershed for the 
export meat industry. Before the war the state played a minimal part 
in securing practices in the networks in the industry and afterwards it 
played a far greater role. In short, the arrangements for the supply of 
Britain made during the First World War and the slump in agricultural 
prices which came in the wake of the armistice and the return to 'free 
trade' (Harrison, 1963) united to disrupt the pre-war arrangement that I 
have detailed. 
The outbreak of First World War and, in particular, the attacks by 
German U-boats on Allied and neutral shipping disrupted the supply of 
markets in Britain and heralded the institution of the Commandeer. 
The Commandeer was set up in 1915 and established buying 
arrangements between the Governments of Britain and New Zealand, 
wherein the British Government purchased all exportable surplus of 
meat (Department of Statistics, 1982). The prices offered to farmers 
under the Commandeer engendered both prosperity and rumblings 
of discontent in New Zealand. The Commandeer spelt the end to all 
forms of consignment and in the absence of this means of accessing 
the markets in Britain this meant that the international agribusiness firms 
enjoyed a far greater and more dominant share of the export 
product. Many farmers and especially those in the outlying districts felt 
that they were being denied access to the markets in Britain by the 
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undue influence and collusion of the international agribusiness firms 
(Harrison, 1963; Knightley, 1981). 
In 1917 a Parliamentary Committee was established to investigate the 
workings of the international agribusiness firms and it reached the 
conclusion that: 
" ... both the British firm Vestey Brothers and the American 
group Armour and Company were operating in New 
Zealand and engaging in unfair practices." (Brooking, 
1981: 236). 
However, as Brooking goes on to note: 
"No action was token while the post-war boom 
continued, but once prices fell in 1921 both formers and 
the Government found a ready scapegoat for their 
troubles-the 'Meat Trusts' (Brooking, 1981: 237). 
The termination of the Commandeer, in June 1920, unleashed an 
intense struggle between the international agribusiness firms mainly as 
a consequence of the expansion by Vesteys and of their 
encroachment on the market shores of the other large agribusiness 
firms (Knightley, 1981; Smith, 1969). This showdown was played out all 
along the commodity chain as Vesteys attempted to undercut the 
cartel around the supply of the markets in Britain which was then 
dominated by Armour and Swifts. Many of the surviving intermediate 
firms and processing companies were absorbed at this time by the 
international agribusiness firms. Long established agencies ceased 
trading, including; Gordon, Woodroffe and Company, Michie and 
White Limited, H. S. Fitter and Sons Limited, and Sheed, Thompson and 
Company, and Kean and Company, alongside the locally-owned 
New Zealand Producers' Co-operative Marketing Association 
(Hereford, 1932; Stephens, 1936b). Furthermore, the prices for frozen 
meat in Britain were crashed deliberately by the international 
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agribusiness firms. While this manoeuvre temporarily benefited the 
consumers in Britain, as a result farmers in New Zealand found that the 
prices they received at stock auctions and from consigning dropped 
precipitously and even more ominously, that their share of the prices 
received at Smithfield also fell. Whereas in 1914 the prices at stock 
auctions constituted about eighty percent of the prices at Smithfield, 
by 1922 this ratio had fallen to only forty-six percent (Hayward 1972).14 
From the perspective of family farmers, the predicament they faced in 
the industry seemed certain to worsen as international agribusiness 
firms rapidly approached a threshold of dominance in New Zealand 
and in the international trade whereby they could impose conditions 
of monopsony. 
"It appears that the New Zealand meat-processing 
industry may have the characteristics of a natural 
monopsony, that is, an industry in which the least cost 
production requires that there be only one firm. /I 
(McWilliams, 1994, for the Boston Consulting Group, cited 
in Stewart). 15 
For farmers the new centrality of the international agribusiness firms, 
foreshadowed the elimination of consignment many of the auctions, 
and the closure of processing companies. 
Their response to this threat centred on an intense lobbying of 
Parliament by the Farmers' Union (Stephens, 1936a, 1936c Bremner 
and Brooking, 1993; Brooking, 1980, 1981; Stephens, 1936a, 1936c ). In 
early 1922 a Producers' Conference was held in Wellington and 
proposed the creation of a 'Board of Control' (Hayward 1972) that 
would oversee and protect the interests of family farmers. Several 
versions of such a Board of Control were mooted before a Bill 
14 "The net return for a sixty Ibw. wether sold in London for 41 / 2d. per Ibw. 
was 15 / -, but by 1922 it had fallen to 6 / 3d. /I (Hayward 1972: 13). 
15 Stewart K., 'Freemarket follies', NZ Listener, 25/6/94. 
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proposing the formation of a Producers' Board was introduced. The 
relevant legislation was introduced into Parliament on 2nd February 
1922, and within the week a new statutory body was created that 
would go on to play the pivotal role in the fortunes of the industry, the 
New Zealand Meat Producers' Board of Control (Bartley, 1987; 
Hayward, 1972; Hereford, 1932; Stephens, 1936a). In sum, this agitation 
by farmers in defence of an array of deals that enabled them 
produced what was to become the most effective mobilisation of 
state support for any single interest or sectoral group in New Zealand 
(Cloke, 1989; Hayward, 1972; Moran, Blunden and Greenwood, 1993; 
Perry, 1992). 
Chapter 4 
The New Zealand Meat Producers' Board of Control: The 
farmers' agent. 
Introduction. 
"Whereas the economic welfare of New Zealand has 
lately been adversely affected by reason of a reduction 
in the net returns receivable by persons engaged in the 
business of the production of meat for export, such 
reduction being due in part to falling prices and in part to 
the charges payable in respect of freight and other 
seNices: And whereas conferences have lately been held 
of representatives of the Government and of persons 
whose business is the production of meat for export, and it 
is has been resolved that the public economic welfare will 
be promoted by the establishment of a Board of Control, 
with power to act as the agent of the producers in 
respect of the preparation, storage, and shipment of 
meat and in respect to the disposal of such meat beyond 
New Zealand: And whereas it is desired to give effect to 
the resolutions aforesaid, and to provide by law 
accordingly: And whereas it is further deemed necessary 
and desirable that the expenditure of the Producers' 
Board of Control should be subject to audit as if it were 
public expenditure, and that expenditure of the 
Producers' Board should be guaranteed by the 
Government of New Zealand" (Meat Export Control Act of 
1923). 
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The Meat Producers' Board was brought into existence and its 
expenditure guaranteed by an Act of Parliament in 1923. The Board 
was designed to defend the interests of farmers in the face of an 
imminent threat posed by integrated firms. These international firms 
were forms of agribusiness (Leopold 1985) that seemed on the brink of 
subordinating the farmers and the political deals through which they 
had enjoyed conditions of autonomy and prosperity in New Zealand. 
This subordination would have been secured through the reshaping of 
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stock procurement in farming districts along the lines of monopsony 
(Smith, 1969) and the prevention of farmers from independently 
accessing the overseas markets. 1 
I have argued that the successful reproduction of family farmers in 
New Zealand related to their favourable linkage to the local and 
global markets in the activities of processing and export (see chapter 
3). In this chapter I will demonstrate that the contribution of the Board 
to the farmers was to maintain and secure these linkages and in doing 
so to retain farmers' control of the export industry (Hollingsworth, 1991). 
The Board therefore was to become a new collective actor within the 
industry, an actor which deployed bureaucratic controls to advance 
political deals in the interests of farmers against a process of 
rationalisation which would have favoured agribusiness interests 
(Smith, 1990). On the one hand, the Board was to enforce divisions in 
local space through the legitimation of catchments within which 
processing firms procured stock. On the other hand, the Board was to 
extend control over much of the accessing by farmers of overseas 
markets. Consequently, family farmers could rest secure in the 
knowledge that no agribusiness firms could dominate the local or 
global markets for stock and meat. They could also be certain that 
the prices they received for stock and meat would remain remarkably 
constant across all the farming districts in New Zealand. 
1 "Capital represented by Vesteys, Thomas Borthwick and Sons, the US Meat 
Trust Companies, particularly Swift and Armour, all actively sought to 
coordinate the frozen meat commodity production chain from stock rearing 
to consumption and more -in the eyes of some critics, to achieve a 
dominant position in the US and British food markets... Fairly early on 
however, the activities of British and US meat companies in New Zealand 
and Australia in particular, produced a series of efforts at regulation. state 
policy geared to controlling the activities of freezing companies or 
excluding same, and co-ordinating sectoral sales and marketing was 
integral to the rise of settler nation states" (Roche, 1992: 8 - 9). 
61 
The brief of the Board was from its outset 'to obtain the highest possible 
net prices for the producer' (Hayward, 1972: 197). This farmers' 
agenda was achieved through a number of strategic interventions 
and modifications of the existing political deals in the industry. The 
Board assumed authority over the transaction of several important 
exchanges involving farmers. The Board was to: (1) unify and monitor 
the inspection, grading and branding of meat; (2) negotiate the 
freight rates for shipping and determine the timetabling of refrigerated 
cargoes; (3) license all freezing works and enforce the policy of the 
'open door' and; (4) monitor and approve the schedule for stock 
procurement. Such actions point to an important example of the 
politics of bureaucratic control. 
The composition and funding of the Board. 
The Meat Producers' Board was established by the Export Control Act, 
an Act of Parliament made in the context of a dramatic slump in 
agricultural prices and in response to a mobilisation by farmers. The 
slump in agricultural prices following the end of the Commandeer 
(1915-1920) was attributed by farmers to the collusion of middlemen 
(Stinchombe, 1961) and especially to the international agribusiness 
firms. The Board was from the outset the farmers' statutory body. It 
was controlled by them and it was neither intended nor has it ever 
operated as a representative or advocate of all the interests involved 
in the networks in the export meat industry. The significance of a 
Producers' Board as opposed to a sectoral or industry grouping 
cannot be overstated. An 'industry' board would have acted as the 
arbiter of sectoral interests, whereas the Producers' Board was to act 
as the champion of farmers. In this regard, the statutory body that 
regulated the industry was very different to the bodies created (at 
about the same time) for the export meat industries in Argentina 
(Smith, 1969), Australia (Denoon, 1983; Roche, 1992), Canada (Dupre, 
1990) and for the local meat industries of the USA (Portz, 1991), Britain 
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(Smith, 1990; Steen, 1981; Wilson, 1977), and France (Cleary, 1989; 
Coulomb and Delorme, 1989). 
The Meat Producers' Board was given wide ranging powers over all 
facets of the industry. The actions of the Board extended beyond the 
exchanges and activities in which farmers had a direct investment. In 
1939 the autonomy of the Board from Parliament was formalised by 
the Meat Act (1939), legislation which required the Minister of 
Agriculture to follow all recommendations (that is, the directions) of 
the Meat Producers' Board (Bartley, 1987: 36; Hayward, 1972: 21). This 
arrangement between the Board and the Minister of Agriculture 
reversed the generally understood norms of corporatism (Coulomb 
and Delorme, 1989). This formal subordination of the Minister of 
Agriculture to the statutory body was to last until the early-1970s.2 
Membership of the Board first consisted of eight members all of whOm 
were appointed by the Government for a period of two years. The 
composition of the Board included five 'representatives of the 
producers of meat for export', two 'representatives of the New 
Zealand Government' and one 'representative of persons for the time 
being engaged in business as stock and station agents' (Export Control 
Act, 1922). However, the proposed representative of the stock and 
stationers never sat on the Board. The delegate proposed by the stock 
and stationers was an outspoken critic of the Board and was rejected 
by the Minister of Agriculture. In response the stock and stationers 
refused to propose any further candidates. As a result, the position for 
a representative of the stock and stationers remained unfilled until it 
was abolished in 1956. Thereafter, a representative of the Dairy Board 
2 The decision-making of the Meat Producers' Board was exempted from 
requiring any approval of its actions by the Commerce Commission. The 
Board was able to pursue its poliCies free of the legislative constraints against 
monopoly and restrictions on trade. Furthermore, firms in the export meat 
industry were disbarred from making appeals against the decisions of the 
Board to the Commerce Commission. 
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was appointed to the Meat Producers' Board (Bartley, 1987; Hayward 
1972). 
The composition of the first Board owed much to the hurried passage 
of the relevant legislation. The first personnel were appointed by the 
Government without any formalisation of the mechanisms by which 
the representatives of producers and stock and stationers might be 
elected. However, a system for the election of the representatives of 
farmers was to become codified in the months after the establishment 
of the Board 0/lJeir, 1992). The election system chosen by farmers 
featured a two-tiered system, in which sheep farmers in each electoral 
district elected (by postal vote) one or more representatives to an 
Electoral College. The franchise was inclusive of small-scale 
sheepfarmers. To be eligible to vote farmers were required to own at 
least 100 sheep. In 1970, the eligibility to vote was extended to farmers 
who owned at least 100 beef cattle. New Zealand was initially divided 
into six electoral districts in 1923. The number of electoral districts was 
increased to ten in 1928, to twenty-one in 1947, to twenty-two in 1957 
and by 1964 to twenty-three. Although the boundaries of the electoral 
districts changed dramatically (more-or-Iess mapping the changes to 
the national sheep flock and of farming districts) the general principle 
was to maintain an equivalence of voting rights between districts 
(number of delegates they elected to the Electoral College). Despite 
these changes the size of the Electoral College remained at 25 
delegates (Bartley, 1987; Weir, 1992). 
The members of the farmers' Electoral College decided on the 
appointment of representatives to the Meat Producers' Board. Two of 
the five representative positions on the Board fell vacant each year. 
The Electoral College was required to select representatives to the 
Board from outside their own ranks. That is, members of the Electoral 
College were disbarred from serving on the Board. The Electoral 
College was further constrained to select only from candidates 
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nominated by individual farmers or recognised groups such as the 
Agricultural and Pastoral Associations, Sheepowners' Federation or 
Farmers Union / Federated Farmers (Bartley, 1987; Hayward, 1973; Weir, 
1992). The representatives of producers on the Meat Producers' Board 
were not required to be eligible to vote in the elections for the 
Electoral College and they did not have to be farmers, although 
inevitably they were (Bartley, 1987). 
The Board was guaranteed by the Government but was funded by 
farmers through two related mechanisms. Firstly, the Board obtained 
all of the funds from the 'reseNe account' established by the New 
Zealand Government during the Commandeer (1915-1920). These 
monies represented the difference between what the New Zealand 
Government had received from the British Government during the First 
World War and what it had paid out to farmers. Following the end of 
the similar arrangements made during the Second World War called 
the Bulk Purchase Agreement (1940-1954) the Meat Producers' Board 
received a similar boost to its coffers (Reissner, 1990). This source of 
funding allowed the Board to build up a '100 million dollar reseNe' by 
the 1950s (Hayward, 1972). 
Secondly, the Board imposed a compulsory levy on all farmers 
engaged in the production of stock for export. A charge was imposed 
on all stock slaughtered for export. The levy was deducted by 
processing companies on a 'per head' basis. In 1993 these 'Meat 
Levies' were set at 47 cents / head for all sheep, 24 cents / head for 
bobby calves and $2.40 / head for all other cattle (Department of 
Statistics, 1995: 417). The processing firms that slaughtered these 
beasts were required to calculate the levy and debit accordingly the 
individual farmers who supplied the flocks of stock, and to then remit 
the balances to the Board on a monthly basis. The funding of the 
statutory body through a compulsory levy on farmers, but collected 
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through currently processing firms, makes it around $25 million each 
year. 
The Board as inspector. 
The international trade in sheep meat began in 1882, some fifty years 
before the creation of the Board, and the legislation that covered the 
inspection of slaughterhouses and the branding (identifying the origins 
of frozen meat) and the grading (identifying the quality of frozen 
meat) of meat destined for export in this period was piecemeal. The 
first laws relating to slaughtering and meat pre-dated the refrigerated 
cargoes and therefore made no mention of the export meat industry. 
Thus, the Slaughterhouses Act (1877) made borough councils 
responsible for the inspection of slaughterhouses and required them to 
keep records of inspection. 
The Stock Act (1893) charged the newly formed Ministry of Agriculture 
with monitoring the borough councils and the actual inspection of 
slaughterhouses was thereafter undertaken by inspectors from the 
Ministry. This legislation was passed in response to widespread public 
concerns about poor food hygiene and issues of public safety.3 The 
3 The burgeoning export meat industry was a significant source of pollution. 
While most of the marketable product of the industry was exported beyond 
the shores of New Zealand, the collateral activities of slaughtering and 
freezing were not. The problems of effluent disposal, in particular, became 
more acute as throughput increased and as urban areas began to 
encroach on the established freezing works. The Chief Government 
Veterinarian, 1893-1908, was driven to comment:- "I cannot condemn too 
strongly the present disgusting spectacle to be seen near most 
slaughterhouses of grovelling pigs and screeching gulls wallowing amongst 
and tearing about the reeking, and at times putrefying refuse ... I venture to 
state that in no other civilised portion of the world could a similar state of 
things be found in such an important industry from a public health point of 
view ... At the present time drainage does not practically exist for the majority 
of these premises, pigs taking on the functions of scavengers of the blood 
and offal; and the water supply is of the most limited description, derived ... 
chiefly from shallow wells dug as near as possible to the slaughter shed for 
convenience. These wells are in several instances little else than cesspools, 
their contents being chiefly filterings from the contiguous fetid quagmires. 
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export meat industry was explicitly excluded from all forms of 
inspection, branding and grading. In other words, the concerns about 
substandard facilities and shoddy food handling that ran rife among 
local consumers was not extended to the international trade. The 
stock Act (1893) and the Abattoirs and Slaughterhouses Act (1894) 
stated explicitly that the export meat industry was exempt from all 
forms of Ministry and borough council inspection: 
"Notwithstanding anything in this Act contained, no cattle 
(sheep, goats, pigs, and beef cattle) slaughtered for 
export purposes only in a slaughterhouse belonging to an 
establishment for the freezing of meat shall be liable to 
the provisions of this Act relating to inspection" (Abattoirs 
and Slaughterhouses Act of 1894). 
Only where stock was slaughtered for export but subsequently 
became available for the local market did the provisions of inspection, 
branding and grading become pertinent: 
"The carcases of all cattle (sheep, goats, pigs, beef 
cattle) slaughtered in such establishment if sold within the 
colony, shall be subject to all provisions of this Act." 
(Abattoirs and Slaughterhouses Amendment Act of 1894). 
The Slaughtering and Inspection Act (1900) represented the first 
extension of the powers of inspection, branding and grading by the 
Ministry of Agriculture -laid out under the Stock Act (1893)- to the 
activities of the international trade. The Act of 1900 established a 
requirement for a certificate of examination to be produced for all 
exportable meat that was loaded onto shipping. The certificates of 
examination included confirmation that: (1) the stock was slaughtered 
with permission of an inspector from the Ministry of Agriculture; (2) the 
.. .the wooden floors and walls are saturated with the accumulated blood of 
years ... it appeared to me in some instances that the supply of water was 
even insufficient to cleanse the instruments used." (J. A Gilruth, 1897; cited in 
Scott, 1973: 56 - 57). 
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carcass was disease free; (3) the shipment was disease free and in 
good condition; (4) the shipment has been graded (no details given); 
(5) the meat had been branded; and (6) it was properly preseNed by 
freezing, chilling or salting and properly packed (Slaughtering and 
Inspection Act, 1900). 
The concerns underlying the introduction of the legislation of 1900, 
which resulted in the inspection of freezing works by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the branding and grading of frozen meat, stemmed 
from a history of misrepresentations about the quality of frozen meat 
and of stock. Many farmers felt that the intermediary firms (agents) 
and agribusiness firms were not paying the full worth of their product 
and they were in favour of an expanded role for the Ministry. As was 
noted, such moves can be seen as expressing the lasting distrust held 
by farmers for all 'middlemen' (Stinchcombe, 1961). 
There is no doubt that a good many of the auctioneers and butchers 
in Britain had little hesitation in selling fresh meat and imported frozen 
meats as one or the other. Good quality frozen meat was often 
thawed and sold as fresh meat, while poor quality fresh meat was also 
presented as the produce of Australasia. Such false trading pandered 
to and reinforced prejudices about frozen meat and secured a 
premium for the fresh meat and the home kill. The governments of 
both Australia and New Zealand brought successful prosecutions 
against British butchers for this type of 'false trade description' 
(Critchell and Raymond, 1912: 270 -273). 
Branding and grading the product destined for export by itself 
provided some check on this form of duplicity. Nevertheless, the 
retention of a private warranty in the assessment of meat and its 
classification into various grades and brands meant that the agents 
and agribusiness firms could easily label or relabel imports into the 
markets in Britain. In this regard, the Act of 1900 more-or-Iess required 
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only the formalisation of the practices used by firms, The bulk of 
inspection occurred on the wharves around New Zealand and 
entailed the limited sampling of cargoes and the verification of paper 
work, A multitude of private brands and methods of grading 
proliferated and (apart from the years of the Commandeer) 
dominated the international trade, For example, Nelson Brothers' 
labelled all of its frozen lamb from New Zealand as 'Canterbury Lamb' 
which was regarded as the premium of imported meat, even though it 
did not operate a processing plant in the province (Critchell and 
Raymond, 1912: 109-11 0; Loach, 1969), 
The absence of permanent and independent inspectors within the 
freezing works, made farmers reliant on the honesty and goodwill of 
processing companies for accurate assessments about the quality of 
their stock as revealed by the procedures of industrial dis-assembly, 
The significance of unfair reductions in receipts for stock bought on the 
hook -after the carcass passed over the scales in the freezing works- is 
impossible to gauge, but the suspicions held by farmers were 
widespread, 
Although farmers, stock buyers and drafters develop a considerable 
expertise in judging the confirmation, health and attributes of stock (in 
the field or in the saleyards) a conclusive valuation of stock is only 
possible after it has been slaughtered and dressed. Old age, bruising, 
excessive fat and broken ribs and limbs reduce the value of carcases, 
Pleurisy, tuberculosis, cancer and cysts render meat and smallgoods 
unfit for human consumption, Fungal infections, cuts and abrasions, 
and parasites damage runners and pelts, Thus, the slaughter and 
dressing of stock may reveal a host of imperfections or deficiencies 
within the carcass, offals, intestines or pelt, Typically such deficiencies 
in the meat and collateral by-products were deducted from the 
farmer's account, 
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With the introduction of the Meat Producers' Board the locus of 
inspection was shifted from the wharves to the freezing works. The 
Board was to enforce a unified code of brands and grades and 
employ inspectors in every freezing works. The marking of frozen 
carcases with official brands and grades in indelible dyes drastically 
reduced the scope for relabelling. Although the brands and labels of 
individual firms were retained, these marks could only be used with the 
approval of the statutory body. In doing so, the Board broke the 
warranty of agents and the international agribusiness firms in the 
supply of markets in Britain. It also provided farmers with an 
independent verification of the quality of their stock. Significantly all 
the costs of inspection and of the implementation of the new codes of 
branding and grading were passed on to the processing companies. 
These moves to secure and to enforce inspection rights on behalf of 
farmers are common to other agricultural-based networks. Dupre 
(1990) provides an analysis that is applicable to the negotiation of 
inspection by the Board in New Zealand. She illustrates how the 
Government of Quebec became involved in the regulation of 
warranty in the export dairy industry. She accounts for the involvement 
of the Government in terms of an attempt to counter perceptions of 
low quality among consumers in the markets in Britain of butter and 
cheese from Quebec. In this regard, the imposition of Government 
sponsored codes of inspection, branding and grading acted as a 
guarantee of quality and, eventually, allowed some reassignment of 
Quebec export produce in the minds of British consumers. Dupre 
further suggests that benefits accrue from Government inteNention in 
disaggregated sectors (like agriculture) because small-scale 
production makes 'voluntary arrangements very difficult to carry out' 
and hence 'there are no good substitutes for regulation' (Dupre, 1990: 
340). Thus, the involvement by the Government of Quebec ultimately 
centred on securing of small-scale dairy farming and dairy factories. 
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Similarly the benefits of the early development of state sponsored 
warranty over food exports is also alluded to in much of the work by 
Harriet Friedmann (1978b, 1980, 1982, 1987, 1988; Friedmann and 
McMichaeL 1989). In the case of New Zealand the working through 
of a warranty sponsored by the state and administered by the Meat 
Producers' Board undoubtedly helped secure and to extend farmers' 
control over the industry. However, these movements were made not 
so much in response to perceptions of low quality among consumers 
in the markets in Britain but as a means of further disciplining the 
middlemen. That is, the Board removed much of the decision making 
capacity of international agribusiness firms to grade and (to a lesser 
extent) to brand the export product. This role of the Board as inspector 
was supplemented by a very different role of agent negotiating 
inclusive deals with shipping lines. 
The Board as shipping agent. 
"Referring to the Blue Star Line's advertisement which 
appeared on 7th June, it should be known that this Line is 
controlled by Vestey Bros. We are sure Exporters and 
Importers will not be deluded into believing that this 
propaganda is entered into for their benefit. These Press 
notices were only issued by that Line after they 
approached us for a 10% share in the New Zealand 
(trade) and had been refused... The Blue Star Line and 
the Vestey Bros. combine the roles of Producers, Owners 
of Freezing Works, Owners of Cold Storage in England 
Salesmen and Distributors with that of Shipowners and 
Carriers, which is entirely contrary to the general 
understandings between Shipowners and Shippers" (Scott 
1973: 151). 
By the time of the First World War a cartel (called a conference) of 
shipping lines absolutely dominated the sea routes between New 
Zealand and the rest of the world. This conference (and other 
conferences on most of the other sea routes) was the result of 
amalgamations and agreements between the shipping firms 
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undertaken in the early years of the twentieth century. As a result, by 
the time of the First World War a stable conference carried all of the 
frozen meat from New Zealand to the markets in Britain. The 
conference was made up of the Pacific and Orient Line, the Port Line, 
the Shaw Savill Line, the New Zealand Shipping Corporation and, 
slightly later, the Blue Star Line (owned by Vesteys) (Meat Producers' 
Board, 1979; Molyneux, 1967). The conference tried to establish 
exclusive shipping arrangements to ensure that all freight was 
conveyed by its members. The conference enjoyed considerable 
advantages in dealing with farmers. Freight rates, conditions and 
timetables were offered to farmers on a take it or leave it basis.4 
The linkage of processing firms and of shipping lines was a feature of 
British domination in the industry that dated from its early days. The 
foundation of the export meat industry, in the wake of the depression 
of the 1870s, had involved many deals between shipping lines and 
various emerging agribusiness firms. For example: (1) the Federal Line 
(subsequently the New Zealand Shipping Company) owned the 
Ocean Beach freezing works until the 1920s; (2) the first international 
agribusiness firm in New Zealand, Nelson Brothers, maintained a 
shareholding in the T owser Line and shipped exclusively through it; (3) 
the Auckland Frozen Meat Company, the Canterbury Frozen Meat 
Company, the Christchurch Meat Company and the Southland 
Freezing Company had established exclusive shipping arrangements 
with the New Zealand Shipping Company, while the shipping line held 
debentures in these local agribusiness firms (Loach, 1969). 
Farmers, and other small shippers, were given to regularly complain of 
collusion between the conference lines and the larger agribusiness 
firms. However, with the return to free trade after the Commandeer 
(1915-1920) it seemed that farmers primarily confronted two closely 
4 'Meat Board defends shipping arrangements', Christchurch Press, 11/9/79. 
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linked cartels: one in processing and export, and the other in shipping. 
On the one hand, the international agribusiness firms stood ready to 
transform the buying of stock and the processing of meat. On the 
other, these firms seemed predisposed to make exclusionary deals 
with the conference lines (and vice versa), to the very great detriment 
of farmers. Agreements -or collusion- between international 
agribusiness firms and shipping lines was labelled 'pooling' by its 
opponents (Smith, 1969). 
Pooling involved the long term contracting of shipping capacity by 
the international agribusiness firms. These agreements constituted an 
effective mechanism for preventing the intrusion of newcomers, either 
into processing or shipping. That is, a processing company could not 
ship more than its tonnage allocated by the pool, and without an 
adequate allocation there was no possibility of entering into the export 
trade. Thus, pooling resulted in farmers and other small shippers being 
excluded from the export trade. In this regard, the rapid growth of the 
group of companies owned by Vesteys constituted a worst case 
scenario for family farmers. The simUltaneous movement by Vesteys 
into the meat trade and into the conference did much to heighten 
farmers' concerns about collusion (Knightley, 1981). 
At its first meeting the Meat Producers' Board assumed overall control 
for the shipping of exports of meat casings and hides from all ports in 
New Zealand and by the carriage of all shipping lines (Hayward, 
1972). The Board took over complete responsibility for the negotiation 
of shipping contracts pertaining to the export of meat. These 
contracts were binding on the shipping lines and on all individuals or 
businesses engaged in export, despite being agreed to without the 
consent of the owners of cargoes.5 In fact all businesses engaged in 
the export trade -all agents, all types of agribusiness firms, and all other 
5 anon, (1979), 'Metamorphosis grips Australasian routes', Freight 
Management 4 August: 25-26. 
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shippers- operating in or from New Zealand were disbarred from direct 
negotiation with any of the conference lines. The statutory body 
commenced its own negotiations with the shipping lines over the 
freight rates charged for meat and established a standing committee 
-the Allotments Committee- that determined the composition and 
timetables for the loading of all refrigerated cargoes. 
The intervention by the Meat Producers' Board disrupted any chance 
of pooling. Farmers were guaranteed access to refrigerated shipping. 
Furthermore, the negotiations undertaken by the Board with the 
conference lines resulted in a series of rolling contracts in which the 
rates for freight were averaged.6 That is, the freight rate -per tonne of 
cargo- was the same, regardless of whether the shipper was an 
individual farmer wanting to transport a single cargo or whether it was 
Vesteys wanting to transport the throughput from all its freezing works. 
Ten tonnes or ten thousand tonnes, the freight rate remained constant. 
The farmer who consigned meat, the agent, and the international 
agribusiness firm all paid the same per tonne for cargo and queued 
for shipping capacity on a first-come-first-served basis. 
The use of averaging costs, therefore denying the larger shippers the 
chance to make any saving through economies of scale, and a 
system of queuing are classic tools of bureaucratic administration. 
Their use in favour of farmers required the legislative authority of an 
agency such as a government board but more significantly speaks to 
the politics of bureaucratic control utilised by farmers. 
The Board as licensing agency_ 
"".this Board will look with an unfriendly eye upon: (a) The 
purchase by overseas interests of any freezing works in 
New Zealand. (b) The acquiring of any interest in New 
Zealand freezing works by overseas interests. (c) The 
6 Bull, J., 'Shipping meat through Meat Board', unknown, 24/9/79. 
erection of new freezing works in New Zealand by 
overseas interests" (Hayward, 1972: 162). 
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In addition to its roles as inspector and commercial agent with regard 
to shipping, the Board also operated as a centralised licensing agent. 
What was to be central to the role of the Board as licensing agency 
was that its inteNentions to mediate the relationship between 
processors and their suppliers, farmers, was again in the interests of 
farmers. Much of the Board's inteNention related to ensuring the 
intense competition for stock within the localised markets that 
constituted the procurement catchments of processing firms. 
Industrial licensing therefore was used by the Board not to secure the 
licensee (the processing firm) but to secure the suppliers of the 
licensee (the local farmers). In this respect, the licensing of processors 
reversed the more common 'franchising' arrangements pursued 
elsewhere in industry by states and licensing authorities. In the case of 
the export meat industry the granting of a license by the Board to any 
processing firm did not guarantee that business a throughput nor did 
the license secure an exclusive catchment or territory for the firm in 
which to buy stock. Rather, the granting of a license by the Board 
permitted the processor only to make offers to local farmers for stock 
but always in competition with the other interests in the farming district. 
The Board further inteNened in the linkage of farmers and processors 
by the innovative use of the existing procedures of licensing 
established by the Slaughtering and Inspection Act (1900). The Act 
had instituted the requirement for a meat-export license to be held by 
all individuals and businesses wanting to engage in the export trade. 
These meat-export licenses were initially issued by the Ministry of 
Agriculture on the recommendation of the local borough councils. 
The pre-requisites for obtaining a license to engage in the export of 
meat were (1) that the potential license holder be of good character 
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and (2) that any premises they intended to use did not pose a hygiene 
or pollution risk to the surrounding community. 
Under the Export Control Act (1923) the right to grant meat-export 
licenses was transferred to the new statutory body. The Board 
immediately began to use its power of industrial licensing to constrain 
the international agribusiness firms and to forestall closures of outlying 
and marginal processing plants. For example, the Board made it 
known to the North American firm, Armour, that should it succeed in 
acquiring a freezing works in New Zealand, any output from this 
freezing works would be denied a meat-export license. The Board's 
(very liberal) interpretation and application of the law effectively 
ended the attempt by Armour to buy freezing works in New Zealand. 
By the same mechanism in 1929 the Board placed restrictions on the 
output of the freezing works already owned by Vesteys and 
Borthwicks. These restrictions were not lifted until 1952 (Knightley, 1981; 
Harrison, 1963; Hayward, 1973). 
The international agribusiness firms did a number of things in response 
to this inteNention by the Board. They checked and then modified 
their move into New Zealand (Harrison, 1963: 105-122). Rather than 
buy the straitened local companies outright, the international 
agribusiness firms increasingly entered into long-term contracts with 
their financially troubled competitors. These deals secured the 
formerly independent freezing firms and also a number of the stock 
and stationers as sub-contractors of Borthwicks, Vesteys and Swifts'? For 
7 "(The firm) were stock and station agents. We used to draft about a million 
lambs and about twenty thousand cattle (yearly). Our operations used to 
extend from right up in the East Cope, down through Gisborne and Wairoa, 
right down to Pahiatua: virtually right down the East Coast. We were the 
largest stock and station firm on the East Coast. Far bigger than Wrighties 
(Wright Stevenson / Wrightson NMA) or Dalgety's (Dalgety Crown). We had a 
very big, very successful business. We used to draft these lambs and ... when 
they went 'over the scales' (at the freezing works) all of these lambs were 
turned over to Vestey's. Everyone of them .... Our clients (farmers) didn't 
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example, the Auckland Farmers' Freezing Company, the Gisborne 
Sheepfarmers' Freezing Company, the Hawkes Bay Farmers' Meat 
Company, the North Canterbury Sheepfarmers' Co-operative Freezing 
Company, the Patea Farmers' Freezing Company, the Southland 
Freezing Company, the South Otago Freezing Company and the 
Wairarapa Farmers' Co-operative Freezing Company all entered into 
sub-contracting agreements that meant that all or part of their 
throughput was sold to the international agribusiness firms (see 
appendix 1). 
While the international agribusiness firms never came to own more 
than a third of the freezing works and the processing capacity in New 
Zealand, through these long-term contracts they came to control the 
bulk of exports. By the end of the Second World War about 80% of the 
exports from the North Island and about half the exports from the 
South Island were owned by such international agribusiness firms 
(Loach, 1969: 97). International agribusiness firms may have 
dominated exports, but they were prevented from any rationalisation 
of processing or procurement. They were required to secure their 
throughput by using deals and local actors that ensured the 
continued competition for stock in localised markets and, most 
significantly, good prices for local farmers. At the same time, the 
international agribusiness firms stepped up the use of holding 
companies to act as fronts for their investments in New Zealand. Thus, 
by the use of companies independent only in name, Vesteys 
attempted to disguise its holdings in New Zealand, 8 while Swifts gained 
know a thing about it. This was all done at the Producers' Board level. They 
didn't know. When they, the farmers, thought that their lambs were going to 
Hawkes Bay Farmers', they never thought that we were laying them off to 
Borthwicks. They always thought that we were marketing them." (inteNiew, 
Manager #3). 
8 Thus, in New Zealand alone, Vesteys owned and fully integrated the 
operations of W. and R. Fletcher, Monarch Bacon Company Ltd, Wanganui 
Mild Cure Bacon Company Ltd, Union Cold Storage Company (NZ) Ltd, 
Patea Freezing Company Ltd, Amalgamated Products Ltd, New Zealand 
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ownership of the freezing works at Ocean Beach, Ngauranga and 
Wairoa through its hidden ownership of the firm of Sims and Company 
(McNulty, 1958; Loach, 1969). 
What amounted to the final effort by international agribusiness firms to 
secure an absolute hold over processing and, what is more important 
over the political deals in procuring stock occurred when Borthwicks 
instituted a major change to the organisation of the labour process in 
its freezing works. This transformation entailed the introduction of a 
variant of the assembly line into the slaughterboard of its freezing 
works in Canterbury. The transformation of work was carried out in the 
1932-1933 killing season. Vesteys followed suit in its freezing works in 
the following killing season. 
The throughput of any freezing works was -before the assembly line-
directly related to the number of solo slaughtermen it employed. 
These highly skilled / craft workers were each responsible for killing and 
dismembering 100 beasts per day (Cammock and Inkson, 1984). 
When the Board decided to impose restrictions on the throughput at 
the freezing works then owned by Borthwicks and Vesteys, it did so by 
limiting the numbers of solo slaughtermen they might employ at these 
freezing works (see chapter 6). Thus, a reworking of the slaughter of 
stock and the dressing of carcases was intended to by-pass the 
procedures of licensing used by the Meat Producers' Board. By 
eliminating the solo slaughtermen and replacing them with an 
assembly line the international agribusiness firms hoped to disrupt the 
allocation of licenses made using calculations about the productivity 
of its craft workforce. 
This initiative on the part of the international agribusiness firms had only 
a minimal success. The rejoinder by the Board was to agitate to 
Stockfoods Ltd, Westfield Freezing Company Ltd, Auckland Meat Company 
Ltd. in New Zealand (National Business Review, 1 December 1980: 20). 
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Government for more extensive powers of licensing. The legislative 
retort to the transformations of work carried out in 1932-33 was quick in 
coming. First the Slaughtering and Inspection Amendment Act (1934) 
and then the Meat Act (1939) extended and belatedly formalised the 
authority of the Board to engage in the licensing of the networks in the 
industry. The two Acts greatly formalised the powers of the Board. The 
Slaughtering and Inspection Amendment Act (1934) officially removed 
the procedures of licensing from the recommendations of local 
authorities based on their decisions about hygiene and pollution issues. 
Instead the Meat Producers' Board was charged to now make its 
licensing decisions under the following rubric: 
\\(0) whether or not there is any economic necessity or 
justification for the proposed work; (b) the probable or 
possible effect of the proposed work if undertaken, on the 
ability of other licensees of meat- export slaughterhouses 
to obtain regular supplies of stock sufficient for the 
reasonable requirements of their business: (c) all such 
relevant matters as the Minister or the said Board thinks 
proper. II (The Slaughtering and Inspection Amendment 
Act of 1934) 
Furthermore, the Board was authorised to include clauses and 
constraints in its licenses in order to: 
\\(a) establish the maximum number of stock that may be 
slaughtered in a slaughterhouse during any period, (b) 
specify the maximum number of types of stock that can 
be slaughtered in a slaughterhouse during any period, (c) 
establish fines for non compliance and allow revocation 
of license, (d) approve extensions to existing 
slaughterhouses, including storage, freezing and cooling 
chambers, (e) approve the proposed construction of new 
slaughterhouses. II (The Meat Act of 1939). 
With the Acts of 1934 and 1939 in place the Meat Producers' Boord 
was able to holt the advance of the international agribusiness firms 
and to ensure the diversity of processing regardless of any reworking of 
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the labour process in freezing works. Indeed, the purchase of existing 
firms and the construction of new freezing works by international 
agribusiness firms was to come to a complete halt. This cessation of 
takeovers and lack of new entrants (international agribusiness firms or 
local) was to last for nearly thirty years (Hartley, 1989). This hiatus was 
terminated not so much by the renewed advance of the international 
agribusiness firms, but by their piecemeal withdrawal. However, the 
new dynamic only became obvious with hindsight and culminated 
with the bankruptcy of Vesteys (1994). 
The Board as guarantor of processing. 
"If you go back a step, we used to have what we called 
the 'open door' policy, in that anybody could demand to 
have their stock killed at any works. The door is closed 
now (sic). Totally appropriate. Why, if Fortex want to 
operate their own plants to their own specification, they 
don't want some twerp coming in the door and having 
their (the farmers') stock killed not in their specification. 
Well it was supposed to provide competition at the farm-
gate." (inteNiew, Director #3).9 
The Meat Producers' Board, as inspector, as commercial agent and as 
licensing agency favoured farmers. It was, however, to further extend 
this pattern of control in ways that effectively made the agribusiness 
firms their agents. As I have noted above, the granting of a license to 
operate an export-slaughterhouse did not secure its owners a 
guaranteed throughput and neither did it define an exclusive 
catchment for the purchase of stock. A license merely allowed the 
licensee to make offers to local farmers. This method of licensing, a 
9 This respondent was a member of the Meat Producers' Board and a long 
serving director in Federated Farmers. He was a relatively new, first 
generation, farmer. The respondent definitely presented himself as part of a 
movement of younger farmers that was highly critical of some of the existing 
arrangements in the industry. Rather than representing a cherished resource, 
the Board was presented as a cumbersome and potentially archaic 
institution. The Board was presented as a necessary evil. 
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bureaucratic tool, was used to maintain competition between 
processors in local markets. The competition was provoked by the 
fact that individual processing firms operated within more or less fixed 
catchments for buying stock. These catchment areas were delimited 
by the firm's spread of processing plants and by the distance a flock 
of sheep could be safely roiled or trucked to slaughter (Deportment of 
Statistics, 1963). Under this licensing system, processing firms could 
therefore only ever hope to purchase stock from the localised markets 
within their catchments. Their problems as processors was further 
complicated by the fact that almost all the forming districts in New 
Zealand were encompassed by the overlapping catchments of 
several firms (see appendix 2). This spread of overlapping catchments 
within forming districts was cemented by licensing and allowed local 
formers to be certain that whenever they offered stock for sale, and 
whatever the type of stock they were selling, there would almost 
certainly be a number of interested buyers. Local formers therefore 
could compare offers for stock from competing firms and be judicious 
in their loyalty to local processors. 
Further, the licensees of meat-export slaughterhouses were required by 
low to accept for slaughter all stock offered by formers that were 
intended for export and to handle that stock on the formers' behalf. 
Licensees were required to process stock intended for consignment or 
for co-operative marketing ventures. This exceptional demand on the 
holders of export licenses was called the policy of the' open door': 
" ... the 1923 Meat Act was after that short sharp depression 
in the 1920s. The Mossey Government were in then, they 
brought in this Act that virtually says any meat company in 
New Zealand must open their doors to any former who 
wonts to kill their stock there and provide him with the 
marketing facility so that he can market that in the UK ... 
That still exists today. For any meat. If I go along to CFM, I 
can soy to them, look you have to kill my bloody lambs or 
kill my cottle for me. And they, they will refuse me. I know 
that. But if you go into a big enough fight, you will 
eventually get it." (interview, Manager #10). 
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If the existence of local processing firms was guaranteed by the 
licensing system operated by the Board it was also the case that they 
had to make processing capacity available to farmers -at relatively 
short notice- even where it was intended by the licensees for the 
supply of its own marketing arm or to fill contracts for outside interests. 
Any individual farmer or any group of farmers (a group of farmers used 
the open door by combining their stock or 'pooling') was entitled to 
have their stock processed at their local freezing works without 
surrendering ownership. Furthermore, while all other enterprises 
required a license for the export of meat, that had to be obtained in 
advance of entering the international trade, farmers could consign on 
an individual or co-operative basis at short notice. 
The enforcement of an open door policy constituted the extension of 
a version of the political deals made around consignment and 
provided a mechanism for the clearance of farmers' stock other than 
by the internalised exchanges of the integrated agribusiness firms. The 
practices of consignment had defended the autonomy of family 
farmers from the beginnings of the industry. However, the growth of 
the international agribusiness firms coupled with the long depression 
had posed a twin threat to the continuation of consignment. A 
number of the agents in Britain who had facilitated on-selling became 
bankrupt or were purchased -along with a large share of the cold 
stores and meat depots- by the integrated international agribusiness 
firms. At the same time, the purchase of local firms and/or their 
subordination as specialist sub-contractors by the international 
agribusiness firms eroded the complex division of labour in the sphere 
of processing that had enabled consignment. 
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Unlike the situation in Argentina, where agribusiness firms had 
achieved an oligopoly across processing, the ownership of processing 
capacity in New Zealand did not provide the international agribusiness 
firms with absolute control over the export product. By placing 
strictures on licensees, which privileged farmers, the Meat Producers' 
Board facilitated a revival of consignment and allowed farmers 
independent access to markets in Britain and ultimately a way to 
establishing their own firms. 
The Board as the promoter of classification (of stock). 
The use of a 'schedule' for stock was another tool which the Board 
would use to privilege farmers. The development of the schedule in 
the years after the termination of the Bulk Purchase Agreement (1940-
1954) represented a new method of buying and selling stock 
(Shadbolt 1981). The schedule was implemented by processing firms 
when the return to the free market displaced the Second World War 
time rationing and pricing of stock, processing and meat by officials 
based in London and Wellington (Harrison, 1963; Reissner, 1990). The 
schedule outlined the prices offered by processing firms for stock. 
Versions of the schedule were published on a weekly (or more 
frequent) basis in most of the newspapers that were read in the 
farming districts around New Zealand. 
The schedule was to become the most important mechanism by 
which processing firms purchased stock. It largely displaced the 
transacting for stock made on the hoof / per head and by the old 
style calculations made on the hook. The schedule combined 
elements of both mechanisms (Hartley, 1989: 24). 
"The Schedule: The farmer is offered and accepts a price 
per kilo of dressed carcass weight for a particular grade 
and weight range. This price is offered by the ... 
(processor) and is known before the stock leaves the 
farm ... " (New Zealand Freezing Companies Association, 
1980: 6) 
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Transactions made per head / on the hoof were favoured by farmers 
because they resulted in a quick assessment of and payment for stock 
(negotiated on farm or at auction). The dispersal of stock through the 
variants of on the hoof / per head required the buyer/processor to 
carry all the risks of this spot market. Transactions made on the hook 
were preferred by processing firms because they allowed a thorough 
assessment of stock through the activities of industrial dis-assembly. 
That is, hidden deficiencies in stock could be revealed by the 
slaughter and dressing of animals and in the handling of by-products. 
The schedule eliminated the risk posed to the buyer/processor in the 
deficiencies of stock (over-fat, over-lean, injured, diseased or old 
beasts) by paying farmers for the meat and by-products made 
available by slaughter and dressing rather than for the living beast. At 
the same time, the classification of stock by grade (mainly its fat 
cover) and weight and the allocation of prices per kilogram for each 
class, allowed farmers to accurately estimate the revenues from the 
sale of stock. Farmers also received a price per kilogram for slipe 
wool, and an averaged price for pelts. No other by-products were 
paid for under the schedule. 
Nevertheless, an evaluation of the carcases that was made at the 
freezing works ultimately determined the price paid to farmers for 
stock. This assessment was made in conjunction with, and was verified 
by, the inspectors employed by the Meat Producers' Board and the 
Ministry (from 1964 all of the inspectors at freezing works were to 
become employees of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries). 
Furthermore, the underpinnings of the schedule, in the establishment 
of the categories of grade and weight, were set only with the 
approval of the Meat Producers' Board. 
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The Board did not initiate the schedule but it monitored the schedule 
(this task and the need for data in its negotiation with Conference 
Lines being the raison d' etre for the creation of its Economic Service in 
1950). In cases where the statutory body felt that the classifications 
used by the schedule were too narrow and did not reflect the range 
of stock made available by farmers, it insisted on an amplification of 
the classifications. By these recurring changes to the schedule the 
Meat Producers' Board ensured that all stock made available by 
farmers woUld always be classified (Shadbolt, 1981). 
"Meetings at weekly intervals throughout the year by the 
major exporting companies... review the schedule prices 
to be offered to the producer. The procedure by which 
this is achieved entails independent calculation of 
schedule values by each exporter (processor), these 
values are then compared and an operating schedule 
based on the majority view is proposed for the coming 
week... While it is quite permissible for individual 
companies to increase their buying schedules to 
compete for or to attempt to obtain additional quantities 
of stock, any reduction in the operating schedule cannot 
be obtained without a general consensus from the other 
major exporters." (New Zealand Freezing Companies 
Association, cited in Shadbolt, 1981: 8-9). 
Turkington (1979: 2-3) suggests that the formulation of the schedule 
provided a forum for 'collusion' between agribusiness firms regarding 
the setting of prices and that farmers frequently bemoaned low prices 
for stock. The vociferous complaints by farmers is certainly a recurring 
feature of the industry. However, the surveillance of the Board 
minimised opportunity for any limitation in the competition for stock. 
Arguably, the schedule acted as yet another device that prevented 
the imposition of monopsony, because it facilitated the co-existence 
of relatively inefficient and efficient processors (McWilliams, 1994).10 
10 McWilliams, A. (1994), for the Boston Consulting Group, cited In Stewart, 
K., 'Freemarket follies', NZ Listener, 25/6/94. 
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The prices for stock offered by schedule was to become the 
benchmark for the price smoothing and subsidisation schemes 
administered by the Meat Producers' Board (Shadbolt, 1981: 14-16). 
Conclusion: The shifting constraint of firms. 
The forms of farmers' control secured by the Meat Producers' Board 
entailed the imposition of constraints on meat processing firms. This 
disciplining of firms, and especially of international agribusiness firms, 
allowed the Board to extend and secure an outcome favourable to 
farmers as a disaggregated form of production. This process centred 
on the enforcement of multiple sites and diverse forms of ownership of 
the processing and export sectors. The Board's main bureaucratic 
'tool' was the licensing of operations. 
The codification and practice of industrial licensing was instrumental in 
checking the process of rationalisation as presented by international 
agribusiness firms. It must be recognised, however, that the 
dominance enjoyed by the international agribusiness firms in 
internalising the exchanges between farm-gates and Britain -which 
they achieved prior to the establishment of the Meat Producers' 
Board- delineated the effective amelioration by the statutory body of 
their ensuing threat. As a result, the inteNentions of the Board left 
ownership in the industry in private hands and left intact the capacity 
of international agribusiness firms to undertake the clearance of the 
bulk of export product. 11 
11 Further, the extent of the Board's far-reaching powers have been by no 
means fully utilised or tested. While the Dairy Board was to effectively 
nationalise its industry (Hill, 1974), the Meat Producers' Board was to be 
content to leave the bulk of day-to-day activities to the decision-making of 
businesses. "The most likely reason why guaranteed prices were applied to 
dairy produce (thereby nationalising the industry) and not meat and wool 
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The inteNentions of the Meat Producers' Board therefore revitalised 
and defended the diversity of mechanisms connecting farmers with 
the markets in Britain. While the inteNentions of the Board 
undoubtedly stymied the efforts of the international agribusiness firms 
to buy a controlling share of processing in New Zealand, they were 
nevertheless free to secure supply by other means as long as they did 
not threaten farmers with monopsony. Any added costs to the 
product (Critchell and Raymond, 1912) resulting from this form of 
agribusiness control were passed on to British consumers (Stevens, 
1978; 1985). In this regard, the Board, in part, operated in lieu of the 
constellation of intermediary firms and political deals which had 
shaped the early industry. While the practices of consignment would 
never again account for more than a minor percentage of the export 
trade the retention of a multiplicity of paths into the markets in Britain 
nevertheless helped maximise the opportunities open to farmers. 
From the point of view of farmers, the Board as an agency of control 
represented as significant a development as other agencies of 
control, such as multi-divisional firms and nationalised industries. These 
forms of control are more typical solutions for manufacturing and 
extractive industries in larger societies. The centrality of a Producers' 
Board of Control 'solution' to agriculture in a society organised 
primarily through the export of agricultural produce, should not 
however be marginalised when reviewing the different ways in which 
markets are organised (Katzenstein, 1985). 
As a 'tool' for farmers the Meat Producers' Board developed a 
number of different ways of regulating markets in favour of farmers. 
These ranged from inspection and licensing to classification of the 
appears to be structural differences between the three industries." (Hill, 1974: 
v). McLauchlan (1981) also highlights differences in the structure of the meat 
dairy and wool industries. 
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schedule and negotiating with shipping lines. These tools, also used by 
mUlti-divisional firms and nationalised industries, were in this case used 
to secure the effective reproduction of family farming. They also 
shaped the supply of processing plants in New Zealand and of 
markets in Britain. The latter were singular in their ability to consume all 
surplus production and export tonnages from New Zealand. Indeed 
the issues associated with marketing proper, the difficulties of actively 
selling into saturated markets, and, in particular, the new forms of 
industry and of business that might then be required were to remain 
only a marginal concern until well after the Second World War. When 
the issues of active marketing (Cornish, 1995) did eventually arise they 
were to become central to the problems and responses of the Board 
and to attempts at a managed rationalisation of the industry. 
Chapter 5 
The Board, firms and access to markets. 
Introduction. 
"Policy is more than the sum of counteNailing pressure 
from social groups. That pressure is mediated by an 
organisational dynamic that imprints its own image on the 
outcome. Because policy-making in the modern state is 
always a collective process, the configuration of the 
institutions that aggregate the opinions of individual 
contributors into a set of policies can have its own effect 
on policy outcomes." (Hall, 1986: 19, cited in Smith, 1990: 
225). 
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The introduction of industrial licensing by the Meat Producers' Board 
checked moves towards the cartelisation of both local processing and 
of the organisation of the export trade from New Zealand. The Board 
secured farmers' access to markets in Britain and in doing so blocked 
what the agribusiness firms- and especially the international 
agribusiness firms- had considered a drive for greater efficiency and 
rationality (Chandler, 1978, 1990; Critchell and Raymond, 1912; Sinclair, 
1949). The passing of the Slaughtering and Inspection Amendment 
Act (1934) and the Meat Act (1939) continued the Board's project of 
preventing any radical reworking or rationalisation of the industry by 
international agribusiness firms. In short, the nefarious 'Meat Trust' 
(Portz, 1991; Smith, 1969) was kept at bay. 
By linking farmers with agribusiness firms which dominated the 
international trade, but not processing, the Board acted as a broker on 
behalf of farmers. As the farmers' broker any concerns the Board had 
about efficiency and rationality in processing came a distant second 
to preseNing the livelihoods of farmers. The Board cemented a 
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configuration of processing characterised by; overlapping catchment 
areas for the procurement of stock by processing companies, intense 
competition for stock across nearly all of the farming districts, and a 
total and regional processing capacity well in excess of that needed 
for the handling of stock (Evans, 1985). The even geographic 
dispersion of freezing works that resulted from these policies favoured 
the family farming unit. The consequences of this arrangement were 
to channel the dilemmas facing farmers in the export meat industry 
into problems for processing firms. This arrangement was in contrast to 
the portrayals in the literature on agribusiness, in which food processors 
(Burns, 1983) are presented as the leading edge of a global capitalist 
penetration of agriculture and/or the industrialisation of farming 
(Goodman, Sorj and Wilkinson, 1987; Leopold, 1985). The Board's 
controls over the export meat industry were part of its overriding desire 
to redistribute revenues to farmers by institutional arrangements 
(Hayward, 1972; Stephens, 1936c). 
The marginality of local processing firms. 
The first problem in the processing sector related to the local 
agribusiness firms. The local firms were decidedly marginal to the form 
of farmers' control at first fostered by the Meat Producers' Board. This 
marginality reflected, in part, the greater difficulty in pursuing forward 
integration by the local agribusiness firms vis a vis those international 
agribusiness firms striving for backward integration. In particular, local 
firms faced extreme difficulties in securing a viable share of the 
activities of wholesaling. 1 
1 Only one New Zealand-owned enterprise operated as a genuine 
wholesaler in the markets in Britain. Thus, Towers and Company, owned meat 
depots and supplied butchers' shops throughout London and the Midlands. 
About two thirds of the frozen meat it distributed came from the freezing 
works of its owners the New Zealand Refrigerating Company, the Southland 
Frozen Meat Company and the Gear Meat Company. The balance of 
Towers operation was made up of Australian and Irish lamb, and Argentine 
beef. This throughput represented approximately 10% of all New Zealand 
meat exports in the years prior to 1970 (Loach, 1969; 167). 
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The Meat Producers' Boord also acted to defend family formers 
partially at the expense of local agribusiness firms. The readiness of the 
Boord to constrain and modify a reworking of the industry by the 
international agribusiness firms was not immediately reflected in any 
concerted effort to advance New Zealand ownership in the activities 
off-shore. Local agribusiness firms were not integral to the Boord's 
'formers' policy. Rother, the Boord focused its activities on the 
exchanges involving formers and processors with the aim of 
maximising the prices formers received at the form-gate for their stock. 
The Boord's position on international agribusiness firms was more 
complex. As broker for the formers, the Boord effectively sanctioned 
the dominance of the international agribusiness firms in the export 
trade of frozen meat to Britain. The Boord merely ensured that the 
dominance enjoyed by these international agribusiness firms, in 
wholesaling in the markets in Britain, was not brought to bear against 
formers in New Zealand. In this arrangement, formers were provided 
with a low risk mechanism of sending very high volumes of export 
product into the markets in Britain. 
As the acute threat of international agribusiness firms coming to 
control both processing and wholesaling subsided, from the mid 1930s 
on, the Boord was to relax its opposition to foreign involvement in New 
Zealand. Thus, while purporting to oppose transfers in the ownership of 
freezing works, the Boord did not prevent the establishment of the 
North American agribusiness firm Swifts and the Cooperative 
Wholesale Society in the late 1930s and 1940s. During this period Swifts 
bought out the plants at Ngauranga and Wairoa and acquired a half 
interest, with the Cooperative Wholesale Society, in Ocean Beach (see 
appendix 1). However, it must be noted that the Ngauranga and 
Ocean Beach plants were both marginal concerns that would 
probably have ceased operations without this international investment 
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(Turner, 1984; Walsh, 1983). In aiL the Board was content for 
international agribusiness firms to clear the bulk of export product. 
Farmers sold the majority of their stock either directly to the 
international agribusiness firms or to the stock and stationers and 
processors sub-contracted by them. 
Although the formation of the Board and much of its early 
interventions exploited a popular rhetoric of opposition to international 
agribusiness firms (Harrison, 1963; Hayward 1972), the resolution of 
local versus international firms was always of secondary importance to 
advancing the localised and global interests of farmers (Steven, 1978, 
1985; Walsh and Fougere, 1987). Roche (1992) makes passing 
comment about the important contribution of local firms to economic 
growth. However, the operation of these enterprises as 'local profit 
centres' was limited and constrained by the Board. All local firms -
proprietary or co-operative- were doubly burdened. The restrictions 
intended to prevent any 'rationalisation' of stock procurement and of 
processing on the part of the international agribusiness firms were 
applied equally to local firms. As local firms they were simultaneously 
denied entry into the international wholesale market by the very same 
cartel of international agribusiness firms. 
The marginality of local firms was pivotal to the political deals 
brokered the Meat Producers' Board with the international 
agribusiness firms. The local firms were more-or-Iess relegated to sub-
contracted processing and only the largest of the 'other proprietaries' 
(Hereford, 1932) were able to secure forward integration. Thus, from 
the end of the Commandeer (1915-1920) until the purchase of Swifts 
(NZ) by the Waitaki company (in 1973), no more than twenty percent 
of the export trade was exported through the local agribusiness firms. 
From the point of view of farmers, the successful implementation of a 
second war time commandeer (the Bulk Purchase Agreement), to 
supply the markets in Britain during the Second World War, and 
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extended well into the 1950s (1940-1954), was to operate to dampen 
any calls for change. 
It was only with the restructuring of international markets, in particular 
by Britain's entry into the European Community, after the termination 
of the Bulk Purchase Agreement, that this construction of the 'national 
interest' was finally disputed (Loach, 1969; McNulty, 1958) and actively 
challenged in the rise of the 'Waitaki company' (Perriam, 1989). 
Thereafter the division of labour between international agribusiness 
firms and local firms and their relative shares of procurement, 
processing and the export trade was to become an issue of debate, 
agitation and manoeuvring by firms, farmers and the Board (see 
chapter 7).2 
The restructuring of overseas markets. 
The second problem in the processing sector related to the 
restructuring of overseas markets. The initial involvement by the Board 
in the industry was to guarantee access to farmers into the certain 
(Salois and Storper, 1992) wholesaling markets in Britain. The Board 
made this guarantee to farmers by a modification of their linkages with 
international agribusiness firms. When markets in Britain were 
restructured, following the Second World War, with them were the 
opportunities and threats posed by the international agribusiness firms 
to the livelihoods of farmers in New Zealand. The rationale of the Meat 
Producers' Board, however, to preserve the autonomy and prosperity 
2 Harrison (1963: 106) made the following comment about foreign versus 
domestic in his tribute to Thomas Borthwick and Sons:- "It is necessary here to 
explain the significance of the word 'overseas' -this for the benefit of those 
UK. readers who might think it is merely a geographical expression. If a visitor 
goes to New Zealand from the United Kingdom, he is certain of a warm 
welcome. New Zealanders have been described as more British than the 
British, and even New Zealanders of several generations' standing refer to 
Britain as the 'old country' or 'home'; but if a New Zealander or a New 
Zealand company wishers to arouse prejudice against British capital or a 
British concern he does not describe them as British. He describes them as 
'overseas' or even 'foreign'." 
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of farmers remained unchanged in the new context of fragmented 
markets. The Board's Economic SeNice was clear about the British 
market: 
"Our chief rival in the United Kingdom meat market is not 
Argentina, but the British Treasury, and our best course of 
action in the long run is to keep the United Kingdom well 
supplied with New Zealand meat, which will have the 
effect of demonstrating to the British taxpayer the high 
real cost of home-produced." (Economic SeNice, 1959: 
15). 
Nevertheless, the desire to retain particular markets is one thing the 
ability to achieve it is another. The Board was to be constantly 
preoccupied with the negotiation of its position in relation to this most 
crucial export market. At times it was to be very influential and at 
other times decidedly less so. 
Throughout its first seventy years the export meat industry was given 
over, almost entirely, to the supply of the consumer markets in Britain 
with sheep meat (Mordue, 1983). The markets in Britain were the sole 
destination of exported chilled and frozen meat and almost all of this 
export produce was lamb or mutton (the only exception being several 
consecutive years in the mid 1930s when trial shipments of chilled beef 
were undertaken) (Economic SeNice, 1984). Historically the stability of 
markets in Britain was such that the 'right' of exporters in New Zealand 
to supply British consumers, unencumbered by quotas or tariffs, was 
only formalised as late as 1932, by the signing of the Ottawa 
Agreement (Reissner, 1990; Roche, 1992). Indeed, New Zealand's role 
as Britain's 'far-flung form' (Hooper and Pratt, 1993) was, by and large, 
assumed to be the natural result of specialised advantage exercised 
on the global scale. In this regard, the manifest ability of family 
farmers in New Zealand to produce good quality, low cost sheep 
meat seemingly dovetailed with the demands of industrialised Britain. 
Put another way, the open access enjoyed by formers in the export 
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meat industry was merely a component of the longstanding British 
policy of creating an 'open door' to the importation of cheap 
foodstuffs (Wilson, 1977). 
Within Britain, however this open door policy did not go unopposed. 
British agriculture has a long history of lobbying by farming interests, 
and especially by the National Farmers Union. This lobbying resulted in 
the granting of subsidies to farmers by the British Government that 
were intended to boost farm production (Burns, 1983; Burns, 
Mcinerney, and Swinbank, 1983b; Smith, 1990; Steen, 1981; Wilson, 
1977). The Economic SeNice of the Meat Producers' Board and the 
Wool Board noted, in one of their first annual publications, that the 
'home production' for the markets in Britain was at a level almost two 
thirds of its requirements (Economic Service, 1958). The partial closure 
of the markets in Britain was to result from this upswing in farm 
production as much as the fact that the deals secured by New 
Zealand faming interests were disrupted by Britain's entry into the 
European Community. 
A process of piecemeal limitation of the access of meat exports from 
New Zealand into the markets in Britain was begun in 1954 with the 
termination of the Bulk Purchase Agreement.3 Following this the 
reorientation of British import and export policies in the lead up to its 
entry into the European Community resulted in the imposition of an 
incremental tariff on meat exported from New Zealand. This restriction 
of the markets in Britain culminated in 1980 with the imposition of a 10% 
tariff and a quota of 245,500 tonnes on all meats exported from New 
3 The United Kingdom was supplied during the Second World War under the 
arrangements of the Bulk Purchase Agreement. The bulk purchase was in 
many ways analogous to that of the earlier Commandeer. Prices were 
guaranteed by controct between the British and New Zealand governments 
and resulted in real prosperity for all farmers and firms that became involved 
in the trade. Whereas the Commandeer had been administered largely by 
the government officials, the Bulk Purchase Agreement made greater use of 
managers and staff seconded from the various meat firms (Harrison, 1963; 
Loach, 1969). 
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Zealand into the European Community (Garway Investments Limited, 
1988: 12). Farmers, agribusiness firms and the Board were, 
consequently, confronted with the need for market diversification (see 
table 5.1). 
Within the classification of sheep meats a distinction should be made 
between lamb and mutton. In the overseas markets, lamb has 
enjoyed a premium over that gained by mutton of around 50%-65%.4 
The volume of export mutton has remained fairly constant since the 
end of the Second World War -at around 70,000 to 80,000 tonnes-
while the increase in the volume of export sheep meats came mainly 
from the export of frozen and chilled lamb.5 
The markets in Britain, which usually paid the highest prices for all 
sheep meats, remained until entry into the EC, in 1966, the 
unchallenged destination for lamb. When EC quotas were imposed 
on all meats from New Zealand they were normally filled with lamb. 
Furthermore, the entry of Britain into the EC was partially off-set by the 
access of sheep meat into the new markets of Europe, with the 
exception of Eire and France where exports were to be, and remain, 
banned (Garway Investments Limited, 1988). The broader quota of 
245,500 tonnes on all meats exported from New Zealand into the 
European Community was also normally filled by lamb. In the case of 
mutton the enforced search for markets was far more apparent in its 
4 Economic Service, 1956 - 1994, 'London wholesale prices', passim. 
5 For more than a century the most profitable branch of sheep farming has 
been fat lamb production, while the production of mutton has been largely 
a function of seasonal culls of the sheep flock. The combined volumes of 
export sheepmeats was to grow only slowly through the 1950s and remained 
around 250,000 tonnes. They were to only exceeded 300,000 tonnes in the 
early 1960s, and then levelled-out at nearly 450,000 tonnes in the early 1970s. 
The volume of exports declined over the following decade before 
recovering to nearly 500,000 tonnes in the mid- 1980s. However, this upsurge 
mainly reflected a cull of the sheep flock unleashed by the termination of 
price support in the mid 1980s and it subsequently declined to about 400,000 
tonnes or approximating the volume exported during the 1960s (Department 
of Statistics, 1990: 447, 1994: 351). 
Table 5.1: Destinations and market shares of meat classes. 
(market share over 2%). 
Year. Lamb. % Mutton. % Beef. % 
1959 UK 98 UK 83 USA 82 
Greece 04 
UK 03 
1964 UK 94 Japan 46 USA 56 
UK 32 UK 20 
Greece 06 W. Indies 04 
Germany 04 Pacific 03 
Italy 02 
Greece 02 
1969 UK 89 Japan 71 USA 54 
USA 02 UK 22 Canada 20 
UK 10 
W. Indies 03 
Pacific 02 
1974 UK 78 Japan 42 USA 69 
USA 02 Chile/Peru 03 Canada 15 
Japan 02 UK 03 W. Indies 02 
Greece 02 Pacific 02 
1979 UK 64 USSR 46 USA 72 
Japan 05 Japan 22 Canada 12 
Greece 04 S. Korea 20 
USA 04 UK 04 
Canada 02 
Germany 02 
1984 Iran 35 Japan 28 USA 74 
UK 29 UK 25 Canada 09 
USSR 10 S. Korea 13 Japan 03 
Rest of EC 07 Rest of EC 06 
Japan 03 USSR 03 
Saudi Arb. 02 Canada 02 
1989 UK 31 USSR 29 USA 75 
Rest of EC 18 S. Korea 21 Canada 09 
Iran 17 Japan 10 S. Korea 03 
Japan 05 
Saudi Arb. 02 
1993 UK 28 Rest of EC 29 USA 62 
Rest of EC 27 UK 27 Canada 14 
PNG 06 S. Korea 20 S. Korea 05 
Saudi Arb. 05 Japan 03 Japan 04 
Japan 05 
USA 03 
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Source: Economic SeNice, 1965: 16, 1970: 17, 1975: 17, 1980: 17, 1985: 
24,1990:24,1994:29. 
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consequences. Japan became an important alternative market 
(although accruing a tariff of 25%), to be surpassed in later years by 
South Korea and a variety of largely one-off buyers. This example of 
market diversification itself stimulated or reinforced a form of product 
diversification in the export of beef. The main market in this case 
being the USA (see table 5.1). 
Beef has enjoyed a premium over that gained by sheep meats of 
around 50%-75%.6 The volumes of export beef enjoyed a steady climb 
after the Second World War exceeding 100,000 tonnes in the 1960s, 
200,000 tonnes in the 1980s, and 300,000 tonnes in the 1990s. The 
steady climb in beef is in contrast with the fluctuations that marked the 
volumes of export sheep meats. Nevertheless meat, and especially 
beef, from New Zealand has also been subjected to restrictions in 
North America. 
The quotas with Canada and USA are normally filled by beef. In 1968 
both Australian and New Zealand meat exporters agreed to a 
'voluntary restraint agreement' (VRA) with the USA. This established a 
quota on beef exported from Australia and New Zealand, of which 
the mix of Australasian exports were determined by the suppliers. The 
Board played a central role in consultations with Australian suppliers. 
During its first year New Zealand farmers were allocated 110,000 
tonnes. The VRA also imposed a tariff of 2c / Ib on beef, 2.2c / Ib on 
mutton, .5c / Ib on lamb and a duty of 4.55%. A similar VRA was 
agreed to with Canada in subsequent years. It imposed a tariff of 2c / 
Ib on beef and .5c / Ib on mutton. Both of the VRA's were increased 
so that New Zealand farmers received an 'in house' quota of around 
6 Economic Service, 1984, and 1956 - 1995, 'London wholesale prices ... ', and 
1962 - 1966, 'Prices of Manufacturing Beef in the United States', and 1967 -
1995, 'Prices for New Zealand Boneless Cow Beef in the United States', 
passim. 
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205,000 tonnes. This quota was expanded to all meats in the 1980s 
and 1990s. 
Recasting the threat of the agribusiness firms. 
"There was a failure of the overseas owned firms, 
including Borthwicks which owned CFM. A lot of the 
overseas investment in New Zealand meat companies 
has been withdrawn. The Vesteys organisation has in fact 
withdrawn from New Zealand a fair chunk, mostly 
because of the problems they are having in their home 
operation." (interview, Manager #6). 
The third problem area in the industry was that of large international 
agribusiness firms. This problem was related to the partial closure of 
the markets in Britain and had significant albeit somewhat 
contradictory, impacts on the Board and on the forms of control it 
could guarantee for farmers. The problems unleashed by the partial 
closure of the British market and the subsequent search for new 
markets required the Board to undertake constant revisions of the costs 
and benefits associated with different linkages of production, 
processing and markets. What is most significant is that the 
restructuring of markets forced a reassessment of the need for the 
amelioration of the threat posed by the international agribusiness firms. 
This reassessment was to exemplify what Portz (1991) has called a 
'search process'. While there was no capitulation by farmers and the 
Board to these integrated firms, there was certainly a greater 
appreciation of their capacity to access the increasingly problematic 
markets. In this regard, the trade-off between the threat of 
monopsony which they posed and the need to clear export product 
through international agribusiness firms was recast. 
The difficulties in the markets in Britain initially served to heighten the 
importance of the international agribusiness firms. In this regard, 
'commodity trading' emerged as a new nemesis of family farmers, 
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local and international agribusiness firms alike (inteNiew, SupeNisor 
#4). By commodity trading is meant the marketing of a generic 
product, in bulk, across an international and relatively anonymous 
market. Such commodity trading often clears the surfeits and 
surpluses of agricultural production in the global economy and 
typically generates very discounted prices to sellers. Insofar as the 
international agribusiness firms promised an alternative to this form of 
'weak selling' (Hussey, 1992) the inherent threat that they also posed 
to farmers was down-played by the Board. 
To the extent that the integration of wholesaling and processing by the 
agribusiness firms secured the clearance of export produce (Cornish, 
1995), the Board was now to move to a position which was to allow a 
further slide of processing capacity into the hands of these firms. The 
issue facing the Board and the farmers it represented was the trade-off 
between the perceived costs and benefits to farmers from the 
contrasting strategies of backward and forward integration, as 
pursued by international and local firms. Insofar as international 
agribusiness firms became involved in New Zealand in order to secure 
the supply of already existing distributional outlets and markets they 
were potentially, and despite the threats involved, more attractive 
than any local firm. 
The alternative to this change in position by the Board was to foster the 
advancement of local agribusiness firms. At the same time, the local 
agribusiness firms which had been marginalised and relegated to sub-
contracted processing by the Board's policies of farmers' control 
found an added incentive in their diminishing margins to seek an 
involvement in the export trade. However, the relatively small and 
disaggregated character of local firms meant that much of this 
forward drive had to be played out across the sphere of processing. 
As a result, the attempts of local firms (farmers' firms and proprietary 
firms alike) to transcend their marginalisation necessarily repeated an 
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earlier agenda of rationalisation by the international agribusiness firms 
that had been thwarted by the Board. 
An important component of the playing out of this new agenda by 
the local firms (most notably by the Waitaki company and somewhat 
after the event by the Fortex Group) was the displacement of the 
international agribusiness firms. What was at stake in this triangle of the 
international agribusiness firms, local firms and the Board? In the 
earlier period, the much vaunted threat posed by international 
agribusiness firms was, as I have documented, fairly rapidly 
transformed into an historic compromise of domination and 
subordination mediated by the Board. In the latter period, the same 
supposed stranglehold enjoyed by international agribusiness firms 
was, ultimately, used to justify a drive for forward integration by local 
firms (Loach, 1969; McNulty, 1958; Perriam, 1989). 
The Board preferred to keep the issue open on these different 
possibilities. It can be seen in retrospect, however, that the qualified 
success of local agribusiness firms in the competition with international 
agribusiness firms and the eventual 'crowding out' of their rivals was 
predicated on the voluntary withdrawal of the latter from processing 
and the industry. Ironically, the strategy of the local firms was to 
centre on the replication of the size and integration achieved by the 
international agribusiness firms (see chapter 7). 
Subsidising farmers. 
The fourth problem area was the declining rate of return and the 
political arrangements for price support and subsidised farming. 
Despite a considerable rhetoric lauding the benefits of market and 
product diversification and especially of 'adding value' (Hussey, 1992; 
Meat Industry study and Trade Union Education Authority, 1988) there 
can be little doubt that the limitation of the markets in Britain, the 
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European Community, the USA and Canada placed formers in on 
extremely difficult situation. The adverse developments in overseas 
markets were portly manifested as a long-run decline in the terms of 
trade (Deportment of Statistics, 1990: 610-611). After the termination of 
the Bulk Price Agreement in 1954, sheep and beef formers never 
regained the high profits they benefited from in the early 1950s 
(Economic Service, 1956-1995). While there were fluctuations in form 
incomes and after tax profits'? more recently, the per annum profits on 
these types of forms declined for every year from 1972, except 1974-
1976, 1983 and 1989 (Alexander, 1990). 
The central response by the Meat Producers' Boord and the National 
Government to this decline in form incomes was to augment the 
prices received by formers for their stock. Such transfers of income 
began immediately following the termination of the Bulk Purchase 
Agreement. A 'floor price scheme' was instituted by the Meat Export 
Prices Act (1955) that established the setting of minimum prices and 
allowed deficiency payments in order to keep the industry 'afloat and 
functioning' (Deportment of Statistics, 1982: 970). The Economic 
Service commented that: 
\\ It is hoped that with the provision of incentives -mostly of 
a financial and fiscal nature- and of the establishment of 
a 'climate of confidence' in the future of their industry, 
formers will set out on a new round of development such 
as we sow in the 1950-57 period." (Economic Service, 
1964: 4). 
The floor price scheme was administered and funded by the Meat 
Producer' Board. Under the scheme, the Boord established minimum 
prices for various classes and grades of stock at the beginning of each 
killing season. If formers did not receive this price or better from 
7 \\ Because of the generally falling prices since 1964, and especially the 
decline in lamb and wool this year, the sheep farmer is caught by the cost-
price squeeze in real earnest." (Economic Service, 1967: 6) 
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processing firms then deficiency payments were made. It only 
became possible for the Board to monitor the movement of prices 
paid for stock because an increasing number of them were bought 
and sold through 'the schedule' (Shad bolt, 1981). 
The deficiency payments made by the Board extended the range of 
its activities into supporting the very constituency that elected it. The 
payments were funded from its Meat Industry Reserve Account 
(MIRA). These monies were, mainly, a surplus from the Bulk Purchase 
Agreement not yet dispersed to farmers, while the MIRA also received 
a share of the compulsory levy paid by farmers to the Board. The 
balance of the Meat Industry Reserve Account stood at about £40 
million at the start of the floor price scheme. Approximately £320 000 
was paid out in deficiency payments for stock -mainly beef cattle- in 
the following four years. The opening years of the next decade 
required heavy drawings from the MIRA. Deficiency payments of 
£935 000 were made on all grades of mutton and lamb in the 1959-
1960 killing season. Even larger payments were made in the 
subsequent year, involving deficiency payments of £2.3 million on 
lamb and £100 000 on mutton. These payments represented the first 
depletion on MIRA from one balance day to the next. That is, it was 
the first time when the incomings to the MIRA -made up of the 
compulsory levy paid by farmers- was insufficient to meet the needs of 
the floor price scheme. The balance of the MIRA fell from £44.8 million 
at 30 September, 1961 to £43.5 million at 30 September, 1962. There 
were to be no further deficiency payment made until the 1970s. Yet, 
when it was again deemed necessary to implement price support the 
funds in the Reserve Account were deemed to be inadequate for that 
purpose (Department of Statistics, 1982: 970). 
In 1975, despite the very significant handouts to farmers a Commission 
of Inquiry, the Farms Income Advisory Committee, recommended the 
enhancement of further price support. This price support was 
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introduced in addition to the payment to farmers of £45 million under 
various stock retention schemes (Ward, 1972), fertiliser and irrigation 
subsidies, low interest loans and sUbstantial tax write-offs (Cloke, 1989; 
Nolan, 1994; Yerex, 1992). The subsequent price smoothing scheme 
was effectively a revival of the floor price scheme. Although the 
proposed scheme was identified as merely a mechanism of 'price 
smoothing', the Economic Service was unequivocal of the need to 
enhance farm incomes: 
"It should be again stated clearly, that in no way does the 
'stabilisation' or smoothing of meat and wool prices to the 
farmer solve all farming problems or necessarily maintain 
adequate levels of income for the farmer. The level of 
these prices is still the critical factor." (Economic Service, 
1976: 4). 
The Board had used the existing floor price scheme in the 1974-1975 
killing season, to improve prices, to the order of $36 million. Where 
prices were particularly weak the Board also moved to purchase stock 
outright and arranged for their processing and export. In 1971, the 
Meat Export Control Amendment Act broadened the powers of the 
Meat Producers' Board to buy and sell sheep meats. Prior to this 
amendment the Board could only participate in the purchase and 
sale of sheep meat into countries where no market had previously 
existed or to expand markets. With the amendment the Board's 
powers were extended to make it able to buy any meat derived from 
sheep and export into any country. A similar amendment to the Act, 
by an Order-in-Council, in 1974, further extended the Board powers to 
buy and sell beef. Thereafter the Meat Producer's Board purchased 
beef and sheep on an increasing basis from the 1974-1975 killing 
season (Department of Statistics, 1987: 449). 
However, even with $10 million contributed by the Government in 1975 
this type of intervention had seriously depleted the MIRA (Department 
of Statistics, 1982: 970). Such a level of direct price support could not 
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be funded for very long by the Meat Producers' Board if it was solely 
reliant on the MIRA. To solve this problem the Meat Export Prices Act 
became law in 1976. This Act established the Meat Industry 
Stabilisation Account (MISA) with the ReseNe Bank. The MISA was 
funded by the Government and by levies paid by farmers. The Board 
was thereafter able to access it to administer the price smoothing 
scheme (Department of Statistics, 1988: 426). 
In 1978 a second tier of price support was created by the 
implementation of the supplementary minimum prices scheme (SMPs). 
The SMPs operated in parallel to the price smoothing scheme. While 
the price smoothing scheme continued to be administered by the 
Meat Producers' Board, the SMPs were administered by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF). The MAF established minimum prices 
separately to those of the Board. Payments to farmers were made 
depending on the state of the market for stock and on which scheme 
had the lower minimum prices. The supplementary minimum prices 
scheme was funded exclusively by the Government. The SMPs were 
intended to: 
"Provide for farmers reasonable requirements for living 
expenses; farm operating expenditure, and new 
developments, more adequately than would minimum 
prices likely to be set under existing arrangements. U 
(Department of Statistics: 1982: 971). 
From the beginning of the 1981-1982 killing season until the end of the 
1984 -1985 killing season more than a billion dollars was paid out in 
SMPs to farmers. However, the mounting costs of farm subsidies 
(McLean, 1978) and a sea change in the Government policy 
promoted by farmers (Garway Investments Limited, 1988; Hartley, 1989; 
Le Heron, 1988b, 1988c; Le Heron, Roche and Anderson, 1989; Perry, 
1992; Yerex, 1992) led it to terminate the supplementary minimum 
prices scheme and to scrap the Meat Industry Stabilisation Account at 
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the beginning of the 1984-1985 killing season (Britton and Le Heron, 
1986). As an interim arrangement, a lump-sum payment of $131.8 
million was made to the Board (Department of Statistics, 1987: 452). 
After that killing season the prices received by farmers for their stock 
was not supported by the Board. 
While the Meat Producers' Board retained the right to implement 
further price support schemes it undoubtedly lacked the financial 
resources to do so. Furthermore, the effects of farm subsidies were 
decidedly contradictory. The problems with farm subsidisation and its 
negative consequences for marketing was recognised well before the 
termination of SMPs. Thus, McLean (1978) noted that by the late- 1970s 
the point of diminishing marginal returns from increased volumes had 
been exceeded. 
Precisely at the juncture when overseas markets were demonstrating a 
diminished capacity to clear meat exports -at least while returning 
reasonable prices- the various price support schemes and other forms 
of subsidisation stimulated a massive increase in the overall numbers of 
stock and the numbers sent to export slaughterhouses. The growth in 
volumes of farm production and of processing consequently greatly 
expanded the volume of export produce. Table 5.2 demonstrates this 
significant increase in stock numbers and in export slaughterings. 
Table 5.2: Stock numbers and export slaughterings. 
Year 
1950 
1960 
1970 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1994 
Sheep / Siaughterings 
(000) 
32,845 / 15,020 
47,134/21,587 
60,274/31,288 
68,772 / 32,677 
67,854/47,546 
57,852 / 29,413 
50,298 I 29,826 
Cattle /Slaughterings. 
(000) 
2,088/ 494 
3,334/ 570 
5,280 / 2,564 
5,162 / 2,358 
4,613/2,315 
4,593 / 2,256 
4,811 /2,690 
Source: Economic Service, 1976: 11, 24, 1994: 19, 25. 
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The increase in the numbers of stock and export slaughterings was 
most obvious in the sheep flock. The numbers of beef cattle and 
slaughterings remained fairly constant following its rapid growth in the 
1960s. HoweveL the ability of beef farmers to utilise some breeds of 
bovines for either the production of meat or milk casts considerable 
doubt on the 'accuracy' of these records. Furthermore, if the price for 
veal or manufacturing grade beef is relatively high or the pay-outs on 
milk fats are relatively low, dairy farmers are always able send part of 
their dairy herds to slaughter. What is very obvious is the close 
correlation between farm subsidies and volumes of sheep production 
and processing. Thus, sheep numbers peaked at around 68 million in 
the final year of price support and fell away drastically thereafter, 
thereby stimulating a brief -but very large- upturn in the volumes 
processed and exported. Currently (in 1995) there are now about 50 
million head in the sheep flock, and around 29 million lambs and ewes 
are annually sent to export slaughterhouses. This level of stocking and 
processing is comparable to that found in the early 1960s. 
Delicensing. 
The problem areas already discussed -the marginality of local firms, 
the restructuring of markets, the new problematic relationship with 
international agribusiness firms, and price support- were to lead to a 
fifth and distinct problem area, that of delicensing. Turkington has 
argued that: 
"Producer licenses usually limit competition and the meat 
industry is no exception to this rule. The motive underlying 
its licensing appear to be two fold: to ensure an 
acceptable standard of meat export facilities and to 
protect companies already operating in the industry." 
(Turkington, 1979: 1). 
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While Turkington's comment may be seen to have misconstrued the 
intentions of industrial licensing they formed part of the milieu in which 
the Meat Producers' Board eventually withdrew from the licensing and 
inspection of export slaughterhouses. This withdrawal at first involved 
only the transfer of the administrative responsibility for the licensing 
and inspection of export slaughterhouses to a greatly expanded 
department of government, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
(Meat Division). This transfer was achieved by amendments to the 
Meat Act (1939) and culminated in the passing of the Meat Act (1964). 
The Act made the administration of the licensing of export 
slaughterhouses (initially the responsibility of the Board) the 
responsibility of MAF. An Order-in-Council, the Meat Regulations 
(1969), also made the inspection of export slaughterhouses the 
responsibility of MAF (McNab, 1974). Thus, any applications for 
licences, were initially directed to the Minister of Agriculture, although 
the department and its Minister were still required to act on any 
recommendation of the Meat Producers' Board. 
In 1976 these moves to restructure the place of processors in the 
representative structure of the industry were further advanced by the 
Meat Amendment Act. This Act established yet another agency, the 
Meat Industry Authority (MIA) (Savage, 1990: 62). This new agency, 
the jurisdiction of which overlapped the Board, consisted of four 
members who were appointed by the Minister of Agriculture: a 
chairman, a representative of the Meat Producers' Board, a 
representative of the NZ Freezing Companies Association, and a 
representative of the employees in the industry (which was never 
filled). The new agency was made responsible for: (1) the 
development of efficient and economic slaughtering, processing, 
chilling, freezing, and storage facilities for the NZ meat industry; (2) the 
investigation and review of justification or economic need for the 
establishment and extension of (above) facilities; (3) the investigation 
and review of the justification or economic need for the existing 
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(above) facilities; (4) to be a licensing authority; (5) to report to the 
Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (on the above); (6) to recommend 
to the Minister for consideration by the Government changes to be 
made in the ownership, organisation, operation, and financial 
arrangements of the meat slaughtering, processing, and freezing 
industries, where such changes may be desirable to effect more 
efficient and economic industries; and (7) the MIA was required to 
implement the policy of the Government. 
Savage (1990) notes that the Meat Industry Authority (MIA) was very 
important in the withdrawal of the Board from industrial licensing. 
Although the Meat Producers' Board retained considerable influence 
on the MIA the longstanding requirement for the Minister of 
Agriculture to act on the recommendation of the Board was ended by 
the Meat Amendment Act (1976). Insofar, as the Ministry appointed 
the MIA this act finally transferred the executive, or decision-making, 
responsibility about the licensing of processing plants to the Minister 
and MAF and must be considered, then, to be at least a symbolic 
marker in the changed relations of the industry (Bartley, 1987). 
The new role of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries in the licensing 
of export slaughterhouses was however to be downgraded soon after. 
A subsequent rewriting of the Act removed the consideration of the 
impacts on the character of processing in granting of licenses for new 
or enlarged export slaughterhouses. The deliberation of 'economic 
necessity or justification' and the 'probable or possible effect of the 
proposed freezing works' were removed from the ambit of the Ministry. 
Thereafter export slaughterhouses were licensed on the basis of 
whether or not they had adequate and hygienic facilities and 
acceptable methods of effluent treatment (Savage, 1990). 
The Meat Act (1981) is often identified as another watershed, or 
symbolic marker, in the recent history of the export industry (Hartley, 
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1989; Le Heron, 1988b; Nolan, 1994). Delicensing is portrayed as 
symptomatic of the diversification and decline of agriculture, of the 
erosion of the socio-political importance of farmers (Font, 1990; 
Lawrence, 1990; Lawrence, Share and Campbell, 1992), and the 
autonomy enjoyed by the Board (Bartley, 1987). In this regard, it is 
crucial to identify the essentially voluntary abdication of responsibility 
for the licensing of export slaughterhouses by the Meat Producers' 
Board, and the importance of the statutory powers it retains. While the 
Board ceased to playa role in the licensing of export slaughterhouses, 
it did so precisely at the juncture when the costs to farmers from the 
existing dispersion of processing plants and resultant over-capacities 
(Evans, 1985) began to exceed its benefits. In turn, delicensing has led 
to a more pro-active role for the Board in rationalising the processing 
sector. To this end, the Board was to move more directly into 
marketing and to carry this through established its own investment firm, 
Freesia Meats in 1985. 
Managed rationalisation and Freesia Meats. 
The transformation in the character of overseas markets, the loss of 
control by the Board in this global sphere, and the subsequent 
responses and attempts at a reworking of the form of farmers' control 
exercised by the Board were especially obvious in the sphere of local 
processing. From a position in which the Board had exercised its 
powers of licensing to oppose rationalisation, the Board was to move 
towards an agenda of managed rationalisation (coupled with a 
rhetoric of farmers' ownership). 
A report produced by Garway Investments Limited articulated the 
Board's new position: 
"The most effective means processors have within their 
control to restructure and survive is to reduce the fixed 
costs of operation through the closure of works. Closures 
of current facilities to fully equate capacity with the level 
of throughputs in 1988 are estimated as follows: 
North Island 
South Island 
New Zealand 
Required Works Closures. 
9 
6 
15 
This represents a closure of 46 out of a total of 155 sheep 
and beef chains. U (Garway Investments Limited. 1988: 2). 
110 
With this change, the Board came to invest heavily in the processing 
sector (see chapter 7). This change in Board policy was in line with the 
banks, the most significant backers of the processors in the industry. 
From the mid-1970s business interests and the banks began to urge the 
closure of the oldest freezing works and the amalgamation of 
agribusiness firms (Crocombe, 1991; Crocombe, Enright and Porter, 
1991; Evans, 1985; Garway Investments Limited, 1988; Hussey, 1992; 
McKinsey, 1988; McLean, 1978; Turkington, 1979; Woods, 1988; Yerex, 
1989, 1992). The positions of these interests constituted a new agenda 
for the 'rationalisation' of the networks in the export meat industry. It 
included two proposals: (1) that only large firms could be trusted to 
properly access the overseas markets, and (2) that a significant share 
of the processing sector should be closed-down in order to eliminate 
excess capacity (Le Heron, Roche and Anderson, 1989). Certainly, 
there can be little doubt that the aging and under-utilised freezing 
works (Hartley, 1989) checked any innovation in work practices and 
compliance with the ever more stringent 'hygiene regulations' 
imposed by the European Community (Meat Industry Study and Trade 
Union Education Authority, 1988: 20-23). 
In many ways this programme of rationalisation merely recycled the 
one threatened earlier by the international agribusiness firms and then 
forestalled by the Board. However, while this agenda of rationalisation 
was initially pursued by the agents of big business and was, in part, 
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merely advancing the interests of very large corporations,8 by the time 
of 'delicensing' the Board had discovered the utility of widespread 
closures in processing. This change in orientation of the Board arose 
because of the acute problem with under utilisation that Board policy 
had promoted. This problem was exacerbated by industrial unrest 
(see chapter 6) and a sharp decline in stock and slaughterings in the 
late 1980s. The significant increase in export slaughterings stimulated 
by the end of SMPs was only a short-term phenomenon. While it 
provided a temporary boost to processing firms -or at least kept them 
busier than usual as farmers culled unwanted stock- the over capacity 
in processing needed urgent redress (Evans, 1985). Only five freezing 
works had been closed permanently in the years between the 
formalisation of industrial licensing and prior to 1985 (Shields, 1982) (see 
table 5.3). 
Table 5.3: Plant closures, 1934-1985. 
Year Firm 
1974 Swifts 
1979 Gear 
1981 AFFCo 
1982 Waitaki-NZR 
1982 Vesteys 
Works. 
Ngahauranga 
Petone 
Southdown 
Picton 
Patea 
The decades of industrial licensing and the intense competition 
between processing firms that it engendered had also cemented an 
operational logic whereby processing firms regarded freezing works as 
sunk costs and operated them accordingly. That is, where any 
freezing works even approximated a point of breaking-even in its 
operation through the killing season, then its owners were typically 
8 The critique of the role of Boards in export oriented agriculture culminated 
with the 'Porter Project' (Crocombe, 1991; Crocombe, Enright and Porter, 
1991), sponsored by the Labour Government and the 'Hussey Report' 
(Hussey, 1992), sponsored by the Business Roundtable. The clearest rejoinder 
in defence of the Boards, to date, has been by McWilliams, A, for the Boston 
Consulting Group, cited in Stewart, K., 'Freemarket follies', NZ Listener, 
25/6/94; and by Steele (1995). 
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hesitant to close it. In this regard, the over-capacity found in the 
processing sector, the interpenetration of catchments for buying stock, 
and the limited stock available for slaughter each killing season 
combined with the result that any down-sizing of processing capacity 
by one firm would immediately benefit its competitors. As a result, 
although the overseas markets displayed increased uncertainty, the 
focus of the processing sector remained squarely on capturing 
throughput. In addition, the generous redundancy agreements 
secured by the Meatworkers' Unions also added to the costs of 
freezing works closures (Turkington, 1979). 
"In 1985, it was free, open, competition starting again. 
The Roger Douglas (Minister of Finance) theories were 
coming in, and predators, and so the Meat Board in those 
days had a Meat Industry Reserve Account, or MIRA as it 
was called, and there was $230 million in that. When the 
product went back to the companies there was a long 
negotiation with Douglas. He wanted to keep all the 
money ... because there had been a loss of nearly a 
billion. In the end he recognised that it was a 
Government scheme that we administered (SMPs). But he 
did keep $100 million of the money and $130 million came 
back to the Board on the understanding that 70% of it 
went into a commercial organisation. That is where 
Freesia was born." (interview, Director #2).9 
The Board identified the direct involvement in the ownership of local 
firms as a means of securing change and of both consolidating firms 
and down-sizing processing capacity. To this end, the Board 
delegated the bulk of the balance of the Meat Industry Stabilisation 
Account -of approximately $80 million dollars- to an investment 
9 This respondent was a very senior and long serving member of the Meat 
Producers' Board. In his tenure with the Board he had been privy to most of 
the decisions to reshape and re-orient the statutory body. The respondent 
presented himself as, in part, trying to bridge a gulf between the old and the 
emergent forms of inteNention. Perhaps because of his centrality in 
decision-making the respondent presented the most grounded account of 
the Board in which it was presented neither as a panacea nor as a bogey. 
The respondent was a farmer, although he bemoaned that for the last 
fifteen years his commitment to the Board and associated bodies had made 
him into a part time farmer. 
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company formed in late 1985 and wholly owned by it. This investment 
arm of the Board, as I have already noted above, was called Freesia 
Meats. 
While the control over the licensing of export slaughterhouses by the 
Meat Producers' Board had been first-and-foremost concerned with 
preventing the closure of freezing works and the exit from the 
processing sector of a range of small and otherwise highly vulnerable 
firms, the establishment of Freesia Meats by the Board had the 
opposite intention. Thus, the formation of Freesia Meats constituted a 
break with fifty years of industrial licensing and practice wherein 
overlapping catchments were forced on processing firms. 
The formation of Freesia Meats pushed the Board towards direct 
intervention in processing. The establishment of Freesia Meats was to 
facilitate a rationalisation of the industry, and, what is most important, 
to down-size the processing sector. In order to offset criticism that this 
agenda was inimical to the interests of farmers, Freesia Meats stated its 
commitment to farmers owning the processing sector. However this 
objective was not actively pursued until the demise of Waitaki 
International (see chapter 7). The investment arm of the Meat 
Producers' Board was to become involved with incumbent firms, and 
chiefly in the Waitaki company, mainly to shut down old freezing works 
or, less often, to prepare them for the co-operatives. Thus, Freesia 
Meats purchased shares in and, like the banks, made loans to 
agribusiness firms to facilitate the closure of freezing works and, less 
often, the transfer of ownership to co-operatives. At the same time, 
Freesia Meats tried to facilitate the exchange of freezing works to 
allow processing firms more defined areas of stock procurement. To 
this end, the Board was willing to write down its investment in a 
processing firm in exchange for the elimination of its unwanted 
processing capacity. For example, Freesia Meats provided AFFCo with 
a loan of $19 million to compensate for its closure of the old Shortland 
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freezing works (1985),10 and has written down $58 million of its 
investment in Waitaki International, Garway Investments Limited and 
the co-operative Alliance Freezing Company.11 
The contribution of Freesia Meats and direct intervention by the Meat 
Producers' Board to a rationalisation of the processing sector can be 
measured by its direct involvement in the closure of eleven freezing 
works (see table 5.4) and a greater number of other partial closures 
(Le Heron, 1988b).12 
Table 5.4. Selected plant closures, 1985-1993. 
Year Firm 
1985 AFFCo 
1987 Waitaki /Richmonds /Vesteys 
1988 Waitaki /Fletchers 
1988 Waitaki /Fletchers 
1989 Waitaki /Fletchers 
1989 AFFCo 
1990 AFFCo 
1991 Alliance 
1991 Alliance 
1991 AFFCo 
1993 AFFCo 
Plant. 
Shortland 
Whakatu 
Burnside 
Islington 
Dunedin 
Waingawa 
Longburn 
Ocean Beach 
Kaiapoi 
Feilding 
Horotiu 
Freesia Meats also obtained a strategic share in some of the leading 
local firms, including AFFCo, Alliance, Waitaki International, Richmond 
and the Fortex Group. Such shareholding was primarily intended to 
further 'collective agreements' mediated by Freesia Meats to shut-
down parts or all of old freezing works (Savage, 1990: 71-75). Evans 
(1985) estimated a reduction of existing processing facilities by 40%, 
and Garway Investments Limited (1988) of around 60%, was required 
to balance processing capacity with throughput. In short, the Board, 
through its investment arm Freesia Meats, played a part in the 
10 'Company clout may shut works', Christchurch star, 5/3/88. 
11 'Meat Board in loss with Freesia write downs', Christchurch Press, 29/2/92. 
12 Knight S., 'Predators circle farmer co-ops', NBR Weekly, 7/9/90. 
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elimination of about a third of the overall processing capacity that 
existed at the time of its formation, within the sphere of lamb and 
mutton processing. However, in doing so, the Board expended about 
$100 million dollars from its coffers. 
Ironically, however, while Freesia Meats was frantically seeking a 
reduction in processing capacity, and was consequently doing deals 
with incumbent firms, the movement into the industry of a host 'new 
entrants' (Hartley, 1989) went largely unchecked. More than a dozen 
enterprises -including three corporate giants- entered (and exited) the 
industry in the years since delicensing and most of these did so during 
the lifetime of Freesia Meats. Their entry had been promoted by the 
delicensing procedures in the Meat Act (1981). 
Most new entrants also introduced new facilities into the processing 
sector. In a number of cases, existing abattoirs or previously closed 
freezing works were licensed as export slaughterhouses (see 
appendices 1 and 2). Elsewhere, entirely new facilities were built. The 
bulk of these new facilities were configured for the processing of beef, 
nevertheless, modern plants like those built by the Fortex Group at 
Seafield (now Phoenix Meats) and Silverstream (now ppeS) more than 
compensated for any closures secured by Freesia Meats. 
This influx of new firms and the construction of modern processing 
plants was diametrically opposed to the programme of consolidation 
and closures being pursued by the Board. The proliferation of new 
firms and new processing capacity calls into doubt the raison d'etre 
for Freesia Meats and certainly the viability of investing in plant 
closures. For example, the high (and arguably unnecessary) costs to 
the Board and Freesia Meats, the co-operatives and farmers in 
general, of investing directly in the closure of freezing works is 
underscored by the collapse of Vesteys in 1994 (see table 5.5). 
Table 5.5: Selected plant closures, 1988-1994. 
Year Firm 
1988 Vesteys 
1994 Vesteys 
1994 Vesteys 
1994 Vesteys 
1994 Vesteys 
1994 Vesteys 
1994 Vesteys 
Works. 
Westfield 
Tomoana 
Kaiti 
Awapuni 
Cambridge 
Feilding 
Whangarei 
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Vesteys had garnered a reputation in the industry of investing in its 
freezing works only the minimum required for the purposes of export 
licensing. Its Westfield (built 1916), Tomoana (built 1882), Kaiti (built 
1902), and Feilding (built 1916) freezing works were some of the oldest 
in the industry and the elimination of these facilities fitted precisely the 
programme of Freesia Meats (Hartley, 1989). But, it was the pressures 
from intensified competition in stock procurement, processing and 
declines in its off-shore operations which forced the closure of the 
entire Vesteys operation in New Zealand. In other words, these closures 
occurred without any intervention by the Board/Freesia Meats. In this 
regard, the main criticism that was to be levelled at Freesia Meats, by 
farmers and agribusiness alike, was that by investing in the incumbent 
firms it actually forestalled and ameliorated crises when it would have 
been better served by allowing the cycles of boom and bust to be 
played out. 13 
It is sufficient to note that, after substantial investment from the 
Board/Freesia Meats the collapse of Waitaki International and its 'sale' 
to the co-operatives (in 1990), criticism of the Board intensified sharply 
from all quarters (see chapter 7). Thereafter, legislative amendments, 
firstly, eliminated the Electoral College in favour of the direct election 
of farmers' representatives to the Board (in 1994) and, secondly, 
expanded the composition of the Board to include on it a minority of 
13 Riddell, 0., 'Commission approves Weddel proposal', Christchurch Press, 
3/2/1995. 
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representatives from agribusiness firms (in 1995). The latter 
development saw the significant removal of the term 'Producers' from 
the name of the Board. It was renamed as the Meat Board of New 
Zealand. 
This reconstitution of the Board can be viewed as an unfolding of a 
form of corporatism. However, the contention by Bartley (1987) that 
recent changes in the Board's policies express the process of 
marginalisation of farmers seems somewhat premature (Wallace and 
Lattimore, 1987; Nolan, 1994). Furthermore, his argument about the 
survival of the Board as a mere intermediary or arbiter of sectional 
interests are decidedly overstated (Coulomb and Delorme, 1989).14 In 
this regard, it is very important to note that the recent legislative 
amendments were not imposed on the Boord in so much as they were 
negotiated by its members (Weir, 1992). As one senior member of 
Federated Farmers and the Board commented: 
\\1 think there is a definite role for a Producers' Board, but it 
isn't what they have been doing. It is a 1990s and 2000s 
role. II (interview, Director #3). 
This new role for the Board relates to marketing and to the use of 
franchises in overseas markets. 
14 \\ ... it has been argued in this thesis that Government established the 
Meat Board in 1922 as a corporate interest group, favouring it with statutory 
powers to regulate the whole of the meat industry, particularly meat 
companies which were viewed suspiciously by farmers. While initially these 
powers were free of direct Government influence (with the exception of 
World War 2), this changed as the political influence of producers declined 
relative to other sectors. Governments became increasingly reluctant to 
give producers unconditional favoured treatment. Although the Board 
remained the central institution in the industry, it was required to adopt the 
role of a semi-governmental body adjudicating between the various 
interests in the industry, including meat companies, before formulating policy 
on behalf of the industry." (Bartley, 1987: 126). 
Single selling and franchising the market. 
"Intervention of this type by the board involves not only 
setting the schedule but olso arranging for the marketing 
OVl9rseas of the various products on their own account." 
(D(~partment of Statistics, '1988: 425). 
"In 1982 we decided thClt Japan, especially, was being 
usEtd as a sort of disposal market. Some of the product 
thClt was going there was disgraceful really. When I say 
dis<;;:JracefuL it was fatty, and they just hate fat. So we 
declared North Asia a development market, which 
means that only one operator goes in to sell all the 
product. Everyone can ,supply it, but it goes through a 
celtral outlet." (interview, Director #2). 
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Like oil the rest of its responses to the new and uncertain environment, 
the Board sponsored and then tried to subordinate associations of 
agribusiness firms. In 1966 the Morket Development Committee (MDC) 
was estCiblished by the Boarcl with the aim of encouraging the 
diversificCltion of markets. This move into direct involvement with 
marketin~J operated by setting marketing targets for meat exporters. 
These targets were calculated in terms of the percentage of exports 
into markets outside of Britain. -rhose individual exporters that did not 
meet the target paid a levy, while those individual exporters that did 
exceed tile target received a bonus. The directorate of the MDC was 
drawn from officials of the Board and of various processing 
compani'9s. This programme was suspended in the 1980-1981 killing 
season bi9cause the actual divE~rsification of exports (of 48.8% outside 
the markets in Britain) had for exceeded the marketing target 
establishE~d the previous year (of 34% outside the markets in Britain) 
(Departrrent of Statistics, 1987: 449). 
In fact th'e Market Development Committee played only a minor role 
in the divi9rsification of marketinG. The main strategy for diversification 
and the control of marketing WClS to involve the creation of a series of 
franchise arrangements. This was to involve a much greater degree of 
activH involvement of the Boarcl in coordinating markets. Processing 
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companies secured franchises from the Board through the granting of 
meat export licenses. These licenses stipulated the supply of specific 
markets with specific products. In addition the Board also established 
a number of marketing companies to co-ordinate the supply of 
particular markets. These companies were owned by the Board and 
the holders of export licenses for that market. They were to operate in 
monopoly conditions. 
In 1960 the Meat Export Development Company (DEVCO) was 
established to oversee the market for lamb in the USA and Canada. 
All lamb sales into these North American markets were controlled by 
Devco whose directorate was also drawn from officials of the Board. 
and various processing companies. Similar marketing companies 
were established for the supply of Japan (Janmark) and other Asian 
markets (ANZCO, later renamed the New Zealand Lamb Company) 
(Department of Statistics, 1987: 449). International agribusiness firms 
were initially granted a disproportionate share of export licenses into 
the new markets. Senior managers from Borthwicks and Vesteys 
played an important part in Devco, Janmark and Anzco and 
consequently in the development of the Asian and North American 
markets. 
These connections between the Board and firms were to develop 
more systematically through a series of 'councils'. In 1971 the Meat 
Exporters' Council (MEC) was formed. This council represented all the 
companies holding meat export licenses and acted to advise the 
Board on the co-ordination of marketing. However, the MEC was 
disbanded in 1982 when, in response to a glut of unsold meat in Britain, 
the Board assumed ownership and responsibility for marketing. In 1985 
the ownership of exports was returned by the Board to meat export 
license holders and the Meat Planning Council (MPC) was formed to 
continue the involvement of firms in decision making over marketing. A 
director of the Board noted what the MPC was saying to the industry: 
"You will be part of setting the criteria for the licences and 
you will be part of the process of auditing to see how well 
the companies 'A' 'B' and 'C' are performing. You tell us, 
because you know best. You are in the market place. 
You tell us how they are performing, and bring it back to 
the Meat Planning Council. And, if the are not 
performing, well, we will take their license away ... In the 
end it probably has to be the Meat Board that actually 
does take the licence away, because if you had a group 
of companies taking another company's license away 
obviously they would scream blue murder and say they 
are being victimised. So you need an intermediary." 
(interview, Director #3). 
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In 1993 the Meat Producers' Board and the Meat Planning Council 
prefigured the formalisation and codification of franchising deals 
when they proposed the creation of quotas for specific markets. They 
proposed to parcel out the 200,000 tonnes of lamb available for the 
EC and the 192,800 tonnes of beef available for the USA to individual 
firms. The initial share of the EC or USA market allocated to individual 
firms was to be based on the historic contribution of each firm. The 
individual firms could then choose to fill the quota or to sell all or part 
of it to a competitor. 15 
Such a reworking of franchising appealed to most of the incumbent 
firms in the industry because the supply quotas would constitute for 
them a new and tradeable asset, whereas the opposition from new 
firms -with no history of supplying the export markets- was vociferous. 
The 'new entrants' (Hartley, 1989) argued that they would be 
excluded from the networks in the industry because the expense of 
buying a supply quota would add significantly to the costs of starting-
up a business. Their complaints coupled with doubts from Federated 
Farmers were to stymie the proposal to rework franchising. 
15 Kitchin, E. 'Outrage could stall meat quota proposal', Dominion Sunday 
Times, 5/9/93; Portanger, E. 'Banks back meat quota proposal', National 
Business Review, 13/8/93, 'Meat quota plan scraps new Japanese Venture', 
National Business Review, 13/8/93. 
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Nevertheless, the Meat Producers' Board retained its statutory power 
to designate any overseas market as a 'special access market' and to 
determine the mix of firms that export there (Hussey, 1992; Meat 
Industry Study and Trade Union Education Authority, 1988). A director 
obseNed that: 
\\1 don't think the Board is going to give that (power) away 
very quickly, because in the end it is the only real power 
that they have." (interview, Director #3). 
In other words, a de facto form of supply quota pertained, based on 
the continued authority of the Board to withdraw the right of entry by 
any agribusiness firm to export markets. This defacto system applied to 
the most important new markets for meat, in the Middle East, Mexico, 
Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, the former USSR, and the USA and 
Canada. 
Conclusion: The changing character of the Meat Board. 
The extent to which the Board disciplined agribusiness firms ebbed 
and flowed in the seventy years since its formation. At first the Board 
operated to stabilise a multiplicity of plants and agribusiness firms in 
the processing sector. The Board also cemented a pronounced form 
of marginality on local firms. This form of farmers' control prevailed for 
long as international agribusiness firms secured the markets in Britain 
(Cornish, 1995) and could be prevented from establishing monopsony 
in localised markets for stock. Its rationale was found in the reworking 
of a form of wholesaling in the interests of farmers. 
Shifting circumstances and the shifting policies by the Board were to 
lead it to dispense with some aspects of its authority to license 
operations, while it simultaneously moved to: (1) administer and 
partially fund the subsidisation of farming; (2) foster a form of 
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managed rationalisation in processing (thereby reversing its previous 
opposition); and to (3) use the licensing of meat exports to impose 
fresh disciplines on agribusiness firms. Overall, the focus of the Board 
shifted from the prevention of monopsony in the localised markets for 
stock in the farming districts of New Zealand to being active in 
marketing. The main thrust of its interventions in order to control the 
market can be understood as attempts to franchise the market 
(Dickie, 1992). 
This change in policies by the Board was predicated on mounting 
difficulties in the supply of overseas markets and the shifting nexus of 
threat and benefit posed by integrated agribusiness firms. In the 
decades following the termination of the Bulk Purchase Agreement 
(1954) when the Board lost control of the markets in Britain, it was to 
become increasingly involved in securing the interests of farmers by its 
interventions into marketing. The dual and interlinked character of 
interventions by the Board into processing and marketing was already 
inherent to the legislation that empowered the Board. Thus, the Meat 
Act (1939) created the possibility of two forms of industrial licensing, of 
export slaughterhouses, and of the meat exports. The differentiation of 
industrial licensing was formalised following the end of the Bulk 
Purchase Agreement (1940-1954). Licenses for export slaughterhouses 
were required by the owners, and their agents, for all premises used in 
processing for the export trade. These types of licenses were granted 
on a works by works basis. On the other hand, the licenses for meat 
export were issued to the individuals and businesses that engaged in 
the export trade. In this regard, the licenses for meat export formalised 
the right of a firm to engage in the export trade. 
An important facet of the interventions pursued by the Board in this 
latter period centred on the use of licensing for meat export to impose 
new and more complex disciplines on business. By and large the 
Board eschewed the use of its full statutory powers and tended not to 
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monopolise the sale or distribution of meat. 16 Rather, the Board tried to 
foster the development of new markets and products and to prevent 
all forms of price undercutting be1ween meat export licensees. In this 
regard, the crux of all future interventions by the Board is a working out 
in the interests of farmers of what must come after wholesaling. 
16 Although at times when the market in Britain was very glutted, the Meat 
Producers' Board did not hesitate to direct meat export license holders when 
and where to release frozen meat. "The chairman of the Meat Board (Mr 
Charles Hilgendorf) made it clear last evening that New Zealand meat 
exports were going to be controlled from New Zealand and nowhere else . 
... Mr Wright said he had found widespread criticism from the meat trade in 
Britain of the Meat Board's recent action in directing importers of New 
Zealand lamb to store part of their imports, at their own cost, to spread its 
disposal. ... he (Mr Hilgendorf) wanted to make it clear to Mr Wright and 
everyone else that New Zealand meat exports were going to be controlled 
from New Zealand and not from West Smithfield (Vesteys) or St. Johns Gate 
(Borthwicks)." cited in 'Meat exports controlled from New Zealand', 
Christchurch Press, 23/5/79. 
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Chapter 6 
The Meatworkers' unions. 
Introduction. 
In the previous chapters I detailed how the agribusiness firms were 
constrained and how farmers achieved autonomy through the Board. 
The source of the constraint exercised by the unions was, in part, from 
a compulsory unionism and registration secured by the state. Their 
autonomy was to facilitate a considerable influence by unions on the 
organisation of processing. The meatworkers' unions took the form of 
federal associations made up of branches which, like the 
procurement areas regulated by farmers, represented districts of New 
Zealand. Historically the main branches were, otago and Southland, 
Canterbury and Marlborough, Wellington, Taranaki and Auckland and 
North Auckland (Roth, 1984). The origins of these branches lay in the 
early decisions of officials at the Department of Labour and the judges 
sitting in the Court of Arbitration. 
The meatworkers' unions were registered with a Registrar of Industrial 
Unions. This process of registration allowed the meatworkers' unions to 
take advantage of the procedures of industrial conciliation and 
arbitration. As registered unions they were then able to cite their 
employers to enter into both conciliation and arbitration. The control 
exercised by these registered unions was enforced by the fact that 
unregistered unions could not obtain legally binding agreements if a 
registered union wished coverage in any worksite (Walsh and Fougere, 
1987). Registered or, put another way, licensed unions were granted 
the exclusive or monopoly coverage over workers within their 
occupational grouping. Issues of occupational grouping and 
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demarcation and coverage were determined by the Court of 
Arbitration. 
For the period moving from 1894 (when the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act was passed) through to 1935 registered unions could 
gain coverage only for single industrial districts. That is, each 
occupational grouping within each industrial district had its own 
registered union. The branches of the meatworkers' unions that exist 
today are in many regards a legacy of this legislated fragmentation 
into industrial districts (Holt 1986; Woods, 1963; Young, 1976). 
In addition, the federated character of the meatworkers' union was 
further amplified by the constitution of individual freezing works as sub-
branches of the union (Roth, 1984). The sub-branches COUld, and 
occasionally did, switch their allegiance from the branch that 
encompassed them to another. For example, in 1958, the plants in 
Marlborough abandoned an association of plants based chiefly in the 
lower North Island to form the Canterbury and Marlborough branch. 
Similarly, the plants at Whakatu, Tomoana and Wanganui opted in 
and out of the two main associations operating in the North Island on 
several occasions in the last twenty-five years (McNulty, 1958, 1972; 
Roth, 1984). 
Since the early 1 970s two federations have co-existed in the industry. 
The New Zealand Meat Processors, Packers, Preservers, Freezing Works 
and Related Trades Union covers the South Island and the southern 
North Island and has its head offices in Christchurch. The Auckland-
T omoana Freezing Workers Federation, with its head office in 
Auckland, covers the rest of the North Island. Despite this split, in most 
years the 'national officers' of these associations combined their 
efforts in negotiation with the representatives of New Zealand Freezing 
Companies Association to produce a single, all-inclusive, Award 
(commonly referred to as the National Award). 
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It is my argument that the continued federated character of the 
meatworkers' unions is explained, in part, by its embeddedness in 
local regional networks of the export meat industry.l The prevalence 
of a multiplicity of firms operating in different regions of the country 
operated, as I have argued, to facilitate farmers' control of the 
industry. However when we turn to the unions were find this situation 
facilitated an association of workers whose organisation, in part, 
mirrored the very multiplicity of the firms it opposed. Regional firms 
gave raise to regional unions and this chapter will document how this 
process of isomorphism and associated problems of organising a 
federation was secured in both the craft and the industrial phases of 
the unions (Perlman, 1949). 
"The absence of one or few major firms with which to 
bargain or against whom one could strike meant that 
these unions could not be created by the classic strategy 
of intensive organisation followed by either summit 
conference or a decisive strike leading to union 
recognition and a contract for a single union. As a result, 
the ILA grew by first gaining control over the work force. 
This was possible because decentralised hiring as a labour 
practice existed together with a labour surplus. With many 
seeking, often on a casual or part-time basis, relatively 
few jobs, any group that could control the hiring process 
could please management by keeping wage rates down 
and at the same time build a cadre of loyal followers by 
selectively rewarding certain workers by giving them the 
best jobs. Union leaders, as in the old ILA, could profit from 
both sides, receiving payoffs from the companies as a 
In my discussions with unionists this split in the meatworkers' union was 
overwhelmingly condemned as the result of short-sightedness and of 
personalities of various officials. During 1991 I was fortunate to attend a 
number of a series of meeting held in all the export slaughterhouses around 
New Zealand at which meatworkers voted overwhelmingly in favour of:- (1) 
amalgamating the New Zealand Meat Processors, Packers, Preservers, 
Freezing Works and Related Trades Union and the Auckland-Tomoana 
Freezing Workers Federation; and (2) eliminating the federal structure of the 
enlarged union. The support for these measures was in excess of 95% of the 
membership of the unions. In the ensuing five years no appreciable steps 
have been taken to realise these goals. 
reward for delivering a steady supply of labour at low cost 
and kickbacks from workers in thanks for getting some of 
the scarce jobs." (Wilson, 1973: 249). 
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In an interesting aside comment on unions Wilson (1973) provides an 
early example of the analysis of actor-networks. In this passing 
comment he identifies much of the nexus of constraint and 
enablement faced by unions. To pursue his argument is to open out an 
appreciation of networks which transcend abstracted arguments 
about unions, firms and the character of labour markets (Fligstein and 
Fernandez, 1988; Gospel, 1992). The significance of his insight is that he 
assumes that unions are inevitably conditioned by the embedded ness 
(Granovetter, 1985) of both the firms they confront and by the 
networks such firms are able to construct in order to pursue their 
diverse sets of interests. 
Wilson's argument is centred upon organisation of labour movements. 
He sketches a relationship between the presence of decentralised 
employers and union hiring as control of jobs. strangely, while Wilson's 
observations on the related character of union and employer 
associations forms much of the substance of the later work on the 
waterfront by Kimeldorf (1988), they seem to be largely unrecognised, 
or at least unacknowledged, in the broader literature on unions 
(Fligstein and Fernandez, 1988). In the case of New Zealand, Reveley 
(1992; 1996) demonstrates that the registration of workers on the 
waterfront in New Zealand displaced the gangsterism practiced by 
the ILA and instead engendered a concern by the union with the 
legally proscribed forms of coverage and bargaining (Gospel, 1992) 
common to industrial relations in New Zealand (Walsh, 1994; Young, 
1976). 
Analysis of this type of control was made by Perlman (1949). Jackson 
(1984) has made similar arguments with reference to craft labour 
markets. Although circumstances in the export meat industry were 
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different to those faced by the ILA the ability of the meatworkers' 
unions to operate its own variant of the hiring hall was in like manner 
central to its early success as a craft union. The power of the 
meatworkers' unions leading to its influence in markets for labour and 
stock originated, as Wilson's comments suggests, in the multiplicity of 
firms in the industry and especially in the processing sector. In this 
respect, the insights of Wilson (1973) allow an extension of analysis 
beyond those delineated by Fox and Flanders (1969) in terms of weak 
employers acting as an external source of union strength. 
From the perspective of John Neilson, then, managing director of 
Waitaki International, the problems facing employers were their 
fragmentation and consequent inability to organise any effective 
utilisation of resources: 
"The South Island meat processing industry is in better 
shape than the North Island, where expensive chaos exists 
-primarily because of the 'competitive' diversity or 
fragmentation of the structure. 
The accuracy of my figures depends on definitions, 
but in the North Island: (1) There are twenty-three plants; 
(2) There are ten different owners; (3) There are six co-
operative plants with one third of the total capacity for 
processing cattle, sheep and lambs; (4) There are five 
plants owned by two public companies with a capacity 
of only about 15% of the total; (5) There are four plants 
owned by two private companies with about 6% of the 
sheep and lamb capacity and 10% of the cattle 
capacity; (6) There are seven plants owned by overseas 
companies, and they have 50% of the sheep and lamb 
capacity and somewhat less in cattle; (7) And, there is 
one plant 50% owned by and English company and 50% 
owned by farmers. 
What an unholy mixture! And it is not only their 
structure that is different: their motives and goals must also 
be very different. The optimum use of the capital works 
and the labour force can never be reached while the 
situation outlined continues to exist. I cannot emphasise 
this enough." (Neilson, 1983).2 
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The specific configuration of firms in the processing sector meant that: 
"Individual plants are very vulnerable to strike action. The 
cost of one week's strike in a typical three-chain plant is 
around $350,000. A plant cannot count on support from 
neighbouring plants, which stand to benefit from the extra 
kill that becomes available. A strong and intelligent union 
leadership at both the national and local level has been 
effective in exploiting this vulnerability to extract 
concessions and to resist change. The relatively high 
degree of seasonality in New Zealand's export kill 
exacerbates the problem for local management as 
compared with their overseas competitors because of the 
urgency to complete the kill and use of seasonal labour." 
(Evans, 1985: 2-22). 
Multiple firms both local and international in the processing sector 
were a longstanding, and arguably the defining, feature of networks in 
the industry. Processing firms were essentially local concerns. Even 
those plants which were owned by very large integrated marketing 
companies (Cornish, 1995) were embedded in localised markets for 
labour and for stock. It was in these markets that the meatworkers' 
unions could confront management. 
Craft unionism. 
The first processing plant in New Zealand began its operations in 1882 
(Barton 1984) and during the next twenty years more than thirty 
'freezing works' were built around the farming districts of the country 
(see appendix 1). These plants constituted the processing sector and 
provided the capacity for the industry to slaughter stock and to freeze 
meat (Hartley, 1989). The processing plants were characterised by the 
2 Neilson, E. J., 'Planning for sUNival in the Meat Industry', Speech to the 
New Zealand Society of Accountants, Wellington Branch Convention, 
Wairakei, 17 September, 1983, Archives of E. J. Neilson. 
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craft of the slaughtermen. Siaughtermen were skilled workers / 
craftsmen who executed all the tasks in the butchery of stock (Loach, 
1969; Scott 1973; Waites, nd). This craft organisation of the labour 
processes in export slaughterhouses endured for more than fifty years. 
During this time no slaughterman in New Zealand could find work in 
the export slaughterhouses of the industry without first joining the 
meatworkers' unions. 
For slaughtermen, and this was a male only occupation, registering for 
work entailed the classic craft union practices of 'buying a ticket' from 
union officials (interview, Union official #4). This ticket was a license to 
work. The tickets were 'sold' by union officials whose wages were 
calculated for many years, in part, as commissions from such sales 
(McNulty, 1972). A slaughterman who worked the Australasian circuit 
of processing firms describes how the ticket-licenses operated: 
"Each individual province (in New Zealand) had its own 
union, but they were all affiliated. A union ticket from up in 
Auckland would cover you in the South Island and vice 
versa ... That year (in 1931) I arrived in Wellington and went 
to the union office in Wellington. A fellow named Alex 
McLeod was the union secretary. I asked if there were any 
vacancies in the lower half of the North Island. Alex said, 
yes there are a few. I asked where they were and he said, 
they want two or three men at Patea and they want men 
at Longburn. Longburn was a pretty good place, just 
outside Palmerston North, so I said, I'" go to Palmerston 
North ... If there had been no vacancies I would have 
gone to the South Island." (interview, Meatworker #1). 
During the early years of the export meat industry the (forerunner of 
the) meatworkers' unions achieved considerable success in the 
worksites largely through their control of the movement and hiring of 
itinerant slaughtermen in freezing works around Australasia (Needham, 
1987; Roth, 1984). The slaughtermen were undoubtedly the closest 
manifestation of an 'aristocracy of labour' of their day. Many 
slaughtermen, like the shearers who worked the farms, pursued an 
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annual circuit of employment between the Australian states and 
provinces of New Zealand. This circuit followed the peak of the killing 
season in these areas. Thus, each year, as the demand for 
slaughtermen peaked in Queensland and then New South Wales and 
Victoria (Willis, 1985) several hundred slaughtermen would sail to New 
Zealand to secure some further months of work. Hence, the 
foundations of the meatworkers' unions lay in governing the access of 
a skilled and very mobile workforce to work in the export 
slaughterhouses around New Zealand. The same slaughterman as 
quoted above concludes with an account of how the circuit was 
informally organised by the slaughtermen coming to arrangements to 
supply labour: 
"In 1925 we (sailed from Sydney and) landed in Auckland 
on Christmas Eve .... I had the idea going to Southdown ... I 
went into the Southdown office, they were the Auckland 
Farmers Freezing Company. When I went in to apply, the 
chap in the office put me on to the manager. The 
manager said, there are no vacancies at Southdown at 
the moment. He said, there will be some at Horotiu at bit 
later on, but not over the holiday period. He said, if you go 
to Morewa there is a job there and you can start in the 
morning. On Christmas morning! He said, they are 
overstocked and short of slaughtermen. He said, have you 
got any mates on the ship? I said, yes, two or three. He 
said, if you can give me a gang of six slaughtermen I'll 
pay for your voyage from Sydney, I'll pay for your first class 
return to Morewa, and guarantee you six weeks works at 
£10 a week ... We got the six weeks full time and then we 
got our first class ticket back again, and a guarantee of 
the same conditions if I brought back six men next time. 
Anyhow I jacked up six good fellows and went back ... 26, 
27, 28 and 29. For the last three years I was the delegate 
there. " (inteNiew, Meatworker #1). 
In this arrangement the overlap of union delegate and recruiter of 
labour illustrates the way in which the union was inseparable from 
hiring. 
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Siaughtermen were inevitably paid on a piece rate for the slaughter 
and dismemberment of stock, however they also usually restricted 
their output to the butchering to an informally agreed number of 100 
sheep in a working day. A working day normally lasted eight hours 
with lunch and tea breaks accounting for one hour. This level of output 
meant that individual slaughtermen maintained a daunting rate of 
work in which they slaughtered a sheep, stripped away its pelt, 
disjointed the hooves, beheaded the carcass, disembowelled it, and 
trimmed off any excess fat and ligaments, every 4.2 minutes (inteNiew, 
Meatworker #1). The all-inclusive nature of the slaughtermen's work 
merited them the appellation of 'solo' slaughtermen. Normally each 
slaughterman was assisted by a rouseabout or labourer who cleaned 
away the mess of slaughter and placed the carcasses in muslin bags 
prior to its blast freezing. Unlike the slaughtermen, the labourers were 
paid day wages or hourly rates and usually lived locally to the freezing 
works. 
No real effort was made by the craft unionists in New Zealand to 
include the unskilled and locally domiciled labourers in their 
Siaughtermen's Federation (which was formed in 1909) until after the 
First World War (Needham, 1987; Roth, 1984) when several small unions 
were established to cater for the labourers in the provinces. Principally 
the labourers relied on the good will of the slaughtermen they worked 
alongside of to win them occasional pay increases. As a solo-
slaughterman noted: 
"The labouring sections more or less consciously 
depended on whatever the slaughtermen got. They never 
actually took action of their own. There may have been 
one or two occasions, but they always sought the support 
of the slaughtermen. " (inteNiew, Meatworker #1). 
Siaughtermen and labourers were mentioned in the same legally 
binding agreement (called an Award and negotiated under the 
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auspices of the Court of Arbitration) for the first time in 1920. The details 
of and rationale for the alliance which produced the New Zealand 
Freezing Workers' Union (NZFWU) are now unclear, however what is 
more apparent is that their brotherhood was invariably an uneasy one. 
Hence, when some of the international agribusiness firms (Borthwicks 
and Vesteys) moved to supersede the craft way of butchering stock, in 
1932, by introducing a variant of the assembly-line (the chain) the New 
Zealand Freezing Workers Union abruptly collapsed as labourers, 
previously dependent on the goodwill of the craftsmen flocked to do 
work previously undertaken only by slaughtermen (Harrison, 1963 Roth, 
1984). 
The eventual conclusion of this change in the organisation of the 
labour process was to shift unionism in the industry from an 
international craft form, operating between the labour markets of 
Australia and New Zealand, to regional unions securing control of 
regional labour markets. Continuities with the older craft form, 
however, were to survive. The slaughtermen retained much of their 
skills. As a result what was in one sense a break in the form of 
unionism also facilitated the union's organisation beyond the 
slaughterboard. This took the form of the generalisation of the 
delegate system across the departments of processing plants in which 
the men on the slaughterboard remained central. 
The unions' control of the seasonal nature of employment in the 
industry remained important. Like the farmers, who exercised control 
through their legal rights to supply on a seasonal basis to the 
processing firm of their choice, the unions sought and achieved 
control of the seasonal hiring of the labour employed to slaughter this 
stock. The strategies of the different actors can be seen as having a 
certain symmetry. 
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New opportunities for union organisation. 
The chain was introduced to processing plants in New Zealand by the 
large integrated marketing firms of Vesteys and Borthwicks (Cammack 
and Inkson, 1984, 1988; Willis, 1985). The chain was certainly not a new 
innovation as variants of the assembly-line had been used in creating 
the 'industrial slaughter' (Hounshell, 1984) of cattle in North America for 
many years prior to their introduction to the export slaughterhouses in 
New Zealand. Indeed, such versions of the 'dis-assembly line' 
(Braverman, 1974: 274-275) were more-or-Iess perfected by 
meatpacking firms based in Chicago and Cincinnatti some fifty years 
prior to their appearance in New Zealand. These developments were 
noted by commentators of the time (Critchell and Raymond, 1912; 
Sinclair, 1949) and inform the later writings of business historians 
(Chandler, 1978, 1990: Hounshell, 1984) and sociologists (Kujovich, 
1970; Novek, 1988; Novek and Yassi, 1990; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Portz, 
1991; Sorj and Wilkinson, 1985). 
When the dis-assembly line was first introduced to freezing works in 
New Zealand, in 1932-1933, it displaced the solo-slaughtermen whose 
daily 'tally' was considered to be 100 sheep each working day. This 
tally was also to determine, in part, the expectations of output from 
firms running the chain. Trials with different versions of the chain, in 
various processing plants around New Zealand, resulted in the 
adoption of a variant with sequential workstations engaging thirty-two 
men along it. This configuration of the slaughterboard was known as 
the 'Morewa system' (Loach, 1969). The movement of the chain was 
thereafter adjusted to equal the tally previously expected from 32 
solo-slaughtermen. The new chains were therefore paced to process 
3200 sheep each working day. This was a tally for individual chains 
which was to remain the industry standard until the mid 1980s. This 
level of output required the movement of approximately 7.6 carcasses 
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onto the chain each minute of what was typically a seven hour 
working day. 
There can be little doubt that the decision on the port of Borthwicks 
and Vesteys to rebuild the slaughterboards of their plants in New 
Zealand around a dis-assembly line owed much to the prevailing 
inteNentions by the Meat Producers' Boord. These moves by the Boord 
were intended to curtail the efforts of international agribusiness firms to 
increase their shores of throughput and exports (Harrison, 1963; 
Knightley, 1981). Prior to the introduction of the chain the Boord of 
Control interpreted its powers under the Export Control Act (1923) very 
broadly. For example, the Boord granted or declined meat-export 
licenses in terms of the welfare of local actors (formers and the weaker 
of the local firms) in the industry rather than in terms of hygiene and 
public safety for which the lows were originally drafted (Hayward 
1972). Using this interest in welfare the Boord fixed the capacity of 
processing plants by determining the maximum number of solo-
slaughtermen they could employ. Each slaughterman was assigned 
and worked alongside a 'hook' on the slaughterboard from which 
animals hung while they were butchered (Loach, 1969). In order to 
restrict the international agribusiness firms, such as Borthwicks and 
Vesteys, the Meat Producers' Boord merely stipulated the number of 
hooks in the meat-export licenses it granted to them. The statutory 
body therefore not only restrained the international agribusiness firms 
but also simultaneously legitimated the output levels typical of the 
slaughtermen. 
The introduction of the chain by Borthwicks and Vesteys was clearly 
intended as a means of by-passing the stipulations of the meat-export 
licenses. By eliminating the solo-slaughtermen and replacing them 
with less skilled workers, who were ordered and machine-paced by 
the dis-assembly line, the international agribusiness firms hoped to 
disrupt the Boord's limitation of their operations which was, in turn, 
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based on the limitation of a craft workforce. At the same time, the 
introduction of the chain promised to eliminate the reliance of 
processors on troublesome slaughtermen and to thereby subdue the 
New Zealand Freezing Workers Union. The chain was actually 
introduced first, by Borthwicks and Vesteys, in processing plants which 
had gone on strike in the previous killing season (1931-1932). These 
strikes were in opposition to sweeping pay cuts that reduced wages in 
the sector to around 1917 levels (Roth, 1984; Needham, personal 
communication).3 
Insofar as the chain was intended to circumvent the Board and to ruin 
the union through its radical modification of work in export 
slaughterhouses, this early example of transforming the labour process 
in the industry was to prove something of a disappointment for both 
Borthwicks and Vesteys. On the one hand, the bid by the international 
agribusiness firms to by-pass the practices of meat-export licensing 
was trumped by the Meat Producers' Board in the form of the 
Slaughtering and Inspection Amendment Act (1934) and the 
subsequent Meat Act (1939). This legislation empowered the Board of 
Control in a full-fledged version of industrial licensing (see chapter 4). 
On the other hand, the eventual configuration (Depla, 1988) of the dis-
assembly line which predominated in the export slaughterhouses did 
not force down the numbers of meatworkers, nor did it erode the 
wages of meatworkers, nor did it produce an enduring disruption of 
the union (Roth, 1984), as was perhaps anticipated by the 
management of processing firms. Some measures of the resilience by 
meatworkers and their union to this particular try at re-engineering the 
factory are captured in the following table (see table 6.1). 
3 Stuart Needham is writing a MA thesis in the Department of History here at 
the University of Canterbury concerning the history of meatworkers' union in 
the South Island during the fifty years prior to the implementation of the 
chain. I am indebted to him for sharing his insights with me about this 
otherwise neglected topic. 
Table 6.1: Numbers of meatworkers, nominal wages and wages 
of meatworkers relative to all workers, 1901 -1994. 
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Year Number Annual wage Ratio: wages 
of meatworkers of meatworkers 
1901 2,221 
1911 3,978 
1921 8,328 
1923 7,145 
1928 6,139 
1933 6,365 
1938 7,835 
1943 10,137 
1948 11,821 
1953 11,516 
1958 13,748 
1963 16,995 
1968 19,555 
1973 24,047 
1979 31,327 
1984 32,168 
1989 23,350 
1994 20,000 
(nominal $) 
374 
480 
486 
558 
756 
948 
1358 
1890 
2248 
2730 
4860 
8845 
17707 
meatworkers 
/011 workers. 
1.05 
1.17 
1.33 
1.36 
1.35 
1.28 
1.29 
1.35 
1.39 
1.31 
1.38 
1.15 
1.23 
Source: Department of Statistics, 1922: v-vii, 1923: vi-3, 1928: 10-12, 1933, 
11-12, 1938: 11-12, 1940: 971, 1943: 11-12, 1953: 32-35, 1958: 39, 1963: 45, 
1968: 48, 1973: 44, 1979: 8-11, 1984: 18-12; Economic Service, 1960: 8, 
1977: 11, 1985: 20, 1994: 26; Evans, 1956: 34; Chris Jackson-Jones, 
personal communication. 4 
4 Chris Jackson-Jones is an economist with the Meat Industry Association. 
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The above table indicates that the new labour market of meatworkers, 
rather than the slaughtermen, was probably able to improve their 
position relative to all other workers in New Zealand in the years 
following the implementation of the chain.5 Such an outcome for 
labour in terms of wages following on the introduction of the dis-
assembly line fits with other accounts of the introduction of the 
assembly line in the early twentieth century (Beynon, 1975). 
By contrast, Piore and Sabel (1984) use the case of the meatpacking 
industry in the USA as typifying of the techniques of mass production 
and leading to the marginalisation of craft. For them, the introduction 
of the dis-assembly line in meatpacking houses and of refrigeration 
technologies in railcars and stores entailed not only the elimination of 
a craft but also its irregular seasonal rhythms of production.6 This latter 
point is extremely significant. 
The implementation of the chain in export slaughterhouses had 
significantly and immediately eroded the union's control over the 
markets for labour. The chain 'de-skilled' work on the slaughterboard 
(Cam mock and Inkson, 1984, 1988) to the extent that several weeks 
would suffice to train new slaughtermen to begin work on the dis-
assembly line. In this respect, the processing firms were able to hire 
local and unskilled men to replace the solo-slaughtermen and 
5 "Wage levels are regarded as high in comparison with industry generally. 
It is difficult to measure the extent of this difference. Any comparison 
between the average earnings of freezing workers and all industries, which 
could be made by using statistics from the Department of Labour's Half 
Yearly Survey would suffer from several inadequacies. It would not take into 
account the range of variations in pay packets between workers and stages 
of the season. Nor would it give an accurate picture of the comparative 
annual incomes of the workers concerned including periods spent 
unemployed or on lower work." (Meat Industry Training Board, 1978: 9). 
6 "This seasonal pattern permitted an elaborate division of labour that 
economised on butchery skills, but obstructed mechanization. Semiskilled 
labourers could be laid off at the end of the cold season, but special-
purpose butchery equipment could not be; hence, there was no point in 
installing it in the first place." (Piore and Sabel, 1984: 58-59). 
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troublemakers. A good many of the former solo-slaughtermen were 
thereafter locked out of work. Indeed, the implementation of the 
chain in combination with the seasonal and intermittent character of 
work in processing plants foreshadowed the likely casualisation of 
employment in the processing sector. In this respect, the fate endured 
by farm workers provided meatworkers with a dire example of the lot 
of a fragmented, unskilled and non-unionised workforce in New 
Zealand (Martin, 1984, 1987; Rotherham, 1980). 
A new association of meatworkers was formed, in 1937, in the 
aftermath of the introduction of the chain, the New Zealand Freezing 
Workers and Related Trades Association (NZFWA). This effort by the 
meatworkers' unions to regroup, and the broader effort among unions 
in New Zealand to recover from a sustained offensive mounted by 
employers (Walsh and Fougere, 1987), was aided greatly by the 
election of the first Labour Government in 1935 and its support of 
compulsory unionism (Holt, 1986; Woods, 1963; Young, 1976). 
Nevertheless, even with the benefits from compulsory unionism (and, in 
part, because of such state-sponsorship of unions) the NZFWA pursued 
a strategy that was very different to its predecessors. Whereas the 
Siaughtermen's Federation and the New Zealand Freezing Workers' 
Union had relied mainly on the scarcities of its craft workforce to 
secure the labour markets for it, the NZFWA instead centred its efforts 
at reconstituting a form of union control through embracing the tenets 
of seniority in seasonal employment (McNulty, 1958, 1972; Roth, 1984). 
In the case of the export meat industry in New Zealand the collision of 
techniques of mass production with seasonal forms of pastoralism 
described a very distinct trajectory. I argued previously that any 
'rationalisation' (see chapter 3) in the export meat industry of the type 
assumed by Piore and Sabel (1984) (and desired by Critchell and 
Raymond, 1912) was more-or-Iess forestalled by the Meat Producers' 
Board. Hence, even after the introduction of the dis-assembly line into 
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the processing sector, the industry in New Zealand remained the most 
seasonal of all meat industries (see table 6.2). 
Table 6.2: Seasonality in meat processing. 
Country. Days/Year slaughtering. 
New Zealand 160 
Australia 230 
USA 250 
UK 250 
France 240 
Source: Evans, 1985: 2-4. 
Hours/week 
slaughtering 
40 
40 
50 
60 
50 
The operation of processing plants, the timing of their throughput and 
of the volumes for export were ultimately governed by the dictates of 
posture growth (McLean, 1978), and they remained so largely 
because this very seasonal form of production best suited the interests 
of family formers (Curtis, 1992). Rother than advance the processing 
(and forming) of stock as a year round set of endeavours (Sanderson, 
1986), the introduction of the chain by processing firms was effectively 
subordinated to the prevailing forms of seasonality. Further, the impact 
of seasonality on the configuration of work in processing plants was 
evidenced materially in the building of multiple or parallel chains 
across the slaughterboards of freezing works in New Zealand. Such 
variants of the dis-assembly line were in place in all the export 
slaughterhouses in New Zealand by 1956 (Cammock and Inkson, 1984; 
Shields, 1982). 
An important reason for building multiple or parallel dis-assembly lines 
in freezing works was that it allowed processing firms considerable 
flexibility to odd and to shed processing capacity in response to the 
seasonal fluctuations in the numbers of stock sent to slaughter by 
formers. Thus, the killing season commenced each spring (the custom 
is that it storts officially on 1 October) and reflects the increase in the 
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numbers of stock (new born lambs and yearlings) then available for 
slaughter. Typically, the processing plants throughout the country 
commenced operations around this time by starting up only one of 
their killing chains (called the first chain). A meatworker explains: 
"If the company has done its homework ... it will know to 
call bock the right number of men. Like on the mutton 
chain, there is probably a particular time of the year when 
the (firm's stock) buyers have been around and have got 
their order books full. The company then divides the 
number of chains that are required into the number of 
stock that is expected." (interview, Meatworker #3). 
As the numbers of stock being mode available by formers increased 
throughout the spring the processing plants increased their capacity to 
slaughter by starting up the other of their killing chains (called the 
second chain, third chain, lost chain). Average-sized freezing works 
operated three chains and the largest in New Zealand (Alliance, 
Lorneville) operated seven chains. At the height of the killing season, 
during the summer months of December, January, February, the 
processing plants would operate all of their chains. During the autumn 
the numbers of stock then available for slaughter (mainly old ewes 
and other culls) tapered off. In response, the processing plants 
decreased their capacity to slaughter by shutting down their killing 
chains one after the other (lost chain, third chain, second chain, first 
chain). Thus, processing plants typically ceased their operations all 
together during the winter months of June, July, August because at 
this time little to no stock was mode available to them by formers. This 
period of shut down in the processing sector of the industry was called 
'the slack' . 
Clearly the use of parallel chains in freezing works allowed flexibility in 
their operations and, what is most important it allowed firms to 
respond promptly to the decisions of formers and competitors in the 
essentially localised markets for stock. At the some time, this 
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configuration of the dis-assembly line further reinforced an existing 
level of over-capacity in the processing sector (Evans, 1985). In this 
regard, the unusual (in comparison with North America and Argentina) 
use of the dis-assembly line also seNed to intensify the emphasis 
placed by the management of firms and processing plants in the 
export meat industry on securing throughput (New Zealand Freezing 
Companies Association, 1980: 28). At the same time, the intersection of 
the dis-assembly line, seasonality and hiring requirements following 
from this 'peculiar' arrangement enhanced the capacity of unionised 
workers to organise and regulate their own labour markets. 
Union organising in a seasonal industry. 
The weight which processing firms were forced, inescapably, to place 
on securing throughput (to the very great benefit of farmers!) 
simultaneously entrenched their vulnerability to manoeuvres by the 
union that might disrupt these endeavours. Although the specific 
relationship remains unclear, the seasonality in processing 
undoubtedly shaped the predisposition of meatworkers to go on strike 
(Alexander, 1972; Geare, 1972a, 1972b, 1972c, 1972d; Howells and 
Alexander, 1968a, 1968b; Howells, and Woodfield, 1970). The key to 
the success of the meatworkers' unions had, subsequent to the 
implementation of the chain, laid squarely in its ability to regulate an 
international market in slaughtermen. In the new arrangements, after 
the chain, the meatworkers' union could (threaten to) interfere in the 
localised markets for stock of processing firms only after they had 
protected themselves in the (increasingly) localised markets for labour. 
Their solution was to institutionalise a queuing system for jobs known 
more generally as 'seniority'. 
Given the seasonal and intermittent character of employment in the 
processing sector and the 'numerical flexibility' (Atkinson, 1985) which 
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the parallel chains gave to processing firms, the struggle for seniority 
was crucial to the union. A meatworker recalls the 1950s: 
"When I started in the industry (1951) you didn't get ten or 
eleven months employment (in a killing season) like they 
do now. You got ten weeks or three months ... They used to 
call it the hundred day season." (interview, Meatworker 
#2). 
Without any rules of seniority meatworkers faced the prospect of 
minimal security in their employment from killing season to killing 
season, while their elected representatives could be singled out and 
effectively blacklisted. Seniority, then, was viewed as securing a new 
form of unionising within the plant as well as regulating the labour 
market. A meatworker explains how the absence of seniority 
empowered the processing firms: 
"There were no set rules about seniority. It was normally 
understood that you were in the first twelve, or fifteen, or 
twenty (to start work). But if you were a naughty boy the 
employers would have no hesitation in saying, we don't 
want you this year. And they would get away with it... I 
was driven out of the industry in 1932. That was the year of 
the big strike ... Every time there was a dispute of any kind 
they (the employers) wanted every shed to fix it up on 
their own. They would never acknowledge to the union, or 
make known to the union, that they had an Association of 
their own. Most of the more intelligent of the union 
members knew that their was an Association. And, that it 
was linked with Australia. I learnt that to my expense. I was 
barred in Australia and the next year I was barred in this 
country." (interview, Meatworker #1). 
Hence, the union's fostering of rules of seniority for employment in 
export slaughterhouses meant codifying and stabilising not so much 
the right to work as the rules governing who had access to work and 
their tenure in a killing season. Not surprisingly then, gaining seniority is 
remembered as a crucial development. A union official explains how 
this was actually a two-stage process. In the first stage: 
"This shed was a forerunner of seniority. We won it here in 
1952-53. (Before that) there was seniority but the company 
never recognised it." (interview, Union official #6). 
This informal agreement was then codified in 1958: 
"Once the national union (sic) was formed then the 
seniority was bought into the Award. Seniority is fair 
because people had their favourites and a lot of foremen 
and bosses had favourites. They could turn around and 
say, well that fellow has been here twenty years but I 
don't like him. I had an argument with him. I'll get 
someone else in." (interview, Union official #6). 
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The main union argument for seniority was that an individual's job with 
a specific processing firm, from killing season to killing season, 
constituted continuous employment in terms of gauging his length of 
service with the firm. Union men argued that continuity of employment 
should apply notwithstanding the cyclical break in work imposed by 
the shutdown of the plant each year (in the slack). 
The management of processing firms resisted the union's demands to 
formalise the practices of seniority. Their claim was that employment 
(like work) started anew with each killing season. However, such 
claims by management were undermined by their own longstanding, 
albeit informal, recognition of the seniority. For example, it was usual 
for the men employed in the previous killing season by any processing 
firm to be summoned to return to work and notified of the dote of 
commencement for the current killing season. Further, it was normal 
for men to start work earlier and to finish work later in the killing season 
as they increased their length of service with that firm. That is, a 
newcomer would inevitably start and finish work with the last chain, 
while a man with twenty years 'continuous' employment would start 
and finish work with the first chain. 
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This structure of employment applied in like manner to the men on the-
dis-assembly line as well as to those in the myriad of 'follow-on' 
departments (casings, fellmongery, smallgoods, rendering, etc). 
Custom and practice rather than rules ordered the factories. A 
meatworker explains that these agreements could, of course, be 
broken: 
"They had a gentleman's agreement. I can remember 
that they had put a lot of slaughtermen off one time and 
then a flush of lambs came in and management wanted 
to bring them back on. The union wouldn't hear of it. The 
union was saying, if you start that then you'll be popping 
people off down the road all the time." (inteNiew, 
Meatworker #3). 
Management also contended that seniority would jeopardise the 
smooth running of a processing plant insofar it would denude the 
slaughterboard and follow-on departments of men with particular sets 
of skills. In this sense, the struggle over seniority bridged the issues of 
control of labour markets and of labour processes or work. That is, 
while the implementation of the chain definitely failed to enhance 
overall levels of productivity in freezing works,? it at least offered 
management some hope of wresting control of other aspects of the 
employment relationship from its newly de-skilled workforce 
(Cam mock and Inkson, 1984; 1988). 
It was this advantageous prospect for management that concerned 
the meatworkers. Their solution, the codification of seniority was won 
in piecemeal fashion, from processing plant to processing plant. In 
addition, the elected worksite representatives of the union also 
obtained control of all the practical aspects of training and the limited 
forms of job rotation (Edwards, 1979). Union control of training was 
critical. It also speaks to the degree of skills retained by the 
7 Indeed the implementation of the chain was described to me as resulting 
in 'the longest go-slow in industrial history' (inteNiew, Manager #4). 
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slaughtermen despite the introduction of the dis-assembly line. A union 
official speaks how this 'service' supplied by the union regulated the 
labour market. 
"When (the delegate for the slaughtermen) gets a learner 
slaughterman, he is trained in three jobs. When he is 
qualified as a slaughterman he can do all those three or 
four jobs. So when (the foreman) calls at the start of the 
year he knows what the group of people can do." 
(interview, Union official #6). 
The formalisation of conditions of seniority in the National Award of 
1958 (McNulty, 1958) ratified the union's informal control of the labour 
market and, in particular, of the practices of hiring and firing. Indeed, 
the codification of rules of seniority, arguably, gave the union even 
greater authority than it had enjoyed in the days of the solo-
slaughtermen. A meatworker explains how in a particular plant these 
rules were used: 
"(The foreman) really hated (a casings worker). He was a 
lazy bastard. Well one season (the foreman) didn't notify 
him of the start-up. We all got to work and after a couple 
of days said, where is that bugger (the worker). When it 
came out that (the foreman) hadn't notified him there 
was hell to pay. The company restarted him. After that 
(the foreman) could never get rid of him." (interview, 
Meatworker #2). 
Seniority, then, became a key feature of the union's endeavours. As a 
union practice it utilises the formalisation of a queuing arrangement for 
jobs. Seniority was determined by the allocation of a 'number' to 
each men who worked in every department of the freezing works. The 
most senior man had the lowest number, the least senior man had the 
highest number. As senior men retired or permanently quit work the 
less senior men gradually obtained the lower numbers. A man's 
number determined his right to work and his tenure of employment in 
each killing season. Thus, the slaughtermen with seniority numbers 1 to 
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32 might start and finish work with the first chain; the slaughtermen with 
numbers 33 to 64 might start and finish work with the second chain; the 
slaughtermen with numbers 65 to 96 might start and finish work with the 
third chain. At the some time, the casings workers with numbers 1 to 20 
might start and finish work in the casings deportment processing the 
guts and runners mode av?ilable by the first chain; those with seniority 
numbers 21 to 26 might be reliant on the second chain; those with 
numbers 27 to 32 on the third chain. 
The strict order of queuing imposed by the seniority numbers could be 
modified only by the agreement of the workforce and, what is more 
important of their elected representatives within each deportment of 
the freezing works. A meatworker explains how a worker could carry 
two numbers: 
"I hod a seniority number on the mutton chain and in the 
boning room. The union hod no objection to having a 
seniority number in both rooms because they hod a way 
of counteracting that. You hod only a week to turn up 
after you hod been called in. Should they ask me to go 
into the boning room when I was working on the mutton 
chain and I didn't go into the boning room within the 
week then I would lose my number... But (the union 
delegate) might soy to me, what about you staying on in 
the mutton chain and let some guys who haven't got a 
job go in front of you?.. Suppose the foreman of the 
boning room, said (to the union delegate), I want another 
man. He would look down the seniority list and it might soy 
that I am the next one due to come bock. The delegate 
might soy to him, Smith is down the rood on the dole, 
starting them would be a neat compromise. Bring them 
bock instead of me. That'll be okay, I've got a job. The 
union would have a quick meeting about it and soy if it 
was okay. They would have no worries. 
Q: If you then got put off the mutton chain could you then 
start in the boning room and (Smith) would go down the 
rood? 
A: I hod that option if I wanted to exercise it. A different 
thing would be if you were outside and wonted 
dispensation not to go back. You see (in the above case) 
I was given dispensation not to go back. It would be a 
different thing if you were whitebaiting (fishing) and 
making a lot of money. Or if you were being crafty and 
you were a builder with a house to finish. The lads would 
not accept that at all. You were not working within the 
confines of the system." (inteNiew, Meatworker #3). 
Union delegates and the organisation of processing. 
"There used to be an open drain that ran along the 
slaughterboard, beneath the chain, well I've seen jokers 
stop work and take a piss, right there. Whenever a carcass 
fell into the drain, they'd just pick it up and put it back on. 
They'd laugh about it. 
Q: What did the boardwalkers (supeNisors) do? 
A: "Nothing." (inteNiew, Meatworker #2). 
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During the 1960s and even more so in the 1970s the processing plants 
of the export meat industry were the most strike-prone worksites in New 
Zealand (see table 6.3 and table 6.4). Further, as the head of Hellabys 
-a long established firm in the industry- noted industrial disharmony 
coincided with sky-rocketing costs in the plants. 
"The cost structure started to get away from us at that 
period. More so I think because you know we started to 
really lose control within the plants." (Sir Alan Hellaby, 
1992).8 
8 Sir Alan Hellaby was inteNiewed in 'The Black Singlet Legacy', which was 
broadcast on 3/11/1992 as part of the series 'Marae' by Television New 
Zealand. The inteNiewer and producer was T ainui Stephens. 
Table 6.3: Strikes in the processing sector. 
Year 
1923 
1928 
1933 
# Strikes 
4 
1 
# Workers 
on strike 
163 
859 
# Working 
days lost. 
o 
1938 11 2,980 4,878 
1943 8 609 566 
1948 13 3,602 5,792 
1953 5 237 250 
1958 12 2,766 4,487 
1963 15 7,739 31,909 
1968 40 21,954 79,702 
1973 96 73,085 141,738 
1979 181 77,461 141,122 
1984 56 62,253 215,376 
1990 16 13,318 215,923 
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Sources: Department of Statistics, 1924 11/5: 37, 1929 16/3: 42, 1934 
21/3: 27, 193926/3: 29, 194331/3: 35, March 1949: 16, March 1954: 19, 
March 1959: 17, March 1964: 26, March 1969: 16, March 1974: 17; 
Department of Statistics, 1980: 818-820, 1985: 898, 1992: 240, 1995: 319. 
Table 6.4: Strikes in the processing sector as % of all industry. 
Year 
1923 
1928 
1933 
% Strikes 
8.1 
1.8 
% Workers 
on strike 
2.2 
8.7 
% Working 
days lost. 
1938 11.1 26.1 13.8 
1943 11.5 5.5 3.7 
1948 13.1 13.9 5.9 
1953 6.8 1.0 12.9 
1958 10.2 20.1 23.9 
1963 20.0 51.9 58.5 
1968 26.1 58.6 61.2 
1973 24.4 63.0 52.2 
1979 34.6 48.9 36.9 
1984 15.3 38.8 50.6 
1990 11 .6 26.6 65.2 
Source: Department of Statistics, 1924 11/5: 37, 1929 16/3: 42, 193421/3: 
27,193926/3: 29,194331/3: 35, March 1949: 16, March 1954: 19, March 
1959: 17, March 1964: 26, March 1969: 16, March 1974: 17; Department 
of Statistics, 1980: 818-820, 1985: 898, 1992: 240-241, 1995: 319. 
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This loss of managerial control coupled with rising costs and strikes 
promoted academic study. In 1968, Howells and Alexander noted 
that: 
"Of working days lost through strikes in New Zealand 
between 1945 and 1955... meat freezing accounted for 
only 8.3 percent. This pattern has been dramatically 
reversed in the last decade: from 1956 to 1965, nearly 43 
percent of working days lost were in meat freezing." 
(Howells and Alexander, 1968a: 418). 
Seven years later Geare identified much the same: 
"Although the industry employs only approximately 10 
percent of wage-earners, over the last eleven years strikes 
in the industry -have often accounted for more than 40 
percent of working days lost through strikes." (Geare, 
1972d: 15). 
In 1975, Inkson and Simpson also highlighted the bad industrial 
relations record in processing plants: 
"The industry has a bad industrial relations record. The 
Meat Industry Commission Report (1973) shows that the 
industry accounts for about half the total man-hours lost 
per year in New Zealand through strikes, despite 
employing only 2.6% of the workforce." (Inkson and 
Simpson, 1975: 45). 
While Turkington offered a comparative analysis: 
"Three industries, employing only one-tenth of all wage 
and salary earners, account for a preponderance of total 
conflict activity in its collective forms. Meat freezing, 
waterfront and building and construction together 
accounted for 71.8% of workers involved in stoppages, 
59.2% of man-days lost and 45.1 % of stoppages by 
number over the decade 1964-73. In all cases meat 
freezing predominated. Moreover, of the few lockouts 
reported in the same decade, 56% occurred in these 
industries with meat freezing again the most important." 
(Turkington, 1976: 30). 
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The bulk of this research both sociological and psychological, into the 
industry was concerned with the problems of supervision in export 
slaughterhouses (Eichbaum, 1980; Inkson, 1976, 1977 a, 1977b, 1978a, 
1978b, 1979; Inkson and Simpson, 1975; Turkington, 1976, 1979; Walsh, 
1975). This research saw little scope for the redesign of work or the 
employment relationship in export slaughterhouses. Researchers and 
the managers in processing firms wished especially to eschew any 
unfruitful (and unwinnable) confrontations with the meatworkers' union 
(Inkson, 1977b). Researchers instead focused on what was considered 
to be the more readily measurable and the more changeable 
aspects of work and employment. Consequently, the body of writing 
they generated concentrated on understanding the psychological 
profile of meatworkers, on developing new styles of supervision, and 
on linking bonuses to performance. Many of these research efforts 
were closely aligned with initiatives to improve the style of supervision 
in order, it was then argued, to improve the effectiveness . of 
management and the performance of processing firms (Martin, 1975; 
Newton, 1975; Moore, 1978). 
John Neilson, then managing director of New Zealand's largest 
processing firm, Waitaki-NZR recognised that industrial relations 
resembled a wasteland for aspiring managers. He argued that: 
"Industrial relations, worker participation and similar topics 
are continuously before us, yet I fear that our thoughts are 
often superficial and top management too often finds 
more important subjects to occupy their time. Waitaki-NZR 
has nine (freezing) works and 5,000 permanent 
employees. We have many younger men who wish to be 
production supervisors, quality controllers, computer 
managers, salesmen and stock buyers. Despite specific 
requests we have almost no candidates wishing to 
specialise in industrial relations. There is a disturbing 
tendency to shy away from this extremely complex and 
frustrating work- yet it is vital." (Neilson, 1976).9 
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For those in the industry who kept away from industrial relations and for 
those who carried out the research, the problem was that formal lines 
of authority was not how work was organised. A meatworker explains 
the role of the delegate in this: 
"You asked before about the delegate doing some of the 
organising in the room. He did. But only because of his 
power. It wasn't his job. Nor did the company really like it 
to be that way. For example, there might be a little bit 
extra work given to us. We would say, there is nobody 
here to do it. They would say, we will put another person 
into your pool and we'll pay for that person. The company 
might not consider that work to be a full time job. So, later 
on there might (again) be a little bit of extra work done in 
consultation with the union. (The delegate) would say, 
well okay, we handled that. There was not much more to 
do. We did all right with the guy you gave to us previously. 
So, the delegate might go to one of the tables and say to 
the chaps on the tables, why not go down and do the job 
they want you to do? The other can carry on here. But I 
should point out that we were usually loath to do that. 
When the company asked for extra work to be done we 
were always reluctant to do it. We had agreed on a 
contract and we battled quite hard not to do anything 
extra." (interview, Meatworker #8). 
In many respects the delegates, the elected representatives of the 
meatworkers' unions in each of the departments or rooms of a 
processing plant were ultimately responsible for the day-to-day 
running of their room. In a well unionised freezing works only the 
delegate could modify the application of seniority in a room or ask 
men to move between jobs in a room. The slaughtermen's delegate in 
such works were full time. A delegate explains his job: 
9 Neilson, E. J" 'Address to NZ Administrative Staff College', 14 October, 
1976, Archives of E. J. Neilson. 
"I am off the chain. I am the only one. I established that 
when I took over in 1969 as delegate here (of the 
slaughtermen) . We had five chains in those days. Now to 
do justice to those chains, to the men I represent, I 
couldn't work on the chain and be a full time delegate. 
So I decided then that I would not work. And the 
company went along with it. Once I had established that 
then (other processing plants) throughout the country got 
walking delegate ... It works in their (the firm's) interests as 
well. I keep the chains rolling. I keep the men happy and 
the company gets their product, but if they aren't then we 
stop the chain, go to a meeting and it costs production." 
(interview, Union official #7). 
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The authority of delegates to keep the chains rolling effectively 
marginalised the authority of supervisors (foremen). The foremen, then, 
had formal authority to hire and fire, to discipline the workforce, to 
successfully monitor work, or to organise the running of the room. But in 
practice the delegate took the decision. The job of the foreman 
involved focusing their energies on 'manufacturing consent' from the 
all important delegates for each and every of their decisions 
(Burawoy, 1985). As a delegate explains: 
"There might have been a fellow not doing his job 
properly. He just might have put a little nick in the skin 
(when loosening the pelt). The next fellow on line gets into 
its and tears (the pelt). Then he may have got a rip up 
from the boardwalker (supervisor). (The supervisor) might 
say, any more of that and you are down the track. Well 
he (the worker) says, it is not me it is the fellow up the 
bloody line doing it. So, I go to the fellow up the line and 
say, you pull your head in and do your job properly. He 
says, get stuffed it is not me at all, it is that fellow up there. 
And so it is a never ending go along. But somewhere 
along the line someone has got to clear it up." (interview, 
Union official #7). 
In other words, the high levels of industrial disharmony in processing 
plants inevitably coincided with an active involvement by the 
delegates and local officials of the union in the organisation and 
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monitoring of work. Another delegate comments on this active role in 
disciplining the workforce: 
"Our situation wasn't very good a while back so (another 
union official) and I had a meeting. We roughed them 
(the workforce) up. We just told them that the bloody job 
is not getting done. One slaughterman stood up and he 
said, yes and you have all got a (poor) attitude to these 
problems. So (the other union official) really got into him. 
That is your bloody trouble, he says. You have been here 
thirty odd years. You are supposed to be the number one 
slaughterman and you can't do your job. You have got 
the bloody attitude problem all right. And told him that it 
was a collective contract and we were there to bloody 
help each other (interview, Union official #6). 
Union delegates, then, were forced to check unruly workers on the 
chain or in the follow-on departments in order to maximise pay 
(Batstone, Boraston and Frenkel, 1978; Beynon, 1975). This role of union 
delegates in disciplining workers was further complicated by the use of 
piece rates in the processing plants. The Award for Meat Processors, 
Packers, Preservers, Freezing Works and Related Trades stated: 
\\ (Clause) 13. Piecework and Co-operative Contracts: (a) 
Wage rates and special conditions of work for piecework 
and other types of 'payment by result' systems not 
provided for in this Award may be arranged by mutual 
consultation and agreement between authorised 
representatives of the employer and the union." (New 
Zealand and Meat Processors, Packers, Preservers, 
Freezing Works and Related Trades Industrial Union of 
Workers, et aI., 1979: 15). 
At the same time, it was understood by meatworkers that: 
"The Award had bugger all relevance to actual pay and 
conditions. It only set the minimum hourly rates, the 
minimum weekly pay, holidays, long service and sick 
leave. Most of any weekly pay came from the clause 
13s." (interview, Union official #4). 
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Before the introduction of the chain the solo-slaughtermen were paid 
on the basis of numbers of stock they dispatched in a single day. This 
piece rate was calculated and paid to individuals or, more 
commonly, it was 'pooled' and divided equally among all the 
slaughtermen on the slaughterboard (interview, Meatworker #1). The 
labourers who worked alongside the slaughtermen and in the follow-
on departments were paid on the basis of day wages or an hourly 
rate. After the introduction of the chain to freezing works around the 
country (starting in 1932 and completed in the smallest processing 
plants by 1956) a related mix of hourly rates, piece rates and pools 
(co-operative contracts) became generalised for the payment of the 
workforce. Thereafter these practices of pay in freezing works acted as 
an important intermediate variable, coupling the undoubted 
belligerence of the meatworkers' unions with the active involvement 
of its delegates in the supervision of work. 
Piece rates were calculated and paid to pools which normally 
included all the workers on a particular chain or in some follow-on 
department. That is, each department or room in a processing plant 
negotiated its own co-operative contract (called the clause 13s). 
Workers received their weekly wages as an equal share of the pool 
formed under the co-operative contracts. 
The co-operative contracts were negotiated around expectations of 
completing a daily tally. A typical full day's tally on a killing chain 
might be 3200 stock. A full day's tally in a casing department being 
supplied by three chains, might be 9600 runners (mucus linings of 
sheep intestines). Thus, an important daily task of most delegates was 
to scrutinise the tally sheets from the previous working day and to 
confirm that the workforce received full credit for that day's 
throughput. In this regard, the weekly wages of meatworkers were 
closely tied to the amount of throughput secured by the processing 
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plant. It was the delegate's job to monitor this process. A delegate 
explains the detailed nature of this operation: 
"Every day, around 8.30, I go to the foremen and we sit 
down and go through the previous day's payments. It 
comes out (about) the same (each day) but there are 
little pieces in there that they try and knock you over on. 
They will say it (deficiencies in work) was the men's fault 
and we are not paying them for that ... What I get there 
the men get, because they are all governed by what I do. 
If I make a slip up on the payment then they get docked 
right throughout the whole system. That is right. It relies on 
me." (inteNiew, Union official #7). 
A number of factors might influence the calculation of pooled and 
individual pays. Firstly, mechanical faults, delays in the supply of stock, 
deficiencies in stock, sanctioned meetings, etc, could reduce 
throughput to below tally. In such cases, essentially where any blame 
for shortages were not attributable to the workforce, an hourly rate 
(called the minimum) became factored in. For example, should a 
power failure halt processing on a killing chain, then the minimum 
hourly rate would be used to compensate for any 'missed hooks' 
(inteNiew, Union official #7). Secondly, where sabotage or 
deficiencies in work caused shortages in the daily tally, then the piece 
rate was used to make deductions from the pooled and individual 
pays. Thirdly, the chain or, more commonly, the follow-on departments 
might have operated below strength. For example, a co-operative 
contract for a casings department might stipulate that its pool would 
apply to 26 workers. If only 24 men turned up for work on a given day, 
and the room still made tally, then the workers who were present 
would each be due 26/24ths of the pool for that day. Fourthly, and 
what was most important, the different types of throughput (whether it 
be types of stock, runners, pelts, etc) each had their own piece rates. 
For example, slaughtermen might receive an extra 2 cent for each 
unsheared lamb and an extra 2 cents for each uncastrated beast. 
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Similarly, casings workers might receive an extra 1/2 cent for each 
runner from beta lambs (six week old lambs). 
The pay and conditions enjoyed by meatworkers was not wholly the 
result of such local deals secured by the delegates. These outcomes 
were the result of a combination of local and national deals that was 
more generally described as 'two tier bargaining' (Geare, 1983). This 
form simultaneously generated both formal and informal agreements. 
This bifurcation in all the aspects of bargaining proved extremely 
advantageous to the meatworkers' unions and its complexities 
surprised at least one noted researcher: 
"I am amazed at just how peripheral the Award is in the 
day-to-day industrial relations of the industry. It simply 
provides the foundation on which a gigantic 
superstructure of written and unwritten, formal and 
informal, plant, department and even sub-department 
agreements uneasily sits." (Turkington 1979: 7). 
On the one hand, the negotiation of the formal Award was a 
centralised process which involved the representatives, the summits, of 
the employers association (the New Zealand Freezing Companies 
Association) and the meatworkers' unions.lO The negotiations of the 
Award were normally undertaken each year and ultimately produced 
a legally-binding document of some sixty to seventy pages in length. 
This document, the Award, purported to detail the pay and conditions 
in all export slaughterhouses in New Zealand. On the other hand, these 
Awards were 'fictions', insofar as they established only the minimum 
10 The negotiation of Awards formed the sUbstantive area for much of 
research in industrial relations. In other words, academics in New Zealand 
emphasised the legal, procedural, centralised and centralising, and 
'systemic' (Geare, 1983) aspects of industrial relations and work. Hence, 
Walsh (1994) in his recent review article highlights a fascination by 
academics in New Zealand with:- \\ ".new Government policies or legislation, 
on major Court decisions or major disputes, on policy debates between or 
within the (political) parties and on major new developments in industrial 
practice. (Walsh, 1994: 163)." 
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hourly rates and piece rates to be later factored into and greatly 
enhanced by local deals. That is, rather than standardise (average) 
pays and conditions for firms and plants in the processing sector the 
Awards established a benchmark that was renegotiated differently in 
every freezing works and department around the country. A union 
official describes this mix of centralised national and local practice 
involved in this form of negotiation: 
"They (national representatives of the union) would go in 
there (into negotiation) and they would put their claims. 
The employers would put their claims. They would go 
away and discuss them, come back, and the employers 
would make counter claims. The union would make 
counter claims. And affer two or three days they would 
get down to, well do we sign it or not? We might as well. 
And most times we (plant representatives of the union) 
were unhappy with that. Some of the people who came 
back and would tell you how militant they were, and that 
the other five or six assessors voted, and they didn't. It was 
bullshit. And we were stuck with it. So then we did all our 
top ups on the plant." (interview, Union official #6.) 
If the delegates supervised they also had the power to disrupt. This 
power to disrupt lay in their ability to target the operations of individual 
firms where they were most vulnerable, that is in the localised markets 
for stock. For rather than relax the drive to secure throughput, the 
institutional constraints (including the truncated killing season) placed 
on processing firms in New Zealand led them to redouble their efforts 
to do so. Hence, just as the stress of firms on throughput intentionally 
weakened them in their transactions with farmers, it also 
unintentionally exposed firms to the machinations of the meatworkers' 
unions. As one meatworker noted: 
"The union let nothing go. I am talking about 1967-68. 
Times were very buoyant and the company were pretty 
happy in the main about the ways things were going. Not 
that I am saying that we ever blackmailed them!" 
(interview, Meatworker #3). 
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The union inteNened in the markets for stock chiefly by threats to stop 
work and, more routinely, by selective bans on 'loading out' 
(inteNiew, Union official #8). Stop works and strikes were for many 
years a prevalent feature of industrial relations in the processing sector. 
The vast majority of these stoppages occurred at the level of the 
individual departments and many were wildcat stoppages 
(Turkington, 1976). However, because meat processing is essentially 
the dis-assembly of a highly perishable commodity (stock, meat, offals, 
guts, pelts) the men on the slaughterboard. the first department in the 
sequence of industrial slaughter, are greatly advantaged. That is, 
when the slaughtermen stop work the supply of materials to the follow 
on departments also ceases. At the same time, freezing works run to 
detailed schedules wherein stock is purchased some days, weeks or 
even months prior to slaughter (inteNiew, Manager #12). Therefore, 
unexpected and unplanned delays in the processing of stock impact 
almost immediately on the deals made by the processor with farmers, 
the railways, trucking firms. Further, farmers are extremely fickle 
suppliers and they have shown repeatedly that when a processing firm 
is belaboured by industrial unrest it will lose their material support. 
Bans on loading out at specific freezing works were imposed by 
delegates in conjuncture with officials from the union branch. They 
were used by the unions in recognition of the particular problems in 
securing stock faced by processing firms (inteNiew, Union official #8). 
When the meatworkers' unions enforced a ban on loading out it 
meant that no finished product could be removed from the targeted 
freezing works. This form of industrial action meant that the processing 
plant could continue to operate for as long as it had capacity to store 
the hundreds and thousands of frozen carcases, cartons of 
smallgoods, barrels of casings, bales of hides, bales of slipe wool, bags 
of fertiliser and ingots of tallow it generated each working day. 
Normally this type of stricture was placed only on frozen meat. Frozen 
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meat was not only the most important of the commodities made at 
export slaughterhouses but it was the one for which there was usually 
the most storage on site. That is, the bans on loading out seNed notice 
on the management of freezing works that in some days or weeks their 
plant would need to cease operations, meanwhile the meatworkers 
could continue to work and earn. 
The emphasis placed by the union on disrupting the share of 
throughput enjoyed by individual plant and firms (and threatening 
such disruptions) was matched by a disinterest in disrupting the flow of 
exports. Despite the years of intense industrial unrest in the processing 
sector of the industry, the export of meat and other collateral 
commodities (called by-products) was rarely ever curtailed. In other 
words, disharmonies in processing barely affected retail and final 
consumers in the export markets. The relative tranquillity in the flow of 
exports was partly a function of the standardised character of the 
main commodity, frozen meat. That is, a frozen carcass from Alliance, 
Lorneville was indistinguishable to one from AFFCo, Morewa, or any 
other plant in the country. The standardised character of products 
meant that they were effectively interchangeable and that any 
specific export order could be filled from a number of plants. Thus, in 
the rare cases where industrial action jeopardised an export order the 
targeted firm and the Meat Producers' Board could readily broker an 
arrangement to supply the affected customer from massive stocks 
kept in cold stores in New Zealand or overseas. Accordingly, to disrupt 
the flow of exports would have required the meatworkers' unions to 
stop work in the majority of freezing works and to do so for a sustained 
period. Such a coordinated effort was never attempted. Further, in 
many regards such a strategy was inimical to the union. 
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Conclusion: The splintering of union federations. 
Only eight years ago Cammock and Inkson (1988) came to the 
conclusion that in response to the troubles facing the industry 
management and labour in its processing sector had come to an 
accommodation which made paramount the viability of the existing 
actors in the industry. From the perspective of the meatworkers' unions 
such an accommodation reflected something of a truism: insofar as 
processing firms were weakened then the unions were empowered, 
but, insofar as they failed on a regular basis then the unions had 
something of a problem. However, despite its seeming encapsulation 
of the state of industrial relations at the time, the above assessment 
proved to be somewhat premature. 
In short, the working out by the meatworkers' unions of the conundrum 
of how to organise and operate in an industry hit, ever increasingly, by 
the restructuring of overseas markets (see chapter 5) and by business 
failures (see chapters 7, 8 and 9) occasioned a significant splintering of 
its federated structure. 11 At this point, the exertions made by 
processing firms at new forms of integrated marketing forced a 
reworking of deals involving labour and management in processing 
plants. This demonstrated, somewhat paradoxically, that the influence 
by the meatworkers' unions over the markets for labour and stock was 
facilitated by the de-coupled (Weick, 1976) character of the linkages 
11 The beginning of the end of the meatworkers' union reign can be dated 
to 1984. In that year, it was announced that representatives of employers in 
the industry, of the NZ Freezing Companies Association, were boycotting the 
official forum (established in 1974 on the recommendation of a Royal 
Commission of Inquiry) for discussions about the introduction of new 
technology. This and subsequent boycotts by employers and the 
attendance by the union at the forum was a reversal of occurrences in all 
the previous years. Then, the representatives of employers had attended 
and those of the union had boycotted the talks. This reversal in roles 
reflected a shift in the balance of power relations involving management 
and labour. Thereafter plant closures and redundancies forced the union 
ever more onto the defensive (Le Heron, 1988b: 18-22: Meat Industry Study, 
1988). 
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between the labour processes in freezing works and the international 
marketing of meat (Cornish, 1995). 
The mastery of the meatworkers' union over processing firms survived a 
massive de-skilling of craft work (dating from 1932-1933) and lasted 
until the mid 1980s. However, the ascendancy of what might be 
labelled a centrifugal dynamic in the unions was to be greatly 
enhanced by the passing of the Labour Relations Act (1987) and the 
Employment Contracts Act (1990). The longstanding legal 
arrangement of industrial relations in New Zealand was modified very 
significantly by the introduction of the Labour Relations Act. In 
particular, the Act was to outlaw the practices of two tier bargaining. 
The enhancement of formal and centrally negotiated Awards by 
unions through the levering-off of local deals was redefined as illegal, 
and the dualism of formal and informal practices of collective 
bargaining were collapsed. 
Collective bargaining under the 1987 Act required that all the rates 
and conditions that were to pertain to any job were to be brought into 
the negotiation of the Award or (if involving a number of unions) the 
composite agreement. In law, rates and conditions that were not 
codified under an Award could not apply. The intention of the Labour 
Relations Act (1987) was to foster enterprise bargaining while at the 
same time a clause requiring a minimum membership (of 1000) was 
introduced for unions registered under the Act (Brosnan, Smith and 
Walsh, 1990; Deeks and BoxalL 1989). Where the 1987 Act was to 
modify, the Employment Contracts Act (1990) was to withdraw most of 
the longstanding state-sponsorship of unions. The Employment 
Contracts Act was to abolish the entire canon of industrial law in 
favour of the application of the law of torts (Boxall, 1991; Harbridge, 
1993; Harbridge and Moulder, 1992). As a result of the 1990 Act an 
increasing number of processing firms in the export meat industry 
secured employment contracts that in no way related to the 
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commonalities of the 'National Award' and, in some cases, excluded 
membership of meatworkers' unions as a precondition of 
employment. 
At the same time, the state-sponsorship of farmers in their dealings with 
processing firms and in the export markets (Dupre, 1990) did not find 
written or formal expression in the labour laws as they pertained to the 
processing sector of the export meat industry (Carter, 1990; Martin, 
1984, 1987). Conversely, for several years (1976-1981) the Federation of 
Labour was able to appoint a representative to the Meat Industry 
Authority (MIA), a sectoral body charged with making 
recommendations to the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries on issues 
of licensing (see chapter 5). However, I can find no record that the 
summit organisation of the union movement in New Zealand took up 
this proposal. Furthermore, this corporatist acknowledgment of the 
meatworkers' unions should not obscure the fact that it was the 
resolution of dilemmas in the industry affecting farmers and 
agribusiness firms, and made beyond the walls of the export 
slaughterhouses, that instituted the parameters of bargaining and 
straitened the organisation of work in processing (Edwards, 1986; Littler 
and Salamon, 1984; Littler, Quinlan and Katay, 1989). In many 
respects, farmers were the principals in this drama, while the unions 
and management were but bit players. In this regard, a frustration felt 
by farmers with processing firms and with meatworkers reawakened 
their desire to reform the processing sector. 
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Chapter '] 
Waitaki: The development of an agribusiness firm. 
Introduction. 
What might be regarded as a general transition to agribusiness in the 
form of processing firms dominating an industry is not a simple process 
of bureaucratic rationalisation and control (Critchell and Raymond, 
1912; Leopold 1985). This chapter will reveal how politics of 
agriculture inhibit and disrupt any such process. This account will also 
show the intense politics involved in this process, the way in which 
different actors, including farmers and agribusiness firms, change their 
positions over time. The focus of this chapter will be on John Neilson, 
and his 'project' of rationalising the export meat industry through the 
mechanism of the 'Waitaki company' (Perriam, 1989). The account 
will reveal that any sociological account of rationalisation that does 
not include reference to the politics of state agencies and 
shareholders' ownership in firms is misguided. 
The case study provides a chronology of events that describe the rise 
and fall of Neilson's company, Waitaki International. It documents the 
ways in which Waitaki International tried to force both a reworking of 
the networks in the export meat industry, and the forms of governance 
brokered by the Meat Producers' Board. Much of the relationship 
between Neilson and the Board was to be antagonistic, mainly due to 
the Board's stymieing of attempts by Neilson to force change on the 
networks in the industry. 
The history of the business which was assembled as Waitaki 
International culminated in the greatest failure among any of the firms 
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which tried to span the international trade in meat. Rather than 
reworking the networks in the export meat industry and marginalising 
the Board by becoming the largest of all integrated agribusiness firms, 
Waitaki International was to end its days as the greatest debtor in the 
history of the industry. It is my argument that the collapse of Waitaki 
International evidenced a crisis of the agribusiness firms which secured 
the overseas markets and did so through the strategies of integration 
and wholesaling (Chandler, 1978). Hence, international agribusiness 
firms and the largest of local agribusiness firms found their efforts at 
making the markets they sold into ones which were more 'certain' 
(Salais and Storper, 1992) increasingly problematic. 
Neilson attempted to make Waitaki International an integrated 
marketing company (Cornish, 1995). In making this effort he reworked 
a threat to farmers in local and global markets that was previously the 
exclusive domain of international agribusiness firms (see chapter 3). 
Insofar as Neilson's attempt to become an integrated marketer 
involved an attempt to by-pass the Board, it also entailed a reworking 
of political deals with farmers. This reworking involved his takeover of 
competitors and foreshadowed conditions of monopsony which 
farmers had always feared and resisted. From the farmers' point of 
view the threat of monopsony limited the numbers of buyers for stock 
in any farming district, and in the particular case of Waitaki, would 
provide it with a potential to transcend a reliance on the localised 
markets for stock in farming districts around New Zealand. 
However, Neilson was to find his strategies of takeover and integration 
possible to implement only where: (1) the international agribusiness 
firms were clearly in the process of withdrawing from New Zealand 
and the networks in the export meat industry; and (2) the potential 
impact on the competition between firms for stock in the affected 
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farming district was minimaLl More significantly the Waitaki company 
was to prove unable to circumvent the authority of the Board. This 
was largely as a result of opposition from the statutory body during the 
late 1960s and 1970s. 
The sudden bankruptcy (1989) of Waitaki International cannot 
however be read as a victory for the Board and farming. In the last 
years of its operation Waitaki International was to become integral to 
a form of rationalisation then being sponsored by the Meat Producers' 
Board. That is, the Board finally accepted that there were benefits 
from Neilson's rationalisation project and, in particular, from the 
creation of an integrated marketing firm owned in New Zealand. 
Thereafter the statutory body set out to defend the interests of family 
farming through the consolidation of meat firms. The Board 
operationalised its switch in policy by the creation of an investment 
arm (Freesia Meats) in 1985. Waitaki International was to then become 
the main beneficiary of this new policy and of investments made by 
Freesia Meats. 
This change in policy by the Board, and the investments from the 
Board sponsored Freesia Meats coupled with the takeover of a 
number of Waitaki International's competitors, were largely 
instrumental in providing further pronounced shifts in ownership in the 
processing sector of the industry. Waitaki International then was 
central to the majority of upheavals that characterised the export 
meat industry in recent times. The most significant of these changes 
were, firstly, a shift in the key players proposing a reworking to the 
networks in the industry, and secondly, a transformation of the 
response by the Board to the agenda for rationalisation and 
specifically the building of large, locally owned, integrated firms to 
supplant the international agribusiness firms. 
1 'Control held by small investors in NZ Refrig.', Christchurch Star, 4/2/75. 
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This change in Board policy, in favour of a managed rationalisation of 
the processing sector, was not without problems. The Board was to be 
criticised for its handling of the tortuous 'rise' of Waitaki International 
but it also proved equally vulnerable to complaints about its response 
to the firm's precipitous 'fall'. For example, the Meat Producers' Board 
preferred to underwrite an orderly withdrawal from the export meat 
industry of some very large corporate investors in Waitaki International, 
although its decision to do so seemingly conflicted with its 
longstanding aim 'to obtain the highest possible net prices for the 
producer' (Hayward, 1972: 197). 
These events, moves and counter-moves employed by the Board, by 
Neilson and the Waitaki company and by other firms raise questions 
about the role of agribusiness in the export meat industry. They also 
reveal the respective significance of particular actors like farmers and 
Neilson. His career was made and broken in his attempt to transform 
the positions of meat processing companies in the export meat 
industry. This was to bring him directly up against the Producers' Board 
and if in the end it was to adopt much of what he argued for it was 
only to be after he had been 'ceremonially' dumped by interests 
greater than his own. 
The origins of Wanaki International. 
The Waitaki company was one of a number of farmers' processing 
companies established by local farmers after the First World War (see 
appendix 1). Farmers from the Waitaki farming district, which straddles 
North Otago and South Canterbury, were to become concerned that 
with the return to free trade (1921) they were being excluded from the 
buoyant export markets in Britain. The agitation for a Waitaki Farmers' 
Co-operative Freezing Company was one indication among many of 
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a belief among farmers that international and local firms were 
conspiring against them (see chapter 3).2 
The extent of disquiet among farmers in the Waitaki district led in 1920 
to some 369 individuals (mainly local farmers) to subscribe for shares in 
a new farmers' processing company (Perriam, 1989: 28). This surge in 
interest in the formation of a farmers' processing company was 
despite the fact that the Waitaki district was already encompassed 
within the catchment areas (for the procurement of stock) of four 
freezing works. New Zealand Refrigerating Company (NZR) operated 
processing plants at Pukeuri and Smithfield, Canterbury Frozen Meat 
(CFM) operated plants at Pareora, and South Otago Freezing (SOF) 
operated a processing plant at Finegand. 
Waitaki was eventually floated as a proprietary company in which 
local farmers had a significant shareholding. The new farmers' firm 
was called the Waitaki Farmers' Freezing Company. Soon after its 
formation the new firm purchased the freezing works at Pukeuri from 
New Zealand Refrigerating (Loach, 1969: 81-82; Macdonald, 1957; 
Perriam, 1989). Unfortunately for the new owners of Pukeuri the end of 
the war time Commandeer (1915-1921) was followed by a sharp 
recession and the much hoped for boom in the supply of meat to the 
markets in Britain did not eventuate (see chapter 3). Rather, the 
ensuing down turn in agricultural prices took an immediate toll on the 
firms established during the Commandeer (see appendix 1). The 
dramatic slump in prices at Smithfield and along the food chain 
(Hayward 1972) forced the Waitaki company to retrench. In 1924 its 
2 Similarly, after a particularly bad year in 1909 for prices at Smithfield many 
farmers in Otago were quick to identify a conspiracy among firms. 
"According to Mr James Begg, an original director of the (South Otago 
Freezing) company ... by about the beginning of 1910 ... there was a general 
belief that the two old established operators (New Zealand Refrigerating 
and Southland Frozen Meat) were 'getting their heads together' and 
keeping prices at a depressed level" (Strang, 1960: 1). 
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stock procurement and marketing operations were returned to New 
Zealand Refrigerating. For the next forty years the company retained 
a formal but not an operational autonomy. 
The profits generated by the Waitaki company for its shareholders 
came from contracts with, firstly, NZR and (after the Second World 
War) with the British company, Vesteys. Thus, the Waitaki company 
operated as a sub-contracting processor from 1924 until 1965. In the 
case of its contracts with Vesteys, drafters employed by Vesteys 
secured all stock for the plant at Pukeuri while the marketing arm of 
Vesteys undertook the distribution and sale of the throughput. 
In these first stages of establishment Waitaki International 
demonstrated the marginality of local firms in the networks in the 
export meat industry. The Waitaki company, like many local firms, was 
constrained by the Board on one side and by 'international 
agribusiness firms on the other, and acted as a sUb-contactor to firms 
with forward links markets. This trade-off between the Board and 
international agribusiness firms suited farmers who were also free to use 
the firm's processing plant under the policy of the 'open door'. 
The revival of the Waitaki company as an independent processing 
and marketing firm was predicated on a shift in the character of its 
shareholding. The firm was gradually bought out by non-farmer 
shareholders. A number of factors account for the shifts in the Waitaki 
firm's shareholding. Firstly, the guaranteed markets secured under the 
Bulk Purchase Agreement (1940-1954) and the general prosperity 
experienced thereafter allowed the company good profits. For 
example, in the decade 1959-1968 the return on shareholders' funds 
averaged 16% per annum (Neilson, 1982: 9-10). Such rates of return 
made the company an attractive proposition for investors not 
associated with farming. Secondly, the prosperity enjoyed by farmers 
and intervention by the Board on their behalf meant that investment in 
170 
processing was to become decidedly less urgent for local farmers (see 
chapter 5). 
The Waitaki Farmers' Freezing Company therefore gradually ceased to 
be a farmers' firm. Its shares were traded beyond the Waitaki district 
and the farming community and it was transformed from its beginnings 
as a farmers' firm into (what was exalted by some commentators as) 
the exemplar of a proprietary business. This influx of non-farmer ('dry') 
shareholding in the Waitaki company was to alter the orientation of 
the firm (see chapter 3). It was reconstituted into a firm in which user-
shareholders had little say, manifesting a marked decline in the 
provision of services to farmers (Perriam, 1989). In short, the shift in the 
character of shareholding promoted making profits and enhancing 
margins as new goals for the company (Curtis, 1992; Salais and 
Storper, 1992). The change in the ownership then had shifted the 
original farmers' focus on improving the prices received by local 
farmers for stock. The key issue was to become how to drive down 
these prices (interview, Director # 1). Hence, the preferred scenario for 
doing business for the non-farmer shareholders in the Waitaki 
company was far removed from that brokered by the Meat 
Producers' Board. Further, 'dry' shareholding in the Waitaki company 
prefigured an effort for increased scale and integration in its 
operations and for a rationalisation of the networks in the industry.3 
3 The details of changes in shareholding in Waitaki were not recorded until 
legislation requiring such disclosures in 'Annual Reports' of firms was 
implemented in the late 1970s. As a result, the first available account of 
shareholding provides a record well after the beginnings of transformation. 
In 1980 the 'Annual Report' of Waitaki (then called Waitaki-NZR) highlights 
the extent to which shareholding had drifted away from local farmers. 
Rather, shareholding in Waitaki was marked by its relatively even 
geographic spread, and shareholders were domiciled throughout New 
Zealand. The North Otago/South Canterbury regions provided only 11.10% of 
shareholders. The Otago/Canterbury regions provided only a further 28.22% 
of shareholders. Wellington provided the greatest shareholding (33.42%), 
largely because it provided the location for the head offices of institutional 
shareholders. At the same time, shareholding in Waitaki was dominated by 
individuals rather than by institutions:- 13,658 individuals owned 58.33% of the 
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John Neilson's Project. 
No one-to-one correlation exists between shareholding and corporate 
strategy. The resulting challenges made by the Waitaki company to 
the Board and to farmers were always an expression of the decision-
making and style of its managers (Fligstein, 1990). In this regard, John 
Neilson was a extraordinarily important figure. Neilson played the 
leading role in formulating and implementing the corporate strategies 
which shaped the development of Waitaki International (Meat 
Producers' Board, 1990). He was the dominant manager within the 
Waitaki company (Perriam, 1989). He started as an accountant with 
the firm and was to become company secretary (1955-1962), 
managing director (1963-1981) and chairman of the board of directors 
(1981-1986). Neilson was to resign in 1986 as chairman of the board of 
directors of Waitaki International only after Watties Industries had 
secured an absolute majority of shareholding in the company.4 
Neilson began as an outsider to the industry and became a leading 
figure in it almost by accident. Neilson lived in the township of Waitaki 
where he chaired the board of trustees and taught occasionally at the 
local high school. His friendship with the then managing director of 
Waitaki led him very reluctantly to agree to audit the books of the firm. 
It was only as he checked the accounts of the Waitaki company that 
Neilson discovered how well-to-do the firm was. With this discovery he 
devised the project to better use the firm's hidden financial assets to 
buyout other firms. The death of the Neilson's friend created a 
vacancy in Waitaki which again he agreed to fill. 
company, the largest institutional shareholder owned only 6.4% of the 
company, the 20 largest shareholders owned just 25% of the company -
including the managing director (John Neilson) with 0.4% of the company. 
'Annual Reports' Waitaki Farmers' Freezing Company, 1954 - 1972; Waitaki 
Industries, 1973 - 1975; Waitaki-NZR 1976 - 1985; Waitaki International, 1985 -
1988, Archives of E. J. Neilson. 
4 'Driving force in meat trade dies', Christchurch star, 12/3/90. 
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By the standards of other managers in the industry Neilson was an 
intellectual and a maverick. He was an avid reader of Joseph 
Conrad, an avowed socialist and member of the Labour Party. He 
publicly supported the unions, in particular the meatworkers' unions, 
and was deemed by other managers in the industry as being 'soft' on 
labour. It is not a coincidence that despite pressure to do so no 
processing plants were closed during his rule at the Waitaki company. 
Further, in the years after he was ousted from Waitaki International until 
his death (in 1990) Neilson was a vociferous critic of the new 
management at the firm when they began to close plants and to 
force redundancies. What is most important was that Neilson opposed 
the authority of international agribusiness firms, farmers, and the Board. 
Neilson's position was clear: 
"Farmers have a powerful influence exercised through the 
New Zealand Meat Producers' Board as a statutory 
authority with specified powers of control. Separately 
they also exercise strong influence through Federated 
Farmers of New Zealand and also through influence on 
the elected Parliamentary representatives -all of which 
are concerned at the influence of the rural vote. Farmers 
must be seen to retain influence but not controlling 
influence. As suppliers of livestock and end recipients of 
market benefits they have a real interest in the efficiency 
of processing, transport, and marketing. On the other 
hand their influence cannot be one of control or 
dominance as such would stultify effective decision 
making by commercial organisations in processing, 
transport, and marketing better equipped to make 
effective decisions in those areas." (Neilson, 1983: 4).5 
For Neilson the repositioning of farmers as influential rather than 
controlling was the condition for moving towards the development of 
Waitaki as a marketing company. He recognised the risk involved with 
this move: 
5 Neilson, E. J.,(1983), 'Planning for survival in the Meat Industry', Speech to 
the New Zealand Society of Accountants, Wellington Branch Convention, 
Wairakei, 17 September, Archives of E. J. Neilson. 
"Waitaki decided to market- to take the trading risk on the 
sheep and lambs bought by the company drafters and 
cease to be a purely processing company. We 
considered then and we consider now that the New 
Zealand meat companies should trade in New Zealand 
meat in line with their financial resources. " (Neilson, 
1974).6 
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NeJlson also argued that such trading in New Zealand meat required 
the Waitaki company to expand its scale of operations (Chandler, 
1989, 1990). In other words, the development of his firm into an 
integrated agribusiness firm meant that it would have to match the 
scale of operation of the international agribusiness firms, notably 
Vesteys. 
"New Zealand meat companies operate at a 
considerable disadvantage to our principal overseas 
competitor, Vesteys. Vesteys has operated with vision for 
longer: it has achieved a vertical integration of farms, 
processing works, ships, shops, wholesale marketing 
outlets and cold stores." (Neilson, 1976: 6).7 
Neilson found his template for growth in the global operations of 
Vesteys (Knightley, 1981). Conventional arguments regarding the 
success of companies like Vesteys attribute much of the success to a 
combination of its large scale of operation and its thorough integration 
of the exchanges which, in part, comprise the networks in the industry 
(Chandler, 1978, 1990; Knightley, 1981). In the case of Vesteys, the 
execution of integrated marketing involved the ownership of farms in 
Australasia and the Americas and all the intermediary activities 
through to retailing in the markets in Britain. Much of the strategies 
pursued by Neilson represented an attempt at replicating the sway 
6 Neilson, E. J., (1974), 'Statement to investment managers, banks etc.' 
Wellington, 11 February, Archives of E. J. Neilson. 
7 Neilson, E. J., (1976), 'Address to NZ Administrative Staff College', 14 
October, Archives of E. J. Neilson. 
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enjoyed by Vesteys over the international trade.8 Certainly Neilson 
was clear that this vertical integration and increased size involved the 
buyout of other domestic and international agribusiness firms. In 
addition, such scale of operation also provided for greater worker and 
union security. 
The Waitaki Farmers' Freezing Company made its first foray into the 
export trade in over forty years following its purchase of a marketing 
outlet, the Stock Breeders' Meat Company in 1964. Stock Breeders 
was a British-owned and based company which had previously 
imported meat and by-products into Britain from New Zealand, 
Australia, Argentina, Uruguay, Rhodesia, Swaziland, and the USA. In 
1965 Neilson terminated the contracts to supply Vesteys. Thereafter 
Neilson orchestrated Waitaki's marketing of its own meat and by-
products in Britain, through the depots and butchers' shops owned by 
Stock Breeders. To reflect this expansion of activities the company was 
to become, for the next few years, the Waitaki Farmers' Freezing 
Company and Subsidiaries Limited. 
Neilson made a concerted effort to build up Stock Breeders' share of 
exports. The North Auckland Farmers' Co-operative and R. L. Morris 
were persuaded to also use and become shareholders in Waitaki's 
new marketing arm in 1971. Similarly, the Alliance Freezing Company 
(after severing its own contract with Borthwicks) and W. R. Richmond 
Limited were to become minority shareholders in Stock Breeders in 
1972. By the early 1970s Stock Breeders owned two retail shops and 
B The involvement of Vesteys in New Zealand included a controlling interest 
in two shipping lines (Blue Star and ACT), banking and insurance operations, 
and a variety of processing, storage and marketing operations 0N and R 
Fletcher, Weddell, Monarch Bacon Co. Ltd, Wanganui Mild Cure Bacon Co. 
Ltd, Union Cold Storage Co. (NZ) Ltd, Patea Freezing Co. Ltd, Amalgamated 
Products Ltd, New Zealand Stockfoods Ltd, Westfield Freezing Co. Ltd, 
Auckland Meat Co. Ltd, and others). eVestey family has big NZ interests', 
Christchurch Press, 13/10/BO; 'Local meat firms question producer boards' 
priorities', National Business Review, 1/12/BO). 
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seven depots in Britain, although its investment and throughput was 
fairly insignificant compared to that of Vesteys, Borthwicks, and the 
New Zealand owned wholesaling consortium of Towers (UK).9 
In addition to the alliances with other firms Neilson also attempted to 
expand his firm by buying out its competitors in New Zealand. 
Consequently, the market shares enjoyed by the stock Breeders in 
Britain were further increased as the Waitaki company expanded its 
share of the processing sector in New Zealand. What Neilson 
envisaged as a rationalisation of the industry was the distribution of 
meat to export markets through outlets like Stock Breeders (and later 
Towers) and the supply of this marketing organisation by a processing 
firm with plants that encompassed all of the farming districts in New 
Zealand. In this sense, Waitaki International was to become the first 
firm with forward links to overseas markets to operate its processing 
plants and stock procurement on a truly national scale (see appendix 
2). 
Neilson's project, the rationalisation of the industry, entailed the 
elimination of the relationship between local firms and local markets 
for stock. As a result, rationalisation was at odds with the forms of 
governance brokered by the Board. The Board's policy had been to 
ensure a multiplicity of firms in processing, each with its own 
catchment for buying stock (see chapters 3 and 4). Typically every 
farming district in New Zealand was encompassed by the catchments 
of several firms. These overlapping catchments allowed local farmers 
to be selective in selling stock, to continually shift allegiances to 
processing firms, and to play-off firms. The capacity to supply some 
firms with stock at the expense of others was central to the autonomy 
9 Neilson, E. J., (1974), 'Statement to investment managers, banks etc.' 
Wellington, 11 February, Archives of E. J. Neilson. In the late 1960s Towers (UK) 
supplied nearly six thousand retail shops from fifty-six depots (Loach, 1969; 
167). 
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and prosperity of farmers. It was, as I have already explained above, 
mirrored in the configuration of control enjoyed by the meatworkers' 
unions within the plants (see chapter 6). As a result, any limitation of 
this forced competition for stock was perceived by farmers and the 
Board as foreshadowing conditions of monopsony in farming districts 
with its ruinous consequences for farmers (Gallo, 1977; Smith 1969). 
The politics of local firms and catchment areas. 
Neilson's project, transforming the Waitaki company into an integrated 
agribusiness firm, was perceived by farmers and the Board not only or 
simply as a threat to procurement. Inherent to the project was the 
potential to secure marketing in an environment characterised 
increasingly by closures and saturation. From the perspective of 
farmers, integrated marketing companies constituted only one, albeit 
the most significant, of a host of middlemen (Stinchombe, 1961). Such 
firms could be acceptable if they could be regulated by farmers (see 
chapter 5). It was precisely because issues of marketing were 
perceived as being more pressing than issues of procurement that 
Neilson's project and Waitaki International were finally sanctioned by 
the Board. However, it was to take thirty years of struggle by Neilson 
until the Board reversed its policies and when it did the decision to 
foster and manage rationalisation was taken at his expense. Neilson 
was ousted from Waitaki International by the Board's new partners, the 
very large corporations of Watties Industries and Fletcher Challenge. 
Before discussing the, post-Neilson, unfolding of the process of 
rationalisation it is useful to examine the manoeuvring and political 
deals that accompanied each of the takeover bids from Neilson for 
competitors of the Waitaki company. These included bids for 
Canterbury Frozen Meat (1968), Swifts (1973), South Otago Freezing 
(1974), Nelson Freezing (1974), New Zealand Refrigerating and Towers 
(1975) and Borthwicks (1986). In each case issues of marketing and 
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monopsony and the trade-offs they engendered were crucial to the 
success, failure or blocking of Neilson's takeover bid. In each case a 
range of actors including the Board, farmers' groups, shareholders in 
the marked firms and the Minister of Agriculture applied their own 
criteria to assess the bid. 
Among this nexus of issues and actors the freeing of the Minister of 
Agriculture from a statutory requirement to act on the 
recommendations of the Meat Producers' Board is significant. This 
enablement of the Minister was attained through an Order-In-Council 
by the Labour Government in 1975 and was passed into law, under 
the subsequent National Government (1975-1984), by the Meat 
Amendment Act (1976). These moves began the removal of decision-
making on licensing to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries in 1981. 
After 1975 the Minister declined to again use his powers under section 
12 of the Meat Amendment Act (1976) to disallow takeover bids. 
Some writers (Bartley, 1987) state that the enablement of the Minister 
directly weakened the Board, however such arguments tend to ignore 
the shift in emphasis to the issues of marketing and monopsony, and 
down play the Board's role in franchising export markets (see chapter 
5). 
Neilson's bids for the Waitaki company to buyout its competitors were 
directed at domestic and international agribusiness firms. Nearly all 
the takeovers were carried out in competition with other local firms 
and in the case of Southland Frozen Meat (SFM), Canterbury Frozen 
Meat (CFM), and New Zealand Refrigerating (NZR) the eventual 
success of Waitaki International in becoming an integrated 
agribusiness firm effectively doomed its close rivals. Without the 
possibility of growing further these firms were themselves bought out 
(NZR by the Waitaki company in 1975, CFM by Primary Producers' Co-
operative Society in 1980, SFM by Fletcher Challenge in 1983). When 
viewed in this light the dilemmas of building an integrated marketing 
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company become not so much whether the project should have 
been allowed, but who should have been allowed to attempt it. 
In 1968 Neilson attempted to purchase Canterbury Frozen Meat 
(CFM).l0 A takeover of CFM was attractive to Neilson mainly because 
the purchase of the freezing works at Fairton, Belfast, and Pareora, 
then owned by CFM, would have quadrupled Waitaki's share of 
processing capacity and would have enabled an expanded 
throughput for Stock Breeders.11 The catchment of CFM extended 
through much of the Canterbury and Otago regions. With the 
purchase of CFM Neilson and Waitaki would have been transformed 
from a small player into a relatively large player in both the New 
Zealand and the international markets (interview, Manager #3).12 
This first attempt by Neilson to purchase a competitor failed largely 
because it was perceived by the Board, local farmers and the 
powerful Canterbury division of Federated Farmers to threaten to 
'reduce competition' for stock (Neilson, 1982). The Waitaki firm and 
CFM indeed had overlapping catchments in Waitaki region and 
throughout the Otago and Canterbury regions (see appendix 2). At 
the same time, Neilson's bid for CFM, one of the first meat firms 
established in New Zealand and still associated with the landed gentry 
in Canterbury (Eldred-Grigg, 1980; Macdonald, 1957) was an 
10 'CFM move good for Canterbury', Christchurch Press, nd/10/72. 
11 Bennett F., 'untitled' Christchurch Star, 13/12/68. 
12 The respondent had been a very senior manager in Waitaki International 
and another meat firm. He had begun work as a stock buyer and eventually 
climbed all the rungs of the corporate ladder. The respondent was extremely 
critical of the Board. He minimised the chances of new entrant firms, like 
Fortex, reforming the industry while the Meat Producers' Board retained its 
statutory powers. For the respondent joint ventures involving the best 
farmers, firms and overseas interests constituted the way forward and, in this 
regard the Board was presented as a major stumbling block. Since the 
failure of Waitaki International he had become a farmer and specialised in 
breeding new types of livestock. He also represented a foreign firm that 
wished to buy processing facilities in New Zealand. 
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audacious challenge to longstanding political deals (Neilson, 1982). 
Rather than accept the offer from Neilson the shareholders of CFM 
looked to Borthwicks (an international,agribusiness firm) to solve their 
firm's problems in marketing. 
CFM lacked a marketing arm of its own and tried to resolve its 
problems in securing forward links into the markets in Britain by sub-
contracting to Borthwicks. The contracts involved CFM operating 
solely as a sub-contracting processor while Borthwicks took over the 
marketing of its meat. Borthwicks purchased a 20% share in CFM. At 
the same time, CFM purchased Borthwick's freezing works at Belfast 
(called the Canterbury works to distinguish it from another plant in 
Belfast already owned by CFM). While this alliance of domestic and 
international interests resolved the issues of marketing for CFM, it 
simultaneously forced the local firm to honour a number of convertible 
notes issued to it by Borthwicks. 13 These bonds were due to become 
eligible for dividends in 1975 and 1977.14 It is indicative of the 
trepidation felt by local farmers and the Board towards any process of 
rationalisation that this arrangement which secured a sizeable share of 
the 'kill' in the South Island to a British-owned firm should evoke 
considerably less outrage than the offer from Neilson (McNulty, 1958; 
Neilson, 1982; Loach, 1969). 
Success in small time marketing alliances in Britain and failure in 
takeovers in New Zealand was not a recipe for growth. Following the 
combined rebuff by the shareholders of CFM, Neilson engaged in a 
series of diversifications that effectively lifted the Waitaki company 
outside of the export meat industry. In October 1965, the firm 
purchased Tekau Knitwear (with woollen factories in Timaru and 
13 'Belfast works changes hands for $2 million', Christchurch Press, 22/12/72; 
'Borthwicks to sell CFM meat', Christchurch Press, 14/10/72. 
14 Bennett F., 'Swift NZ faces problem of further profits', Christchurch Star, 
12/5/73. 
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Ashburton) in October 1969, In the following year it acquired two 
hotels, the Town House (Wellington) and the Moray Motel (Dunedin), 
These diversifications increased the capital backing of Waitaki and at 
the same time provided it with some supplementary forms of 
income,15 They did not, however, satisfy Neilson's plans for the 
company and the export meat industry, 
Neilson recognised that it was the long-standing links between the 
National Government and the more conseNative elements in farming 
and the processing sectors that had played a significant part in the 
debacle with CFM, He was friendly with senior members of the Labour 
Opposition and with Colin Moyle who would become Minister of 
Agriculture after the change in Government in November of 1972, In 
this regard, contingent events such as the election of the third Labour 
Government (1972-1975) were to provide a definite window of 
opportunity for him, In addition, whilst waiting for 'the right time to 
move', Neilson sponsored a series of discussions between firms in the 
South Island, These meetings were held in early 1972, The meetings 
originally took place between the Waitaki company, CFM, NZR, 
Southland Frozen Meat (SFM) and South Otago Freezing (SOF), The 
agenda concerned the possibility of mutually advantageous mergers 
between combinations of these processing companies,16 Southland 
Frozen Meat exited the discussions soon after they began, CFM did 
likewise to pursue its own arrangements with Borthwicks but the 
continuing discussions with South Otago Freezing and New Zealand 
Refrigerating were to become the basis for their subsequent takeovers 
bids by Neilson,17 
15 'Can the meat industry find the finance?', Christchurch Star, 21/8/71, 
16 'No progress on merger, says Waitaki', Christchurch Star, 10/2/72; 'Freezer 
talks lapse', Otago Daily Times, 30/6/72, 
17 'NZ Refrig, sees merger gains', Christchurch Star, 19/2/72; Radford, H, J, , 
'Letter to the Minister of Agriculture', Archives of E, J, Neilson, 25/1/74; South 
otago Freezing Company, (1974), Report of Managing Director, South 
Otago Freezing Company, Balclutha, 
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In 1973 the takeover of Swifts (NZ) reinforced moves by Neilson to 
make the Waitaki firm into an integrated agribusiness firm. Swifts (NZ) 
represented the local business-arm of an international agribusiness firm 
that was then in the process of retrenching its operation in New 
Zealand 18 Swifts were one of the 'big three' firms that had first 
dominated the meatpacking industry in the United States and then 
(alongside Armour and Vesteys) became a major player in 
international trade (Critchell and Raymond, 1912; Chandler; 1978, 
1990; Portz, 1991). The fortunes of Swifts (NZ) in the post-war period 
foreshadowed the withdrawal of international agribusiness firms from 
New Zealand that would culminate with the exit and liquidation of the 
local business-arms of Borthwicks (1986) and of Vesteys (1994).19 
A number of local firms appeared interested in buying the balance of 
Swifts (NZ). Its catchment for stock, surrounding its lone processing 
plant at Wairoa, was Hawkes Bay, a region on the east coast of the 
North Island (see appendix 2). Waitaki, CFM, and the Hawkes Bay 
Farmers' Meat (HBF) were all suggested by the media as potential 
buyers.2o However it was Neilson who presented a takeover bid to the 
shareholders of Swifts (NZ) in July 1973. The bid was welcomed by 
local farmers, the Board, the Labour Government and in particular his 
close associate, Colin Moyle, the Minister of Agriculture. This range of 
support for Neilson reflected the minimal impacts on procurement 
from the movement of the Waitaki company into the east coast of the 
North Island, and the greater interest of the Labour Government in the 
fate of the processing firms and indirectly the meatworkers' unions in 
18 'Swift shareholders await takeover offer', Otago Daily Times, 28/7/73. 
19 Bennett, F., 'Swift NZ faces problem of future profits', Christchurch star, 
12/5/73. 
20 anon, 'Don't sell from Swift - is it Waitaki?', 1717173. 
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New Zealand. The bid from Neilson was readily accepted by the 
shareholders at Swifts (NZ).21 
After the takeover Waitaki sold some of the land surrounding the 
Ngauranga freezing works for $6 million. This transaction generated an 
final profit for the entire takeover of $2 million for Waitaki. 22 The influx of 
these funds into the enlarged company's coffers greatly enhanced its 
capacity to initiate further takeover bids. Following the takeover of 
Swifts (NZ) Waitaki again changed its name becoming Waitaki 
Industries Limited in 1973. 
In late 1973 two competing takeover offers were made for South 
Otago Freezing. Neilson made one bid and Southland Frozen Meat 
(SFM) the other. South Otago Freezing (SOF) operated a processing 
plant at Finegand.23 Its catchment for stock was centred on the Tairei 
plains of mid Otago, a region on the lower east coast of the South 
Island (see appendix 2). The bulk of its sheepmeats, including all of 
the throughput from Finegand were purchased and marketed by 
Borthwicks.24 In other words, SOF was a sub-contractor and occupied 
a similar position in the division of processing and marketing to CFM 
and to the Waitaki company prior to Neilson buying Stock Breeders in 
1964. 
Both Neilson and SFM emphasised the benefits in their bids from a 
rationalisation of processing and enhanced marketing. Similarly, both 
companies stressed that any rationalisation of processing would come 
21 Moyle had been publicly critical of the earlier decision by Swifts NZ to run 
down and to close the Ngauranga freezing works. The Labour Government 
and the Producers' Board both supported the return of an increased volume 
of export meat to New Zealand control. 
22 anon,' Profitable takeover', nd. 
23 'Big meat industry merger is likely', Christchurch Star, 18/10/1973. 
24 anon, (1974), 'Report of the Managing Director', South Otago Freezing 
Company, Dunedin, July; 'Benefits from freezing companies' merger', The 
Farmer, 12/11/73. 
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from the more efficient use of capital and not from any reduction in 
the competition and prices for stock. These assurances were made to 
allay the recurring fears of farmers that any rationalisation in 
processing inevitably equated with monopsony in stock 
procurement.25 
Between late 1973 and early 1974 Neilson and SFM engaged in a 
bidding war for shares in SOF. The end result of this competition was 
indecisive and neither Waitaki nor SFM secured a majority of 
shareholding. 26 However, the then Chairman of the Meat Producers' 
Board (Sir Charles Hilgendorf) identified two clear advantages, in his 
assessment of the bid from Neilson over that of SFM: (1) the Waitaki 
company bid provided greater scope for continuing competition over 
stock; (2) the increased throughput to Stock Breeders would have 
greater significance in marketing.27 As a result the issue of which firm 
could buy SOF was resolved by the Board which used its statutory 
powers, defined under section 12 of the Meat Act (1964), to block the 
bid from SFM. 
Further, the Minister of Agriculture, Colin Moyle, stated that it was not in 
the best interests of farmers for the issue of takeover to be resolved by 
competition between the Waitaki company and SFM as this process 
would ultimately result in the victorious company passing on its costs to 
farmers. 28 This ruling effectively halted the shareholders in SOF from 
25 'Profit for all in $8m meat deal', Christchurch star, 27/10/1973. 
26 'SFM to make offer for SOF', Christchurch Press, 4/12/73; 'Waitaki to 
discuss third offer', Christchurch Press, 11/1/73; 'Counter bid for South Otago 
Freezing', Oamaru Mail, 3/12/73; 'Merger in meats', Otago Daily Times, 
6/12/73; 'Waitaki raises bid for Balclutha firm', Otago Daily Times, 8/1/74; 
'Takeover battle nears climax', Otago Daily Times, 11/1/74; 'Is SFM pushing 
the stakes too high?', National Business Review, 21/1/74. 
27 'Waitaki bid favoured', Christchurch Press, 18/1 /73; 'Govt. asked to 
explain support for Waitaki', Dominion, 28/3/1974. 
28 'Govt. blocks SFM $9m takeover bid', Christchurch star, 26/1/74; 'Why the 
SFM bid was blocked', Christchurch Star, 29/1/1974. 
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selling their shares to the highest bidder,29 Another important factor 
affecting the decision of the Minister was the composition of the bid 
from SFM, This contained a substantial cash element which created 
the potential for capital to exit the networks in the industry at the time 
when increasing emphasis was being placed by the Labour 
Government on the upgrading of processing plants,30 
The board of directors of the SOF immediately accepted the 
remaining offer,31 but minority shareholders greeted the decision with 
hostility, Regardless of minority opposition Neilson successfully 
obtained a 90% shareholding of SOF at which point the firm was 
required to become its wholly-owned subsidiary,32 Neilson tolerated 
the existing contracts between SOF and Borthwicks to continue only 
until the start of the next (1975-1976) killing season, Thereafter all the 
stock processed at the Finegand were distributed through Stock 
Breeders in Britain,33 
Nelson Freezing (NF) was a small domestic meat company that 
operated for many years as a sub-contractor and without forward links 
into the export market (see appendix 2), The firm ran a small freezing 
works at Nelson and the bulk of its throughput was actually destined 
for the domestic market only about 100,000 head of lamb, per 
29 'Dangerous precedent', Southland Times, 14/2/74, 
30 'untitled', Dunedin Star, 12/1/74, 
31 'SOF directors will take Waitaki offer', Christchurch Star, 29/1/74; 'Waitaki 
merger criticised and questioned', Christchurch Star, 14/2/74, 
32 'SFM disappointed by decision', Christchurch Press, 29/1 /74, 'SOF 
recommends remaining offer', Christchurch Press, 30/1/1974, 'Would the SOF 
company remain independent', Christchurch Press, 9/2/1974; 'Waitaki and 
SOF will merge', Christchurch Star, 1/3/1974; 'Waitaki', Christchurch Star, 
24/8/74; 'Shareholders query planned takeover', Otago Daily Times, 12/2/74, 
'SO chairman challenges SO opponents', Otago Daily Times, 14/2/74, 'Govt, 
degree termed 'dangerous", Otago Daily Times, 14/2/74, 'Plan to disrupt 
merger by share manipulation', Otago Daily Times, 23/2/74, 'Directors 
accuse shareholders over motives in takeover bid', Otago Daily Times, nd; 
'Shareholders up in arms', Southland Times, 14/2/74, 
33 'Dispute between Waitaki - NZR and Borthwicks', Evening Post, 6/11/76, 
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annum, were exported to the markets in Britain,34 This was meat sold 
through a British meat importer.35 The catchment area of NF was the 
valleys of the Nelson Bays and throughout the region of Marlborough, 
a region on the north coast of the South Island (see appendix 2), The 
deciding element in the assessment by the Board between the bids 
from Neilson and SFM had centred on the increased threat of 
monopsony in buying stock, The issues of marketing and monopsony 
were repeated in the contest between Neilson and CFM in their bids 
for Nelson Freezing (NF),36 Thus, Neilson and CFM made competing 
bids for NF in 1974, but the takeover finally was resolved by the Board 
which used its statutory powers to block the bid from CFM, 
NF and CFM had overlapping catchments and were competitors for 
stock in Marlborough, Waitaki did not employ stock drafters in 
Marlborough, Local farmers and the Board expressed concern that a 
takeover by CFM of NF would eliminate competition for stock in 
Marlborough, whereas a takeover by Neilson would not affect the 
competition and prices for stock, At the same time, CFM was tainted 
by its marketing arrangements with Borthwicks, This agreement had 
left Borthwicks with a 20% holding in CFM, Borthwicks would retain a 
15,5% holding in an enlarged CFM if it bought NF, Neilson petitioned 
the Board and stressed these links between CFM and Borthwicks, In 
this regard Neilson, playing both a national interest card and 
argument about processors that had been used against his own plans 
elsewhere, claimed that these links had 'weakened the New Zealand 
element in the meat processing industry', He further stated that the 
proposed takeover did not fit with CFM strategies, Neilson claimed 
34 Bennett F" 'Cat and mouse game at meat works' Christchurch Star, nd, 
35 'Two bids for Nelson meat company', Christchurch Press, 23/5/74, 
36 Bennett F" 'Waitaki and CFM collide on Nelson takeover, Christchurch 
Star, 22/5/74; 'Waitaki in Nelson', Christchurch Star, 9/5/74, 'No standing on 
sideline for Mr Moyle', Christchurch Star, 23/5/74; 'Is Waitaki the bidder?', 
Evening Post, 9/5/74, 'Nelson Freezing target of takeover bids', Evening Post, 
22/5/74), 
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that the proposed takeover would actually only benefit Borthwicks 
and that the takeover was the brain-child of that firm's general 
manager, who was also a director at CFM (Neilson, nd).37 The Minister 
publicly agreed with the Board's decision to block CFM and, like 
Neilson, cited the need to expand the share of New Zealand-control in 
marketing (Loach, 1969; McNulty, 1958).38 
However, the board of directors at NF fully supported the takeover bid 
from CFM. They opposed the offer from Waitaki on the grounds that 
the assets of NF were unlikely to be fully utilised by an enlarged Waitaki 
and that this under utilisation would be detrimental to any minority 
shareholders.39 The minority shareholders were concerned that the 
limited capacity of the Waitaki company to rationalise procurement 
and processing at Nelson in comparison with that of CFM would 
restrict profits and thereby dividends. In other words, the minority 
shareholders and the Board made identical assessments of the likely 
impact of Neilson's and CFM's bids.4o After several weeks of intense 
public debate regarding the future. of the NF, Neilson secured 
sufficient shareholding to transform it into a wholly-owned subsidiary 
and to eliminate the troublesome minority shareholders.41 At the same 
37 Neilson, E. J., end), 'Speech notes', Archives of E. J. Neilson. 
38 'Borthwicks link stopped CFM', Christchurch Press, 12/7/74. 
39 Drummond, A. R., 'Letter to NFC shareholders', Nelson Freezing 
Company, Nelson, 17/7/ 1974; Valentine, J. A, 'Letter to NFC shareholders', 
Waitaki Industries, 19/7/74. 
'Waitaki bids for Nelson', Christchurch Press, 5/7/74; 'Waitaki bid over to NFC 
holders', Christchurch Star, 25/7/74; 'Waitaki takeover raising doubts', 
Oamaru Mail, 25/7/74; 'Doubts on Waitaki takeover', Southland Times, 
25/7/74. 
40 'Information sought', Christchurch Press, 30/7/74; 'Meeting to discuss NFC 
offer', Christchurch Star, 30/7/74. 
41 'CFM can get along without NFC', anon, nd; 'Nelson works may 
expand', Auckland Star, 3/8/74, 'Waitaki may extend Nelson offer', 
Auckland Star, 16/8/74, 'Nelson board to accept Waitaki', Auckland Star, 
23/8/74, 'Waitaki has 92.3% of Nelson Freez:, Auckland Star, 3/9/74; 'NFC 
shareholders favour Waitaki', Christchurch Star, 7/8/74, 'Nelson to take 
Waitaki bid', Christchurch Star, 23/8/74; 'Waitaki chairman denies plans to 
close Nelson plant', Otago Daily Times, 3/8/74, 'Nelson directors advising on 
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time, it was necessary for Neilson to allay the fears of local farmers. 
Hence, Neilson pledged to welcome farmers and the Primary 
Producers' Co-operative Society (with 9000 farmer-shareholders in the 
South Island) killing stock for consignment at Nelson.42 
The New Zealand Refrigerating Company (NZR) was the largest of the 
local firms and its catchment stretched along the entire east coast of 
the South Island. By 1975 NZR owned freezing works at Imlay, Picton, 
Islington, Smithfield and Burnside as well as a majority share in the 
marketing consortium Towers (UK) (see appendices 1 and 2). 
However, from the mid 1960s NZR began to experience drastic 
fluctuations in its profit and evidenced problems in marketing from the 
new uncertainties of the markets in Britain.43 Further, generous share 
issues by NZR in 1965 and 1966 had left the firm decidedly under 
capitalised,44 NZR had been supportive of discussions about mergers 
in 1972 and after these were adjourned held further talks with 
Neilson.45 But the talks between the managers of NZR and Neilson 
were disrupted in February 1975 by a takeover bid from Southland 
Frozen Meat (SFM).46 
takeover situation', Otago Daily Times, 16/8/74, 'Waitaki reports 25 percent 
acceptance from Nelson', Otago Daily Times, 17/8/74, 'Waitaki offer 
unconditional', Otago Daily Times, 27/8/74. 
42 'untitled', National Business Review, 31 /7/74. 
43 'NZ Refrig. encounters vagaries of international trade', Bennett, F., 
Christchurch Star, 29/1/72; 'NZ Refrig. profit tumbles', Christchurch Star, 
10/12/70, 'No progress, on merger, says Waitaki', Christchurch Star, 19/2/72, 
'NZR cautious on 1974 prospectus', Christchurch Star, 1/3/1974; 
'Unprecedented move by NZ Refrigeration', Evening Post, 15/1 0/71. 
44 'NZR in weak position but not a pushover', Christchurch Star, nd. 
45 'And what of Waitaki?', Christchurch Star, nd. 
46 A combination of SFM and NZR would then have produced a firm with 7 
freezing works and a throughput of 7 million head of sheep and lamb, per 
annum. Such a throughput would have approximated 30% of all annual 
sheepmeat exports. 'Big takeover battle looms', Bennett, F., Christchurch 
Star 1/2/75. 
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The bid from SFM was rejected by the board of directors at NZR. The 
board of directors at NZR considered that the combination of 
processing and marketing it proposed offered minimal scope for 
rationalisation. In other words, they made precisely the same 
arguments as did the minority shareholders of Nelson Freezing. The 
catchments of SFM and NZR were separated by the catchment of the 
Waitaki company. Waitaki and NZR had overlapping catchments.47 
Conversely, the bid from Neilson was favoured by the board of 
directors at NZR because of the potential benefits to an enlarged firm 
from the rationalisation of procurement and processing. Hence, the 
bid from Neilson raised the possibility, to local farmers and the Board, 
of a monopsony within the farming districts of the Southland/South 
Otago regions. 48 
In bidding for NZR, Neilson and SFM occupied positions which were 
almost the reverse of those they had done in their contest over the 
SOF. In that show-down (and the later one with CFM over NF) Neilson 
had won the support of the Board precisely because his bid adhered 
to Board policy insofar as it offered a lesser potential for forcing 
monopsony.49 In this case, the Board remained consistent in its 
assessment of the implications for farmers and its contention that any 
rationalisation of processing and procurement prefigured lower prices 
for stock. The Board accordingly announced its opposition towards 
the Waitaki bid, and its support for SFM's bid.50 The chairman of the 
47 'Well produced NZR booklet gives directors reasons', Christchurch Press, 
23/5175. 
48 Similarly, a better potential for rationalisation and improved utilisation of 
processing had been the main factor for the support by the board of 
directors at the NF for the CFM bid in contrast to the bid from Waitaki. 
49 Neither bid proposed to change much in marketing as Waitaki and SFM 
already used their own marketing outlets (SFM and NZR were partners in 
Towers (UK)) (Loach, 1969). 'No advantages in industry merger -NZR', 
Christchurch star, 29/3/75; 'Wait for it- best advice in NZR deal', NZ 
Mercantile Gazette, 1/4175; 'SFM down but not out', National Business 
Review, 2/4/75. 
50 'Meat Board on merger plans', Christchurch Press, 2/5175. 
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Board stated that a takeover of NZR by Waitaki would create a 
monopsony in the lower South Island.51 He made recommendation to 
the Minister of Agriculture to approve the SFM bid and to block the 
Waitaki bid.52 
However, the new Labour Government was committed to the repeal 
of the Meat Act (1964) which would remove the directive for the 
Minister of Agriculture to follow the recommendations of the Board. 
The Minister subsequently indicated that he preferred to allow the 
operation of 'market forces' to determine what firm succeeded with 
the takeover of NZR. The refusal of the Minister to follow the 
recommend.ation of the Board reveals much about the politics of 
stock procurement and catchment areas. At the last minute 
opposition was expressed by farmers to both takeover bids. The 
Primary Producers' Co-operative Society (PPCS) urged the Minister to 
block both bids on the grounds that they would restrict farmers access 
to processing and result in higher killing charges. 53 The Canterbury 
division of Federated Farmers subsequently rescinded its support for 
the SFM bid in favour of a farmers' co-operative acquiring the major 
share in NZR. Then, PPCS and Federated Farmers made submissions to 
the Government seeking funding for the establishment of a farmers' 
co-operative in the North Otago and South Canterbury region, the 
original catchment of the Waitaki company (Hunt, 1975).54 In this 
regard, the debacle contributed directly to passing of the Meat 
Amendment Act (1976). 
51 'Farmer opposition to NZR - Waitaki merger', Evening Post, 29/4/75. 
52 'Board 'no' to merger', Auckland Star, 14/5/75; 'NZR - Waitaki merger 
opposed by Board', Otago Daily Times, 15/4/75; 'Waitaki - NZR merger 
vetoed: Meat Producers' Board sees monopoly threat', Timaru Herald, 
15/4/75. 'Waitaki and NZR merger terms set', Dominion, 24/4/75; 'Waitaki, 
NZR in agreement', Evening Post, 23/4/75; 'NZR - Waitaki proposal awaits 
Minister's word', Otago Daily Times, 24/4/75. 
53 'Farmers hope to stop freezing works merger', Christchurch Star, 29/4/75; 
'PPCS hits out at Waitaki - NZR merger', Timaru Herald, 29/4/75. 
54 'Producer interest shown in NZ Refrig. Co. takeover', Northland Times, 
3/5/75; 'Concern at takeovers', NZ Herald, 3/5/75). 
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As a result of the decision of the Minister to allow the trading in NZR 
shares, Neilson and SFM pressed on with their bids.55 However, it was 
Waitaki that carried the day in late 1975.56 After the acquisition of New 
Zealand Refrigerating the Waitaki company again changed its name 
to become Waitaki-NZR.57 This version of Waitaki owned 9 freezing 
works. The export slaughterhouses owned by Waitaki represented 
approximately 25% of processing capacity (Hartley, 1989: 38; Waitaki-
NZR, 1981: 3) and a sizeable share of the meat shipped from New 
Zealand belonged to Waitaki. 58 
Borthwicks was a British-owned company operating largely in the 
Taranaki and Manawatu regions of the western and southern North 
Island, although it had used contracts with a number of local firms to 
augment the supply of its marketing-arm with frozen meat (see 
appendix 1). The firm experienced mounting problems with its 
international operations through-out the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s 
(Harrison, 1963).59 Borthwicks problems were diagnosed as an over-
reliance on the supply of the markets in Britain from Australasia 
(Harrison, 1963), compounded by the mounting restrictions imposed by 
55 Bennett F., 'Southland get the cold shoulder', Christchurch Star, nd; 'SFM 
raises div. in renewed drive', Christchurch Star, 29/8/75; 'SFM still in', Otago 
Daily Times, 29/8/75, 'Merger moves no good for farmers', Otago Daily Times, 
29/8/75; 'Legal bid by SFM', Southland Times, 24/9/75. 
56 The defeat of Southland Frozen Meat in both of its bids, for SOF and for 
NZR, meant the firm was unable to expand its scale of operation. A merger 
with either Waitaki or CFM was predicted at the time and Southland Frozen 
Meat was subsequently to be bought by Fletcher Challenge (Lind, 1981). 
Hall, T. W., 'Meat industry battle nearing bitter end for SFM', Reuters, nd. 
57 'Annual Reports' Waitaki - NZR, 1976 - 1985, Archives of E. J. Neilson. 
58 In 1976, Waitaki slaughtered in excess of 7 million stock. In the three years 
following the merger with NZR, Waitaki processed about 18.5% of the sheep, 
23.8% of the lambs, and 6.3% of the beef cattle exported from New Zealand 
(Economic Service: 1981: 16; Waitaki-NZR 1981: 17). The company retained 
ownership of around half of this kill, which it marketed primarily through Stock 
Breeders and Towers (UK). 'Merger benefits on the way', Bennett, F., 
Christchurch Star, 20/4/76. 
59 Vaughan, R., 'Victim of meat price volatility', Financial Times, 17/12/80. 
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the European Community. Various attempts by Borthwicks to diversify 
in Britain and to form alliances in New Zealand had met with only 
limited success.60 For example, a public float undertaken on the British 
stock exchange in 1976 with a face value of £15 million was under 
subscribed by 98.4%.61 
Borthwicks sold off its 23% holdings in CFM in 1980.62 These problems 
excited speculation that Borthwicks would exit New Zealand,63 and 
were proved correct when in 1986 Neilson announced that he had 
completed the purchase of all Borthwicks remaining interests in New 
Zealand.64 The response to Neilson's purchase of Borthwicks was 
similar to that surrounding the earlier buyout of Swifts. This particular 
takeover had received the formal blessing of both the Board and the 
Minister of Agriculture well before its public announcement. On the 
60 The Co-operative Wholesale Society exited New Zealand in 1977. Its 
Ocean Beach works was sold to the Alliance Freezing Company. Its 
Longburn freezing works was sold to Borthwicks and initially operated as a 
'merged' firm, Borthwicks - CWS. "The chairman of the Meat Board (Sir 
Charles Hilgendorf) said that he thought the proposal was sensible. 
Maintenance of individual buying operations would ensure that farmers in 
the southern North Island would still be able to 'shop around' before 
committing their stock for slaughter." 'Meatworks to merge', Christchurch 
Press, 15/2/77; Vaughan, R" 'Borthwick's nominal dividend payment', 
Financial Times, 17/12/80; 'Profits butchered at Borthwicks', Financial Times, 
17/12/80. 
61 'Borth wicks public share issue a flop', Christchurch Star, 31/7!7 6. 
62 'Borthwicks sells CFM holding', Christchurch Press, 13/9/80; 'CFM holds 
talks with Borthwicks', Christchurch Star, 20/8/80. 
63 'Borthwicks 'will stay", Christchurch Press, 18/12/80, 'UK banks consider 
Borthwicks' future', Christchurch Press, 9/1/81, 'Borthwicks finance 
rearranged', Christchurch Press, 21/1/81, "Borthwicks' troubles almost over", 
Christchurch Press, 31/1/81; 'Borthwick still big loser', Christchurch Star, 
13/5/81. 
64 In this context the Meat Producers' Board indicated that it would prefer 
CFM, already part-owned by Borthwicks, to attempt a reverse takeover, 
although such an investment subsequently proved beyond CFM. This share 
in CFM and the balance was eventually acquired by the Primary Producers' 
Co-operative Society. Bennet F., 'Horns of a dilemma', Christchurch Star, 
23/8/80; 'Board favours CFM', Christchurch Press, 23/8/80, 'Waitaki's biggest 
coup coming up', Christchurch Star, nd; 'Apex trebles result', Christchurch 
Press, 23/5/80; Fyfe, D., 'Farmers approve sale of works', Christchurch Press, 
24/5/86, 'Farmers' view' Christchurch Press, 13/6/80. 
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one hand, the benefits in marketing were apparent to farmers and 
Board alike. On the other hand, all of Borthwick's sUNiving plants were 
in the North Island where the Waitaki company had only a single plant 
at Wairoa (see appendix 2). 
After securing the takeover the company again changed its name, to 
Waitaki International.65 The purchase by Waitaki International of the 
four freezing works then wholly-owned by Borthwicks seemingly 
represented the cUlmination of John Neilson's project.66 Neilson's 
control over a large section of the export meat industry was however 
to push him into direct opposition to the Board's control over shipping 
contracts which secured access to overseas markets. 
The politics of shipping to export markets. 
With the takeovers overs and integration of Stock Breeders (1964), 
Swifts (1973), South Otago Freezing (1974), Nelson Freezing (1974), New 
Zealand Refrigerating (1975), Towers (1975) and Borthwicks (1986), 
Waitaki was consolidated as a large integrated marketing firm. One 
of the important areas which Neilson wished to apply the new 
company's nascent economies of scale and integration was in 
shipping. In particular, Neilson attempted to improve on the 
'averaged' freight rates that Waitaki was forced to pay as result of the 
shipping contracts negotiated by the Meat Producers' Board with the 
Conference Lines. However, any savings in freight rates from by-
passing the Conference Lines could only be realised if Neilson was 
able to negotiate independently of the Board. Arrayed against 
Waitaki were a host of statutory and institutional arrangements. 
65 'Waitaki to buyout Borthwicks for $65M', Christchurch Press, 22/2/86 
'Meat deal of great consequence', Christchurch Press, 1/3/86; Bennett F.,' 
Borthwick sells out to Waitaki', Christchurch Star, 22/2/86; O'Hara, P. 'Best to 
disengage', Christchurch Star, 22/2/86. 
66 'Match point now for Mr Neilson', Christchurch Star, 22/2/86. 
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The Board acted as the agents of farmers when it negotiated with the 
Conference Lines. The contracts were binding on all exporters (meat-
export license holders) but not subject to their consent. These shipping 
contracts were negotiated every four years,67 A number of 
commentators maintained that by excluding meat-export license 
holders from the negotiations with shippers the Board was sanctioning 
cost-plus arrangements. For example, in the period 1974-1979 freight 
rates increased by 282%, while the consumer price index increased by 
87%.68 
In the light of such high freight rates there was mounting criticism of 
the Board and unfavourable comparisons were made with other 
industries. For example, the Dairy Board and the Apple and Pear 
Board had dispensed with the Conference Lines in the early 1 970s and 
instead chartered vessels. The marketing manager of the Apple and 
Pear Board claimed to have saved millions in reduced freight rates 
since it stopped using the Conference Lines. The Dairy Board paid only 
about half the of prevailing freight rates for frozen meat.69 
In response to such criticism, the Meat Producers' Board stressed its 
commitment to securing the flow of exports and to ensuring that all 
exporters, large or small, integrated marketing firms or individual 
farmers, faced the same freight rates. Insofar as this guarantee 
required a premium to the Conference Lines then the Board was 
willing to accept this cost.70 That is, averaged and consequently 
elevated freight rates were regarded as a means of maintaining the 
67 Bull, J., 'Shipping meat through Meat Board', unknown, 24/9/79. 
68 'Threat at farm gate', Christchurch Star, 6/9/79. 
69 'Cost put heavy load on meat', Auckland Star, 12/9/79; 'The case for 
shipping by conference lines', Christchurch Star, 3/9/79; Freight shipping 
costs saved', Evening Post, 6/9/79. 
70 'Meat Board defends shipping arrangements', Christchurch Press, 
11/9/79. 
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multiplicity of firms in the industry. The Chairman of the Meat 
Producers' Board stated: 
"This country must have a regular flow on to the British 
market which individual companies are unable to ensure: 
that was the reason the Producers' Board was set up 50 
years ago." (Hilgendorf, 1979),71 
However, the commitment of the Board to averaged rates and to the 
Conference Lines impacted unevenly on meat firms. For example, not 
only was Waitaki disbarred from by-passing the Conference Lines but 
its main competitor, Vesteys, was a part owner of the shipping cartel. 
Vesteys had an interest in two of the shipping firms which made up the 
Conferences Lines, the Blue Star Line and the Australian Container 
Transport Line. It wholly owned the former and had a 42.5% 
shareholding in the latter. Hence, a substantial part of the freight rates 
paid by Waitaki and other firms ended up in the coffers of Vesteys 
diverse holdings (Knightley, 1981).72 
The meat-export license holders belonged to the Meat Exporters' 
Council which advised the Board in the negotiation of shipping 
contracts. However, the Meat Exporters' Council was dominated by 
the international agribusiness firms and the most influential members 
were representatives for the various licensees actually owned by 
Vesteys,73 Their influence effectively stifled the Meat Export Council 
and prevented it from criticising the existing shipping contracts. 74 
71 'Meat company trying to break export monopoly', Christchurch Press, 
30/8/79. 
72 'Local meat firms question producer boards' priorities', National Business 
Review, 1/12/80. 
73 Berryman, W., 'ABC Lines provide ammunition for attack on shipping 
cartel system', National Business Review, 1/12/80. 
74 'Meat ship rebel disappointed', NZ Herald, 31/8/79; 'More fuel for 
Waitaki's fire', NZ News UK, 11 /11 /79. 
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The continued influence of Vesteys, the restraints on the Meat 
Exporters' Council and the continued commitment of the Board to its 
deals with the Conference Lines imparted a real inertia to the shipping 
arrangements. Neilson endeavoured to by-pass this nexus of political 
deals by negotiating independently with the Antwerp Bulk Carries Line 
and by mounting a case in the High Court to defend his actions. 
In October 1977 Neilson extended the interests of his company into 
shipping. In that year he bought a part interest in Maritime Carriers, a 
coastal shipping firm owned by the Antwerp Bulk Carriers Line,75 
Maritime Carriers were soon after appointed as shipping agents for 
Pacific Maritime, the Australasian operation of the ABC Line. Neilson's 
foray into coastal shipping with ABC was initially portrayed as merely 
another facet of its diversification,76 but in fact it signalled that he was 
on a collision course with the Board. 
The Antwerp Bulk Carriers Line (ABC) operated outside the Conference 
Lines and had tried to undercut their bigger competitors a number of 
times elsewhere in the world,77 ABC had approached the Meat 
Producers' Board and the Wool Board in July 1978 with an offer to 
carry 10% of their exports at a 10% discount. However, both Boards 
had rejected this offer,78 Sir Edmund Vestey, chairman of the Blue star 
and ACT Lines had described ABC as 'an expensive nuisance',79 
In early 1979, Waitaki, the Hawkes' Bay Farmers' Co-operative and 
ABC reached an agreement to ship independently of the Board and 
75 'Waitaki - NZR ventures into coastal shipping', Christchurch Press, 5/10/77. 
76 'Coastal cargo gives hope', Christchurch Press, 27/4/78; 'Battle begins for 
trade over Tasman', Auckland star, 8/3/78; 'Tasman link underway', 
Dominion, 2/3/78. 
77 'Cut-price container link planned', Christchurch Press, 31/7/78; 'How a 
shipping tycoon confounded his critics', Lloyd's List, 3/8/79. 
78 'Meat company trying to break export monopoly', Christchurch Press, 
30/8/79. 
79 'Shipping news', Christchurch Press, 25/5/79. 
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Conference Lines. A trial shipment of thirty-two containers of frozen 
meat and two containers of slipe wool was proposed for mid 1979. 
The bulk of the frozen meat was to be supplied by Waitaki and the 
Hawkes Bay Farmers' Co-operative would supply a small amount of 
frozen meat and the slipe wool. The trial shipment would be carried at 
freight rates representing a 15% discount on those negotiated 
between the Board and the Conference Lines (interview, Manager 
#3). 
However, in the following months the management of the ACT Line 
was to become aware of the trial shipment and alerted the Meat 
Producers' Board and the Wool Board. The Wool Board immediately 
threatened the Hawkes Bay Farmers' Co-operative with a fine if it 
continued with its plans to ship outside the Conference Lines and the 
Hawkes Bay Farmers Co-operative consequently abandoned its plans 
to supply slipe wool for the trial shipment (interview, Manager #3). 
Despite these moves the conspirators pressed on with the shipment of 
meat which was transported to the ports of Lyttleton and Napier. 
However in the days before it was loaded on to an ABC vessel, the 
Board declared the shipment illegal in terms of the Meat Export 
Control Act (1922).80 On 30 August 1979, the Meat Producers' Board 
notified Waitaki and Hawkes Bay Farmers' Co-operative that in 
accordance with its statutory powers it intended to seize the thirty-two 
containers of frozen meats intended for the ABC Line and, what is 
more significant, all other the meat belonging to the two firms: 
"The New Zealand Meat Producers' Board, a body 
established under the Meat Export Control Act 1921-22, 
acting under the powers conferred by the Act, hereby 
gives you notice that the Producers' Board intends to 
assume absolute control over all meat owned by you 
and, in particular, all meat intended to be exported by 
the vessel Antwerpen, due to sail from Auckland on or 
80 'Waitaki battles Meat Board', Christchurch Star, 28/8/79, 'Cosy 
arrangement is challenged', Christchurch Star, 29/8/79. 
about September 3 for Southampton and Hamburg and 
other ports, at and from September 1, 1 979. 
By virtue of this notice, the Producers' Board will, as from 
September 1, 1979, assume absolute control over the 
meat referred to herein, and the said meat may be 
graded and shipped only in accordance with such 
directions as may from time to time be given by the 
Producers' Board, and may (be) sold or disposed of only 
by the Producers' Board or by direction of the Producers' 
Board at such times and in such a manner and on such 
terms as the Producers' Board in its discretion may 
determine." B1 
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The measures used by the Board to defend its authority evoked a 
strong response from both the opponents and supporters of the 
existing shipping arrangements. Dissatisfaction with the Board's 
handling of shipping was even expressed by farmers and politicians. 
Federated Farmers officials were critical of the high freight rates paid 
to the Conference Lines. and while not wishing to disrupt the shipping 
arrangements, they urged the Producers' Board to consider ABC when 
renegotiating the shipping contracts.B2 
John Elworthy, Member of Parliament (Waitaki), supported the actions 
of Waitaki. He called for farmers to influence the Meat Producers' 
Board through the lobbying of Federated Farmers and the Electoral 
College to be more flexible over shipping. These comments were 
taken up by Waitaki and ABC Line management who stressed the 
potential savings from shipping outside the Conference Lines. This 
annual saving was estimated to be around $40 million.83 
The Meat Export Council was also drawn into the public debate when 
it was revealed that in contrast to the international agribusiness firms, 
81 'Board seizes meat cargo', Christchurch Star, 30/8/79. 
82 'NZ may save on discount shipping', Auckland Herald, nd; Berryman, W., 
'ABC line exporters brave conference wrath', National Business Review, 
10/10/79; 'Dispute in meat export', Christchurch Star, 29/8/79. 
83 'Belgian shippers claim potential saving of $40m to NZ exporters', 
Christchurch Press, 31/8/79. 
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almost all the local firms on the Meat Export Council had supported 
the earlier offer from ABC to the Board,84 The response by the Meat 
Producers' Board was to, once again, emphasise the benefits of 
continuity in shipping arrangements and the need to control the flow 
of frozen meat onto the British market.85 Supporters of the contracts 
with the Conference Lines cast doubt on the ability of ABC to provide 
sufficient and regular shipping capacity.86 They claimed ABC merely 
wished to pick-up the most profitable parts of the international trade, 
making the balance unattractive to the Conference Lines. These 
claims were hotly disputed by Neilson, the Hawkes Bay Farmers' Co-
operative and ABC.8? 
While this public debate raged on the National Government proved 
extremely reluctant to be seen to direct the activities of the Meat 
Producers' Board. The Under-Secretary of Agriculture (Lance Talbot) 
stressed that the Government would only become involved if it could 
see 'a continuing situation where a statutory body will not face up to 
its responsibilities'. The National Government was not prepared to use 
its new powers, under section 12 of the Meat Amendment Act (1976), 
to override the Board. 88 
84 'Cost put heavy load on meat', Auckland Star, 12/9/79; 'Board's 
'sympathy' for foreign interests sparks attack', National Business Review, 
5/11/79, 'Local meat firms query producers boards' priorities', National 
Business Review, 1/12/80. 
85 'Meat Board defends shipping arrangements', Christchurch Press, 
11/9/79. 
86 'MB open to offers of lower freight rates', Christchurch Press, 1/9/79; 'MB 
interest in freight proposal', otago Daily Times, 1/9/79. 
87 'Waitaki has no wish to destroy shipping conference', Christchurch Press, 
7/9/79; 'Why meat was seized', Christchurch Star, 6/9/79; 'Fresh bid to ship 
meat', NZ Herald, 7/9/79, 
Waitaki - NZR attempted to lobby parliamentarians and sponsored a 
discussion document to this effect:- Hobbs, E. (1979), 'The case for container 
lines to seNice the NZ / UK - Europe trade as a non-conference carrier', a 
presentation to all Members of Parliament, September, Archives of E. J. 
Neilson. 
88 'Mr Macintyre stays out of the meat trade dispute', Christchurch Star, 
31/8/79. 
"An attempt to force a snap debate on the issue in 
Parliament ... failed when the Speaker (Mr Harrison) ruled 
that such a debate did not come within the scope of 
Parliament's Standing Orders. The Labour spokesman on 
agriculture, Sir Basil Arthur (Timaru) initiated the move, 
saying that if the Producers' Board tried to stop Waitaki 
from using a competing shipping line, meat works and 
farmers would suffer 'considerable loss'. The Speaker 
ruled that the Minister of Agriculture (Mr Macintyre) was 
not directly responsible for the Producers' Board and that 
therefore it was not within Parliamentary rules to adjourn 
the business of the House to hold a snap debate on the 
issue." 89 
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Neilson then announced that he would seek compensation resulting 
from the actions of the Meat Producers' Board through the High Court. 
This court case coincided with a similar initiative by another 
independent shipping line, the ACE Line, against the Wool Board, in 
which the shipping line sought redress for its exclusion from the wool 
trade. Both court cases sought to disrupt the longstanding 
arrangements between the Meat Producers' Board and Wool Board 
and the Conference Lines.9o 
Neilson indicated his company's lawyers would argue that by creating 
a cost-pius and monopolistic shipping system the Producers' Board 
had breached the demands for fair trade under the Commerce Act 
(1975). Waitaki International's lawyers would also argue that the 
Producers' Board had exceeded its authority in impounding all of the 
firm's meat.91 The Waitaki case against the Meat Producers' Board 
however was comprehensively defeated.92 Chief Justice Davison had 
89 'Meat company trying to break export monopoly', Christchurch Press, 
30/8/79. 
90 Gasson, W., 'Steam up in shipping' Christchurch star, 10/7/80. 
91 'Waitaki to seek court ruling', Christchurch Press, 18/9/79, 'Line to take MB 
to court', Christchurch Press, 26/10/79, 'Collusion denied in shipping row', 
Christchurch Press, nd, 'Meat Board challenged', Christchurch Press, nd; 
'Waitaki determined on meat freights', Christchurch Star, 19/10/79. 
92 'Court rules for Meat Board', Christchurch Press, 11/3/81. 
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already made ruling in a similar case in favour of the Wool Board 
where he supported the practice of excluding firms not of the 
Conference Lines from the wool trade. The Chief Justice's ruling also 
discounted all the arguments raised by Neilson and his lawyers. The 
Chief Justice determined: (1) that the Meat Producers' Board did not 
exceed its lawful powers by entering into the Freight Agreement of 20 
September 1978; (2) that this arrangement with the Conference Lines 
was a reasonable agreement; (3) that the agreement was not in 
breach of the Commerce Act (1975), insofar as the Act applies only to 
combinations of persons selling goods and not parties at arms length; 
(4) that the Meat Export Control Act did not require the Meat 
Producers' Board to consult with Waitaki, or to act as its agent; (5) that 
the Meat Producers' Board was not obliged to allow other shipping 
arrangements to exist side by side its own; (6) that the Meat Producers' 
Board did not wrongly exercise its statutory authority in declaring the 
trial shipment illegal; and (7) that the Meat Producers' Board was 
entitled to assume full control of all Waitaki meat shipments in the 
manner it did, that is, without a recourse to a hearing relating to the 
case.93 
By confiscating the meat of Waitaki International and having its 
actions validated in the High Court and by Government the Board 
demonstrated its considerable autonomy both from the firms and 
other farmer interests in the industry. However, in a sense this judicial 
approval of the actions of the Meat Producers' Board simply ratified 
the statutory and institutional arrangements that were set up by the 
Meat Export Control Act (1923). Nevertheless, interventions of the 
Board had always entailed costs and benefits to actors in the industry 
and were therefore at best only partial solutions. In the case of 
shipping arrangements with the Conference Lines the high costs 
93 Davison, R., Judgement: Waitaki-NZR, Meat Producers' Board, Chief 
Justice of the Court of Appeal, Wellington, March, 1981. 
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associated with securing access to markets firstly for farmers and 
secondly for firms was finally subjected to criticism from farmers. 
Existing shipping arrangements were to be placed under further 
pressure by the announcement that contracts between the Board and 
the Conference Lines for 1980-1984 had only minimal increases in 
rates. This check in the upward spiral of freight rates provided 
conclusive proof to the opponents of the existing shipping 
arrangements of correlation of Neilson's challenge to the Board and 
of the benefits of competition. They argued that the reduced 
increases had only been made possible by the threat posed to the 
Conference Lines by ABC and that full competition would bring an 
even greater saving.94 
Further, the controversy stirred by Neilson led the Labour Opposition 
and Federated Farmers to demand a Commission of Inquiry into 
shipping.95 In the face of this mounting criticism the Minister of 
Agriculture ordered a Commission of Inquiry. The major 
recommendations of this Commission of Inquiry were that the 
negotiations with the Conference Lines be extended but that ABC be 
included as a shipper of meat, and that the members of the Meat 
Exporters' Council play an active part in future negotiations with the 
Conference Lines. These recommendations were enacted in 1983 
(Meat Industry Task Force, 1983). 
Neilson's project. the Board and new corporations. 
The takeover and the integration of the businesses of Swifts, South 
Otago Freezing, Nelson Freezing, New Zealand Refrigerating and 
Borthwicks meant that Waitaki International had achieved a spread of 
94 Berryman, W., 'ABC men stewing', National Business Review, 12/9/79. 
95 'Call for inquiry into export freight rates', Lloyd's List, 13/9/79; 'Shipping 
alternative favoured by farmers', Otago Daily Times, 15/9/79. 
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processing plants which encompassed nearly all of the farming 
districts in New Zealand (see appendix 2). In this regard, Neilson had 
made Waitaki International into the first truly national (as opposed to 
regional) based processor in the long history of firms in the export meat 
industry. Waitaki International enjoyed a coverage of the country that 
made possible a genuine rationalisation of its deals with farmers. The 
Board was also to come to this conclusion and in doing so seemingly 
removed the statutory constraints on Neilson's project. This change in 
policy by the Board was signalled by the creation of Freesia Meats in 
1985. This establishment heralded investment in and making deals 
with local firms to advance marketing and to eliminate excess 
capacity in the processing sector (Le Heron, 1990; Le Heron, Roche 
and Anderson, 1989). In other words, Waitaki was abruptly 
transformed from a grasping middleman into a potential saviour of the 
industry. 
Waitaki International, but without John Neilson, went on to close 
several freezing works with the direct assistance of Freesia Meats, the 
Board's investment arm. However, these closures were not just the 
result of political deals brokered by the largest local agribusiness firm, 
the Board and Government. They included a number of new actors, 
and, what is most important in this account they involved the large 
corporations that had previously steered clear of the networks in the 
export meat industry and who only entered the sector of commerce in 
the wake of the delicensing of the processing sector. Thus, Fletcher 
Challenge (Fletchers), Watties Industries (Watties) and Brierley 
Investments (Brierleys) individually began to invest in the export meat 
industry several years before delicensing, and their agitation for reform 
of the law relating to the ownership of export slaughterhouses 
constituted an important stimulus for change. 
The large corporations were clearly enamoured with the form of 
corporatism instigated by the Labour Government (1972-1975) and 
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formalised as 'Think Big' by the successive National Governments 
(1975-1984). After the constraints of industrial licensing were removed 
these corporations soon after achieved a significant transfer in the 
ownership of the networks in the industry. The corporations went on to 
quickly build a complex web of ownership across the processing 
sector of the industry.96 
Brierleys moved into the export meat industry first, when in 1977 it 
purchased shares in the Gear Meat Company and the Hawkes Bay 
Farmers' Meat Company. In the next few years Brierleys also took 
control of Huttons. These investments gave it an interest in plants at 
Petone (closed 1979), Eltham, Blenheim, and approximately 20% of the 
freezing works at Whakatu. Brierleys holdings in the Eltham and 
Blenheim plants were consolidated by the formation of the holding 
firm, Riverlands, while the interest in HBF was sold to Watties in 1985.97 
At the same time, Fletchers also moved into the export meat industry, 
when in 1980 it, along with PPCS, purchased all the shares of SFM's. 
Fletchers obtained all of these assets in 1984 (Lind, 1981 ).98 The firm 
also bought and refitted the abattoir at Dunedin, for which it 
subsequently obtained an export slaughterhouse license. These 
development gave Fletchers an interest in plants at Mataura, 
Makerewa and Dunedin operated by a holding firm, Challenge 
Meats. 
Watties targeted 'the big boy', Waitaki International, and in 1982 
purchased 24.9% of its shares (Manager #3). Watties' stake in Waitaki 
International increased in 1985 to 40% of its shares -mainly in counter to 
a bid for shares made by Brierley Investments.99 In the next twelve 
96 'Ownership picture complex', Christchurch Press, 21/10/86. 
97 'Corporate juggling for meat works', Christchurch Press, 21/10/86. 
98 'PPCS revealed as SFM buyer', Christchurch Star, 7/5/80; 'SFM consent 
extended', Christchurch Press, 25/8/84. 
99 'Wattie boosting Waitaki stake', Christchurch Press, 27/7/85, 'Westfarmers 
drops Waitaki options', Christchurch Press, 3/8/85. 
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months Watties was to become the majority shareholder of Waitaki 
International,lOo and Watties also bought a controlling interest the 
Hawkes Bay Farmers' Meat Company (HBF). This joint ownership 
resulted in the physical assets of HBF being integrated with the 
operation of Waitaki. It meant that two more freezing works, HBF 
Whakatu and HBF T akapau, were briefly included as part of the fold of 
Waitaki. 101 
Many of the deals between Fletchers, Brierleys, Watties, and other 
smaller players involved Freesia Meats, the Board's investment arm. 
Most of these deals centred on the enlargement and consolidation of 
a corporate owned version of Waitaki International. Waitaki 
International was to become transformed -with approval from the 
Board and Government- into the holding company of its corporate 
owners (Le Heron, 1988a, 1988b, 1990). In this respect, Waitaki 
International was to become the vehicle favoured by the Board and 
Government and the corporations to extend the building of an 
integrated firm and the -relatively unfettered- rationalisation of the 
networks in the industry. Thus, the involvement of Freesia Meats in the 
affairs of the industry permitted the dismemberment of the assets of 
the Hawkes Bay Farmers' Meat, the merger of the operations of 
Waitaki International with those owned by Fletcher Challenge, and 
100 Neilson, was vocal in his opposition to the intervention of Watties in 
Waitaki and was displaced from the Board of Directors by a corporate 
appointee (1986). "Wattie's overnight raid, some years ago, on Waitaki, 
unhappily proved to have a dismal outcome for Waitaki and the meat 
industry and despite protestations to the contrary Wattie brought its holding 
up to over 60%. Fletcher Challenge's excursion into the meat industry has 
also had many unhappy results ... .the remnants of the Waitaki Head Office 
are to be moved to Wellington. The move under the apparent domination of 
Fletcher Challenge Limited, may only hasten the demise of Waitaki. Perhaps 
Fletchers, Goodmans (Watties) and Freesia would like to buyout the 28% of 
the small shareholders -Challenge found a value of $1.35 acceptable and 
so would many shareholders- though it is questionable whether the meat 
industry would benefit from this action. U (Neilson, 1988). 
101 'Strong Wattie seeks bigger role in meat', Christchurch Press, 12/12/85; 
Wattie's takes majority interest in Waitaki, Christchurch Press, 26/3/86. 
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saw four export slaughterhouses closed (see table 7.1). In the two 
rounds of plant closures and transfers brokered by Freesia Meats, and 
in which Waitaki International played an important part, the 
investment arm of the Meat Producers' Board provided access to 
finance for the large corporate players (Le Heron, 1988b). 
Table 7.1: Selected plant closures, 1987-1989. 
Year Firm 
1987 Waitaki /Richmonds /Vesteys 
1988 Waitaki /Fletchers 
1988 Waitaki /Fletchers 
1989 Waitaki /Fletchers 
Plant. 
Whakatu 
Burnside 
Islington 
Dunedin 
The first go at rationalisation in the processing sector resulted in the 
closure of the Whakatu plant. In 1986 Waitaki International sold the 
Whakatu and T akapau freezing works (the assets of the former Hawkes 
Bay Farmers' Meat) to Richmonds. Richmonds retained and operated 
the plant at Takapau. This freezing works was operated as a joint 
venture with Richmonds, the Board and a British food manufacture, 
Bernard Mathews Ltd. Richmonds sold the plant at Whakatu to 
Vesteys. Vesteys then closed and mothballed this old freezing works. 
The costs of the closure were shared between Waitaki International, 
Richmonds and Vesteys. 102 
An important feature of this round of deals was the approval by the 
Board for the consolidation of catchments (for the procurement of 
stock) for the remaining freezing works. The problems of over capacity 
were extreme in the lower east coast of the North Island. The 
catchments of the T akapau and Whakatu freezing works cut across 
those of the plants owned by Vesteys and by Waitaki International 
(formerly by Borthwicks) and the situation was exacerbated by the 
entry of Richmonds into the region. All three surviving enterprises -
102 'Corporate juggling for meat works', Christchurch Press, 21/10/86. 
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Waitaki International, Richmonds and Vesteys- were happy to shore 
the costs (especially where it was part funded by Freesia Meats) of 
plant closure in order to achieve a better utilisation of their remaining 
processing capacity. 
The second attempt at rationalisation commenced in early 1988 and 
centred on the amalgamation of Challenge Meats (Fletcher's interest 
in the export meat industry) with Waitaki International. The enlarged 
business entity was formally secured in a joint venture -called Garway 
Investments Limited- that continued to be operated as Waitaki 
International. The creation of Garway Investments was directly funded 
by monies from the Meat Producers' Board and Freesia Meats. The 
merger of the Waitaki company and Challenge Meats involved a 
share swap wherein Waitaki International obtained the Makerewa, 
Mataura and Dunedin works while Fletchers obtained a minority 
interest in the enlarged firm. Thus, Watties (itself now part of an even 
larger corporate entity, Goodman, Fielder Watties) owned 29% of 
Waitaki International, and Fletchers owned 29%, while Freesia Meats 
owned 14%, and small shareholders owned the balance of 28% (Le 
Heron, 1990).103 
The amalgamation of Waitaki International and Challenge Meats 
facilitated the immediate closure of two freezing works at Burnside 
and Islington and the cessation of export activities at Dunedin. The 
newly modernised freezing works at Finegand and Marlborough were 
sold to the Primary Producers' Co-operative Society (PPCS).104 As was 
the case with the previous round of deals, the amalgamation of 
Waitaki and the operation owned by Fletchers was intended to both 
eliminate processing capacity and to improve the likelihood of the 
103 'Approvals for all Waitaki', Christchurch Press, 14/4/88, 'Meat Industry 
too slow to modernise', Christchurch Press, 13/8/88, 'Tough words for Waitaki 
directors', Christchurch Press, 16/8/8; O'Brien, P., 'How Waitaki was led to the 
slaughter', NBR Weekly, 20/4/90. 
104 Riddell, 0., '1670 to go off chains', Christchurch Press, 5/7/88. 
207 
remaining freezing works to operate at full capacity. This latter aspect 
of closure was intended to function through the (partial) elimination of 
overlapping catchments. In this regard, the enlarged Waitaki 
company and PPCS (a farmers' firm) were the main beneficiaries. At 
the same time, the rationalisation of processing allowed a further 
enhancement of the ownership of marketing. In the months following 
the creation of Garway Investments (late 1988) the marketing arm into 
Britain and the rest of Europe of the enlarged Waitaki firm was merged 
yet again, in this case with those distributional outlets owned by two 
farmers' firms, AFFCo and Alliance. 
Collapse of Waitaki International and exit of the corporations. 
In many regards, the strategy of building a local marketing company -
to match the scale and integration of the international agribusiness 
firms- seemed accomplished by the steps towards rationalisation 
taken in New Zealand alongside the fusion of the marketing arms of 
Waitaki International, AFFCo and Alliance. The resultant marketing firm 
was expected to handle around 50,000 tonnes of lamb and to 
become the largest importer of chilled and frozen meat into the EC.105 
However, the new business entity dreamed of by John Neilson and 
finally created by the takeovers, amalgamations and joint ventures" 
was to be short-lived. Rather than the enhanced stability and 
profitability that was expected to eventuate from these manoeuvres a 
precipitous decline in the fortunes of Waitaki International culminated 
in its bankruptcy in 1990, and provided an unexpected denouement 
to the most sustained attempt by local firms at the development of a 
marketing company. Hussey has argued that: 
"Central to the restructuring process were the commercial 
problems of Waitaki International Ltd. This publicly listed 
meat processor and exporting company processed 
105 'Meat marketers to merge', Christchurch Press, 21/9/88; 'Waitaki: Merger 
is rational, logical', Christchurch Press, 24/9/88. 
around 40% of the New Zealand lamb kill and 30% of the 
beef kill before it was broken up and effectively 'taken 
over' by AFFCo and Alliance. Facilitating the exit of the 
prominent corporate investors who had entered the 
industry during the 1980s was also part of the plan. While 
some plants were closed as part of the restructuring and 
ownership changes involving Waitaki, the exercise has 
very much been one of 'rearranging the deckchairs on 
the Titanic'. The corporate participant have suffered 
major capital losses during their withdrawal." (Hussey, 
1992: 174). 
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The amalgamation of Waitaki International and Challenge Meats 
(1988) occurred in the context of worsening conditions for all meat 
firms and especially for Waitaki International. A high and appreciating 
New Zealand dollar along with the rising cost of stock served to make 
an involvement in processing, and arguably throughout the networks 
in the export meat industry, increasingly unattractive (Garway 
Investments Limited, 1988; McKinsey and Company, 1988). 
Undoubtedly the biggest problem confronting Waitaki International 
remained that of over capacity in processing. That is, Waitaki 
International owned the largest share of a processing sector and 
therefore of its over-capacity. Over-capacity resulted in high fixed 
costs, and the problems with inordinately high fixed costs were further 
exacerbated by a fall in export slaughterings. There were 16.5 million 
slaughterings in 1985, 12.5 million in 1986, and only 11.4 in 1987.106 
While the physical assets of the Waitaki company got ever larger, the 
numbers of stock, and especially of sheep and lambs, going through 
its works declined. 
The over capacity in processing that Evans (1985) had estimated at 
40% during the artificial boom in slaughterings following the end of 
SMPs were to become significantly worse and finally unsustainable for 
Waitaki International. As a result of its massive overheads in 
processing, Waitaki International reported an annual loss of $796,000 
106 O'Brien, P., 'How Waitaki was led to the slaughter', NBR Weekly, 20/4/90 
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for the year ending 1 October 1987. This was the first such balance 
date deficit for Waitaki International since 1974. However, the deficit 
the following year, in 1988, was a staggering $97.1 million and this 
figure then constituted the largest ever annual loss by any firm 
operating in New Zealand. 107 
Some commentators have noted that the collapse and demise of 
Waitaki International and the ensuing closure of its many freezing 
works up and down the country might be the swiftest means of 
achieving the long sought for rationalisation of the networks in the 
industry. In this regard, Waitaki International had ceased to be the 
active proponent of rationalisation and the consolidation of 
marketing, it now appeared more as its victim. 108 At the same time, 
the Meat Producers' Board found itself in a quandary. Freesia Meats 
had already invested more than $50 million in Waitaki International in 
the belief that only an enlarged version of the Waitaki company could 
secure a truly integrated marketing company and the rationalisation 
of processing. With the imminent bankruptcy of Waitaki International, 
the statutory body faced the difficult choice of walking away from its 
investment or of attempting some transfer of assets to the other 
incumbent firms. 
Had the Board allowed Waitaki International to flounder and let its 
freezing works and inventory be handed over to a receiver and 
liquidator of bankrupt firms, a 'fire sale' of assets might have ensued. 
The sale of physical assets of Waitaki International probably would 
have returned no more than 10%-15% of their book values, and almost 
nothing would be returned to the Board from its investment made in 
Waitaki International. That is, the Board would likely have made an 
outright loss of many tens of millions of dollars. At the same time, there 
107 'Waitaki set to announce big loss', Christchurch Press, 12/12/88, Topp, 
N., 'Waitaki reports $97m total loss', Christchurch Press, 21/12/88. 
108 'Single meat seller wanted by Waitaki', Christchurch Press, 15/4/89. 
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was no guarantee that any of the works closed by the bankruptcy of 
Waitaki International would stay shut. A likely scenario was that further 
new firms would buy these plants, at a considerable discount, and 
thereby further undermine the existing players. The statutory body was 
very opposed to this scenario, because it would result in massive write 
downs that would be made all the more pointless if the plants were 
subsequently re-opened. Thus, instead of leaving Waitaki International 
to its creditors and to be dismembered by the sale of its assets, the 
Meat Producers' Board chose to broker yet another deal. 
The intervention by the Board to secure some transfer in the ownership 
of Waitaki International and some return to its corporate investors was 
undoubtedly welcomed by Fletchers and Watties. Indeed, the extent 
to which the senior management of these corporations misled the 
members of Meat Producers' Board, and thereby subverted the 
interests of farmers, remains a highly contentious issue. A number of 
farmers and other commentators have since claimed that Freesia 
Meats and the Meat Producers' Board were simply duped by big 
business. Not only had they blundered when the statutory body first 
bought into the Waitaki company, but they did so again by facilitating 
the transfer of the processing facilities owned by Waitaki International. 
In a number of interviews (and in at least one N documentary) this 
final intervention by the Board in the fate of Waitaki International is 
referred to as 'the charge of the shiny-arse brigade'. 
"Freesia's investment into Waitaki, which relieved 
Goodman Fielder Wattie of half its interest, was a blunder 
which was never fully acknowledged. If it had been, 
Freesia would have cut its losses when it had the chance. 
Instead, as the full extent of Waitaki's financial problems 
became evident, the investment was justified as a step to 
increased farmers ownership of the industry." (Turner, 
1991 ).109 
1 09 Turner, M" 'Meat producers face heavy burden of Waitaki purchase', 
Dominion Sunday Times, 6/10/91. 
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The immediate response by Freesia Meats, Fletchers and Watties to the 
loss by Waitaki International was to each inject $15 million dollars to 
keep the company afloat during 1989. This cash outlay was required 
because the bankers of Waitaki International had refused any further 
funding. Nearly a year of behind the scenes discussions followed 
before a deal was announced. The deal involved the transfer of all of 
Waitaki International's assets to two farmers' co-operatives. 110 
According to this deal AFFCo took over the Waitara, Feilding, 
Waingawa, Longburn, Wairoa and Imlay works in the North Island,lll 
while Alliance took over the Nelson, Smithfield, Pukeuri, Dunedin, 
Mataura, and Makerewa works in the South Island. At the same time, 
Fletchers and Watties were able to quit all their interests in the joint 
venture, Garway Investments, when Freesia Meats took up its entire 
share issue. This purchase of shares meant that Freesia Meats held a 
37% ownership of the enlarged Alliance Freezing Company (see 
appendices 1 and 2).112 
Waitaki International was liquidated in 1990 when the bulk of its assets 
was passed into the hands of the farmers' co-operatives. 113 The 
winding up of Waitaki International, the sale of assets of its to PPCS, 
AFFCo and Alliance, and the sale of Garway Investments allowed 
Fletchers and Watties to, more-or-Iess, extricate themselves from the 
110 'Waitaki feel confident in revamp talks', Christchurch Press, 2/9/89; 
'Moyle leaves meat strategies to companies', Christchurch Press, 20/9/89. 
111 Keenan, D., 'Merger start of meat moves', Christchurch Press, 26/9/89; 
'Angry meat workers promise ban', Christchurch Press, 26/9/89. 
112 'Companies silent on meat deal rumour', Christchurch Press, 13/11/89, 
'Meat industry reshuffle', Christchurch Press, 14/11/89, 'Waitaki bid terms 
given by Alliance', Christchurch Press, 30/11/89, 'Alliance bid gets green 
light', Christchurch Press, 12/12/89; Keenan, D., 'Alliance likely to mop up 
Waitaki', Christchurch Press, 14/11/89; Keenan, D., 'Waitaki takeover 
supported, Christchurch Press, 12/12/89; Keenan, D., 'Alliance milestone 
marred by strike', Christchurch Press, 28/3/90. 
113 'Waitaki writs $79m off plant', 23/12/89. 
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industry.114 The Alliance Freezing Company took possession of the last 
of the plants owned by Waitaki International on 28 March 1990. These 
transfers in the ownership of its freezing works left Waitaki International 
without any physical assets. In what was to become its last full annual 
report Waitaki International posted a further deficit of $40.9 million for 
the year. With the break up and sale of Waitaki International to the 
co-operatives in 1990, Neilson's project, the building of a firm with a 
nationwide approach to stock procurement and processing and with 
forward links into overseas markets, was ended. Neilson also died that 
year, he contracted amoebic meningitis while holidaying and fell into 
a coma from which he never woke. Moreover the co-operatives that 
were enlarged by the demise of Waitaki did not pursue Neilson's 
project. Although PPCS, Alliance and AFFCo were to become large 
concerns they remained essentially regionally based processors and 
attempted to access markets by means other than forward 
integration. 
Conclusion: The limits of em integrated agribusiness firm? 
The initial inteNentions by the Producers' Board into the networks in the 
industry in 1923 had addressed the part played by international 
agribusiness firms in the linkage of production, processing and 
overseas markets (see chapter 4). That is, reining in the international 
agribusiness firms was the raison d'etre of the statutory body. Still, the 
influence of Borthwicks, Swifts, and Vesteys resulted in a form of 
governance that was secured on the basis of a compromise reached 
between the statutory body and international agribusiness firms. This 
trade-off locked the domestic (proprietary and co-operative) 
enterprises into the pursuit of marginal and subordinated endeavours, 
largely as a corollary of their inability to achieve the necessary level of 
forward-integration to guarantee the clearance of export product. 
114 'FCL in AFFCo', Christchurch Press, 3/6/95. 
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The account of the growth and the demise of the largest of the 
integrated marketing companies, Waitaki International, pertains to the 
period in which the networks in the industry (and all its players) were 
impacted by the saturation and closure of the markets in Britain. This 
transformation in markets was heralded by the end of the Bulk 
Purchase Agreement (1940-1954) wherein New Zealand had supplied 
ration-bound markets in Britain with foodstuffs. Its termination also spelt 
the end of the old-style trade-offs around bulk wholesaling and the 
respective roles of the local firms and the international agribusiness 
firms. In this case, the unique aspects of the export meat industry in 
New Zealand are revealed not through the interventions of overseas 
companies in their efforts to build integrated firms and to force a 
rationalisation of the networks in the industry, but through the efforts of 
Neilson and the indigenous Waitaki company. 
In the decades after the Bulk Purchase Agreement, Neilson and the 
managers of a number of the 'other proprietaries' (Hereford, 1932: 53), 
began to assert the need for a rationalisation of the export meat 
industry. Waitaki International was to become the foremost of these 
local firms, and set out to rid itself of all the trappings of marginality 
and in particular its reliance on contracted processing. In doing so, 
Waitaki International was to become the main agent of this revived 
agenda of rationalisation. Thus, as was noted, the development of 
Waitaki International into an integrated agribusiness firm in many 
respects merely reintroduced the old-styled agenda for efficient forms 
of business and for the rationalisation of the networks in the industry. 
The initial opposition from the Board to Neilson and the Waitaki 
company was undoubtedly predicated on an assessment about the 
menace from the integrated firm to local farmers. The development 
of Waitaki International, its pursuit of Neilson's corporate strategies 
which eventually allowed it to enjoy a position of considerable 
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influence within the networks in the industry, was for a long time 
associated by farmers and by the Board exclusively with the threat of 
monopsony. In retrospect, however, it can now be seen that Waitaki 
International (and other players) merely filled a void left by the decline 
of the international agribusiness firms. However, only a very belated 
credence was given by the statutory body to the strategies of 
emergent firms ever resulting in any qualitative improvement in the 
overall ability of the industry to clear its export product. As a result, 
Neilson and Waitaki were forced into conflict with the Meat Producers' 
Board (the lawful bafflement of Waitaki International culminated in its 
debacle at trying to ship outside the Conference Lines). 
While the discussion of Neilson's project for Waitaki illuminates some of 
the dilemmas faced by meat firms in New Zealand it also shows the 
extent to which the Board tried to defend the interests of family 
farmers in the face of industrial change (Portz, 1991). In many 
respects, the story of the rise and fall of Neilson and Waitaki 
International is as much about the Board as it is about the firm. The 
firm's most senior manager and eventual chairman of its board of 
directors (John Neilson) was to become at first the most outspoken 
critic of the Meat Producers' Board. After he was removed by Waitaki 
International's new corporate owners he was to became a 
Government appointed member of the Board. Parallel to these shifts, 
the Board's response to Waitaki International was to refuse to 
underwrite the firm's agenda for change until the mid 1980s when it 
transformed its opposition into wholehearted endorsement of the new 
proposals for rationalisation and the fostering of integrated firms. This 
about-face resulted in the Board becoming a major loser when 
Waitaki International as bankrupt. 
It would be a decided understatement to claim that the development 
of Waitaki International did not unfold as Neilson might have 
envisaged when he decided, in 1964, that the company cease to be 
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a purely processing firm. The firm experienced some considerable 
success in the development of an integrated organisation of 
processing and wholesaling. It was to become a very large player in 
New Zealand and in the export markets, its multi-divisional structure 
accounted for a very significant share of the export product. 
However, this increase in size and in integration did not allow Waitaki 
International to displace the farmers' agent in the Meat Producers' 
Board or to ever ignore the statutory body. 
The surge in growth enjoyed by Waitaki in the 1980s and its partial 
rationalisation of processing and of marketing was underwritten by the 
Board. The about-face by the Board in its assessment of the threats 
and benefits of rationalisation and integrated marketers, and its 
subsequent favouring of Waitaki International, reflected the Board's 
identification of problems of marketing as being pivotal to working out 
of the contemporary networks in the industry. This reassessment by the 
Board was not the result of its subordination to Waitaki International 
acting as an 'unmarginalised' local firm, but rather in recognition that 
it could use Waitaki International as its tool. Interventions by Freesia 
Meats in Waitaki International's drive for a rationalisation of processing 
and its feeding into the fostering of forward-integration were intended 
to secure a new form of clearance of the export product, which the 
Meat Producers' Board could then licence and include in its 
franchising deals. It would thereby, again, control the mechanisms of 
export in order to ensure its continued benefit to family farmers. 
Yet the increase in size and in the integration of Waitaki International 
did not facilitate a clearance of export product, nor did it improve on 
the uncertainties of modern marketing. In this regard, it may be 
plausible to argue that Waitaki International was hobbled in its 
operations by the earlier intransigence of the Meat Producers' Board 
and by the stymieing by the Board of Waitaki International's attempts 
at full integration. Waitaki International was only belatedly able to 
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close its unwanted freezing works and to realise any economies of 
scale. Although it owned '48% of the bloody bricks and mortar in New 
Zealand' (interview, Manager #3) Waitaki International failed to drive 
down the prices of stock or to make any reductions in the unit costs of 
processing and of handling the export product. At the same time, the 
depots it owned in Britain increasingly resembled what one very senior 
manager called 'white elephants' (interview, Manager #3). 
Put another way, the integration and rationalisation that Neilson was 
finally able to achieve was too little, too late and at too high a cost. 
On the other hand, the retrenchment and break up of the 
international agribusiness firms, Swifts, Borthwick and Vesteys, not only 
in New Zealand but in their international markets suggests a more 
general malaise in the old-style form of business. That is, Waitaki 
International contrived to replicate, by the integration of the activities 
of food processing and wholesaling, a form of business at the moment 
of its breakdown and demise (Burns, 1983; Senker, 1988). 
At the same time, Waitaki International's loss was also the Board's loss. 
The blow to fortunes and plans of the Meat Producers' Board from the 
demise of Waitaki International was enormous. The miscarriage of 
what at the time seemed to be a opportune dovetailing of the efforts 
by the Board to simultaneously down-size processing capacity and to 
consolidate a few large players in processing and export with the 
corporate strategies long pursued by Waitaki International, resulted 
not only in the loss of a multi-million dollar investment by Freesia Meats 
but with the partial eclipse of the statutory body. In this regard, 
Waitaki International might achieve in death what it failed to achieve 
in life, that is, the marginalisation of the Board. Indeed, the extent to 
which the undoing of Waitaki International might prove the undoing of 
the Board, still hangs in the balance. 
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While the future of the Meat Board is somewhat vague, the failure of 
Waitaki International, arguably, illustrates a more precise delimitation 
of the future for integrated marketing companies. In this regard, an 
important factor may be that Neilson's pursuit of greater size and 
greater integration never moved far beyond the internalisation of the 
activities of processing and of export by the simple addition of labour 
processes (Blackburn, Coombs and Green, 1985). The techniques 
which Waitaki International deployed in its effort at building an 
integrated agribusiness firm were those which had prevailed in the 
old-style industry. These techniques had proved successful in an 
environment in which the markets in Britain consumed an apparently 
limitless amount of a very standardised product. 
Export markets however were changing. Despite Neilson's attempts at 
rationalisation and consolidation, which supported the meatworker's 
unions, delicensing in 1981 facilitated the entry of many new firms into 
the export meat industry. Ironically this delicensing again raised the 
prospect of farmers putting together new companies to control their 
own marketing and a new role for unions. In doing so it also 
challenged the idea of large agribusiness firms dominating farmers in 
the industry (Hartley, 1989; Savage, 1990). The new forms of integrating 
marketing, processing and procurement of these new firms is 
discussed in the following account of the Fortex Group (see chapters 8 
and 9). 
Chapter 8 
Fortex Group: The firm and the Meatworkers' Union. 
Introduction. 
"By exploiting these niches small firms embody the broad 
principles that the industry as a whole is moving towards; 
the adoption of increased added value processing; 
efficient meat processing plants; rapid and flexible 
response to market signals; and efficient procurement 
mechanisms. While these principles are crucial to the 
development and exploitation of small plant operating 
niches, they are also coming to dominate the industry as 
a whole. Consequently the production, market and 
procurement configurations of small independent plants 
may reflect the possible configurations of large plants at 
the end of the current period of transition." (Hartley, 1989: 
93). 
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The case study of the Fortex Group (Fortex) provides another account 
of a firm's rise and fall. Fortex emerged and operated in a business 
environment where the problems confronting any enterprise engaged 
in the meat export trade had become acute and where the 
consequences of getting it wrong were far more immediate than in 
the old-style industry. The hub of this aggravation in the conditions in 
which agribusiness firms operated lay in the demise of the utility of a 
standardised product (the frozen carcass) as a commodity through 
which it was possible to secure the export market. 
Where Neilson had sought to control the local industry and farmers by 
buying it up and in doing so create a vertically integrated firm, Fortex, 
under Graeme Thompson was to seek to work out new contractual 
relationships with farmers and a diverse range of buyers in globalised 
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markets. The response by the management at Fortex to the 
establishment of a new type of market was therefore very different 
from Neilson's project at Waitaki. The project was underpinned by the 
pursuit of further processing on a large-scale. Further processing is the 
advanced (further) dis-assembly of meat beyond the stage of the 
carcass and the transformation of an entire, longitudinal half, or primal 
cut of an animal, into consumer ready cuts and meal-sized portions. 
This required that Thompson's project unlike that of Neilson's, was 
particularly concerned with the re-engineering of the factory 
(Hammer and Champy, 1993). In the case of Fortex, and arguably in 
all others (Perry, Davidson and Hill; 1995), Thompson's project 
attempted to integrate the union into its marketing strategies. The new 
factory that Thompson aimed for involved the consolidation of new 
deals among its marketing personnel, production managers and the 
union that represented meatworkers. How these were put together is 
the subject of this chapter. 
The drive for re-engineering is associated with a raft of techniques in 
the sociological and business literature (Lazonick, 1990). It is a form of 
managerial control that involves an unending drive to raise 
productivity and quality. In principle, re-engineering deploys up-
skilling, autonomy and team working (Adler, 1993), just-in-time 
production and the elimination of buffers (Hill, 1991; Oliver, 1991; 
Safeyeni, 1991), and hyper-sensitivity to the market (De Toni, Caputo, 
Vinelli, 1987). The management team that Thompson recruited to 
carry this through came mainly from the remains of Waitaki 
International. This team was to attempt to rework both the 
organisation of work and of industrial relations in its factories largely by 
reworking the traditional linkage, or 'coupling' (Weick, 1976), of 
centralised and decentralised bargaining over pay and conditions 
(Edwards, 1990; Edwards and Scullion, 1982; Littler, Quinlan and Kitay, 
1989; Littler and Salamon, 1984) that was so central to Neilson's 
factories. 
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Their successes and failures serve to problematise the claims about the 
'Japanisation' of work and of modern corporations (Cusumano, 1988, 
1989; Fuccini, and Fuccini, 1990; Hopper, 1993; Sayer, 1986) and a set 
of assumptions about a once-and-for all break through in industrial 
relations and work that echoes previous concerns about de-skilling the 
labour process (Hyman 1988, 1991 ).1 They also point yet again to the 
central problem of stock procurement which operated in favour of 
farmers rather than processors. 
1 An argument could be made about the 'rise and fall' of Fortex with 
reference to the fairly abstracted discussions about the decline of the 
integrated firm (Piore and Sabel, 1984). The issues of what comes after the 
integrated firm is mainly explored in literature on the forms of business which 
exist as hybrids of markets and hierarchy (Johnston and Lawrence, 1988). 
Furthermore, the intersection of this line of argument with recent claims on 
the centrality of management accounting (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987) and, 
in particular, accounting's role in supplying management with vital 
information and the deals made around this supply of information have 
undoubted efficacy in explaining the reworking of contemporary forms of 
business (Armstrong, 1984, 1985, 1987 a, 1987b, 1993; deLuzio, 1993b). Thus, 
the eventual demise of the Fortex Group Limited could be used to illustrate 
that the limits of any integrated firm are always found in its ability to 
integrate labour processes and that this ability is often proscribed by the 
limits of its internalised accounting practices (Cooper and Kaplan, 1992; 
Hopper and Armstrong, 1991). 
Hopper (1993) has shown that while Western business leaders and theorists 
are fixated with new techniques of managerial accounting, giving rise to a 
burgeoning literature on activity based costing (Drumheller, 1993; Cooper 
and Kaplan, 1992; Eider and Campi, 1990; Johnson, 1991; Kleinsorge and 
Tanner, 1991; Turney, 1990; Turney and Reeve, 1990), that nevertheless, these 
techniques are largely disdained in Japan where other, non financial, 
techniques are deployed (Chan, Samson and Amrik, 1990; Daniel and 
Reitsperger, 1991). Total quality management (lQM) constitutes the foremost 
distillation of this Japanese way of doing business (Wilkinson and Oliver, 1989) 
into a Western literature on business (Cusumano, 1988, 1989; Fuccini, and 
Fuccini, 1990; Sayer, 1986). TQM certainly informed the management at 
Fortex rather more than any concern with new techniques of accounting 
(Roslender, 1990, 1991). In this regard, the ultimate failure of the Fortex Group 
Limited is also a failure of a series of deals that were indistinguishable from 
TQM. 
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Marketers who got into processing. 
The origins of the Fortex Group are found in three small marketing 
ventures through which about 400 farmers from North Otago and 
Canterbury sought to access a range of overseas markets. These 
ventures accessed the markets independently of the channels 
provided by the 'incumbent' agribusiness firms (Hartley, 1989). To this 
end, Cattle Services Limited (1971, a private firm), Fort Export Limited (a 
co-operative) and Canterbury Venison Limited (1978, a private firm) 
were formed to take advantage of the right of farmers, enshrined in 
statute and administered by the Meat Producers' Board, to freely 
access processing.2 
As I have already noted this longstanding policy was called the 'open 
door'. Individual farmers had the right -introduced by the Slaughtering 
and Inspection Amendment Act (1934)- to demand of any export 
slaughterhouse that it process their livestock. The Meat Amendment 
Act (1961) had further extended this right requiring that export 
slaughterhouses also accept and facilitate the pooling of meat, hides 
wool, pelts. Pooling allowed farmers to jointly or collectively access 
processing and to market their product. 
These marketing endeavours were managed and co-ordinated as a 
group by Graeme Thompson. The group initially engaged in the 
selection of livestock from the farms of its shareholders and arranged 
for their transport to freezing works. Beef cattle, sheep and deer were 
slaughtered, dressed, bagged and frozen at a number of processing 
plants owned by CFM and Waitaki.3 As a sideline to this operation the 
2 Hutching, C., 'Shaking the system', New Zealand Business, October, 1990; 
Williams, A, 'Fortex -farmers co-op to industry innovator', Christchurch Press, 
28/3/94. 
3 A disastrous season in beef trading in the late 1970s prompted the winding 
up of Cattle Services Limited. Thereafter, the deals involving Canterbury 
Venison Limited and Fort Export Limited centred solely on venison and 
sheepmeats. 
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group also purchased frozen lamb from the processing firms and 
marketed these frozen carcases through its own channels of 
distribution. The group made arrangements for the sale of meat to a 
variety of local and foreign clients, although the majority of sales were 
made to two food companies -Indu Farm AG of Switzerland and 
Belgian Coldstores Limited. Significantly both of these were outside 
the traditional British market. 
Fortex was one of a number of firms to enter processing in the wake of 
delicensing (1981) and was thereby a 'new entrant' (Hartley, 1989; 
Savage, 1990). The delicensing of the processing sector (1981) 
allowed the group to build its own processing facility and the Seafield 
plant was constructed (1982). Seafield was built to combine the 
slaughter of deer and the further cutting of frozen lamb. The plant was 
very small and was built decidedly 'on the cheap' (interview, 
Manager #5).4 It offered only the minimum facilities required by an 
export slaughterhouse. A staff of only 30 was employed on the site. Its 
throughput was targeted at slaughtering only 42 deer every two 
working days. The deer slaughtering premises (DSP) constituted a 'mini 
works' with its own stockyards, pens and slaughtering facility (interview, 
Supervisor #1). Whenever there was insufficient deer available for 
slaughtering, the character of work at Seafield switched to the further 
cutting of frozen lamb. This further cutting was undertaken in a large 
room built some distance away from the DSP and adjoining chillers in 
which the lamb carcases were stored. 
4 The respondent was a very senior production manager at Fortex. Unlike 
the majority of managers at his level, he had become involved in the 
industry relatively late and after a career in other industries and countries. He 
was cynical rather than critical of the centrality of farmers and the Board in 
the industry. That is, he accepted that without the Board farmers would have 
fared much worse than they did in their dealings with firms. HoweveL from his 
perspective as a manager at Fortex the statutory body appeared as an 
institution that was occasionally helpful but usually had to be side-stepped. 
He was also a new farmer and ran a small farm nearby the processing plant. 
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The group initially relied on PPCS (which had taken over CFM) and 
Waitaki International to sell it frozen carcases of lamb to be further 
processed at Seafield. However, the undoubted success of this and 
other small ventures in concentrating on the most profitable aspects of 
processing and niche marketing raised the ire of the incumbent firms 
and notably the large and integrated marketing firms, Very small 
ventures, like Fortex, were accused of 'picking the eyes from the 
industry' (inteNiew, Director # 1; also see Hartley, 1989: 93), PPCS and 
Waitaki International tried to stymie this operation when they refused to 
sell more frozen carcases to the group (1984), A contributing factor in 
the decision-making by these incumbent firms to cease sales to Fortex 
was the move by the Meat Producers' Board to take over the 
complete responsibility for the marketing of lamb and mutton (1982-
1985), This inteNention established a guaranteed market for 
sheepmeats, albeit one subsidised by Government (inteNiew, 
Manager #4), and meant that PPCS and Waitaki International gained 
nothing by diverting their product to Fortex, 
The disruption to the supply of frozen carcases to Seafield encouraged 
the new firm to commence the industrial slaughter of lambs, A 
slaughterboard for the processing of sheep was added to the Seafield 
plant (1985), Around seventy staff were then employed on site, The 
construction of Seafield also stimulated the consolidation of the group 
as an unlisted company (1985), The group became the Fortex Group, 
This formal consolidation facilitated the raising of capital through 
outside shareholding and the raising of debentures, Further investment 
in Fortex was required to fund its very rapid expansion, The search for 
further funding of an enlarged firm subsequently resulted in its listing on 
the Stock Exchange (1990-1991 ),5 
5 Birss, N" 'Fortex seeks $6m in capital', Christchurch Press, 1/5/91; Dowling, 
Co, 'Fortex seeks listing to aid growth plans', Christchurch Press, 27/4/90; 
'Fortex issue raises $1O,8M', Christchurch Press, 16/5/90; 'Fortex poised for 
shares listing', Christchurch Press, 13/6/90; Rennie, Co; 'Fortex to get listing 
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At the time of consolidation of the group (1983) the major 
shareholding in Fortex was split between: (1) Freesia Meats (the Meat 
Producers' Board) that held around 25% of the firm; (2) Indu Farm AG 
of Switzerland that held around 25% of the firm; (3) National Mutual 
Insurance and Prudential Assurance that each held around 12% of the 
firm; (4) the shareholder-suppliers of Fort Export Limited who held 
around 6% of the firm; (5) its founders, especially Graeme Thompson; 
and (6) various small shareholders. At the time of its listing as a public 
company in 1990 the Meat Producers' Board had sold all its shares in 
Fortex. The Board/Freesia Meats had been a major investor in the 
early stages of the company. However, as Fortex moved beyond the 
small-scale and began to impact on the procurement and marketing 
operations of Waitaki International and the co-operatives in which the 
Board had far greater investment, its enthusiasm for Thompson's 
project waned (see chapter 7). As a result, the decision by Thompson 
to press ahead with the construction of a plant at Silverstream, in 1989-
1990, was met with considerable hostility by the Board. Its shares in 
Fortex were then subscribed by a number of banking and investment 
firms.6 
Production at Seafield was greatly expanded with the introduction of 
shift work (1988), a move that was made possible after the introduction 
of the Labour Relations Act (1987),7 Thompson further augmented the 
firm's plant at Seafield by adding rendering (1989), a fellmongery 
(1990) and a casings department (1993), and purchased cold store 
facilities in Ashburton (1989).8 In his boldest move Thompson pushed 
shortly', National Business Review, 27/4/90; Topp, N., 'Fortex listing given 
market prominence', Christchurch Press, 23/6/90. 
6 'Fortex details rights issue', Christchurch Press, 10/7/90; 'Freesia sells Fortex 
stake', Christchurch Press, 16/12/89; 'Fortex Shares sold', Christchurch Press, 
27/1/90; 'Listing step closer for Fortex Group', Christchurch Press, 8/6/90. 
7 'Fortex deal may see 1.5M kill', Christchurch Press, 22/12/88. 
8 'Approval for Fortex proposal' Christchurch Press, 9/11/90; 'Fortex 
confident of growth prospects', Christchurch Press, 7/12/91. 
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through, against the arguments from his own managers, the building 
of a new plant with follow-on departments at Silverstream (1990).9 He 
also purchased a venison plant at Tauranga (1989) and purchased a 
15% stake in Phoenix Meat (1994).10 At the time of its closing 
Thompson's firm employed nearly 1800 workers and salaried staff at its 
three plants and Head Office in Christchurch. The combined 
throughput of Seafield and Silverstream in their last season of 
operation (for Fortex) represented about a 10% share of the annual 
sheep kill.ll 
Narratives, rhetorics and awards. 
In August of 1990 the Fortex Group became listed as a public 
company by the Stock Exchange of New Zealand. Thompson's 
decision to seek public shareholding excited considerable attention, 
especially from the media. Fortex Group was one of the first 
corporations to be publicly listed in the wake of the disastrous share 
market crash of 1987, and it was the first agribusiness firm to seek 
public shareholding after the demise of Waitaki International (1989). A 
blaze of publicity accompanied its listing, wherein Fortex enjoyed the 
status of a saviour to the export meat industry and to the broader 
economy.12 Mike Moore, Prime Minister and Minister for Trade, for 
example, offered elaborate rhetorics on the place of the company in 
9 '500-job Fortex plant for Otago', Christchurch Press, 23/11/90; 'Second 
plant for Fortex', Christchurch Press, 27/1/90; Chalmers, H., 'High level of 
automation in meat processing plant', Christchurch Press, 7/12/90. 
10 Fortex purchased a 59% holding in Summit Deer Products Limited in 1989. 
'Fortex deer arm in $207,645 profit'. The firm became a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Fortex in 1991. 'Fortex considers venison plant', Christchurch 
Press, 29/5/90; 'Fortex to bid for Summit', Christchurch Press, 14/3/91; 'Fortex 
to mop up Summit', Christchurch Press, 14/3/91. 
11 Archibald, J. and N. Topp, 'Pay-cut plea fails as 1800 jobs go', 
Christchurch Press, 26/3/94: 'Fortex eyes profit lift', Christchurch Press, 
29/11/90. 
12 Hutching, C., 'Shaking the system', New Zealand Business, October, 1990 
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his vision of the new society that the fourth Labour Government had 
ushered in: 
"Management and staff and unions... have made a 
difference. So have the people at Fortex meat company 
in the South Island, which is an export winner. The people 
there are creating new jobs, while elsewhere freezing 
works close. At Fortex they have shift work, new 
technology, they have excellent marketing for New 
Zealand's products. They are making a difference for 
themselves and New Zealand at home and abroad." 
(Moore, 1990).13 
In addition to Moore other "politicians, award givers, public relations 
advisers, share analysts, business buffs" combined to make Fortex the 
most favoured company in New Zealand. 14 The acclaim from nearly 
all quarters coincided with a succession of business awards and 
honours. Fortex was declared the 'company of the year' in 1990. It 
won the Tradenz-Air New Zealand's Exporting Excellence Award in 
1992. It was awarded the NNZ-Marketing Magazine's Business to 
Business Award in 1993. Graeme Thompson as managing director was 
granted the Order of the British Empire for his contribution to the export 
meat industry in the New Year's honours list of 1991.15 
The awards lauded the Fortex Group and its founder for an 
inteNention into the industry that promised to erase the failure of 
Waitaki International. The narrative of the success of the new 
company appealed to a variety of actors. It stood in stark contrast to 
the narrative of Waitaki International, which never transcended that of 
a threat to farmers. The narrative of Fortex was constructed as follows. 
13 Moore, M., 'The Prime Minister's Address to the Nation', 
14 Brett, C., 'Silence of the lambs', North and South, July 1994; Macfie, R., 
'Strong profit 11ft by Fortex', National Business Review, 5111/90. 
15 Brett, c., 'Silence of the lambs', North and South, July 1994; Keenan, DOl 
'Fortex named company of the year', Christchurch Press, 22/11/90; Turner, 
M., 'Fortex accused of price undercutting', The Dominion Sunday Times, 
24/3/91. 
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The activities of further processing of chilled lamb in New Zealand 
were equated with the adding of value to New Zealand's single most 
important export. The adding of value was championed as a distinct 
break with and advance over the old-style carcass oriented industry. 
Adding value to the carcass was a panacea for the industry. In this 
narrative much larger firms that adopted other strategies in an effort to 
supply the overseas markets were (as in the case of the Primary 
Producers' Co-operative Society and the feed lotting enterprise based 
at Five Star Beef) derided as mere 'carcass handlers' .16 
The public relations surrounding the Fortex narrative also made much 
of its intimate links with, and the benefits that would accrue to, 
farmers. The Fortex Group was presented as the product of farmers 
acting as 'marketers who got into processing' (interview, Manager #1). 
What is more important is that Fortex could fuel this narrative of a 
modern meat marketing company. In their 1990 annual report we find 
the following observations: 
"The objective is that by the time the animal is 
slaughtered, it has already been sold and its contribution 
to the company is known. The goal of achieving higher 
margins from added-value further processing has 
enhanced profitability." 17 
The firm's mission statement was to achieve flexibility in manufacture 
and be thoroughly market-led. It would undertake the procurement 
and processing of livestock only when it had already secured a buyer 
for its highly valued product. To most commentators on the industry 
the Fortex approach as presented in this narrative seemed a sure 
winner.1B The appeal of Fortex to them was that it promised a way 
16 Brett C., 'Silence of the lambs', North and South, July 1994. 
17 Fortex Group Limited, Annual Report: 1990, cited in O'Brien, P. V" 'Fortex 
report makes impressive reading', National Business Review, 4/12/90. 
18 Chalmers, H., 'Lamb trade move to quality forecast', Christchurch Press, 
29/6/90; Dowling, c., 'Fortex has healthy profit', Christchurch Press, 3/11/90; 
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forward, it was writing a new chapter in the history of the export meat 
industry. This new chapter was self-consciously referred to as 'the 
Fortex Way'. This was the name given to it by the managers, 
supeNisors, team leaders and union officials I inteNiewed at Seafield 
and Silverstream. 
Transformation of the industry. 
the group must have the ability to change the 
specifications of its products within days." (Linn, 1990).19 
Thompson's project was to make Fortex 'the world's butchers shop' 
and the management at Fortex (especially its marketing managers) 
envisaged a new type of integrated firm; one with the capacity to 
exactly customise its products and to supply them to customers all 
around the world. In striving for this ideal, the firm aimed at the 
internalisation and the relocation of work from butchers' shops in the 
United Kingdom to export slaughterhouses in New Zealand. Thus, 
Fortex tried to deviate from the norms of the traditional industry by 
internalising further processing, relocating it to New Zealand, and 
making the new factory the cornerstone of its operation. In other 
words, the activity of this new niche marketing company involved the 
combination of activities across what was a global industry into a new 
form of vertical integration which in a sense surpassed even Neilson's 
project. It is worth noting what was involved in this apparently simple 
addition to the operation of an agribusiness firm. 
It has already been noted that the activities of the procurement of 
livestock, processing, further processing, marketing and final 
Macfie, H., 'Strong profit lift by Fortex', National Business Review, 5111/90; 
O'Brien, P. V., 'Fortex report makes impressive reading', National Business 
Review, 4/12/90; Weir, J., 'Fortex makes splash with evolutionary 
breakthrough', The Dominion Sunday Times, 3/6/90. 
19 Linn, M., Marketing Manager, Fortex Group Limited, cited in 
'Shareholders satisfied with Fortex's progress', Christchurch Press, 15/12/90. 
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consumption are separated physically by many thousands of 
kilometres. The networks for the supplying, processing and selling of 
meat are truly global and vertically integrated firms established the 
dominant form of business across the international trade. Vertical 
integration allowed firms to bridge the vast distances and to control 
their labour processes. In the 'old-style' industry, the industry that 
Neilson was familiar with, the physical gulf across the industry fell 
between the activities of processing and of further processing. Primary 
processing occurred in New Zealand and further processing occurred 
in Britain. A standardised product -of relatively low value- was shipped 
from New Zealand and distributed through the markets in Britain. The 
refrigerated infrastructure in Britain was controlled for the most part by 
international agribusiness firms. The firms who controlled the bulk of 
this export product operated only as wholesalers (Cornish, 1995) and 
thereby maintained an arms length relationship with the activities of 
further processing. 
While the largest and the most successful of these international entities 
vigorously pursued vertical integration, the strategy was always more-
or-less delineated at the stage of further cutting. Borthwicks, Vesteys 
and even Towers all owned chains of butchers' shops, but these 
investments were relatively insignificant. The bulk of frozen meat, the 
old-style international agribusiness firms were responsible for importing, 
was subjected to further cutting in the many thousands of 
independent butcheries dotted around Britain (Harrison, 1963; 
Knightley, 1981). 
The international agribusiness firms exemplified the benefits of 
internalising processing and distribution in conditions of relative 
certainty (Salais and Storper, 1992). The incumbent firms (Hartley, 1989) 
initially moved into processing to guarantee supply and the 
opportunity to process a standardised product. In this regard, the 
internalisation of processing constituted the control over what 
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amounted to a stock standard configuration of technologies and 
labour processes. Hence, the freezing works of the post-war period 
were remarkably similar in their lay-out. The organisation of activities 
found in freezing works were little more than derivations of the 
renowned Chicago system first developed in the 1870s (HounshelL 
1984). 
The international agribusiness firms and the largest of the local firms 
achieved vertical integration around the production of a standardised 
product and its distribution by the mechanisms of wholesaling into 
terminal markets characterised by their insatiability and certainty. The 
holding of large inventories -or buffer stocks- of the standardised 
product was the central feature of this form of vertical integration. The 
capacity for such agribusiness firms to store many weeks and even 
months of refrigerated throughput allowed them to bridge what were 
otherwise discontinuous moments in the cycle of activity of the firm. 
The old-style agribusiness firms essentially sold to final customers from 
an inventory built up in the preceding weeks and months. Massive 
cold stores that could hold tens of thousands of frozen carcases were 
built at all of the major freezing works. The dockside facilities and 
depots owned by Borthwicks, Vesteys and Towers could store even 
more refrigerated meat. The internalisation of this refrigerated storage 
allowed the old-style, agribusiness firms to operate the procurement of 
livestock and the processing of meat in New Zealand with 
considerable autonomy from the wholesaling and retailing 
undertaken in the United Kingdom. Procurement of livestock and 
processing of meat were governed by seasonality which in the 
northern hemisphere also cemented the traditional 'window of 
opportunity' for the supply of the United Kingdom. 
In the old-style industry, the international agribusiness firms were able 
to significantly control the quantities of meat / standardised product 
that entered Smithfield other auctions, and the butchers' shops. The 
231 
manipulation of the quantity of meat available for sale allowed these 
agribusiness firms to shape prices and to enhance their revenues. The 
integrated agribusiness firms were thus able to exercise the power of 
an oligopoly over retailers, wherein a few large sellers confronted 
many small buyers. 
The configuration of the standardised product that empowered this 
oligopoly was achieved by the blast freezing of the dismembered 
bodies of beasts immediately after they came off the slaughterboard. 
The frozen carcass thus entailed the modification of fresh meat only to 
the extent that it could be safely preseNed, transported and then 
stored and wholesaled in the United Kingdom. Beyond the 
procedures required for its packaging and refrigeration the raw 
materials made available by industrial slaughter were left largely 
intact. This is what happened, for example, at Waitaki International. 
However, the concentration of buying power into the hands of large 
supermarket chains was to fundamentally alter the relationship 
between the wholesalers and the buyers of food in the United 
Kingdom. The development of their retail hegemony was to end the 
power of the wholesaler across a variety of commodity chains (Burns, 
1983; Burns, Mcinerney and Swinbank, 1983b; Hunt, 1983; Mordue, 
1983; Senker, 1988; Smith, 1990). The networks in the export meat 
industry were no exception, butchers' shops -like grocers' shops and 
tobacconists- were displaced by the supermarkets and hypermarkets. 
These new and very large retailers drastically reduced the capacity of 
agribusiness firms to influence or channel the supply of the market. In 
doing so they weakened the advantages of old-style vertical 
integration. 
As a result of the growth of the supermarket chains, the benefits that 
accrued to the integrated agribusiness firms from their control over the 
physical resources of wholesaling were permanently undermined. 
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Selling a standardised product from inventory, and using large buffer 
stocks to bind together corporate activities based in New Zealand and 
abroad, was effectively eliminated as a viable organisational device. 
The holding of inventory ceased to be an effective lever over the 
workings of demand and supply and became merely another set of 
costs against the agribusiness firm. 
The supermarkets and other large retailers were also decidedly 
disinterested in buying meat in the form of the frozen carcass. The 
new focus among retailers was on consumer ready cuts (Senker, 1988). 
Thus, the rise of retail control (itself facilitated by the belated 
installation of home refrigeration in the United Kingdom) created both 
the potential and the requirement for agribusiness firms to engage in 
the manufacture of customised products by the further processing of 
meat. This was the opportunity that Thompson and the new Fortex 
Group sought to exploit. 
Re-engineering the factory: The Fortex way. 
The new form of vertical integration championed by Thompson at 
Fortex bridged a physical gulf across the networks in the industry that 
fell between the activities of further processing and marketing. A fully 
customised product -of very high value- was shipped and often air 
lifted from New Zealand and sent to restaurants, hotels and 
supermarkets all around the world. This new form of vertical 
integration required that Fortex transform the activities of its further 
processing into a variant of bespoke manufacture in order to 
transcend the limitations of niche marketing. 
The firm adopted an approach to the linkage of procurement, 
processing, further processing and marketing that had many similarities 
to the techniques of just-in-time production (deLuzio, 1993a, 1993b). 
Narratives of success, of course, gloss what in practice was an attempt 
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to resolve differences within and between the activities and the actors 
that controlled them in the different spheres of procurement, 
processing, further processing and marketing, Fortex set out to rework 
these sets of activities by pulling the actors together into a continuous 
moment in the cycle of activity of the firm, The aim was to establish an 
allocation of resources that was at all times hyper-sensitive to diverse 
markets, This effort to undertake a form of bespoke manufacture 
(Piore and Sabel, 1984) was significant in repositioning the union, 
"In this game you can't afford to have quality slipping .. , 
One of the really significant factors today is speed, the 
telecommunications, technics and that, and also the 
speed of the meat actually getting to the other side of the 
world, A container can leave here (Seafield) on 
Wednesday and it is in the European Community before 
our Friday. So it leaves here Wednesday, and a day, just 
over a day and a bit and it is on sale on the other side of 
the world. Now if it is not right you can lose the order as 
quick, 11 (inteNiew, Union official #1 ),20 
Recognition of this from the union was also important for the firm, In 
order for Fortex to become the world's butchers shop, the firm was 
driven to eliminate all types of inaccuracy in its assessment of quality 
and of costing, The pursuit of continuity in its cycle of activity required 
continuity and precision in deCision-making and unlike in Neilson's day 
a union on side and committed. 
In this arrangement there was a great potential for miscalculation in 
the alliance of the factory and of marketing pursued by Fortex, 
Accuracy in the assessment of these two dimensions of manufacture 
20 The respondent had worked in the industry for many years, combining 
employment as a slaughterman with various other jobs in the slack, He had 
been made redundant by plant closures some years prior to joining Fortex, 
He had not been previously active in the union, He was also a farmer and 
argued that employment in processing allowed a significant number of the 
workforce to run small farms and other businesses, His farm adjoined that of 
one of the production managers (and boss) which stimulated a constant 
banter between the two about the state of the other's pasture and stock, 
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was absolutely pivotal to the operation of the Fortex Way. Thus, Fortex 
was 'lean and mean' (inteNiew, Manager #1; inteNiew, Manager 
#11). The efficiencies granted were to enhance the bottom line but 
were also problematic for securing a successful embedding of further 
processing in the firm and of the firm in the networks in the industry 
(Krafcik, 1988). 
Potential errors in this arrangement were likely to be both manifest and 
hidden. The issues of quality and costing pertained, mainly, to the 
suitability of raw materials, the effectiveness of remuneration and 
supeNision, and the minimisation of opportunity costs. This trio 
reflected the hyper-sensitivity of the new firm to the market. The 
urgency to control quality and costing reflected the complexity of the 
firm's operations the drastic truncation in the timespan of deals and 
reflected the absence of buffers in the form of frozen carcases. 
Contrary to the narrative of Fortex, which tended to stress its high 
technology nature this attempt to put together a new factory did not 
deploy anything in the way of novel technologies or work practices, at 
least not in the absolute sense. Meatpacking in North America moved 
to the further cutting of meat in the 1950s and the modern meat 
processing factory was actually more labour intensive. Seafield and 
Silverstream were exemplars of the new factory not because of high 
technology, but because of ways in which they attempted to utilise 
new work practices and contractual arrangements. In other words, 
their novelty related not to the use of advanced machinery but to the 
deals made inside the factory with labour and outside the factory with 
farmers and buyers. 
Being market-led is not the same as being marketing-led. 
How then did an attempt at a market led company work out? 
Although the firm enjoyed a couple of standing orders with Indu Farm 
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and Belgian Coldstores, the main thrust of its early development came 
from an aggressive search for new clients and new orders. In pursuing 
these deals the marketing staff (based mainly in Europe) stressed the 
capacity of Fortex to customise its end product. That is, they stressed 
the flexibility of the plant. In this regard, the successes of the 
marketing arm -organised as subsidiary companies based in the 
United Kingdom, Belgium, the USA and Hong Kong- established 
recurring dilemmas for the plant(s).21 
The relationship encompassing the demands of marketing and the 
operation of the plant was resolved by an essentially, one-way flow of 
information: the marketing concerns sent customers' orders and other 
instructions to Head Office, and the staff from Head Office made 
regular visits to Seafield. Making operational this flow of information -
from marketing to plant- was secured by the decision-making of key 
personalities involved in the firm, of whom Thompson was central. 
Thus, the recurring issues of organising the work in the plant(s) were 
actually, ultimately, resolved by bargaining between managers and a 
series of one-off deals. In these affrays marketing staff were typically 
able to direct and then redirect the activities of processing. Hence, 
the marketing staff settled the allocation of resources and therefore 
the timetables of processing. 
The sway of marketing became more pronounced after the move to 
shift work at Seafield (1988), especially where supervisors of the night 
shifts (a lower tier of management than could be found on plant 
during the day) were confronted by managers from Head Office. 
However, this type of inteNention also became more problematic. 
That is, the interference by marketing staff (who were concerned with 
their supply deadlines and not the complexities of further processing) 
became increasingly counter-productive. For example, a marketing 
21 'Fortex profit returns to tune of $2.86M', Christchurch Press, 1/11/89; 
'Overseas interest in Fortex surfaces', Christchurch Press, 28/3/94. 
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manager might insist that the cutting of one order be abandoned for 
another, or that an order be released for shipment without the normal 
checks on quality. 
The limits to the utility of the informal practices by which the plant(s) 
was subordinated to its marketing arm, was reached largely as a result 
of the growth in the size and complexity of the firm. Fortex enjoyed a 
much larger throughput following the enlargement of Seafield and the 
opening of Silverstream. In its first year of operation the Silverstream 
plant established a new record for the number of sheep killed in an 
export slaughterhouse in a single working week. 22 However, the firm 
was also faced with a sharp increase in the number of rejected orders. 
Two technical reasons for the rejected orders were highlighted by 
management at the plants: (1) the order was rejected because it was 
found to have too high an incidence of bacteria (the bacto count) 
and as a consequence a shortened shelf-life, or (2) the order was 
rejected because it was out of specification. The cause of both was 
partly attributed to the unwanted interference from Head Office. 
Problems of the first type usually required Fortex to drop its price for the 
product. This discounting allowed the retailer to drop their price to 
ensure that the product was sold within its reduced shelf-life. Problems 
of the second type required Fortex to drop its price and/or to under 
take re-work. Re-work meant that the meat was returned to the 
cutting room and re-processed at the company's expense. Re-work 
cost the firm several hundred thousand dollars in 1989 and 1990. In 
short, the undoubted advances the firm had made in terms of quantity 
seemed to collide with its commitment to high quality and effective 
costing. One production manager had this to say: 
"Oh it (re-work) was bloody dreadfuL but it wasn't only the 
people here (at the plant) fault. There were also people 
22 'Record at Fortex', Christchurch Press, 24/5/91. 
in Head Office saying: Well it is ready, send it. And people 
here saying: Yes, but we haven't checked the bacteria. 
Don't worry about it, send it... 
Anyone from Head Office who wanted to walk in 
here and tell people to do something felt that they had 
that right. So one of the difficulties I had when I came 
here was people (who) would arrive down here. I would 
see them walking down the corridor and I would say: Who 
are you? Oh I am here to do this. And I would say: No you 
are not! Go back, fuck off to Christchurch, and then ring 
me up and make an appointment to come down here. I 
will see whether we have got time to talk to you." 
(interview, Manager #5). 
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The transition from 0 small to a relatively big enterprise necessitated 
the adoption of formal practices to link marketing and processing. The 
formalisation of the practices of decision-making also co-determined 
a (partial) redressing of the imbalance between marketing and the 
plants. The opening of the plant at Silverstream further exacerbated 
the issues of size and complexity, and heralded a shift in the 
composition and structure of senior management at Fortex. Fresh 
appointments were made to oversee Seafield and Silverstream and 
these new plant managers were also appointed to an enlarged board 
of directors. A manager records what this enlargement meant: 
"What happened was as the place grew, the philosophy 
basically stayed until it (the firm) went into slaughtering. 
At that point they changed the size of it. It sort of went 
from a small company, where everybody knew each 
other... When the slaughterboard started all the old 
hands felt a bit betrayed and stuff, because the new guys 
got better conditions and you know all those sorts of 
things. Suddenly there were not so many visits from the 
likes of Graeme Thompson and Michael Mullen (the 
company secretary), and there was more business 
orientation and financial controls and things of this 
nature." (inteNiew, Manager #2). 
These were significant developments, and they enhanced the 
management of the plant while advancing the integrity (if not the 
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autonomy) of Seafield and Silverstream (interview, Manager # 1 ; 
interview, Manager #11). 
The firm was to replicate the history of financial control in the modern 
corporation in miniature (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987) when it belatedly 
jettisoned its adherence to informal practices of decision-making. In 
doing so, Fortex tried for a new balance between marketing and 
processing, one that approximated and paralleled the workings of the 
market and minimised its costs (Chandler, 1978, 1990). The firm did so 
in order to properly cost its internalised customer-supplier exchanges 
(Hopper and Armstrong, 1991). To this end, both Seafield and 
Silverstream were 'paid' by the marketing arm of the firm for their 
endeavours in processing and any deficiencies in the end product 
were charged back against the plant. The plants received a nominal 
payment for their activities. Seafield and Silverstream were paid for 
the slaughtering of livestock and the dressing of carcases, the working 
up of casings, the treatment of pelts, the handling of offals, the refining 
of blood and off-cuts, rendering, and the further cutting of meat. 
Later it would be discovered that this method of accounting allowed 
for extensive cover-ups and false entries on company records. 
One manager, who had been at Seafield since its beginnings, 
bemoaned that with the start-up of Silverstream, and the hiring of new 
managers and supervisors, and the introduction of new financial 
controls, the company had been transformed 'from a marketing firm 
into an agribusiness firm' (interview, Manager #2). Part of his 
assessment reflected the grieved for loss of informality and with it 
familiarity, part of it was a response to the new burdens and 
constraints placed on all staff at the plants. The devices of cost 
accounting formalised and underscored the responsibility of 
management (and workers) at the plants for costing and for quality. 
Indeed, the drive by Fortex to re-engineer the factory and to make it 
led by the market, had its true beginnings in this belated recognition of 
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the complex accommodation that was actually needed to link 
processing and marketing. 
However, re-engineering the factory and its linkage with the marketing 
arm could not be achieved by fiat. Last minute demands by senior 
marketing managers from Head Office were proven as ineffective. 
Their dominance was to spread confusion, destroy the scheduling and 
order of work and increase the need for re-work. What was required 
were new deals done from inside the factory and not merely ordered 
by Head Office. What was required was a new plant management to 
oversee a new arrangement of work. 
New technology or new ways of working. 
"I had a guy (a researcher) in the other day who turned 
around and said he was here to look at Fortex because of 
all the new technology that he said we have got. And, I 
sat and listened to what he was saying, and I thought we 
have got a bloody good PR machine because this guy's 
perception of Fortex is all this new technology, because 
there is nothing new in (this) technology." (interview, 
Manager #6). 
Having stressed the problems associated with Fortex's management of 
the new factory, it is also worth noting that the plants at Seafield and 
Silverstream were among the newest and most efficient in the industry. 
The plants were designed from the outset to be efficient in all of the 
activities leading up to the further cutting of chilled meat. They 
deployed the best of available labour-saving technologies. However, 
most of the 'new' and labour-saving technology at Seafield and 
Silverstream was located in and around the slaughterboard. Ironically, 
the slow accumulation of innovation available to the industry had 
allowed for the automation of chunks of slaughterboard just at the 
time when its reconfiguration had ceased to be seen as a solution for 
the problems confronting processing firms. Indeed, as noted above, 
the shift to further cutting reintroduced and intensified the centrality of 
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a manual labour process (albeit a different manual labour process) 
that had dominated the old industry. 
In the stock yards, the yells of shepherds and incessant barking of their 
dogs was replaced by an automated system of yarding and washing 
the livestock. The stockyards were connected by automated runs and 
gates. Mobs of sheep were directed through the maze of yards by a 
microprocessor, which opened gates in front and closed those behind 
the sheep. The animals were moved into the sticking pens -the first 
workstation on the slaughterboard- by conveyor belt. This conveyor 
moved the sheep up the last few metres of pens and through a 
narrow turnstile. The turnstile then turned and forced the beast's head 
against the electrical stunner. On contact another microprocessor 
then zapped the creature, and the turnstile executed a half turn that 
dropped the insensate animal into arms of the men in the sticking pen. 
The slaughterboard at Seafield and Silverstream looked much the 
same as those found in other processing plants. The machines that 
made these chains two of the most efficient in the country were hardly 
obtrusive. Significantly, however, whereas a slaughterboard in one of 
Neilson's plants processed about 7.6 animals a minute with a manning 
of up to 55, Silverstream processed over 9 animals a minute with a 
manning of only 32 (interview, Manager #12). The slaughterboards at 
Seafield and Silverstream handled livestock using the 'inverted system' 
in which a sheep was suspended from all fours (rather than from its 
hind legs) for its journey along the first half of the chain. This inverted 
hanging of the beast facilitated the initial cuts made to dress the 
carcass and allowed the re-ordering of dis-assembly (that was 
required to introduce new machinery). Most of the slaughterboards 
around the country became converted to the handling of carcases 
by this arrangement in the mid 1980s. 
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Five new pieces of machinery (not found on the traditional 
slaughterboard) were positioned along the chain. Firstly, hand held 
mechanical flays replaced the knife for making the all important 'Y 
cut' to the chest and along the front legs of the carcass. The flays 
were small circular saws positioned at the end of a short staff. They 
were water powered (rather like a dentist's drill). Secondly, and 
further down the chain, was the automatic neck breaker. This 
machine snapped the neck of the animal by guillotining it between 
two moving bars. The action of the machine snapped the spinal cord 
and stretched apart the vertebrae. This operation then enabled the 
head to be severed by a single knife stroke. Thirdly, an automatic 
cross-over machine re-positioned the carcass. It eliminated the need 
for one man from the traditional chain. The carcass was switched 
from its inverted position to one hanging from its hind legs. Fourthly, 
was the automatic de-Iegger. This machine incorporated its own 
microprocessor to locate the trotters, clasp them in its grip and sever 
them by mechanical shears. It eliminated four men from the 
traditional chain. Finally, came the pelting machine. This was little 
more than a powerful mechanical arm. Each carcass stopped briefly 
before the arm and a worker clamped it to the top of the (by then 
loosened) pelt. At the push of a button the pelting machine pulled off 
the pelt and dropped it into the chute leading to the fellmongery. 
Immediately after pelting a barcode was attached to both the 
carcass and its pelt. This barcoding provided each with a unique 
number and information used in the payment of farmers and further 
processing (Tyson, 1990). 
The integration of hot boning. 
The activities of further processing can be applied to either frozen or 
chilled meat. The working up of frozen meat is called 'cold boning' 
and that of chilled meat is called 'hot boning'. Cold boning was the 
industry standard for further processing until the mid 1980s, when 
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techniques of cutting unfrozen meat became the new industry 
standard (Hartley, 1989). 
The addition of cold boning to freezing works represented a fairly 
simple augmentation of the existing activities of processing. In this 
regard further processing merely modified the standardised product. 
A portion of the throughput was diverted into the cutting room after it 
had passed through the blast freezers: 
"That is why at a lot of works like Ocean Beach, Smithfield 
and Islington, if you flew over the top of them you could 
see the old buildings and where they have stuck on bits to 
cope with (further processing)... Those sort of works used 
to kill the sheep and then straight on the ship. And that 
was it. They added a cutting room, and they have stuck 
a bit here and they have stuck a bit there." (interview, 
Union official #2). 
Cold boning was done in cutting rooms where the ambient 
temperature remained almost freezing. This form of further processing 
did not disrupt the preservation of the meat by freezing. However, the 
freezing of small and meal-sized portions of meat made them very 
prone to a deleterious side-effect called 'freezer burn'. Freezer burn is 
the manifestation of the damage that is caused to cellular tissue by 
freezing. Freezer burn is associated with a loss of flavour and 
discolouration of the meat. It has its most obvious effects on the 
surface of the frozen meat. With frozen carcases it was relatively 
straight forward to trim off the surfaces badly effected by freezer burn 
and to reveal the undamaged volume of meat. With consumer ready 
cuts and meal-sized portions the trimming of damaged product is not 
viable. 
Furthermore, the location of the labour process in a refrigerated room 
made the further cutting of meat and its transformation into a range of 
consumer ready cuts very arduous. Frozen meat is a raw material that 
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is very difficult to cut. Subjecting it to detailed knife work is not only 
difficult it is dangerous to the worker. Thus cold boning was better 
suited to, and was typically restricted to, making a limited range of 
fairly simple cuts and end products. 
Techniques of hot boning were tria led in the mid 1 980s. These 
experiments in a new labour process coupled with the development 
of methods of preservation for chilled meat became a major research 
project of the Meat Industry Research Institute of New Zealand 
(MIRINZ). In many regards, this re-orientation of research and 
development provided some relief to the Institute following the failure 
of its earlier experiments with a mechanised chain.23 The key 
technological break-through (although technology transfer might be a 
better description) was the development of CAPTECH packaging. This 
form of packaging cling wrapped the chilled meat· and used carbon 
dioxide gas as a preserving medium. The shelf-life of chilled meat 
using this form of packaging is up to sixteen weeks. 
Thus, hot boning eliminated the need to freeze meat. Chillers and 
advanced methods of packaging replaced blast freezers as the basis 
of preservation. The temperature of meat was brought down and 
kept at some degrees above freezing, at which point the processes of 
decay are nearly checked, although the meat remains pliable and 
easily cut. However, the use of hot boning requires a qualitative 
advance in the area of hygiene. The elimination of bacteria in all 
facets of hot boning becomes absolutely vital. A high 'bacto count' 
will result in a halving in the shelf-life of chilled meat. 
23 "For more that 20 years MIRINZ research has been largely devoted to 
enhancing the quality of whole carcass meats, work that is still essential. 
However, it is generally accepted that the future viability of the Industry must 
be secured by adding value through further processing. 'Further processing' 
is defined as a stage beyond the immediate fabrication of carcass meats, 
into boneless or bone-in cuts and involves physical, chemical or thermal 
modification of the raw meat into restructured forms. U (MIRINZ, 1984: 7). 
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The early trials by Fortex in further processing at Seafield broke down 
frozen carcases. The construction of a lamb slaughterboard at the 
plant allowed the introduction of hot boning. The firm became fully 
given over to this form of handling sheepmeats, to the extent that 
neither the Seafield nor the Silverstream plants had blast furnaces nor 
the capacity to store frozen meat. In this regard, the firm also strived 
to match the ideal of just-in-time production by minimising its retention 
of inventory. 
The cutting facility at Seafield was a large rectangular room, in which 
work was organised around three parallel conveyor belts, and a 
smaller room used for packaging. At the height of its operation 52 
workers were employed in the cutting facility on each shift and each 
shift further processed around 3000 carcases. Around 40 workers were 
engaged in the activities of cutting while the balance of the staff 
worked 'out back' in the packaging room. 
At times of peak workloads some of the experienced staff from the 
packaging room could be brought into cutting. Normally the two 
workforces did not interact largely because the restrictions on hygiene 
limited the movement of people. The cardboard cartons into which 
cling wrapped portions of meat were packed and shipped were 
regarded as potential sources of bacteria. Neither the cartons nor the 
staff who handled the cartons ever came into contact with exposed 
meat. The cutting staff wore white caps and gumboots to distinguish 
them from the packing staff, who wore blue. Thus, any staff brought 
into cutting from packaging had to scrub up and change their overalls 
and footwear. 
The cutting facility handled the previous day's output from the 
slaughterboard. The barcoded carcases required for further 
processing were kept in a chiller adjoining the cutting room. There 
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they hung from, and could be moved along, an overhead rail. The 
rail was designed so that, although the carcases were pushed from 
the end of the slaughterboard and into the chiller in the sequential 
order by which they were slaughtered and dressed, they could be re-
sequenced by being moved through different branches of the rail 
(rather like shunting railway wagons!). Half a dozen men were kept 
busy at this task of re-sequencing the kill. Batches of carcases that 
were deemed suitable for further processing were pushed along the 
rail into the cutting room. 
The overhead rail ended at the work area where the carcases were 
removed and then pushed, singly, through a vertical bandsaw. The 
job of the bandsaw operator was to divide the carcass into more 
easily handled portions. The operator had an assistant who helped 
position each chilled carcass. The operator's job was an extremely 
dangerous one with the likelihood of accidentally severing fingers. 
Normally, but by no means always, the operator made two passes 
through the saw and divided the carcass in hind, loin and forequarter. 
These three primal cuts were usually worked up into consumer ready 
cuts. As the carcass was passed through the bandsaw and the hinds, 
and loins and forequarters fell away, the portions were placed on one 
of the three conveyors. Normally, one conveyor would carry the 
hinds, another the loins, and the other the forequarters. The conveyors 
moved through the cutting room at about waist height and each was 
flanked by stainless steel tables. The conveyor belts carried the meat 
to the workers, men and women, who did the further cutting using 
hand held knives. Each worker was assigned to a table and did a 
particular set of cuts. The worker removed the piece of meat from the 
conveyor, placed it on the table, did their cutting and returned the 
meat to the conveyor. Any scraps were dropped in bins next to each 
worker. 
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This work was very detailed. For example, one customer might require 
that a rack of lamb be frenched (end of the ribs exposed) to the 
depth of 15 millimetres, while another might demand an exposure of 
25 millimetres. The work was also very variable. For example, a 
forequarter could be left intact, or have the neck chops removed, or 
have the shank removed, or both, or be completely de-boned and 
rolled. There were a voriety of ways of removing the neck and the 
shank and even more ways of further cutting these portions. On the 
tables flanking the other conveyor belts the processing of the hinds 
and the loins offered an even greater complexity. 
The allocation of workers to conveyors, tables and assigned cuts 
depended on how the carcass was to be dis-assembled or, in other 
words, the orders received from customers. Furthermore, the 
allocations of staff that were made at the start of the shift only lasted 
until the completion of the initial order (an order was called a run). 
Individual orders hardly ever used all of the carcases made available 
to the shift. As one customer's order was completed and a new run 
begun a fresh allocation of staff to jobs was required. These changes 
in manning were required for every run. 
Bringing in the union at Fortex. 
Q: So what do you think the problem is with the national 
union? 
A: Archaic and outdated thinking! Like I said earlier, there 
is no room to be bloody minded. We have got to be as 
sophisticated as the bosses. I think it is lack of 
sophistication, lack of appreciation of problems... It is no 
good holding a gun at their heads, or making wage 
demands of the nature that eventually put the company 
under. Then there are no jobs. There is no future for 
anybody in that." (inteNiew, Union official #1). 
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The interdependence of management and union strategies (Brown 
and Reich, 1989) that facilitated the re-engineering of Fortex 
expressed both a continuity and a discontinuity with the old-style of 
industrial relations typical of Neilson's era. Fortex was driven to an 
accommodation with the union by the demands of flexibility in 
manufacture and being market-led (Piore and Sabel, 1984). For its 
part, the union was very much bound by the process of 
'peripheralising' of what had been a core labour market (Novek, 1989; 
Novek and Yassi, 1990; Portz, 1991; Rachlef, 1992; Stanley, 1992). The 
collapse of Waitaki International and the ensuing redundancies 
(Savage, 1990), the influx of aggressive new entrant firms and a shift to 
greenfield sites (Hartley, 1989), the accumulation of automated 
technology (Depla, 1988), and especially the rewriting of the legal 
underpinnings of industrial relations, all served to force the Canterbury-
Westland branch and federations of the meatworkers' unions onto the 
defensive (Gardner and Morgan, 1985; Lane, 1980; Le Heron, 1988b; 
Meat Industry Study and TUEA, 1988; Morgan, 1984; Rotherham, 1980; 
Shields, 1982; Sutherland, 1989; Turner, 1984; Walsh, 1983). 
The most obvious effect of these deleterious developments on 
organised labour was its fragmentation. Fragmentation by itself was 
nothing new to the meatworkers' union. The union was always a 
relatively splintered entity, and one that secured an organisational 
unity mainly through the rules of federation. However, the changes to 
industrial law instigated by the Labour Relations Act (1987) tilted the 
organisational balance achieved by the federation of the 
meatworkers' unions, further towards the complete autonomy of the 
sub-branch (see chapter 6). The important deals pushed through by 
Thompson at Fortex, especially the introduction of shift work, were 
made after the abolition of two-tier bargaining by the 1987 Act. In 
many respects the requirement to formalise these types of deals made 
by the Act merely extended the long tradition of local deals and of 
decentralised bargaining. However, what for Thompson was the 
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major condition for success of a new type of factory was regarded by 
unionists beyond Fortex as symptomatic of a sell-out. 
For the unionists at Fortex the scope and the consequences of 
collective bargaining were driven by the desire to maximise pay and 
conditions of work for their members, and simultaneously checked by 
the new realities of new work arrangements and of job (in)security. To 
a significant degree these new realities were to lead to a union 
appreciation of the heightened difficulties of staying in business. This 
re-orientation on the part of the union at Fortex resulted in a 
requirement that the union itself be party to reworking the 
instrumentalism (Eichbaum, 1980; Walsh, 1975) of meatworkers: 
"We can't screw the boss for more money if he is not 
making more money. Its no good screwing the boss and 
putting him under. In order for us to get more money out 
of the boss he has got to be making more money. And 
the way he will make more money is if we are productive 
and fully employ our work skills to produce a quality 
product." (interview, Union official #1). 
The union's variant of instrumentalism looked forward to the up-skilling 
of work and the autonomy of the work group (Perry, Davidson, Hill, 
1995). In other words, the union at Fortex was committed to 
enhancing pay and conditions but was equally up front in 
acknowledging the limits and constraints to any deals. Put another 
way, the union was explicit in linking pay with productivity, but in 
addition also argued that any assessment of productivity and pay now 
required the integration of the dimension of quality and pay alongside 
the old-style measures of quantity. 
"In this game you can't afford to have quality slipping ... 
One of the really significant factors today is speed, the 
telecommunications, technics and that, and also the 
speed of the meat actually getting to the other side of the 
world. A container can leave here (Seafield) on 
Wednesday and it is in the European Community before 
our Friday. So it leaves here Wednesday, and a day, just 
over a day and a bit, and it is on sale on the other side of 
the world. Now if it is not right y'ou can lose the order as 
quick." (interview, Union official #1). 
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From their perspective, union officials at Seafield and Silverstream 
further asserted that they and not management (and especially not 
the front-line supervisors) had initiated and adhered to the deals that 
kept Fortex in business. 
"Q: Did the change in management... make any 
difference to the management philosophy? 
A: Well the other one (manager) was an arsehole 
anyway, I am still making my mind up about this one. It 
didn't come from management, you see. It came from 
the union. The whole thing came from the union. 
Q: How did they signal that they wanted change? 
A: They didn't say it, we approached them." (interview, 
Union official #3). 
In effect, problems and confusions generated by the struggle 
between marketing and production management left the union at 
Fortex as the chief proponent of real controls on quality, for which they 
demanded pay, and on the accounting for costs. For the union this 
was necessary if their members were to secure sufficient wages. The 
union, then, tried to secure employment and maximise take home 
pays through the imposition of new disciplines on workers that were 
inherent to the new deals. Within the context of constant change 
there can be little doubt the advances made by the Fortex Group in 
industrial relations, by securing shift work and then by re-jigging the 
procedures of remuneration and supervision, owe something to the 
enforced re-orientation of the meatworkers' union under the pressures 
of new and highly unfavourable conditions. At Seafield and 
Silverstream the unionists I spoke with were determined that the fate of 
redundancy would not befall their members. 
The introduction of shift work. 
"The managing director, Mr Graeme Thompson, told the 
annual general meeting of the unlisted company in 
Christchurch yesterday that the shifts would allow 
dramatic improvements in the costs of running the chain, 
giving better prices for farmers and better returns to the 
company ... 
The chairman of Fortex, Mr John Austin, 
commended the Meat Workers' Union for its 'positive and 
enlightened attitude'. " 24 
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Re-engineering the factory involved a spiral of deals, in which any 
gains in making the firm more effectively market-led immediately 
raised the potential (and the need) for further deals. The deals at 
Seafield and Silverstream were interlinked. No one agreement 
between the union and the firm stood in isolation from the nexus of 
innovation that existed in the exercise of industrial relations within the 
company. 
Among all of these deals, those made in and about the cutting room 
were vital to the plant. The majority of the problems associated with 
the firm being flexible and market-led were focused on the labour 
process found in this room. It is in this area that value was added 
through the generation of customised cuts, and where the processing 
plant diverged from the old-style freezing works, and where the form 
of further processing pursued by Fortex mostly clearly necessitated a 
reworking of the mechanism of control over quality and of costing. 
New bargains introduced new mechanisms that tried to ensure: (1) the 
suitability of raw materials, (2) that workers acquired and used a range 
of skills over and above those of the slaughterboard. and (3) that, in 
the absence of complete interchangeability of workers, supervision 
was adept at the positioning and re-positioning of members of the 
24 'Fortex deal may see 1.5M kill', Christchurch Press, 22/12/88. 
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workforce, and (4) that the specifications made by customers were 
exactly translated to the cutting room, and finally (5) the maintenance 
of high levels of hygiene. 
These deals also structured the capacity of the firm. Traditionally the 
number of chains in a freezing works provided its upper limit in terms of 
throughput and their number was the accepted gauge of a plant's 
size (Evans, 1985). Thus, the works at Alliance, Lorneville was 'twice as 
big' as Stevens NCF, Kaiapoi (inteNiew, SupeNisor #2); the former had 
six slaughterboards and the latter had three. Siaughterboards were 
normally manned five days a week -largely because of the prohibitive 
penalty rates inscribed in the award for work on Saturday and Sunday. 
Furthermore, the length of a day's work on a slaughterboard only very 
rarely exceeded the time required to make tally. The agreements 
about tally were the products of local deals but were never much 
more than 3200 sheep per day. The chain was paced at around 7.6 
carcases per minute. Thus, the working day on a lamb and mutton 
chain normally lasted for about eight hours, although this was broken 
up by lunch and two 'smokoes' that reduced production time to six 
and a half hours. 
The standardisation and rigidities of the labour process in the old-style 
industry allowed for the close estimation of throughput for each chain, 
freezing works, and firm. The two largest firms running in the South 
Island, Alliance and PPCS, each operated about 25 killing chains. That 
is, they each could process around 400,000 sheep a week. By contrast 
when Seafield and Silverstream were fully operational Fortex 
"would be processing 20% of South Island lamb kill on two 
chains; the other 80% would be killed on 62 chains." 25 
25 'Fortex eyes profit lift', Christchurch Press, 29/11/90. 
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In this way, Fortex disrupted the norms of processing of the industry. 
Seafield and Silverstream were built and operated as 'single chain 
meat plants' (interview, Manager #1). This configuration reflected the 
lowest cost way of entering into the slaughter of sheep. It also meant 
that, without shift working, Fortex could only hope to process a 
minuscule share of the sheep kill. With an adherence to the traditional 
organisation of work its single chain might have processed about 
16,000 sheep a week. Improvements to the chain boosted this figure 
to around 26,000. Shift work boosted it more. 
Fortex secured an agreement with the Canterbury-Westland branch of 
the union to introduce shift work to all the operations at its Seafield 
plant for the 1988-1989 killing season. This agreement was 
subsequently extended to Silverstream. Four shifts each operating 
over three days for eleven hours replaced the five days a week and 
eight hours a day operation normal to the industry. The hours and 
days the shifts worked were fixed. The first shift worked on Monday, 
Tuesday and Wednesday from 6.00 am until 5.00 pm. The second shift 
worked the same days from 6.00 pm until 5.00 am. The third shift 
worked on Thursday, Friday and Saturday from 6.00 am until 5.00 pm. 
The fourth shift also worked the second half of the week from 6.00 pm 
until 5.00 am. 
Workers on each shift were guaranteed a minimum number of weeks 
of continuous employment each year. The first and second shifts were 
guaranteed all year employment. The third shift was guaranteed 33 
weeks of work a year. The fourth shift was guaranteed 20 weeks. 
Rostering on the shifts was determined by the union principle of 
seniority. Workers with the longest seniority were rostered to the first 
shift. Those with the least seniority were rostered to the fourth shift. 
Seniority within each department was the mechanism by which it was 
determined who was offered work whenever a vacancy occurred. 
Thus, if a vacancy became available on the slaughterboard's second 
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shift the most senior worker on the slaughterboard's third shift was 
given the optiGn of changing their hours of work. If the promotion was 
declined, the next most senior worker in the department was 
approached until someone accepted the new job (interview, 
Manager #1) 
The agreement reached over shift work allowed Fortex to greatly 
expand its capacity to process sheep. It effectively quadrupled its 
capacity. Seafield, and subsequently Silverstream, became capable 
of processing over 100,000 sheep and Fortex became a major buyer of 
livestock in the South Island. 
Balancing the cutting room. 
The introduction of shift work to the slaughterboard at Seafield (1988) 
created the possibility of very large volumes of meat being available 
for further cutting. Shift work and then the opening of Silverstream 
(1990) meant that the firm could handle a level of throughput to which 
the adding of value would definitely transcend the parameters of 
niche marketing. Increased capacity placed extra pressures on the 
activities of livestock procurement and on the marketing arm, but by 
far the greatest pressures came to bear in the cutting room. 
In the early days of the firm there was considerable 'slack' (Oliver, 
1991) in the demands of further cutting thanks to the small-scale of the 
operation. Thus, decision-making operated within a reasonable 
tolerance for error. However, the qualitative increase in the volume of 
meat to be cut and the number of orders to be filled made the 
decision-making in the cutting room a remarkably complicated and 
difficult endeavour. Two aspects of the further cutting of chilled meat 
combined to make this task very onerous: (1) the extreme diversity of 
opportunity costs made it crucial to select the best range of cuts in the 
dis-assembly of any batch of carcases, and (2) the extreme 
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perishability of the raw material required absolute precision in 
organising the room. 
The end products that were made by the processes of further cutting 
varied very greatly in their value. For example, a boneless breast 
could be worth $4.50 an item or $2.00/ kilogram, while a hind shank 
could only get 40 cents an item or 15 cents/kilogram. The main 
procedure followed in the organisation of further cutting was to target 
the most valuable cuts of meat from a batch of carcases and to then 
'find homes for the rest'. In other words, the prime undertaking on any 
shift in the cutting room was to produce the most valuable orders / 
cuts of meat from the carcass. 
The process of dis-assembly often resulted in the making of what could 
be deemed 'complementary' end products. This complementarity 
was most obvious where further cutting was done to the discontinuous 
portions of meat. For example, the hind and forequarters -that were 
made available by the use of the bandsaw- could be further cut 
independently of each other. In other words, how the carcases were 
further cut incurred no opportunity costs. 
However, the process of dis-assembly also resulted in the making of 
'substitutable' end products. That is, the way a carcass was passed 
through the bandsaw, and the way the hinds, loins, and forequarters 
were further cut, precluded many other uses of the rest of the meat. 
For example, if a long loin was cut from the carcass then a range of 
cuts to the forequarters was prevented; and if a pistola (a cut 
combining the hind and part of the loins) was cut from the carcass 
then a range of cuts from the rest of the loin and the forequarters were 
precluded. Substitutable end products or alternative cutting of meat 
involved an enormous complexity when it came to breaking down the 
hinds, forequarters and especially the loins. In other words, how the 
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carcass and especially the smaller portions of meat were cut incurred 
significant opportunity costs. 
While, it was a useful technique to target the most valuable cuts of 
meat there were real limits to what extent the simultaneous 
processing of lesser cuts could be ignored. Chilled meat is a very 
perishable product and it is doubly so in small portions prior to being 
vacuum packed. In this regard, the retardation of a high bacto count 
was all important. Bacteria grows on chilled meat at an exponential 
rate and, as a result the prevention of any unnecessary exposure of 
meat to a bacteria laden atmosphere leads to real benefits. Even a 
delay of a matter of minutes in the handling of the chilled meat can 
lead to a jump in the growth of bacteria and the ultimate 
downgrading of the end product. Therefore, the amount of time that 
could be spent on the further cutting of any of the portions of meat 
from a batch of chilled carcases was very limited. This meant that it 
was not regarded as feasible to concentrate all of the staff in the 
making of one particular cut while allowing a build up and backlog of 
other portions of the carcass. 
The importance placed by management on the immediate handling 
of the portions of meat as soon as possible after they fell from the 
bandsawn carcass was demonstrated during one of my visits to the 
cutting room at Seafield. During my visit one of the members of the 
shift received an official warning from the supervisor for his improper 
handling of meat. The worker was one of three engaged in removing 
the bones from a portion of meat called the flap. The flap had been 
already cut from the loin by a worker stationed further up the 
conveyor belt. As the flaps came down the conveyor belt and 
alongside his work station, the worker would remove them and stack 
them on the table that provided his work surface. This practice by the 
worker created a small pile of flaps on the table. The worker would 
then take the flap at the top of the pile and de-bone it. This job took 
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about thirty seconds and required several passes of the knife, The 
bones (ends of the ribs) were dropped in a bin and the boned-out flap 
was returned to the conveyor belt and was carried away to be 
vacuum sealed, This simple re-sequencing of work was deemed 
improper because the flaps at the bottom of the pile were not 
handled immediately, Instead they sometimes lay at the bottom of 
the pile for several minutes before being de-boned and this delay 
allowed a measurable increase in the bacto count, The problem was 
pointed out to me by a supeNisor who operated from a glass office 
from which he could obseNe the activities of the room, 
The problem of balancing the cutting room was of two-tiers: the 
allocation of orders to a shift and the allocation of workers to jobs, The 
cutting rooms at Seafield and Silverstream were organised around 
three conveyor belts that handled the main portions of meat (hinds, 
loins, forequarters) that fell from the bandsaw, The most important 
dimension to achieving balance was to ensure the most profitable 
release of materials from further cutting the batch of carcases, within 
the constraints of ensuring an allocation of workers to all three 
conveyor belts (given that all belts had to be covered at all times) and 
to specific tasks on each of the belts, 
The problems of balance were addressed mainly by the codification 
of information about customers' orders into standard packages or 
'stand-packs', Every order from a customer required precise cutting 
instructions that outlined the exact configuration (dimensions, fat 
cover, etc) of the end product, When this type of information was 
combined with an outline of how long the product took to make (an 
estimate made on historical data or on approximations based on the 
production times of similar orders) the result was a stand-pock, Every 
order had its own stand-pack, All of the stand-packs were allotted to 
one of ten categories of production time, The categories ranged from 
the relatively easily made cuts to the more arduous, Each category of 
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difficulty had an estimate of the expected throughput per minute of 
items (finished portions of meat). This estimation of production time 
measured how many portions of meat (derived from either the hinds, 
or loins, or forequarters) could roll off a fully manned conveyor belt 
(12-15 staff). 
Table 8.1: The ranking of stand-packs. 
Categories 
of production 
times. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Expected 
# items 
Iminute. 
7.23 
6.67 
6.25 
6.00 
5.77 
5.50 
5.22 
4.84 
4.35 
3.70 
A shift involved nine and a half hours production time. In other words, 
the three conveyor belts each operated for 570 minutes and the task 
at hand for production management was to maximise the effective 
use of this time. The production manager also had to handle a bundle 
of orders each with due dates and so this aspect of timing also 
impacted on the allocation of orders to shifts. Each shift in the cutting 
room was assigned about 3000 chilled carcases that were made 
available by activities of slaughter, dressing, barcoding and chilling 
done the previous day. The number of carcases was budgeted to 
keep the shift fully active and to be sufficient for further cutting into a 
predetermined variety of orders. Typically (but not always), these 
carcases would be divided by bandsawing into 3000 hinds, 3000 loins 
and 3000 forequarters. This meant that the production manager had 
to ensure that the production time on each of the belts needed to 
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make the cuts to (and to fill orders from) these basic portions of meat 
summed to 570 minutes. 
Thus, the cutting instruction for a (hypothetical) shift could require the 
dis-assembly of exactly 3000 carcases. All of which were to be 
bandsawed into hinds, loins and forequarters. The further cutting of 
these primal cuts involved (only) 8 stand-packs. The hinds were 
transformed into (a) 3000 boneless short legs with the shank left on and 
the flanks untrimmed. The loins were all divided into (b) 3000 bone-in 
flaps, (c) 1500 long loins, (d) 1500 tenderloins. The forequarters were 
cut into (e) 3000 4 shoulder chops (12 mm thick), (f) 3000 fore shanks, 
and (g) 800 3 neck rings (16 mm thick), (h) 1200 4 neck rings (10 mm 
thick). However, in calculating the production times necessary to fill 
these orders, it was crucial to avoid any double counting. A single 
pass of the knife could release two portions of meat. Thus, the making 
of Stand Packs (c) and (d) simultaneously released stand-pack (b); 
and the making of stand-packs (g) and (h) simultaneously released 
stand-pack (f). Since no further cutting of the flaps (b) and the fore 
shanks (f) were required, they did not need to figure in the calculations 
of production times (on the conveyor belts). 
Table 8.2: Scheduling a shift. 
Stand-Qack. CategorY. Budgeted % of 570 
timeLbelt. minutes. 
hinds. 
a. (3000 items) 2 450 minutes. 78% 
loins. 
b. (3000 items) 
c. (1500 items) 2 225 minutes. 
d. (1500 items) 6 272 minutes. 88% 
foreguarters. 
e. (3000 items) 2 450 minutes. 
f. (3000 items) 
g. ( 800 items) 3 128 minutes. 
h. (1200 items) 3 192 minutes. 135% 
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This break down of production times indicates that the unused time on 
the conveyor belt where workers were processing the hinds (120 
minutes) and on the belt processing the loins (73 minutes) could off-set 
the excess time on the belt processing the forequarters (200 
minutes).26 In this case, a transfer of workers from the under utilised 
conveyor belts would allow the complete dis-assembly of 3000 
carcases into the eight orders. 
The calculation of production times, of the composition of further 
cutting and the production target for any shift was explicitly linked to 
stressing the very averages that underpinned those calculations. This 
extreme flexibility in the allocation of tasks required the co-operation 
(the pro-active co-operation) of the workforce. This co-operation was 
secured by re-jigging the procedures of remuneration and supeNision. 
The modification of remuneration. 
"Q: So it is where you have variability ... that is where you 
try to develop procedures or protocols... to produce a 
standardised payment? 
A: A fair payment system. Not a standardised payment 
system. We pay them now for the work they do. And if 
there are higher degrees of difficulty, as they have got to 
bone everything right out, then we pay them more money 
for that carcass. 
Q: It was driven from below? Because they perceived the 
old system to be unfair? 
A: We also accepted it was unfair. And as a company 
being market-led we had to agree with them. But what it 
26 The above table shows a hypothetical example. The stand-packs were 
regarded as extremely commercially sensitive information and Fortex was 
believed to have fallen victim to industrial espionage. At the time of the 
closure of the firm, a previous plant manager and a shift supeNisor were 
facing criminal charges (independently of those laid against the directors of 
the firm) for trying to steal this information. At my query one of the managers 
at Seafield estimated the value of this information as being in the hundreds 
of thousands of dollars to a competitor. 
did was to also put a little more pressure back into 
marketing. Because when we got paid for the more 
difficult cuts, they couldn't sell them. They had to watch 
how they sold them. So it balanced the whole thing right 
up. 
Q: That is a very finally balanced system? 
A: Bloody oath it is! But we go to the marketing now. And 
they have this guy on the other side of the world and this 
guy wants a special cut. They have to turn around and 
say, yes we can do it... Then they have to work out their 
costs, if we haven't done that before. And then they 
have to come back and say, now how can we apply this. 
We have got this degree of difficult for this particular 
cut..." ( interview, Manager #6). 
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Here again then, we see that it is the union or the worker who was 
caught between the demands of marketing and the requirements of 
processing. Inevitably in this three cornered arrangement the union 
was required to either agree to an alliance with production 
management or with marketing. Given the pressures involved it was 
always going to be the former. What is interesting is that the union was 
to be the promoter of the alliance and not production management. 
The procedures of remuneration first used in the cutting rooms at 
Seafield and Silverstream recycled the norms of the networks in the 
industry. Pay was calculated on the basis of piece work and only 
rewarded the number of carcases dis-assembled each shift. Like most 
piece rates used in the industry the rewards for doing the work were 
calculated on a pool basis. The pool included the entire shift 
(including the dozen workers in the packaging room). That is, the shift 
was paid an amount for its work, and this amount was divided equally 
among the workers. 
The initial calculation of pay rewarded only quantity. The greater the 
number of carcases that were dis-assembled each shift the greater 
the pooled and individual pays. This old-style form of remuneration 
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established an incentive among workers to speed up the pace of 
work: to cut as many carcases as possible or to minimise the amount 
of time taken to process a given number of carcases. In this regard, 
the use of piece work tended to overlay and blur the need for 
precision in the labour process. Speed and the cutting of chilled meat 
to the precise specifications made by customers was demonstrated as 
being irreconcilable. 
The high rates of re-work faced by the firm in 1989 and 1990 were, 
however, to reveal a basic incompatibility between the continued use 
of an old-style remuneration, of piece work, and the intensified 
demands on quality and costing in the cutting room. Payment by 
piece work was based on expectations about making a standardised 
product and about the regular, unvarying, character of the labour 
process it rewarded. In the context of the cutting room, piece work 
fostered re-work. However, the high incidence of re-work was 
perceived as a dead loss by management and labour, insofar as it 
reduced the profitability of the firm and the pay of the shift (when re-
work was done it was only reimbursed at the minimum hourly rate). 
A new form of remuneration was required by both management and 
labour -essentially to slow down the pace of work and to thereby 
facilitate the use of skill. The new form of remuneration for the cutting 
room involved making an hourly rate more central to pay, while 
retaining the opportunity of the shift to earn a pooled bonus if it 
exceeded the production target. Payment under the hourly rate (in 
1992-1994 at Seafield) earned each worker $133.33 per shift. The 
individual share of the pooled bonus for a shift operating at 100% 
efficiency was $97.30 per shift. The share of the bonus was directly 
proportional to the rating of efficiency. A 50% rating resulted in a half 
payment of the bonus. A 200% rating resulted in a doubled payment 
of the bonus. Generally the rating of efficiency ranged between 95% 
and 105%. 
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The new form of remuneration centred on the integration of a 'degree 
of difficulty' into the calculation of the composition of further cutting 
and of the production target. In this regard, the use of a degree of 
difficulty broke decisively with the tradition of piece work by trying to 
reward the effort (and supposedly the value) of the work being done, 
rather than simply how much work was being done. 
The stand-packs, noted above, were important to the new deal. A 
parallel ranking to that rating the production times of stand-packs was 
developed and called the degree of difficulty. Each category was 
assigned a degree of difficulty. The degree of difficulty reflected how 
troublesome it was estimated to be for the workforce to action the 
stand-packs. Although the correlation between the categories of 
production times and the degrees of difficulty was not one-to-one it 
was very strong. Simple stand-packs producing relatively straight-
forward final items were assumed to take little effort and were 
assigned to the lower degrees of difficulty. Arduous stand-packs were 
assigned to the upper degrees of difficulty. Each degree of difficulty 
was allocated a number of points. Low degrees of difficulty accrued 
few points. High degrees of difficulty accrued many points. 
Table 8.3: The degree of difficultv. 
Categories 
of production 
times. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Expected 
# of items 
/minute. 
7.23 
6.67 
6.25 
6.00 
5.77 
5.50 
5.22 
4.84 
4.35 
3.70 
Points 
per 
item. 
7 
9 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
18 
20 
Benchmark, 
0,83 
0.90 
0.96 
1.00 
1.04 
1.09 
1.15 
1.23 
1.38 
1.62 
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The completion of any end -product or item earned the shift the points 
it was assigned under the degree of difficulty. The shift earned a share 
of the bonus equivalent to it achieving a share of the number of points 
that were calculated from the mix of stand-packs allocated to the 
shift. The calculation of points that was achieved by the shift involved 
the use of a benchmark figure. 
The setting of the benchmark reflected the overall pace of work 
needed in the cutting room to dis-assemble 3000 carcases in a shift. It 
required the dis-assembly of carcases at about 5.25 a minute across 
the nine and a half hour shift. In this regard, the use of the benchmark 
echoed the expectations about tally that predominated on the old-
style slaughterboards. Stand-packs with associated degrees of 
difficulty of more than 5.25 items per minute thereby received a 
proportional extra loading in the calculation of points achieved by the 
shift. Stand-packs with associated degrees of difficulty less than 5.25 
items per minute received less. The benchmark provided a multiplier 
that made it more likely for a shift to achieve a higher bonus when it 
had further cut difficult stand-packs. That is, the completion of stand-
packs with a high degree of difficulty resulted in an enhanced 
assessment of efficiency. 
Table 8.4: Estimating a bonus. 
Stand-Qack. Budgeted. Benchmark. Actual 
Points. Points. 
a. 3000 x 9 = 27000 x 0.90 = 24300 
c. 1500 x 9 = 13500 x 0.90 = 12150 
d. 1500 x 14 = 21000 x 1.09 = 22890 
e. 3000 x 9 = 27000 x 0.90 = 24300 
g. 800 x 11 = 8800 x 0.96 = 8448 
h. 1200 x 11 = 13200 x 0.96 = 12672 
= 110500 = 104760 
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In the case of a hypothetical shift, where all the 3000 carcases were 
dis-assembled (and all the orders filled), the shift received a rating of 
efficiency of 95% (104760/110500). On this basis the shift received 95% 
of the bonus. This relatively low rating was skewed by the 
preponderance of low degrees of difficulty used in the example. 
The role of team leaders and the supervisors. 
"We have changed specification (stand-packs) ten times 
in two hours and gone from one cut to something else 
completely different in 49 carcases. Stopped, cut another 
40 here, cut another 30 there. Which means it is a mass of 
organisational change ... You might go from a very labour 
intensive cut, from a heavy grade carcass, where you 
need every one on line. All doing short loins, rumps and 
frenched racks. Then going to a YL carcass (a light 
carcass) which might be a split fore loin and a leg. Which 
means (instead of) the 30 people you need there, 
suddenly you need only a dozen. So (laughs) it can 
change quite dramatically from needing a lot of people 
to needing very few." (inteNiew, SupeNisor #3). 
The work in the cutting room was inevitably far more complex than in 
the example. Often twenty or twenty-five orders would be filled or 
part filled in a shift. On these occasions the allocation of workers to 
tasks could be changed as often as every half an hour, or more. 
Organising the room in these conditions required both careful 
planning and the close monitoring of work. Bottlenecks and backlogs 
had to be anticipated and prevented. The changeovers to new 
stand-packs had to be signalled clearly and the appropriate workers 
moved around the room and put in the appropriate places. The 
differing skills of workers had to be dovetailed with the constantly 
changing range of tasks. 
The precision and flexibility that was required was well beyond the old-
style of supeNision. The inspection of work and the techniques of 
coercion and inter-personal confrontation did not work in the cutting 
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rooms at Seafield and Silverstream. In part, the two supervisors 
covering each shift simply did not have the time to stand over a 
wayward worker. To try and do so meant that other decision-making 
was ignored. At the same time, the introduction of the degree of 
difficulty into the calculation of pays secured a commonality of 
interest between the workforce and their supervisors. This shared 
desire to maximise efficiency (at least in the terms by which it was 
calculated for making a bonus) allowed a fundamental re-
organisation of supervision. 
"We go into the room this morning, the team leader and 
myself (senior union official), and we audit that room. We 
audit everything everyone does. You get reasonably 
astute at being able to see what is wrong, what is not 
going right, what is costing money. Because it costs us 
money, as well as costing the company profits... You 
have got to realise that in the cutting room, if production is 
down, it stops or there are blow-outs, it costs about $7,000 
a minute. 
Q: In lost wages? 
A: No. In lost revenue to the company... We devised the 
data analysis sheet, so we can account for every minute 
of the 570 minutes in that cutting room each day (shift). 
Q: Is this a union initiative? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Where did this idea come from? 
A: We had to get something that would show us what was 
going on." (interview, Union official #1). 
A transfer in formal responsibility was achieved through the 
introduction of three or four team leaders into each shift in the cutting 
room. The use of teams to re-engineer the factory is by itself a normal 
feature associated with flatter management structures. The 
deployment of teams of workers and of leaders is a contemporary 
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response by manufacturing firms to the mounting complexities and 
demands of running assembly-lines. In this regard, the quantification 
of the labour process and of scheduling made possible by the stand-
packs mirrors the study of 'time-and-motion' that commonly 
foreshadows and underpins the autonomy of the team (Adler, 1993). 
Teams working along the line -indeed much of the drive for re-
engineering- are arguably evidence of a new variant of T aylorism 
(Cusumano, 1988, 1989). It is, however, a solution that is allowed only 
by the interdependence of management and union strategies to 
which the issue of trust is absolutely central (Brown and Reich, 1989). 
Fortex was remarkable for the high degree of trust and autonomy 
achieved by the team leaders. In the cutting rooms the union took 
over the moment-to-moment running of the cutting room while the 
supervisors withdrew from their role in the front-line of surveillance and 
control. 
The team leaders were selected by management supposedly on the 
merits of their past performance, their wide range of cutting skills, their 
good relations with co-workers and their assumed ability to co-
ordinate fellow workers. The selection and authority of the team 
leaders had a formal independence from the election and influence 
of the union officials at Seafield and Silverstream. However, all of the 
union delegates were appointed as team leaders, and a team leader 
could not be appointed or hope to function without the blessing of the 
union. In this regard, the role of the delegate at Fortex showed both 
continuity and discontinuity with the traditional industry. On the one 
hand, the ability of delegates to run the room and to ensure 
throughput was a feature of the industry in Neilson's day (see chapter 
6). On the other hand, the delegates at Fortex used their new 
formalised authority to run with the firm and not against it. 
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The team leaders continued to work on the conveyor belts. This in itself 
was a contrast with the old-style industry where typically the most 
important delegates in a plant had done no processing work. They 
became responsible for allocating and re-allocating workers to tasks 
depending on their assessments about the mix of stand-packs being 
worked on, 
"Now for a start there was a percentage of the (workers in 
the) room, say about 40% of the room, who thought 'Oh 
stuff it', They wouldn't help me because they couldn't 
see where we were going to. I would explain to them the 
end result of all their (time) savings, What it meant. As 
soon as we hit it the first night they saw what I was doing". 
Now they know what I am doing they pool and share it 
(the information). It makes my job easier. I get the 
information. I don't ever go into the office or away from 
my workplace. It is not like, because you are a team 
leader, you think you can skive and walk around." 
(inteNiew, Union official #3). 27 
The supervisors of the room liaised with the team leaders and ensured 
that cutting instructions were followed and that the chilled carcases, 
labels and packing materials were all correct and readily available, 
The supeNisors spent a considerable portion of their working day in 
scheduling the activities of the shift and in determining the precise 
order in which stand-packs were handled. SupeNisors played only a 
limited and indirect role in imposing disciplines on the workforce. 
"The person (union official) we have at the moment is 
strong in some issues, especially hard on his own people. 
Discipline wise, very supportive. We are lucky, I would 
suggest, at the moment, You know that could change 
tomorrow. I will give you an example". We have these 
team leader concepts, on Level 3 we had a problem with 
one guying using the old 'get fucked I am not taking 
notice of you.' We hauled this guy out. Took him into the 
smoking room, Away from everyone, (The union official) 
and I. This guy watched me the whole time and I didn't 
27 This respondent was also a team leader. 
open my mouth. (The union official) said 'Did you say 
that?' He said 'Yes' and the union bloke said 'Don't 
fucking say it again'. Bang! Quick! This guy is still a 
member (of the union). This guy was watching me the 
whole time thinking that I was going to. I still hadn't 
opened up my mouth. Didn't need to. He was shaken up 
enough. That sort of support is great. I realise there is a 
wee bit of intimidation out there, but we had to get 
control of it and that is what we did. II (inteNiew, Manager 
#8). 
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The union, then, directly underpinned the new regime of discipline. 
Thus, the close working relationship between supeNisors and team 
leaders was facilitated by removing much of the responsibility of 
disciplining the room from the supeNisors. In other words, supeNisors 
at Fortex were equally as marginalised as their counterparts in the old 
industry. The task of preseNing the new, and heightened, disciplines of 
work fell on the strata of management above the supeNisor and was 
inevitably done in conjunction with the president and secretary of the 
union at Fortex. 
Conclusion: Bankruptcy, despite a fusion of interests. 
"Now that they have got the other works down there 
(Silverstream) they are starting to get into the big league. 
The marketing gets harder. What do we do with it all? 
And that is what the problem is. They are finding that out 
now. They (union officials at Fortex) were telling me that 
they had, I forget how many thousand of tonnes of 
forequarters in their freezers in Dunedin. They don't know 
what to do with it. Can't sell it. They have sold the hind 
legs and the chops but they can't sell the rest. So that is a 
another problem they have you see and it all comes 
about when you get into the big league. Marketing. You 
have got to get rid of it (the meat). II (inteNiew, Union 
official #6). 
Fortex's corporate strategy was realised by a set of deals made in and 
around its factories. Hence, a discussion of those deals which 
incorporated the potentially disparate interests of its marketing 
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personnel, production managers and the meatworkers' union 
provided a trace of the innovations made at the firm. The coupling of 
these deals (Weick, 1976) constituted the 'Fortex Way' and, in turn, 
represented yet another attempt by a local firm at obtaining a 
contemporary form of the integrated marketing company. This 
approach was, in the context of the networks in the industry, highly 
innovative. The end result of this endeavour by the Fortex Group into 
processing and export was, however, the bankruptcy of the firm (in 
1994). 
"Silence fell on the Hampstead rugby field yesterday as 
Fortex's Seafield workers had their worst fears confirmed. 
Over a PA, Mr Bart Bullen, a senior partner of KPMG Peat 
Marwick, the firm handling the receivership, officially 
made the 900 workers at Ashburton's biggest employer 
redundant. 'The Seafield and Silverstream plants will not 
be reopened under the receivers. This is the only decision 
we can make under the circumstances,' he said. N 28 
The previous variants of the integrated firm had relied on forms of 
wholesaling and the largest of these businesses (most notably the 
international agribusiness firms and including Waitaki) had been 
undone by changes in the export markets. Fortex had ventured a new 
form of the integrated firm, one that relied on a re-engineering of the 
factory and was thereby made ultra-sensitive to export markets. In 
other words, Fortex pursued a form of business which strived to 
integrate the activities of further processing with those of active 
marketing (Cornish, 1995), but like Waitaki it too failed. 
The firm had promised a reworking of the traditional embeddedness of 
enterprises in the processing sector through the creation of an 
endeavour with enormous flexibility (Pollert, 1991). In this case, the 
production of flexibility centred on the running of the cutting rooms 
28 Archibald, J. and N. Topp, 'Pay-cut plea fails as 1800 jobs go', 
Christchurch Press, 28/3/94. 
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and, what is more important on their linkage with the requirements of 
marketing (Hill, 1991; Hill and Chambers, 1990). As a result issues of 
scheduling, the quality of work, and its surveillance (by the workforce) 
dominated the deals that secured the export product. The hub of 
Fortex's attempt at sustaining an integrated form of production and 
marketing were the deals that simultaneously facilitated a fusion of the 
interests of production management and the union, and severely 
limited the authority of marketing personnel. 29 Thus, the Fortex Group 
was market-led insofar as it achieved a degree of flexibility in its 
production which was unsurpassed by any of the firms in the 
processing sector (Austrin and Curtis, 1992, 1993; Perry, Davidson and 
Hill, 1995). 
The head of the union at Seafield noted and lauded this fusion of 
interests in the months after the closing of the plant. For him, the 
tragedy of the failure of Fortex lay in the stymieing of the new forms of 
work and industrial relations. 
"There is a flip side to every coin and for us the bright side 
would have to be the fairly advanced stage we had got 
to with the TQM and ISO 9002 philosophy. It would be 
quite wrong to say that every single person had totally 
accepted these principles, yes there were some rough 
edges that needed to be fine-tuned. It is remarkable how 
many people who have found employment in other meat 
processing plants, and indeed in other walks of life have 
discovered that the lessons learned at Seafield have 
become so much a part of them. It is only now that many 
realise the significance of the 'culture' of doing it right 
and being responsible for your own patch. Part of the last 
minute rescue package was of a scenario of being able 
to develop that much further. If am fully confident that if 
we had a chance the Fortex workforce would have 
shown the meat industry what a totally integrated team-
29 "I bank with the union. I bank with the union because marketing pay us 
(the plant). When we come in to talk I end up batting on the union side 
because it affects my income, through the processing income." (interview, 
Manager #9). 
work environment could achieve. Lets hope that come 
the end of July there may be some prospect of bringing 
that hope to reality. The workforce was the richest asset 
Fortex had, all of us whether process worker or salaried 
person should be proud of their achievement- no one can 
take that away from us./I (Binnie, 1994).30 
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Graeme Thompson, the managing director, echoed the statements of 
the head of the union at Seafield. For him, the demise of his firm, was 
the result of the short-sighted actions of other players. 
"The Meat Industry is a hard unforgiving business and is 
highly competitive as companies have endeavoured to 
out manoeuvre each other in a scramble for an 
increasingly scarce raw material resource. More than 20 
companies have met financial demise in the last 15 years 
as a direct result of pressures inherent in the Industry. 
Fortex Group set out to make changes to the way 
sheepmeat is processed and marketed from New 
Zealand. We were successful in introducing many new 
methods which included work practices, and processing 
and marketing techniques. Our meat products were 
recognised as being the benchmark for all others to aspire 
to. There has been no argument put forward at any stage 
suggesting that Fortex was not on the right track. 
We were simply not given the time for Fortex to 
reach commercial maturity in order that full benefit could 
be gained from the many initiatives taken. II (Thompson, 
1994).31 
There is no doubt that to understand the collapse of Fortex, and with it 
the demise of a narrative of a firm which seemingly epitomised a new 
way of doing business, it is necessary to look beyond the factory. An 
account for the failure of Fortex must incorporate a number of players 
from outside the firm and, most notably, it must address the perilous 
state of the networks in the industry and the actions of farmers, of 
farmers' firms, the banks and the Board in this troubled environment. 
30 'Good Morning', Hampstead Resource Centre Newsletter, 7/6/94. 
31 Thompson, G. 'Statement of Graeme Thompson, Managing Director of 
Fortex Group (In Receivership and in Liquidation)', 4/10/94. 
272 
After achieving an appreciation of the embedded character of 
innovation at Fortex, it becomes more possible to assess Binnie's and 
Thompson's contentions that the firm was done in prematurely by 
outside interests (see chapters 9 and 10). 
Chapter 9 
Fortex Group: The firm and farmers. 
Introduction. 
"Here lies Fortex: choked to death on its own hype. 
The bitter little epitaphs have come thick and fast as 
New Zealand comes to grips with the spectacular failure 
of its most favoured public company since the 1987 share 
market crash . 
... But as we pick over the carcass it seems most 
have forgotten one critical fact: Fortex was a meat 
company. And all around it are the bones of other meat 
companies -some of them giants- which have gone to the 
wall in very similar circumstances. 
Nobody in the meat industry is infallible and the 
signs are that Fortex's collapse is just another chapter in 
the endless restructuring of a high risk sector. 
Tomorrow it will be someone else's turn. n (Brett 
1994).1 
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Narratives of success are vulnerable to questions of scandal and this 
was to be the fate of Graeme Thompson. On 9 March 1996 he was 
sentenced to six and a half years imprisonment for fraud. The local 
press reported the outcome of his trial in the following way: 
"Graeme Thompson, the Fortex managing director who 
Justice Holland said wanted to be the Mr Big of the meat-
processing industry, at any cost was jailed yesterday for 6 
1/2 years for fraud. He found that Fortex had insufficient 
capital to justify the building of the Silverstream processing 
plant at Dunedin... I do not believe that financiers would 
have been prepared to finance the expansion if figures 
had shown the company was making a loss instead of 
profit. n 2 
1 Breit C., 'Silence of the lambs', North and South, July 1994. 
2 'Fortex chief jailed for 6 1/2 years', Christchurch Press, 9/3/96. 
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The transformation of Thompson from an honoured holder of an OBE, 
and representative of all that was innovative about New Zealand, to a 
disgraced 'Mr Big' involved in conspiracy to defraud was to lead to his 
disappearance from public life. 
The Fortex Group, his company, had proved to be unsuccessful in its 
bid to establish itself as an agribusiness firm. Fortex, just like many of the 
firms that preceded it into the export meat industry, accrued enormous 
losses before being closed, then liquidated and its plants sold to other 
players. Thus, what appeared as the beginnings of a new way of 
doing business for the export meat industry, based on 'added value 
processing' (Hartley, 1989), ended in the dissolution of the Fortex Group 
in circumstances that looked much like the failure of Borthwicks (1986), 
Waitaki International (1990) and Vesteys (1994). 
The case studies of the Fortex Group and the Waitaki company have 
similarities. Both case studies detail attempts at innovation by local 
firms that resulted in the complete failure of the instigating firm, rather 
than its intended reworking of the networks in the industry. Further, 
both studies illustrate how proposals of new forms of business and deals 
to rework existing business networks, were perceived as threats by 
other players in the industry in terms of their authority, power and 
embedded ness (Hirsch, Michael and Friedmann, 1990). In the case of 
Waitaki the threat was perceived by farmers and acted on by the 
Board. In the case of Fortex the threat was to other firms in the South 
Island.3 These other firms were described by one manager at Fortex as 
'opposition with cheque books' (interview, Manager #8). Their means 
of action involved pricing wars against Fortex over the price of stock. In 
3 \\By limiting stock available to the larger companies during off-peak times, 
small operators (sic) restrict the efficiency of large plants. They also increase 
prices at farm-gate auctions by bidding up the cost of stock, often to the 
point where its so high companies are forced to sell for less than their cost of 
production." (Steward, 1994: 40). 
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these 'wars' the farmers supported the traditional buying arrangements 
of Fortex's competitors rather than the innovations desired by the new 
firm, 
Fortex ceased its operations amidst a flurry of doubt on the part of 
farmer-suppliers and financiers concerning its ability to repay its 
outstanding debts, Widespread worry about the firm was first 
evidenced by a slide in its share prices,4 and was confirmed by an 
announcement in mid- March 1994 that the firm would report losses in 
excess of $40 million on its operations for the half-year ending 28 April, 
1994,5 Within little more than a week of its acknowledgment of 
problems in securing continued supplies of finance from a consortium 
of banks and of livestock from farmers, the firm was passed into the 
hands of a receiver who closed its plants and laid off their combined 
workforces,6 By the end of the year (1994) all of the assets of the Fortex 
Group had been sold, Silverstream was sold to the Primary Producers 
Co-operative Society (PPCS) and Seafield to Canterbury Meat Packers 
(CMP), The plants were disposed of for only around 10% of their book 
value, This swift liquidation of the firm resulted in a loss of $6 million to its 
first charge debenture holders, and a massive deficiency of $72 million 
to its second charge debenture holders, unsecured debenture holders, 
and unsecured creditors (mainly farmers who remained unpaid for 
their stOCk), Significantly the banks secured over 75% of their original 
investment,7 
4 'Fortex shares near half book value' Christchurch Press, 22/2/94; 
5 'Fortex battles dollar, kill levels', Christchurch Press, 12/3/94; 'Fortex in crisis: 
$40-$50m loss expected', Christchurch Press, 12/3/94; 'Farmers seek 
assurance from struggling Fortex', Christchurch Press, 15/3/94; 'Fortex-bonk 
talks on stock payments' Christchurch Press, 16/3/94, 
6 'Receivership a dampener', Christchurch Press, 24/3/94; 'Fortex's 1800 staff 
on knife-edge', Christchurch Press, 24/3/94; 'Fortex tells of rescue plan', 
Christchurch Press, 25/3/94; 'Pay-out day for Fortex hundreds', Christchurch 
Press, 25/3/94, 
7 'Fortex Group Ltd (In Receivership): Summary of Position', The Receiver, 
4/10/94, 
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Further, in addition to legal action being brought against Graeme 
Thompson, the firm's marketing manager and company secretary 
were also charged. The charges brought by the Serious Fraud Office 
of the New Zealand Police Department centred on the 
misrepresentation of the viability of the firm in its Annual Reports. The 
managers were charged with borrowing substantial amounts from 
overseas banks (in excess of $20 million), hiding these debts from 
financiers in New Zealand and entering these sums in the accounts of 
the firm as revenues rather than as liabilities. While the collapse of the 
firm was probably made unavoidable once interests apart from senior 
management opened its books and discovered this malfeasance, the 
problems which stimulated this scrutiny lay outside the practices of 
accounting.8 Rather than cause the bankruptcy of Fortex, these illegal 
transactions and manipulation of the Annual Reports fed the narrative 
of company success and arguably staved off a public recognition of 
problems that confronted the firm. To some extent the arrested 
members of senior management became the scapegoats for a firm 
that, for approximately the last four years of its existence, was making 
very significant losses on its operations.9 However, for the most of the 
staff, meatworkers and especially the union officials who were laid-off 
from Fortex such a rationale for the actions of senior management was 
decidedly unconvincing. 
"Whatever the decision of the Courts, whatever the 
eventual fate of Thompson and Mullen it will not 
compensate for the dis-illusion that all must feel. The 
deceit and betrayal if proven we will carry for the rest of 
our days." (Binnie, 1994).10 
8 Williams, A, 'Graeme Thompson and the downfall of Fortex', Christchurch 
Press, 9/3/96. 
9 "The former secretary of the failed Fortex meat processing group has been 
jailed for four years. Michael John Mullen, 44, pleaded guilty last week in the 
Christchurch High Court to seven charges- three of publishing false 
statements, two of forgery, and two of false accounting.", 'Four years jail for 
Fortex secretary', Christchurch Star, 10/2/96. 
10 'Good Morning', Hampstead Resource Centre Newsletter, 7/6/94. 
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Nevertheless, the contention by some commentators that the Fortex 
Group was little more than an extended swindle or some form of ego 
gratification on the part of Thompson and other managers is 
excessively harsh.ll While the possibilities and benefits of good public 
relations (PR) were rarely overlooked by the firm, there was more to the 
firm than merely its 'hype' (Austrin, 1991). Indeed, the firm's 
manipulation of the media, and by it the instilling of confidence 
among its potential and existing shareholders and suppliers, was a 
necessary prerequisite of Fortex ever becoming the world's butchers 
shop. 
The key rhetoric among the managers (and the union) at Fortex was 
that of being 'lean and mean' (interview, Manager #1; interview 
Manager # 11; also see Ufkes, 1995). The issues that management at 
Fortex identified as central to them were achieving flexibility in 
processing and to be thoroughly market-led and, what is most 
important to make a profit. Thus, what has greater purchase in any 
post-mortem on Fortex is an argument about the margins in which 
nowadays an integrated marketing company must operate, and 
especially (and perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively), the issue of 
supply of stock. 
Accounting for the failure of the Fortex Group can only be grounded in 
an appreciation of the complexities of buying stock locally and selling 
meat in a global market place. A recognition of the complexities must 
encompass, firstly, the mix of players who constituted the industry and, 
secondly, the recurring and accumulating problems they confronted. 
In this regard, the key to grasping the demise of Fortex lies· in 
understanding the responses it evoked from farmers, its competitors; 
11 Brett C., 'Silence of the lambs', North and South, July 1994; Hutching, Co, 
'Shaking the system', New Zealand Business, October, 1990; Stewart, K., 
'Freemarket follies', NZ Listener, 25/6/94; and also Stewart, (1994). 
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the co-operatives, the Meat Producers' Board and the consortium of 
banks that are the industry's financiers. These responses ranged from 
cool, to opportunistic, to hostile. They were expressed against the 
backdrop of mounting indebtedness on the part of all agribusiness 
firms and continued autonomy (in the form of a freedom to sell stock to 
a range of buyers) on the part of farmers. In short, the innovations 
trialed by Fortex called forth a number of responses from other players 
in the industry, and simultaneously made it vulnerable to a 
combination of collusion (by the co-operatives and, arguably, the 
banks) and independence (by farmers), which effectively doomed the 
firm. 
I have argued that the management at Fortex was able to foster new 
techniques of work and supeNision that owed much to the ideals of 
flexible production and TQM (Austrin, 1991). Their attempt at a re-
engineering of the factory involved the imposition of fresh disciplines in 
work, and the ability of managers to engage in new forms of 
sUNeiliance and, in particular, the readiness of the union to ally its 
interests with production managers (Sewell and Wilkinson, 1992). 
However, the passing of the Employment Contracts Act (1991), which 
eliminated the industrial relations regime of Awards and 'top ups' in 
favour of fixed term employment contracts, had made it far easier for 
Fortex's competitors to negotiate, and in some cases to impose, new 
pay and conditions and even, in the case of some of the small 
operations in the North Island, to exclude the meatworkers' unions 
(Harbridge, 1993; Harbridge and Moulder, 1992). Thus, the Primary 
Producers Co-operative Society had secured, in the employment 
contracts for 1991-1993, an effective cut in wages in the order of 10% 
across all of its plants in the South Island (inteNiew, Union official #5).12 
12 The respondent was a senior worksite official. He was also a farmer and 
produced beef cattle which he subsequently sold to his employer 
(processing firm). Some years prior to our discussion he had secured an 
advance on a redundancy package which he then used to substantially 
improve his farm. 
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By taking advantage of the new legislation and a deteriorating labour 
market to force new deals on their workforces (Underhill and Kelly, 
1993) these firms adopted a very different approach to that taken at 
Fortex. At Fortex the focus remained on re-engineering work with the 
consent of the union. The senior union official at Seafield put the 
position of the workforce and the firm in the following terms: 
"".if you don't perform there is someone else out there 
who will. Fortex led the way in quality. They led the way in 
niche marketing. The others are catching up a little. We 
have got to sprint again now and get back out in front." 
(interview, Union official #1). 
If the firm was squeezed by the new deals with the meatworkers' union 
branches by its competitors, it was also squeezed by its suppliers, the 
farmers. The bulk of farmer-suppliers, unlike the meatworkers the firm 
employed, proved unwilling to submit to the demands of TQM and 
added value processing, insofar as Fortex envisaged them. 
Consequently, neither formal contracts, nor the Fortex Formula, nor the 
use of barcoding succeeded in securing for Fortex the supply of 
classes of stock it most preferred. While there was a gradual increase 
in the numbers of heavy and lean lamb produced in the South Island 
and spread in the months in which stock was obtainable, these 
developments actually benefited Fortex very little. In particular, Fortex 
was unable to develop any deals with farmers that gave it exclusive, or 
even preferential, access to their stock. In other words, the firm's share 
of the total numbers of stock made available for slaughter remained 
largely a function of the price it was willing to pay at the farm:-gate, 
and this price was made in competition with the newly enlarged co-
operatives. 
Dilemmas in securing the supply of a value adding processor. 
With the introduction of shift work in its plant at Seafield (1988) and its 
extension by the construction of a new plant at Silverstream (1990) the 
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Fortex Group became a major buyer of stock in the South Island. At 
the same time, the procurement arm of the firm and its production 
managers conceived of a far closer relationship between Fortex and 
its suppliers than did other firms in the industry. Whereas a manager of 
an old-style plant might dismiss an interest in the intricacies of buying 
stock and assert that "I only kill them" (interview, Manager # 12), the 
management at Fortex could not. 
Further, the more successful the firm was in approximating an ideal of 
'bespoke manufacture' (Piore and Sabel, 1984), the more precise it 
needed to be in buying the type of stock that was best suited for 
further processing and needed to fill the customer's specifications 
(Rainnie, 1991). That is, the requirements of added-value processing, of 
maximising returns from the disassembly of carcases, also shaped the 
procurement activities of the firm. The firm favoured lamb (and some 
classes of sheep but only if there was insufficient lamb) and, in 
particular, beasts with heavy and comparatively lean confirmations. 
"Fortex processes only lambs (sic)... We favour heavy 
lambs, up to four grades of weight over the Meat Board's 
schedule. This is because heavy lambs are the most cost 
effective for further processing. The Meat Board and 
companies have traditionally favoured light weight 
lambs." (interview, Manager #1). 
A new conception of supply reflected the imperatives for precision 
and quality in further processing and the existence of constraints on 
cutting which resulted in specific orders needing the disassembly of 
specific types of, larger and leaner than normal, stock. What is most 
important the management at Fortex wished to abandon any reliance 
on the essentially transitory deals made at the farm-gate. Instead of 
recourse to the farmers' preferred options of the schedule, or auctions, 
their preferred sourcing strategy was through the individual contracting 
for supply (de Janvry and LeVeen, 1986). However, when, because of 
reluctance from farmers, the deployment of contracts failed to secure 
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supply, the firm was forced to adopt other more costly and ultimately 
ineffective alternatives. These, more commonplace, mechanisms for 
securing supply were both relatively undifferentiated and ultimately 
exposed the firm to a ruinous price war. In addition, because of its 
emphasis on the most select stock and requirements for supplies that 
stretched well beyond the months of the normal killing season still used 
by other firms, Fortex was decidedly disadvantaged. 
Thus, in its buying of stock (like its other activities) Fortex stood outside 
the traditional practices of the industry. This difference was, in part, the 
consequence of its requirement for larger and leaner than normal 
stock and also due to the deals made with the union. The latter were 
important for the use of shift work at Fortex (and used only at Fortex) 
had impacted the procurement activities of the firm. Shift work had 
allowed the firm to greatly multiply the capacity of its factories, but its 
introduction at Fortex was secured only with guarantees to the 
workforce concerning minimum weeks of employment. As noted (see 
chapter 8), the first and second shifts at Seafield and Silverstream were 
guaranteed all year employment. The third shifts were guaranteed 33 
weeks (of three eleven hour working days) of work a year. The fourth 
shifts were guaranteed 20 weeks of continuous employment. There 
was no equivalent to these guarantees elsewhere in the industry. 
Meat processors have traditionally scaled-down their operations in the 
winter months and frequently shut for several weeks or months in 
response to the seasonality of farming and the ebb and flow of stock. 
Hence, Evans (1985) estimated the length of the killing season in the 
mid- 1980s at around only 160 (six and a half hour) working days. 
Fortex also obseNed the traditional pattern of use of processing 
capacity but because of the guarantee to its workforce of continuous 
employment, did so in a modified form. The firm sought after, more-or-
less, year round supplies of stock. Thus, when all four levels were 
operating at Seafield and Silverstream the firm required more than 
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70,000 beasts each week to keep its two plants fully utilised. This level 
of manning occurred at the peak of the killing season, when stock was 
fairly plentiful, and meant that Fortex then aimed at approximately a 
10% share of the kill in the South Island. Moreover, when only the most 
senior shifts were operating the firm still required in excess of 30,000 
beasts each week. This level of manning occurred at the depths of the 
killing season (called 'the slack') when stock were scarce, and meant 
that during the months of autumn Fortex aimed at a considerably 
greater share than its competitors of the kill in the South Island. 
The most senior workers at Fortex were entitled to three weeks paid 
leave each year to be taken at the discretion of the firm (lnteNiew, 
Union official #2). By scheduling the holiday break for all its staff in the 
middle of winter, the firm was able to opt out of procuring stock during 
the time of their greatest scarcity. Nevertheless, by making guarantees 
of continuous employment to its workforce Fortex established an extra 
incentive for it to extend as much as possible the length of the killing 
season and the procurement of stock. 
The desire of the Fortex Group to kill stock all year round also made it 
particularly vulnerable to the big players. As the general manager of a 
plant owned by PPCS elucidated early on in this contest: 
CFM (PPCS) kills most of its stock during the peak times and 
the balance during off peak times. Fortex kills about half 
of its stock during the peak times and half during the off 
peak times. CFM can put pressure on Fortex by bidding up 
the cost of livestock during the off-peak times. This is only a 
marginal cost to CFM but it is significant to Fortex ... CFM 
would prefer companies like Fortex not to be in the 
industry. But if they are going to enter the industry they will 
have to pay the going rate for stock and CFM' s schedule 
is way out ahead at the moment. II (inteNiew, Manager 
#12). 
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At the same time, the production of heavy and lean lamb desired by 
Fortex is probably the most challenging aspect of animal husbandry 
and farm management as practiced on sheep and mixed farms in 
New Zealand (Sheppard, 1982). The use of farmland and the sheep 
flock to grow heavy and lean lamb involves: (1) a precise regime for 
the breeding, lambing, weaning and pasturing of stock, and (2) a 
reduction to the normal levels of stocking, in order to facilitate the 
longer than usual period needed for the lamb to attain targets for 
weight and fat cover, and (3) favourable weather conditions and 
good growths of pasture continuously throughout the life of the flock. 
In addition the farming of heavy and lean lamb requires a greater than 
usual commitment for each beast of the farmer's skill, farmlands, feed i 
and time (Hatch, 1992). If such a utilisation of resources, or the 
imponderables of weather and natural disaster, cause the farmer's 
plans to go awry (Mann and Dickinson, 1978) then the result is a 
reduction in the revenues well below those enjoyed from an 
adherence to more traditional forms of farming (Alexander, 1990). 
The farming of heavy and lean lamb and classes of sheep therefore 
entails an exposure by the farmer to additional risks. Farmers are 
renowned risk-avoiders (McLauchlan, 1981; Shanin, 1973) and this was 
expressed, in part, by an aversion to growing heavy and lean lamb. 
Fortex therefore found itself wanting to buy precisely the classes of 
stock which farmers were reluctant to produce in any great numbers. 
Thus, Fortex was regularly confronted by inadequate numbers of heavy 
and lean lambs being offered for slaughter in the farming districts that 
its procurement arm encompassed. 
The problem for Fortex was, then, that it endeavoured to procure what 
constituted a significant share of the total numbers of stock made 
available for slaughter each year and, at the same time, to obtain a 
disproportionate share of this throughput at a time when their seasonal 
production was at an ebb. Further, Fortex wanted to buy classes of 
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stock that were usually available in limited numbers, The dynamics of 
added value processing, at least its performance on a large scale, 
had therefore combined with deals made in the factory, engendering 
a year round operation, and with the recurring shortages among the 
classes of stock best suited to further processing, to effectively shackle 
the buying operations at Fortex, It was, I suggest this crisis of the firm, 
caught between the farmers on one side and the union on the other, 
that promoted the use of dubious accounting practices by Thompson, 
The crisis of stock supply faced by the firm revived and redoubled the 
pertinence of claims that "there is no single factor more important to 
the processor than throughput" (New Zealand Freezing Companies 
Association, 1980: 28). In this case, the drive for throughput was 
coupled with price wars provoked by other players in the industry, In 
order to secure throughput the new firm broached new ideas of 
contracts with farmers stressing aspects of longevity, stability and even 
trust (interview, Manager #1), What the firm sought was a new relation 
with farmer-suppliers, This new relation was a form of buying 
associated with dedicated sourcing and with archetypes of 
manufacturing and assembly networks in Japan (Ramsay and Wilson, 
1990). In this regard, the building in of forms of permanence and 
reciprOCity (beyond the monetary) in the exchanges between the firm 
and its farmer-suppliers, or more precisely of the benefits from such 
long-term relationships that may accrue the buyer, constituted no 
small part in the agenda of Thompson and Fortex (Ouichi, 1991), 
Fortex was driven to be very selective not only in the· type of stock it 
procured but in the type of deals it used to procure them, Several 
facets and motivations were discernible in the firm's sourcing strategy, 
Fortex wished to secure a body of dedicated and long-term suppliers, 
This group of farmers was intended to be capable of producing the 
bulk of the firm's requirements for stock, and especially so during the 
off-peak months. Consequently they would dedicate a proportion of 
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their resources to the production of the classes of stock most wanted 
by Fortex. It was intended that this group of farmers would deal mainly 
or even exclusively with Fortex (interview, Manager #1). 
Sanderson (1986) has noted how farmers may become enmeshed in 
contracting and in the supply of food processors to their detriment. 
Indeed, the dedication of resources by family farmers in order to 
source processors is presented in the literature as an important 
manifestation of the subordination of farmers to agribusiness firms 
(Commins, 1990; de Janvry and Le Veen, 1986; Redclift, 1984, 1986). 
However, as I have stressed, family farming in New Zealand not only 
enjoys the benefits of a range of prospective buyers but has been 
predicated upon the existence of such a range. One critic of this 
'institutionalisation' of deals that effect an excess of demand over 
supply (for stock) has maintained: 
"(The) situation is exacerbated by the much vaunted free 
market that exists at the farm-gate, where farmers are 
selling their stock to the highest bidder, irrespective of their 
interest in a processing company." (Stewart, 1994: 38) 
While a union official at one of the processing plants owned by the 
Primary Producers Co-operative Society and in competition with Fortex 
noted: 
"The dollar counts. If the farmer has got a mortgage or 
something and you walk in his gate and say, I will give you 
an extra $1 .50 a head, no more loyalties!" (interview, Union 
official #6). 
While the efforts of Fortex around supply sought to transcend the 
problems which intense competition for stock and the shifting loyalties 
of suppliers placed on agribusiness firms, and in doing so undoubtedly 
foreshadowed a reworking of these deals, the firm envisioned, at least 
in the first instance, a nurturing of its 'preferred suppliers' (interview, 
Manager #7). 
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The management at Fortex wished to extend the numbers of heavy 
and lean lamb produced each year and to spread the production of 
the favoured classes of stock more evenly across the year. In order to 
do so, the firm intended the implementation of contracts with several 
hundreds of farmers to set precisely the numbers, the scheduling and 
the characteristics of stock (including their age and configuration) 
wanted by the firm (inteNiew, Manager # 1 ). This attention to detail 
was to be linked with the payment of bonuses to its preferred suppliers. 
That is, the farmers who were preferred suppliers would get benefits 
from the higher returns of added-value processing and niche 
marketing (Piore and Sabel, 1984). 
The firm's efforts at stock procurement attempted, as much as possible, 
to by-pass the deals made at the farm-gate by which the bulk of stock 
were bought and sold by other firms. The management at Fortex 
wished, in particular, to circumvent any reliance on the schedule, 
which was administered by the Meat Producers' Board. While the 
schedule established the benchmark for the industry in the 
procurement and dispersal of stock (Shadbolt 1981), and was used 
throughout the industry, it represented a very crude device for buying 
the classes of stock best suited for further processing. The schedule 
reflected the buying interests of large firms, the incumbent firms, who 
remained essentially 'carcass handlers' (Hartley, 1989).13 As a result 
the classification of stock that were most favoured by the Fortex Group 
was not included in this arrangement. 
Thus, Fortex entered into the competition for stock in the South Island 
with the intention of using contracts that were binding on farmers and 
stipulated the required classes, scheduling and prices paid for stock 
(Little and Watts, 1994). A first round of contracts was offered for the 
13 Brett C., 'Silence of the lambs', North and South, July 1994. 
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supply of lamb in the winter and early spring of 1990. 14 The response 
from farmers was exceedingly disappointing for the firm. The firm was 
completely unable to fill its books by using contracts. While Fortex 
trumpeted the mutually advantageous aspects of its contracts, the 
vast majority of farmers remained wary and preferred to rely on the 
deals made at the farm-gate. The majority of farmers who supplied 
Fortex preferred to use the more familiar versions of deals made 'on 
the hoof (Hartley, 1989; New Zealand Freezing Companies Association, 
1980). In this regard, the management at Fortex was unable to ever 
convince more than a fraction of the farmers that the use of such 
contracts truly constituted a fusion of interests, or even that such an 
interpenetration of interests would benefit its suppliers (interview, 
Manager #7). As a result, Thompson's vision of bridging the gulf 
between farm production and processing and of effectively bringing 
farmer-suppliers into the running of the factories at Fortex was 
thwarted. 
The reasons for this are both general and specific. They are general 
insofar as they involve recognition that such contracts could 
subordinate producers. As a farmer and member of the Board noted: 
"If you take the way Marks and Spencers operate in the 
UK. You get locked into their system and then they screw 
you. But I mean, we had that for ten thousand years as 
peasants, so we are reasonably cunning. We work our 
way out of that, but yes, there is a danger of that" 
(interview, Director #3). 
They were specific insofar as farmers in New Zealand had exercised 
their control in the export meat industry by avoiding precisely such 
arrangements. 
14 'Spring lamb contract from Fortex Group', Christchurch Press, 19/10/90. 
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The immediate response on the part of Fortex to the reluctance of 
farmers to enter into contracts with it was to relax its stipUlations, 
Thereafter farmers were given the right to receive whatever the prices 
were that prevailed under the schedule on the day a contract was 
due to be honoured. Although the contracts entered into by Fortex 
with its suppliers continued to stipulate a price for stock, this amount 
had effect only if it exceeded the price paid under schedule, The 
rearrangement and relaxation of contracts meant that while Fortex 
was able to use them to guarantee throughput in advance of its 
needs, it could not determine the price of the stock. 
Despite this loosening in its contracts, which eliminated the risks of 
incurring opportunity costs from the considerations of farmers, the 
growth of a body of contracted or preferred suppliers nevertheless 
remained negligible. The firm was forced, like its competitors, to 
employ several dozen stock drafters and it continued to rely on buying 
under the schedule for a number of seasons. In other words, Fortex 
was compelled to compete for stock, like all processing firms, by using 
the long established deals favoured by farmers. From the farmers point 
of view the success story of Fortex simply meant that it was 'business as 
usual'. They continued to bargain over prices in a market operating in 
their favour. 
Arguably then the success story was one applied to the firm-union 
relations and not the firm-farmers relations. It was for what happened in 
the factory that Thompson received his OBE and throughout the period 
of the firm's existence the on-site union was to be its strongest ally. 
The Fortex formula and the role of the union. 
Notwithstanding the setback in its effort at contracting for supply 
Thompson and the management at Fortex continued to strive for what 
they felt were more appropriate deals with farmers. The firm's 
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campaign to rework and to secure supply culminated in it formally 
abandoning the schedule administered by the Board at the start of the 
1992-1993 killing season, in favour of its own version of the schedule 
that was better tailored to the needs of the firm. This initiative was 
called the 'Fortex Formula' .15 The Fortex Formula, or sometimes called 
the 'Fortex Schedule Plus', was described by the company as a 'yield 
grading scheme' which incorporated regular payments and the 
disbursement of bonuses to its suppliers. 
"Fortex Schedule Plus is a revolutionary approach to rewarding 
farmers for marketplace achievements, without the need for 
the outdated pooling concept. 
Fortex Schedule Plus means that full schedule is paid on 
the Fortex Yield Grading scheme 14 days after kill. Within two or 
three months (see below) an announcement will be made on a 
market-related bonus. 
Supply Period Bonus Announced Bonus Paid 
October, November 
December, January 
February, March, April 
May, June 
December 
February 
May 
July 
October 
January 
March 
June 
August 
November July, August, September 
Fortex Schedule Plus means the farmer supplier wins four ways: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
100% full schedule payment. 
full yield grading and supporting information. 
no on-farm negotiation hassles. 
prospect of bonus payment within two or three 
months. 
The Alternative: Per Head Sales. Fortex remains willing to 
purchase on-farm per head. Per-head sales: 
* 
* 
* 
may only be negotiated with a Fortex livestock 
coordinator. 
will receive the Fortex Arrival Report only. 
will not qualify for the Fortex Schedule Plus scheme." 16 
15 'Yield grading of lambs at Fortex plants next season', Christchurch Press, 
18/10/91. 
16 Fortex Group Limited, (1992), Fortex Formula Information Booklet, Fortex 
Group Limited, Seafield. 
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The Fortex Formula was, in the first instance, a fine-tuning of the type of 
deals made through the schedule which it sought to replace. The 
schedule administered by the Board had usually delineated only 
about twenty-five classes of stock. This classification was made in 
terms of the weight of the carcass (from 7 kg to 21.5 kg) and, for some 
of the heavier weights, in terms of three grades of fat cover. A price 
per beast was quoted in each farming district by each firm and for 
each class. The Fortex Formula expressed a far greater delineation in 
its classification of stock. It used the industrial standards for fat cover 
and weight as the x-axis and the y-axis, respectively, to create a grid 
with some 150 classes of stock. The firm then indicated from this 
multitude of classes which types of stock, shown as clusters of classes 
on the grid space, it was interested in buying and established price 
differentials between the more and the less preferred classes. 
The old-style deals made at the farm-gate had entailed very little in the 
way of flows of information between processor and suppliers. In the 
case of deals made on the hook, farmers received, as part of the 
documentation of payment, a brief classification of their flock, that is, 
how many beasts belonged to each class of stock (PM, YM, YX, etc.). 
In the case of deals made on the hoof, farmers received no feedback 
at all about the characteristics of their stock as the price for the 
animals was negotiated before slaughter. In contrast, the Fortex 
Formula offered farmers considerable information about any stock 
(called lines) they sold to the firm. For each line of stock a 'Fortex 
Scattergram' was generated that plotted the characteristics of the 
relevant mob of sheep across the grid space of possible classifications. 
This information was intended to help farmers to improve their returns in 
the future by ascertaining how accurate they were in supplying the 
classes of stock most preferred by Fortex (interview, Manager #8). 
Theoretically the Fortex Formula was possible to operationalise 
because of the barcoding of all carcases and pelts processed at 
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Seafield and Silverstream. Tyson (1990) illustrates how the techniques of 
barcoding might identify the host of activities that constitute a labour 
process and therefore to illuminate its cost drivers. The benefits from 
barcoding for a firm, adjudged by Tyson, centre on the tracing of work 
and its association with labour costs. The introduction of barcoding in 
the factories owned by Fortex facilitated the tracing of stock through 
the stages of its disassembly. Barcoding allowed the firm to trace the 
movement of carcases and pelts through its plants, to assign ownership 
of these materials to individual farmers, and to offer payment based on 
assessments about the quality of these materials. Thus, barcoding 
allowed the firm to calculate the suitability of stock for further 
processing in terms of its yield (available meat and quality of the pelt). 
At the same time, as the Fortex Formula promised to pay farmers what 
their stock was worth in full and within two weeks of slaughter, it also 
offered payments of bonuses to farmers which purported to reflect the 
contribution of suppliers to the profits enjoyed by the firm from further 
processing and niche marketing. In doing so, the firm tried to extend 
the time span of its deals with suppliers and to foster a commonality of 
interest. Further, for all the period that the firm experimented with 
contracts and then with the Fortex Formula it attempted to engage its 
suppliers in the practicalities of processing. The company did so in the 
hope of obtaining a level of commitment from farmers in the care and 
presentation of stock that, simply, could not be secured through formal 
deals. 
The premium set by the firm (and supposedly by its customers) on 
precision and on quality meant that Fortex was moved to forever detail 
its contracts with suppliers and to control for the minutiae of 
imperfections and deficiencies in stock that could not be eliminated or 
penalised by formal contracts. The dictates of maintaining throughput 
for its plants were from the outset mediated by the desire to interest 
farmers in the immediate (practical) concerns of further processing. 
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However, even with the new forms of surveillance made possible by 
barcoding and its expression in the Fortex Formula, suppliers could sell 
stock that was problematic for the firm. For example, the improper 
washing and over-feeding of animals prior to slaughter were just two of 
many practices by farmers that could not always be detected by the 
firm and nevertheless tended to increase the ever important 'bacto 
count' in the cutting rooms. What the new Fortex practices meant, 
then, was that the practice of animal husbandry in a shoddy manner 
by a farmer-supplier, previously not a problem in the industry, could 
now affect the activities of processing and consequently reduce the 
shelf-life of the chilled product. 
The firm's attempt at integrating farmers with processing constituted a 
first for the industry and was thoroughly integrated with the public 
relations (PR) effort which characterised the firm. The most startling 
aspect of this effort was found in the role of the union. Officials of the 
meatworkers' union at Fortex and some of the team leaders played a 
very visible part in the attempts to inform and to engage farmer-
suppliers. Members of the union at the plants accompanied senior 
members of the management team on its corporate 'Road Show' 
where the Fortex Formula was trumpeted as a way forward for the 
industry. The secretary of the sub-branch (plant) notes: 
"We have been away. They took me away on the Road 
Show with them. To Nelson, right down to Oamaru. Did 
two of them. One group we spoke to, bankers, solicitors, 
(Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries) Department advisers, 
stock firms, that sort of thing. That was quite a swept up 
straight out address format. Graeme Thompson 
(managing director), Stuart Macintosh (general manager, 
processing), Ian Graham (general manager, Seafield) and 
myself addressed them. So we did a series of meetings, 
then we went back and did the Road Show proper I guess 
where we took all the displays around and visited all the 
farming centres. So I went on that with them." (interview, 
Union official #1). 
The response by farmers and the farmers' co-operatives. 
"Perhaps if Fortex had been satisfied with niche market 
and a smaller slice of the industry it would have coped -
and been tolerated by the big players." (Brett, 1994).17 
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The Meat Producers' Board made it very clear to Fortex that it wished 
the company to remain relatively small and to not intensify 
competition for stock in the South Island (see chapter 5 and 7). The 
Board was highly critical of Fortex when the firm announced its plans to 
build a second plant at Silverstream, and Freesia Meats thereafter sold 
all of its shares in the firm.1B 
The move by Fortex to slaughter lamb at Seafield (1985), and the 
quadruple expansion of its processing capacity by the introduction of 
shift work at Seafield (1988), followed by the construction of 
Silverstream (1990) meant that the firm forever left behind any chance 
of an accommodation in the industry with the incumbent firms based 
on its smallness and its exclusive focus on niche markets (Hartley, 1989). 
By greatly expanding its capacity to process venison and to further 
process lamb, Fortex became committed to a strategy that would 
bring it into direct competition with the established agribusiness firms as 
well as the plans of the Meat Producers' Board to secure the farmers' 
co-operatives. 
Regardless of several efforts at dedicating the resources of its suppliers 
to suit its own ends, Fortex was forced to compete for the farmers' 
stock with two very large co-operative enterprises, Alliance Freezing 
(Alliance) and the Primary Producers' Co-operative Society (PPCS). 
These farmers' firms had both functioned as co-operative marketing 
17 Brett C., 'Silence of the lambs', North and South, July 1994. 
18 Brett, C., 'Silence of the lambs', North and South, July 1994; 'Freesia sells 
Fortex stake', Christchurch Press, 16/12/89 'Second plantfor Fortex', 
ChristChurch Press, 27/1/89; Weir, J., 'Fortex makes splash with evolutionary 
breakthrough', The Dominion Sunday Times, 3/6/90. 
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ventures, by taking advantage of the 'open door' to processing, in the 
years following the end of the Bulk Purchase Agreement (1940-1954). 
However, the costs and uncertainties that ensue from large-scale 
leasing of processing capacity across a multitude of freezing works, 
encouraged the co-operatives to own their own plants (Lind 1985). 
Alliance moved into processing first, in 1960, when it constructed the 
largest plant in the country at Lorneville (with six killing chains). In the 
early 1980s it purchased the plant at Ocean Beach (Turner, 1984) from 
the Co-operative Wholesale Society (UK). PPCS moved into 
processing, in 1980, when (in partnership with Fletchers) it purchased 
the shares of Southland Frozen Meats (SFM).19 Later that year it 
purchased Borthwicks remaining holdings (of 23%) in Canterbury 
Frozen Meat (CFM).20 In the next four years PPCS sold off its holdings in 
SFM and consolidated its ownership of CFM (Lind, 1985).21 
The involvement of the Board, through Freesia Meats, in a 
rationalisation of the industry led Alliance and PPCS to become the 
largest firms to operate in the South Island (see chapters 5 and 7). In 
1988 the plants at Finegand and Marlborough, then owned by Waitaki 
International, were sold to PPCS. In the subsequent break-up of the 
Waitaki company a few years later, it was Alliance that became the 
biggest benefiCiary of the liquidation when it purchased all of the 
failed firm's plants in the South Island (see appendices 1 and 2). By the 
time Fortex had got its plants at Seafield and Silverstream fully 
operational (in 1990), the Alliance owned 9 plants (Nelson, Kaiapoi, 
Sockburn, Smithfield, Pukeuri, Mataura, Makerewa, Lorneville, Ocean 
19 'PPCS revealed as SFM buyer', Christchurch Star, 7/5/80; 'SFM consent 
extended', Christchurch Press, 25/8/84. 
20 'Borthwicks sells CFM holding', Christchurch Press, 13/9/80; 'CFM holds 
talks with Borthwicks', Christchurch Star, 20/8/80. 
21 Bennet, F., 'Horns of a dilemma', Christchurch Star, 23/8/80; 'Board 
favours CFM', Christchurch Press, 23/8/80, 'Waitaki's biggest coup coming 
up', Christchurch Star, nd; 'Apex trebles result', Christchurch Press, 23/5/80; 
Fyfe, D., 'Formers approve sale of works', Christchurch Press, 24/5/86, 
'Formers' view' Christchurch Press, 13/6/80. 
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Beach) and PPCS owned 5 plants (Marlborough, Belfast, Canterbury, 
Fairton, Pareora, Finegand), All of these plants, except Belfast, 
slaughtered lamb and sheep and therefore sought after stock and 
operated in competition with the new entrant (Hartley, 1989), 
Management at these firms were not taken in by the hype about 
Fortex: 
"Fortex is a little guy and little guys can always exist where 
there are big guys, Fortex has been able to fill a niche 
because of its smallness, The building of (the plant at) 
Silverstream will make things more difficult for them," 
(interview, Manager #12), 
Several factors counted against Fortex in its showdown with the co-
operatives, The advantage in size enjoyed by Alliance and PPCS was 
of significance, but of far more importance to the eventual resolution 
of this competition was: (1) the differential impact of escalating prices 
for stock on the co-operatives in comparison to Fortex, and (2) the 
pursuit by Fortex of a year round operation at Seafield and 
Silverstream, Together these factors allowed the co-operatives an 
advantage over Fortex, They permitted the co-operatives to weather 
what became a pricing 'war' for stock while the Fortex Group 
foundered and failed. 
Growth in the scale and scope of operation of these two co-operative 
firms had made necessary for them the development of strategies 
which transcended the very short-term horizons of the earlier variants of 
farmers' firms, These farmers' firms had, therefore, come to resemble, 
in the ways they entered into business, their more integrated 
proprietary competitors (Chandler, 1978), That is, with the 
consolidation of the co-operative firms there was some reworking of 
what their 'service' orientation entailed (interview, Director #1), 
However, the fusion of supply and shareholding ensured that the 
foundation of any co-operative enterprise was to maximise the returns 
to farmers, 
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Farmers obtained two forms of payment from their co-operative for 
their stock. Firstly, was a payment made at the farm-gate. This amount 
is calculated on a per head basis or under the schedule, and is paid 
within two weeks of the stock being killed. Secondly, was a payment 
made at the end of the financial year. This rebate is calculated (by 
share of stock supplied) as an individual portion of any surplus enjoyed 
by the firm (Desmond, 1951). However, the rebate, which is, in part, a 
measure of the 'efficiency' of the firm is actually of far less significance 
to farmers than the monies they get at the farm-gate (Alexander, 
1990). Because of the very unequal weighting given to payments at 
the farm-gate and rebated reimbursements, farmers were (and 
remain) decidedly ambivalent about the prices paid by their co-
operative for stock. 22 That is, as a host of writers has noted, farmers 
have only a conditional loyalty to firms (including the ones they own in 
part) and will inevitably try to sell to the firm with the highest prices on 
the day (Evans, 1985, Hussey, 1992; and more recently McWilliams, 
1994, for the Boston Consulting Group, cited in Stewart).23 
In many respects, the co-operative firms possess an incentive or 
disposition to offer the highest possible prices for stock and this 
particular aspect of the fusion of shareholding and supply found its full 
expression in the context of the showdown involving Alliance, PPCS 
and Fortex. That is, throughout the last four seasons of its operation, 
whenever the Fortex Group appeared to be gaining a 
disproportionate share of the kill, one or both of the co-operative firms 
would improve on the schedule and thereby ratchet-up the price of 
stock. 
22 I was fortunate to be able to attend several meetings held for the 
suppliers of Alliance and PPCS in the mid-Canterbury area in 1990-1995. 
23 Stewart K., 'Freemarket follies', NZ Listener, 25/6/94. 
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Conclusion: Beyond the narrative of success? 
In this account of failure I have argued that orchestrated narratives of 
success present Fortex as an emergent form of business and as the 
future of the industry, By contrast, the farmers' co-operatives (greatly 
enlarged as they were by the dismemberment of Waitaki International 
and apparently backed by the Meat Producers' Board) were 
represented as vestiges and 'dinosaurs' ,24 However, it was the Fortex 
Group that faced resistance from farmers and ultimately faltered in the 
struggle for stock, In doing so it left Alliance and PPCS, the dinosaurs, 
almost unchallenged in the South Island (see appendices 1 and 2), In 
other words, the innovation in the deals achieved by the Fortex Group 
with the union were undone, Thompson's failure was his inability to 
rework the deals with farmers over supply, 
The intensification of competition for stock by Alliance, PPCS and Fortex 
was a very visible manifestation of the dilemmas that for an extended 
time have confronted the firms engaged in processing (New Zealand 
Freezing Companies Association, 1980), In this regard, the collapse of 
yet another processing firm was nothing out of the ordinary, in that 
failures of such firms are close to being the rule in the export meat 
industry (Savage, 1990), Putting it another way, what writers in other 
societies have identified as a crisis of farming (Butte I, 1989; Commins, 
1990; Coulomb and Delorme, 1989; Cox, Lowe and Winter, 1989; 
Frankel, 1983; Goodman and Redclift, 1989b, 1991; Redclift, 1984; 
Tubiana, 1989; Wilson, 1977) was instead channelled in New Zealand 
by the Meat Producers' Board and a host of deals to become a crisis 
of processing (Cloke, 1989; Evans, 1985; Hussey, 1992; Le Heron, 1988b), 
The channelling of dilemmas into the sphere of processing was 
expressed first as a marginalisation of local agribusiness firms and it 
24 'Dinosaurs 1, Fortex Nil!', Otago Daily Times, nd; Weir, J" 'Fortex makes 
splash with evolutionary breakthrough', The Dominion Sunday Times, 3/6/90, 
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underpinned a working compromise of farmers and international 
agribusiness firms (Neilson, 1982). The withdrawal of international 
agribusiness firms left a vacuum which the local firms, most notably 
Waitaki International and the Fortex Group, tried to fill. This objective 
proved to be unobtainable for the local enterprises. While Waitaki and 
Fortex adopted very different approaches to building a new 
integrated marketing company, in large part, both were stymied by 
the insubordination of farmers. In this regard, the mounting problems 
confronting the export meat industry were manifested as the difficulty 
of sustaining any version of a local business capable of brokering deals 
with farmers (Savage, 1990). 
Further, the long-run tendency for the actors in the industry has been 
unfavourable as their returns on investment seemingly decline in 
comparison with those in other sectors (Cloke, 1989; Fairweather, 1987; 
Sandrey and Reynolds, 1990; Wallace and Lattimore, 1987). As one 
farmer noted: 
"Unless there is a substantial increase in fat lamb prices to 
farmers, I believe that the freezing (processing) industry 
could well be a thing of the past. A good example is the 
cost of producing fat lambs. In 1957 I purchased a new 
tractor equipped with a hydraulic system. It cost me just 
under 300 fat lambs. The present price of a similar new 
tractor is 1700 fat lambs." 25 
The maintenance of prices at the farm-gate therefore is ever more 
likely to bring farmers into open conflict with the agribusiness firms (of 
which they are shareholders). That is, the ability of farmers to benefit 
from a form of control that secures high prices for stock at the farm-
gate and ever narrowing margins for agribusiness firms is very likely 
approaching its limits (Perry, 1992; Savage, 1990). At the same time, 
the transfer of the assets of Waitaki and Fortex, and therefore the bulk 
25 Edgar, J., 'Letter to the Editor', Christchurch Press, 20/7/91. 
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of processing and export, into the hands of the co-operatives raises the 
prospect that the more farmers succeed in pressuring agribusiness firms 
the more they will be cutting their own throats, Further, it may well be 
the case that the sphere of processing is so insolvent and the firms in it 
are in such a state of disarray that the consortium of banks who 
finance the firms in the industry is set to circumvent the longstanding 
institutions and forms of control to protect their outstanding loans 
(Hussey, 1992; Perry, 1992). Such a by-passing of longstanding 
arrangements is certainly central in the restructuring and 
transformation of other industrial networks (Fligstein, 1990; Campbell, 
Hollingsworth and Lindberg, 1991), 
In this regard the foreclosure on Fortex,26 and then the refusal of 
financiers to broker a rescue deal (interview, Union official # 1 ) 
arguably reflected a decision by officials of the firm' s (and the 
industry's) main backers, the Australia New Zealand Bank and the Bank 
of New Zealand, to force the realignment of processing capacity in the 
South Island most favourable to them,27 Consequently, Fortex was 
sacrificed at the insistence of interests outside the industry, and was 
closed rather than PPCS or Alliance, mainly because it owed less to the 
banks and its assets might be worth more than its competitors (Stewart, 
1994).28 It was this resolution that was to ultimately end Thompson's 
career in the export meat industry, 
26 Archibald, J, and N, Topp, 'Pay-cut plea fails as 1800 jobs go', 
Christchurch Press, 26/3/94, 
27 The reluctance on the part of the financiers to revive the Fortex Group 
was despite guarantees from union officials at Seafield and Silverstream of a 
reduction in the annual wage bill of the company in excess of $15 million 
(nearly $200 per worker per week). 
28 Brett C" 'Silence of the lambs', North and South, July 1994; Hutching, c., 
'Shaking the system', New Zealand Business, October, 1990; Stewart, K., 
'Freemarket follies', NZ Listener, 25/6/9, 
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Chapter 10 
Conclusion. 
In this thesis I have focussed on the politics family farmers have utilised 
to exercise control over the export meat industry, I have attempted to 
answer three questions, Firstly, how have farmers retained centrality in 
the export meat industry? Secondly, what are the consequences of 
this centrality for the other actors in the industry? Thirdly, what is the 
relationship between the success of family farming and the recurring 
failure of agribusiness firms? The answer of these questions provoked 
an account of the historical process by which farmers pursued forms of 
control 'off-farm', 
Framing the questions in this way allowed me to both situate farmers 
as securing controls appropriate to their reproduction as family 
farmers, but also as constrained by the control efforts of other actors in 
the export meat industry, I have described the Meat Producers' Board 
as generally acting in the farmers' collective interest, Insofar as a 
large part of the Board's control was exercised over processing firms it 
was also the case, however, that processing firms resisted this control 
and sought other ways of operating which directly challenged the 
Board, For example, I have described the way in which John Neilson 
and Waitaki International attempted to challenge the Meat 
Producers' Board and how, after defeating Neilson's challenge, the 
Board was to take up the very policies advocated by him, These 
shifting positions of the Board, acting as the farmers' agent, were 
described as being outcomes of its attempts to control both local and 
global markets, 
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Similarly, the meatworkers unions and sub-branches, the other major 
actors in the industry, were described as shifting their positions vis-a-vis 
farmers over time. The position of the union sub-branches and, in 
particular, the delegate in the unions' style of operation was 
contrasted with the new position of the hybrid delegate-team leader 
in the Fortex company. In the former arrangement, unions were not 
directly concerned with the fate of farmers, and meatworkers' strikes 
were resented bitterly by farmers. In the latter, the union sub-branches 
sought active alliances with farmers in order to secure particular 
outcomes with regard to the quality of work. The thesis documents 
how these shifting union positions were taken up. 
Farmers as both local and global actors. 
It is my contention that to appreciate how farmers in New Zealand 
exercised control 'off-farm' and over the export meat industry it is 
necessary to grasp how local markets in stock and global markets in 
meat were arranged. Markets for stock were delimited in local space 
by the territories or catchments of local meat processing firms. 
Markets for meat were delimited in global space by the cold stores, 
depots and shops of wholesalers. Securing access to markets was, in 
both cases, paramount to farmers. On the one hand, farmers could 
sell stock only if their farms were encompassed by the catchment(s) of 
some processing firm. On the other hand, farmers could sell meat only 
if they could use the transnational infrastructure of refrigeration and 
distribution. 
Insofar as farmers secured access to processing in New Zealand and 
to wholesaling in Britain, they also secured their livelihoods. I have 
documented how access to these local and global markets, and with 
it farmers' control, was achieved first independently by farmers using 
contractual arrangements, and subsequently through the Meat 
Producers' Board and legislative inteNention. Prior to the formation of 
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the Board farmers utilised an array of deals covering stock auctions, 
the consignment of frozen meat and sub-contracted processing. Their 
control over these deals engendered a multiplicity of firms through 
which they could readily access processing and wholesaling. With the 
formation of the Board these types of deals were effectively extended. 
The Board acted as the legal guarantor of these deals. In doing so the 
Board, acting as the farmers' agent offset the threat of subordination 
posed by international agribusiness firms. The existence of the Board 
allowed farmers to resist the imposition of conditions of monopsony (in 
markets for stock) and at the same time facilitated their efforts in 
marketing their own meat. 
The creation of the Board, in 1923, was a response on the part of 
farmers, sponsored by the state, to a dramatic restructuring of 
overseas markets in the form of the concentration of wholesaling in 
the hands of the international agribusiness firms. Thereafter, the Board 
forestalled any rationalisation of stock procurement or processing in 
New Zealand and guaranteed farmers' at least a vestige of access to 
wholesaling in Britain. Nevertheless, the international agribusiness firms 
were entrusted with a sUbstantial share of processing and an even 
greater one of the export trade. This form of agribusiness control 
reflected, in part, the muscle of international agribusiness firms. It also 
showed the nature of an historic compromise reached between 
farmers, the Board and international agribusiness firms. Insofar as the 
integrated operations of the international agribusiness firms could be 
safely constrained and their economies of scale were not deployed to 
subordinate farmers, their ability to clear very large volumes of export 
product through wholesaling became of real benefit to farmers. 
The Board operated, then, a as a broker of the threat and benefits 
posed by international agribusiness firms. The Board developed a 
number of different ways of regulating local and global markets in 
favour of farmers; ranging from inspection in processing plants, to 
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classification of the schedule for stock, and negotiation with shipping 
lines. However, the main 'tool' used by the Board to secure the 
interests of farmers was the licensing of all firms engaged in 
processing. 
The Board used industrial licensing (1934-1981) to maintain agribusiness 
firms (both international and local) as fiercely competitive buyers in 
localised markets for stock. At the same time, as the farmers' agent it 
also used licensing to enforce its policy of the 'open door' (which 
made processing facilities readily available for farmers) and to prevent 
any process of rationalisation in the industry. In doing so, the Board 
also cemented a subordination of local agribusiness firms to farmers 
and international agribusiness firms. 
This use of industrial licensing by the Board may be seen as a peculiar 
form of franchising. In this form, rather than securing the licensees (as 
franchising normally does), its use by the Board made firms in 
processing inherently unstable. In the case of the export meat industry 
the Board franchised not the right to any throughput or territory (in 
which to buy stock), but merely the permission to make offers to local 
farmers for stock and further to do so in competition with other 
licensees in the local farming district. 
The Board moved towards more typical franchising arrangements in 
the context of abandoning industrial licensing in favour of its own 
managed rationalisation of the industry. This more typical form 
extended franchises in the form of overseas market monopolies to 
agribusiness firms. To date their efforts at formalising the franchising of 
overseas markets remain incomplete. 
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The politics of farmers. 
This thesis shows how many of the problems that the Board resolved for 
farmers were to result in different problems for agribusiness firms. 
Specifically, the agribusiness firms were constrained by the farmers' 
control of the industry to operate in conditions of overlapping 
catchments and, what was effectively, a forced competition for stock. 
Their unremitting efforts to secure adequate levels of throughput not 
only made them exceedingly vulnerable to farmers (and inflated the 
price for stock in local farming districts), but it also made them 
vulnerable to the meatworkers' unions (and inflated wages in 
processing plants). The constraints on processing provide an 
explanation for the recurring failure of agribusiness firms and for their 
continued efforts at restructuring the control of local and global 
markets. This effort, in turn, shaped much of the resources and 
strategies of the unions. 
The initial advantage to the meatworkers' unions in their dealings with 
processors lay in the unions' ability to secure markets for labour and to 
interfere, by playing firms off against each other, in the localised 
markets for stock. Control of labour markets involved the operation of 
union 'hiring halls' and the administration of seniority in the hiring of 
seasonal labour. By these mechanisms the unions, like farmers, were 
able to exploit seasonality in their dealings with processors. 
Within the plants the local union delegates were central to the 
organisation of work and to the ability of individual firms to secure 
throughput. At the same time, the local delegates were central to the 
federations of the unions. It was through these local delegates that 
the rules of seniority were applied and that the host of 'tops ups' of the 
Award were negotiated. While the federations of the meatworkers' 
unions eventually splintered under the combined pressure of the 
Board's managed rationalisation in the industry and worsening 
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conditions in labour markets, the role of the delegate in 'running the 
room' remained central in a later re-fashioning of processing. 
The problems facing agribusiness firms were illustrated through the 
'projects' of John Neilson and Waitaki International and Graeme 
Thompson and Fortex. Neilson's project, the building of Waitaki 
International, left intact the unions' control of processing. Neilson's 
project aimed at wresting control from farmers and in many respects 
supported the meatworkers' unions. However, the demise of Waitaki, 
the closure and down-sizing of many of its plants, strained fatally the 
federations of the meatworkers' unions. Graeme Thompson's project 
profited from the 'fallout' of agribusiness firms like Waitaki International, 
of the Board's failed attempt at managed rationalisation, and of the 
disarray of the meatworkers' unions. The crux of the effort made by 
the Fortex company involved an attempt to establish a new form of 
integrated marketing company. This involved the reworking of deals 
between unions and management in the processing plants. Fortex 
attempted to secure a deal with the union which allowed it to 
customise its products on a year round basis using shift work at its 
plants. 
The Fortex deal was dramatically different to those previously secured 
in the industry. In this deal the ability of local union delegates to keep 
the plant running became formalised through the arrangements of 
team leaders. What was attempted at Fortex was a novel form of 
enterprise unionism which drew upon the local union delegates to 
maximise throughput for the firm rather than to threaten it. This deal 
effectively removed Fortex from the ambit of the broader 
meatworkers' unions and contributed to the further splintering of its 
federations. 
Nevertheless, Fortex remained reliant on farmers in local markets for 
stock. In this respect, Thompson fronted an approach to farmers that 
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mode appeals to them in terms of adding value and niche marketing, 
whereas, Neilson hod at best only ever down-played the threat to 
formers from Waitaki International. Making the appeals to formers also 
involved the union in a new marketing role at Fortex. The union was 
utilised in campaigns to change formers' methods of production and 
simultaneously to convince them to enter into long-term contracts with 
the firm. 
The new arrangements with the union were, however, to prove to be 
central in the firm's undoing in the local markets for stock. In short, 
because the formers' co-operative processing firms were able to offer 
better prices at the form-gates than Fortex, the firm was deserted by its 
suppliers. Without throughput the new deal with the union was 
rendered useless. Like Waitaki, its plants were closed and within weeks 
Fortex was liquidated. In the Fortex case a 'strike' by formers 
ultimately destroyed the firm. 
This failure, like Waitaki International before it was used in the thesis to 
review how the confrontation between formers and agribusiness firms 
does not have to be resolved in terms of the marginalisation of the 
former and the triumph of the latter. In the export meat industry of 
New Zealand family formers and agribusiness firms co-existed. Their 
co-existence was secured by the state through the Meat Producers' 
Boord. The political deals that secured this co-existence resulted, 
however, in the recurring failure of the firms which processed meat. 
The explanation of these failures lies not in any assumed process of 
commodification or control, but rather in the way in which markets, 
both local and global, were structured through political interventions 
by formers. 
Appendix 1. 
International agribusiness firms, proprietary firms and farmers' 
firms in the export meat industry. 
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This appendix lists all the processing plants to have operated in the 
export meat industry and characterises the firms that owned them. In 
it I characterise these firms as being: (1) international agribusiness firms, 
and I divide local agribusiness firms into (2) proprietary firms, and (3) 
farmers' firms. The appendix also shows the presence of some of the 
contracts by which the output of sub-contracted processing firms was 
secured by other firms. 
There are a number of books on firms (Brett, 1974; Harrison, 1963; 
Knightley, 1981; Lind, 1981, 1985; Loach, 1969; Macdonald, 1957; 
Perriam, 1989; Scott, 1973; Strang, 1960; Taranaki Producers, 1952; 
Waites, nd), and official histories (Barton, 1984; Department of Statistics, 
1972, 1973, 1982; Hayward, 1973), and other accounts of the industry 
(Critchell and Raymond, 1912; Hartley, 1989; Hereford, 1932; Le Heron, 
1988b; McNulty, 1958; and Symington, 1972) which proved useful in 
constructing this appendix. While they do not constitute a 
comprehensive overview of ownership, they allowed considerable 
cross referencing with the material I gained from interviewing and 
aided the decisions I made determining what was the character of 
individual firms. Such triangulation allowed what I believe is, to date, 
the most comprehensive classification of the plants and firms to have 
operated in New Zealand. 
308 
International agribusiness firms: 1882-1960. 
1882-1889 1900-1909 1910-1919 1920-1929 1930-1939 1940-1960 
Borthwicks Borthwicks Borthwicks Borthwicks 
Waitara Waitara Waitara Tokumaru 
Paki Paki Paki Paki Paki Paki (closed 1952) 
Canterbury (closed 1931) Waitara 
Waingawa Waingawa 
Feilding Feilding 
Canterbury Canterbury 
Co-oRerative 
Wholesale 
Society (U!0 
Longburn 
Ocean Beach 
Nelson Bros Nelson Bros Nelson Bros 
Tomoana Taruheu Taruheu 
Waipukurau Tomoana Tomoana 
(closed 1893) Hornby 
Woodville 
(closed 1897) 
North British & North British & North British & 
Hawkes Ba~ Hawkes Ba~ Hawkes Ba~ 
Farmers Meat Farmers Meat Farmers Meat 
Westshore Westshore Westshore 
(closed 1924) 
Sims Sims 
Ngauranga 1/2 Ocean 
1/2 Ocean Beach 
Beach 
Swifts Swifts 
1/2 Ocean Ngauranga· 
Beach Wairoa 
Veste~s Veste~s Veste~s 
Reotahi Westtield Westtield 
(closed 1921) Tomoana Tomoana 
Westtield 1/2 Kaiti Kaiti 
Taruheu Patea 
(closed 1923) 
Waiapoa 
(closed 1923) 
Tomoana 
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Proprietary Firms: 1882- 1960. 
1882-1889 1900-1909 1910-1919 1920-1929 1930-1939 1940-1960 
Auckland Auckland 
Frozen Meat L Frozen Meat L 
Bank of New Bank of New 
Zealand Zealand 
Westfield Westfield 
Canterbur'L Cante[bu!}, Canterbu!}' Canterbu!}, Canterbu!}, Canterbu!}' 
Frozen Meat Frozen Meat Frozen Meat Frozen Meat Frozen Meat Frozen Meat 
Belfast Belfast Belfast Belfast Belfast Belfast 
Fairton Fairton Fairton Fairton Fairton 
Pare ora Pareora Pareora Pareora 
Christchurch 
Meat 
Picton 
Blenheim 
Islington 
Smithfield 
Federal Steam Federal Steam Federal Steam 
Navigation Navigation Navigation 
(Ocean (Ocean (Ocean 
Beach Beach Beach 
Freezing) Freezing) Freezing) 
Ocean Beach Ocean Beach Ocean Beach 
Gear Meat Gear Meat Gear Meat Gear Meat Gear Meat Gear Meat 
Petone Petone Petone Petone Petone Petone 
Hellab'LS Hellab'Ls Hellab'Ls Hellab'Ls 
Westfield Shortland Shortland Shortland 
Huttons Huttons 
Eltham Eltham 
Mitchells Mitchells 
Aramoho Aramoho 
(closed 1914) 
Mount 
Egmont 
Freezing 
Waitara 
National National National National 
Mortgage Mortgage Mortgage Mortgage 
and AgenC'L and Agenc'L and Agenc'L and Agenc'L 
of NZ ofNZ of NZ of NZ 
LonQburn LonQburn Longburn Longburn 
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Proprietary Firms: 1882-1960. 
1882-1889 1900-1909 1910-1919 1920-1929 1930-1939 1940-1960 
Nelson Nelson Nelson Nelson 
Freezing Freezing Freezing Freezing 
Nelson Nelson Nelson Nelson 
NZ Meat 
Packing and 
Bacon 
Eltham 
NZ NZ NZ NZ NZ NZ 
Refrigerating Refrigerating Refrigerating Refrigerating Refrigerating Refrigerating 
Burnside Eveline Picton Imlay Castlecliff Imlay 
Burnside Hornby Picton Imlay Picton 
ISlington Hornby Picton Islington 
Smithfield ISlington Islington Smithfield 
Eveline Smithfield Smithfield Burns)de 
(closed 1912) Pukeuri Burnside 
Burnside Burnside 
South 
Canterbu!:'t' 
Freezing 
Smithfield 
Southland S6uthland Southland Southland Southland Southland 
Freezing Freezing Freezing Freezing Freezing Freezing 
Bluff Mataura Mataura Mataura Mataura Mataura 
(killing for Bluff Makerewa Makerewa Makerewa Makerewa 
Nelson Bros) (killing for Bluff (killing for (killing for (killing for 
Nelson Bros) (closed 1913) Borthwicks) Borthwicks2 Borthwicks) 
South Otago South Otago South Otago South Otago 
Freezing Freezing Freezing Freezing 
Finegand Finegand Finegand Finegand 
(killing for (killing for (killing for (killing for 
Andersons) Borthwicks, Borthwicks, Borthwicks, 
CWS, NZR) CWS, NZR) SFM. NZR) 
WangaQui Wanganui Wanganui 
Meat Freezing Meat Freezing Meat Freezing 
Castlecliff Castlecliff Castlecliff 
(closed 1926) 
Wellington Wellington Wellington Wellington 
Meat EXQort Meat EXQort Meat EXQort Meat EXQort 
Ngauranga Ngauranga Ngauranga Ngauranga 
Karariki 
~closed 1921) 
Whangarei 
Freezing 
Reotahi 
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Farmers' Firms: 1882-1960. 
1882-1889 1900-1909 1910-1919 1920-1929 1930-1939 1940-1960 
Auckland Auckland Auckland Auckland Auckland 
Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers 
Freezing Freezing Freezing Freezing Freezing 
Southdown Southdown Morewa Morewa Morewa 
(killing for Southdown Southdown Southdown 
Borthwicks) Horotiu Horotiu Horotiu 
(killing for (killing for (killing for 
Borthwicks) Borthwicks) Borthwicks) 
East Coast 
Co-oRerative 
Freezing 
Whakatane 
(closed 1926) 
Feilding 
Farmers 
Freezing 
Feildinq 
Gisborne Gisborne Gisborne Gisborne 
SheeR-farmers SheeR-farmers SheeR-farmers SheeR-farmers 
Frozen Meat Frozen Meat Frozen Meat Frozen Meat 
Kaiti Kaiti Tokumaru Tokumaru 
Kaiti 1/2 Kaiti 
(killing for (killing for (killing for (killing for 
Borthwicks Borthwicks Borthwicks Borthwicks 
Hawkes Ba'i Hawkes Ba'i Hawkes Ba'i 
Farmers Meat Farmers Meat Farmers Megt 
Whakatu Whakatu Whakatu 
(killing for (killing for 
Vesteys) Vesteys) 
Hicks Ba'i 
Farmers Meat 
Hicks Bay 
(closed 1924) 
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Farmers' Firms: 1882-1960. 
1882-1889 1900-1909 1910-1919 1920-1929 1930-1939 1940-1960 
North North North 
Canterbu!y Canterbu!y Canterbury 
SheeQ-farmers SheeQ-farmers SheeQ-farmers 
Co-oQerative Co-oQerative Co-oQerative 
Freezing Freezing Freezing 
Kaiapoi Kaiapoi Kaiapoi 
(killing for (killing for 
Sims) Swifts) 
OtiahaQe 
Farmers 
Freezing 
Otiahape 
(closed 1926) 
Pate a Farmers Patea Farmers Patea Farmers Patea Farmers 
Co-oQerative Co-oQerative Co-oQerative Co-oQerative 
Freezing Freezing Freezing Freezing 
Patea Pate a Patea Patea 
(killing for Sims 
and NZR2 
Povertv Bay 
Farmers Meat 
Waiapoa 
Taranaki Taranaki 
Farmers Farmers 
Freezing Freezing 
Moturoa Moturoa 
(closed 1922) 
T okumaru Bay 
Farmers Meat 
Tokumaru 
WaiararaQa WaiararaQa 
Farmers Meat Farmers Meat 
Waingawa Waingawa 
(killing for 
Borthwicks) 
Wairoa Wairoa 
Farmers Co- Farmers Co-
oQerative oQerative 
Meat Meat 
Wairoa Wairoa 
Waitaki Waitaki Waitaki 
Farmers Co- Farmers Farmers 
oQerative Freezing Freezing 
Freezing Pukeuri Pukeuri 
(killing for (killing for 
NZR) NZR) 
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International agribusiness firms: 1960-1995. 
1960-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995 
Borthwicks Borthwi~ks Borthwicks -
Waitara Waitara CWS 
Waingawa Waingawa Waitara 
Feilding Feilding Waingawa 
Feilding 
LonQburn 
Co-o(2erative Co-o(2erative 
Wholesale Whol~sale 
Socieh' (U!0 Socieh' (U!0 
Longburn Longburn 
Ocean Beach Ocean Beach 
Swifts 
Ngauranga 
(closed 1974) 
Wairoa 
Vesteys Vesteys Vesteys Vesteys Vesteys 
Westfield Westfield Westfield Westfield Tomoana 
Tomoana Tomoana Tomoana (closed 1988) (closed 1995) 
Kaiti Kaiti Kaiti Tomoana Kaiti 
Patea Patea Patea Kaiti (closed 1995) 
Cambridge (closed 1982) Cambridge Awapuni 
Feilding Cambridge Feilding (closed 1995) 
Feilding Whangarei Cambridge 
(closed 1995) 
Feilding 
(closed 1995) 
Whangarei 
(closed 1995) 
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Proprietary Firms: 1960-1995. 
1960-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995 
Atas L Nelson Atas L Nelson Atas L Nelson 
Ba')'s Meat Ba')'s Meat Ba')'s Meat 
Producers Producers Producers 
Takaka Takaka Takaka 
Auckland Cit')' Auckland Cit')' 
Abattoir Abattoir 
Otahuhu Otahuhu 
Blue Sk,), Blue Sk,), 
Meats (NZ) Meats (NZ) 
Gore Gore 
Canterbury Canterbury 
Frozen Meat Frozen Meat 
and and 
Borthwicks Borthwicks 
Belfast Belfast 
Canterbury Canterbury 
Fairton Fairton 
Pareora Pareora 
(killing for (killing for 
Borthwicks) Borthwicks) 
Canterbury 
Meat Packers 
Seafield 
Cavalier Cavalier Cavalier 
Meats Meats Meats 
Tirau Tirau Tirau 
Coromandel Coromandel 
Meat Meat 
Processors Processors 
Totara Totara 
Dawn Meats Dawn Meats 
am am 
Hawera Hawera 
Paeroa Paeroa 
Fletcher Fletcher 
Challenge L Challenge L 
Challenge Challenge 
Meats Meats 
Mataura Mataura 
Makerewa Makerewa 
Dunedin Dunedin 
(closed 1990) 
Fortex GrouQ Fortex GrouQ 
Seafield Seafield 
Silverstream 
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Proprietary Firms: 1960-1995. 
1960-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995 
Frasertown Frasertown Frasertown 
Meats Meats Meats 
Frasertown Frasertown Frasertown 
Gear Meat Gear Meat 
Petone Petone 
(closed 1979) 
Greenlea 
Premier Meats 
Hamilton 
Hawera Meat Hawera Meat Hawera Meat 
Processors Processors Processors 
HMP-Hawera HMP-Hawera HMP-Hawera 
Hellabys Hellabys Hellabys 
Shortland Whangarei Whangarei 
Shortland Taumarunui 
Shortland 
Hill Count[y Hill Country 
Beef NZ Beef NZ 
Napier Napier 
Huttons Huttons 
Eltham Eltham 
King Count[y 
Lamb-
Benneydale 
Benneydale 
(closed 1995~ 
Lakeview Lakeview 
Meats Meats 
Levin Levin 
Lowe Walker Lowe Walker Lowe Walker 
Hawera Hawera Hastings 
Paeroa Paeroa Hawera 
Te Aroha Te Aroha Paeroa 
Te Aroha 
DarQavilie 
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Proprietary Firms: 1960-1995. 
1960-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995 
Nelson 
Freezing 
Nelson 
(killing for 
agent) 
NZ 
Refrigerating 
Imlay 
Picton 
Islington 
Smithfield 
Burnside 
NZ Beef 
Packers 
Whakatu 
Paramount Paramount Paramount 
Export Export Export 
Te Kauwhata Te Kauwhata Piriaka 
Phoenix Meat Phoenix Meat Phoenix Meat 
Greymouth Greymouth Greymouth 
Pro-Pacific Pro-Pacific 
Opotiki Opotiki 
Progressive Progressive Progressive 
Meats Meats Meats 
Hastings Hastings Hastings 
Richmond Richmond Richmond Richmond Richmond 
Pacific Pacific Pacific Pacific Pacific 
Oringi Oringi Oringi Oringi 
Takapau Takapau 
Otaki Otaki 
Te Kauwhata 
Riverlands Riverlands Riverlands Riverlands 
/Brierley /Brierley [Brierley LBrierley 
Investments Investments Investments Investments 
Eltham Eltham Eltham Eltham 
Blenheim Blenheim Blenheim Bulls 
Blenheim 
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Proprietary Firms: 1960-1995. 
1960-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995 
Southland Southland 
Freezing Freezing 
Mataura Mataura 
Makerewa Makerewa 
(killing for 
Borthwicks) 
South Otago 
Freezing 
Finegand 
(killing for 
Borthwicks) 
South Pacific South Pacific 
Meats Meats 
Morrinsville Morrinsville 
Stevens NCF Stevens NCF 
Kaiapoi Kaiapoi 
(killing for (killing for 
CFM) CFM) 
T a'ilor Preston T a'ilor Preston 
Johnsonville Johnsonville 
Te Kuiti Meat Te Kuiti Meat Te Kuiti Meat 
Processors Processors Processors 
Te Kuiti Te Kuiti Te Kuiti 
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Proprietary Firms: 1960- 1995. 
1960-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995 
Waikato Beef 
Packers 
Morrinsville 
Waitaki Waitaki-NZR Waitaki-NZR Waitaki 
Industries Wairoa Wairoa International 
Pukeuri Imlay Imlay Waitara 
(killing for Picton Picton Feilding 
Vesteys) Nelson (closed 1982) Waingawa 
Pukeuri Marlborough Longburn 
ISlington Nelson Takapau 
Smithfield Pukeuri Whakatu 
Burnside ISlington (closed 1985) 
Finegand Smithfield Wairoa 
Burnside Imlay 
Finegand Marlborough 
Nelson 
Pukeuri 
ISlington 
(closed 1988) 
Smithfield 
Burnside 
(closed 1988) 
Finegand 
Waitotara Waitotara Waitotara 
Meat Meat Meat 
Waitotara Waitotara Waitotara 
Wallford Wallford Wallford 
Meats Meats Meats 
Waitoa Waitoa Waitoa 
WelQro Meats WelQro Meats WelQro Meats 
Nqauranqa Ngauranga Ngauranga 
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Farmers' Firms: 1960-1995. 
1960-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995 
Alliance Alliance Alliance Alliance Alliance Alliance 
Freezing Freezing Freezing Freezing Freezing Freezing 
Lorneville Lorneville Lorneville Kaiapoi Nelson Nelson 
Ocean Beach Lorneville Kaiapoi Sockburn 
Ocean Beach (closed 1991) Smithfield 
Sockburn Pukeuri 
Smithfield Dunedin 
Pukeuri Mataura 
Mataura Makerewa 
Makerewa Lorneville 
Lorneville 
(killing for Ocean Beach 
Borthwicks) (closed 1991) 
Auckland Auckland Auckland Auckland 'Auckland Auckland 
Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers Farmers 
Freezing Freezing Freezing Freezing Freezing Freezing 
Morewa Morewa Morewa Morewa Morewa Morewa 
Southdown Southdown Southdown Whangarei Whangarei Whangarei 
Horotiu Rangiuru (closed 1981) Rangiuru Rangiuru Rangiuru 
(killing for Horotiu Rangiuru Horotiu Horotiu Mamuku 
Borthwicks) Horotiu Mamuku (closed 1993) Taumaranui 
Taumaranui Mamuku Waitara 
Shortland Taumaranui Wairoa 
(closed 1984) Waitara Imlay 
Wairoa Feilding 
Imlay 
Feilding 
Waingawa 
(closed 1989) 
Longburn 
(closed 1990) 
Farmers Meat 
Export 
Whangarei 
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Farmers' Firms: 1960-1995. 
1960-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995 
Hawkes Ba':l Hawkes Ba':l Hawkes Ba':l 
Farmers Meat Farmers Meat Farmers Meat 
Whakatu Whakatu Takapau 
(killing for (killing for Whakatu 
Borthwicks) Borthwicks) 
North 
Canterbuey 
Sheeg-farmers 
Co-ogerative 
Freezing 
Kaiapoi 
(killing for 
CFM and NZR) 
Primaey Primary Primar':l Primary 
Producers Co- Producers Co- Producers Co- Producers Co-
ogerative ogerative ogerative oRerative 
Society Society Society Society 
Belfast Belfast Marlborough Marlborough 
Canterbury Canterbury Belfast Belfast 
Fairton Fairton Canterbury Canterbury 
Pare ora Pare ora Fairton Fairton 
Pareora Pareora 
Finegand Finegand 
Silverstream 
Gore 
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Appendix 2. 
Mapping the processing plants in New Zealand. 
This appendix maps the information given in appendix 1, for the period 
after 1960, relating to the ownership of plants and character of the 
firms that owned them. It is hoped that the maps will aid an 
appreciation of the multiplicity of firms in the processing sector and of 
their overlapping catchments for buying stock. It is also intended that 
the time series provided by these maps will facilitate an appreciation 
of the wax and wane of firms. 
PROCESSING PLANTS: 1960·1974 
Proprietary firms 
CFM, Canterbury Frozen Meat 
GEAR. Gear Meat 
HELLABY. Hellaby 
HUTTONS, Huttons 
NELSON, Nelson Refrigerating 
NZR, New Zealand Refrigerating 
SOF. South Otago Freezing 
SFM, Southland Frozen Meat 
WAITAKI. Waitaki Industries 
Farmers' firms 
ALLIANCE. Alliance Freezing 
AFF. Auckland Farmers Freezing 
HBF, Hawkes Bay Farmers Meat 
NCF. North Canterbury Sheep-farmers Co-operative 
International agribusiness firms 
BORTH, Borthwicks 
CWS, Co-operative Wholesaler Society 
SWI FTS. Swifts 
VEST. Vesteys 
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BORTH. Wa~ara 
o 100 
I I I 
KI LOM ETRES 
PROCESSING PLANTS: 1975-1979 
Proprietary firms 
CFM, Canterbury Frozen Meat 
DAWN, Dawn Meats 
GEAR, Gear Meat 
HELLABY, Hellaby 
HUTTONS, Huttons 
RICH, Richmond 
SFM, Southland Frozen Meat 
STEVENS, Stevens-NCF 
WAITAKI. Waitaki Industries 
Farmers' firms 
ALLIANCE. Alliance Freezing 
AFF. Auckland Farmers Freezing 
HBF, Hawkes Bay Farmers Meat 
International agribusiness firms 
BORTH, Borthwicks 
CWS, Co-operative Wholesaler Society 
VEST, Vesteys 
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PROCESSING PLANTS: 11980·11984 
Proprietary firms 
DAWN. Dawn Meats 
FCL. Fletcher Challenge 
HELLABY. Hellaby 
RICH. Richmond 
RIVER. Riverlands 
STEVENS. Stevens-NCF 
WAITAKI. Waitaki Industries 
Farmers' firms 
ALLIANCE. Alliance Freezing 
AFF. Auckland Farmers Freezing 
HBF. Hawkes Bay Farmers Meat 
FME. Farmers Meat Export 
PPCS. Primary Producers Co-operative Society 
International agribusiness firms 
BORTH. Borthwicks 
VEST. Vesteys 
Finegand AITAKI. 
ALLIANCE. 
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PROCESSIING PLAINTS: 1985w1989 
Proprietary firms 
ATAS. Atas/Nelson Bays Meat Producers 
BLUE. Blue Skies Meats 
CAV. Cavalier Meats 
FCL. Fletcher Challenge 
FORTEX. Fortex Group 
FRASER. Frasertown Meats 
HMP. Hawera Meat Processors 
LAKE. Lakeview Meats 
LOWE. Lowe Walker 
PARA. Paramount Export 
PROG. Progressive Meats 
RICH. Richmond 
RIVER. Riverlands 
SOUTH. South Pacific Meats 
TeK. Te Kuiti Meat Processors 
WAITAKI. Waitaki Industries 
WAIT. Waitotara Meat 
WALL. Wallford Meats 
WELPR. Welpro Meats 
Farmers' firms 
ALLIANCE. Alliance Freezing 
AFF. Auckland Farmers Freezing 
PPCS. Primary Producers Co-operative Society 
International agribusiness firms 
VEST. Vesteys 
Te Aroha LOWE. 
Mamuku AFF. 
Tirau CAV. 
V 
Taumaranui AFF. 
o 100 
1 I 
KllOM ETRES 
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PROCESSING PLANTS: 1990~1994 
Proprietary firms 
ATAS. Atas/Nelson Bays Meat Producers 
AUCKL. Auckland City Abattoir 
BLUE. Blue Skies Meats 
CAV. Cavalier Meats 
CORO. Coromandel Meat Packers 
FORTEX. Fortex Group 
FRASER. Frasertown Meats 
HMP. Hawera Meat Processors 
HILL. Hill Country Beef NZ 
KING. King Country Lamb 
LAKE. Lakeview Meats 
LOWE. Lowe Walker 
NZB. New Zealand Beef Packers 
PARA. Paramount Export 
PHO. Phoenix Meat 
PRO. Pro-Pacific 
PROG. Progressive Meats 
RICH. Richmond 
RIVER. Riverlands 
SOUTH. South Pacific Meats 
TP. Taylor Preston 
TeK. Te Kuiti Meat Processors 
WAIT. Waitotara Meat 
WALL. Wallford Meats 
WELPR. Welpro Meats 
Farmers' firms 
ALLIANCE. Alliance Freezing 
AFF. Auckland Farmers Freezing 
PPCS. Primary Producers Co-operative Society 
International agribusiness firms 
VEST. Vesteys 
ALLIANCE. 
Te Aroha LOWE. 
Mamuku AFF. 
Tirau CAY. 
V 
Taumaranui AFF. Wairoa AFF. 
NZB. Whakalu 
VEST. Tomoana 
RIVER. Ellham 
o 100 
! 
KI LOM ETRES 
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PROCESSING PLANTS: 11995 
Proprietary firms 
ATAS. Atas/Nelson Bays Meat Producers 
AUCKL. Auckland City Abattoir 
CMP. Canterbury Meat Packers 
CAV. Cavalier Meats 
CORO. Coromandel Meat Packers 
FRASER. Frasertown Meats 
GREEN. Greenlea Premier Meats 
HMP. Hawera Meat Processors 
HILL. Hill Country Beef NZ 
LOWE. Lowe Walker 
PARA. Paramount Export 
PHO. Phoenix Meat 
PRO. Pro-Pacific 
PROG. Progressive Meats 
RICH. Richmond 
RIVER. Riverlands 
TP. Taylor Preston 
TeK. Te Kuiti Meat Processors 
WAIT. Waitotara Meat 
WALL. Wallford Meats 
WBP. Waikato Beef Packers 
WELPR. Welpro Meats 
Farmers' firms 
ALLIANCE. Alliance Freezing 
AFF. Auckland Farmers Freezing 
PPCS. Primary Producers Co-operative Society 
Te Aroha LOWE. 
Mamuku AFF. 
TeK Te Kuiti Tirau CAV. 
Piriaka PARD 
Taumaranui AFF. 
o 100 
KI LOM ETRES 
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Appendix 3. 
Reflections on the Research Process. 
Introduction. 
Reflections on the puzzles generated whilst doing research have come 
to take the place of formal accounts of methodology. I started this 
thesis with a set of assumptions about measuring social relations that 
were drawn from Marxism or, more accurately, from what Dunne 
(1991) has called 'quantitative Marxism'. My original contention was 
that after producing a statistical summary of Marxist value categories 
(surplus value, constant and variable capital) relating to the export 
slaughterhouses I could then pursue the sociological endeavour of 
positioning the strategies of unions and companies (Pearce, 1986). My 
research was intended, in essence, as an account of false 
consciousness (Anderson, 1967). I did not, however, go on to 
compose my investigation within the strictures of what I then imagined 
to be (Marxist) scholarship and this methodological appendix is 
offered, in part, as an account of the disparity between the beginning 
and end points of this thesis. 
The transformation of my research was provoked as a result of doing 
fieldwork. Fieldwork shattered my assumptions about the export meat 
industry. Flexibly structured inteNiews (Whyte, 1979), non-participant 
obseNation and, to a lesser extent, documentary research drew me 
away from the abstractions of my starting framework toward an 
appreciation of the complex networks comprising the export meat 
industry. My model of false consciousness survived in libraries whilst I 
consulted statistics but was undermined after only two visits to the field. 
The first visit took place at the head offices of the Canterbury-Westland 
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Branch of the New Zealand Meat Processors, Packers, Preservers, 
Freezing Works and Related Trades Union and centred on a lengthy 
'interview' with one of the union's officials. The second visit took 
place, several days later, at the home of a man who worked in the 
boning room at PPCS, Canterbury. 
From these visits I found that these men had a knowledge not just of 
the minutiae of their work (as I expected) but of the networks and 
narratives in the industry. In terms of the latter, they were reflexive, 
even cynical, about their own positions and those of other actors in 
the industry. With hindsight I now wonder how I could ever have 
imagined it otherwise. However, at the time this demonstration of 
what I then considered to be the exclusive domain of a 'sociological 
imagination' was startling. Further, whilst I came to talk about the 
struggles of capital and labour, these men repeatedly offered 
explanations of the industry which emphasised 'farmers control'. At 
the time of these conversations, in 1990, Fortex just had begun its 
operation at Silverstream and both the union official and the 
meatworker spent much of my visits talking about the challenge Fortex 
presented to the co-operatives, Alliance and PPCS. Both emphasised 
that the fate of Fortex and the co-operatives would be determined by 
the decisions of local farmer-suppliers. 
Talking with union officials and meatworkers led me then to the 
question of farmers and they became an ever more important 
component of my research. In my initial conception of the thesis they 
figured not at all, partly because the only statistics on production 
suitable for Marxist value analysis were of 'factory production'. These 
statistics completely excluded farming (Department of Statistics, 1921-
1924 1925-1932, 1933-1942, 1943-1952, 1953-1968, 1969-1973, 1979, 
1984). At the same time, my reading of Marx, Lenin, Trotsky and 
Mandel had certainly not sensitised me to appreciating farmers as 
political actors. I consequently had to search for a new form of 
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research and of understanding the industry. The results of this search 
are distilled in my review of the arguments found in the literatures 
about rural sociology, the political economy of agriculture and actor-
networks (see chapter 2). 
Networking and sponsors. 
As I commenced fieldwork I discovered, as anthropologists often do, 
that insofar as fieldwork inevitably focuses on networks, the practice of 
research is itself facilitated by the researcher's efforts at networking 
(yang, 1994). Networking became a crucial part of my research, and 
my own biography, including my tacit understanding of the world 
Bourdieu (1977), aided my efforts. My biography provided me with 
contacts. Most significantly, my father's friends at work and his 
familiarity with officials of the New Zealand Meat Processors, Packers, 
PreseNers, Freezing Works and Related Trades Union proved an 
invaluable resource in my gaining access to the unions and 
subsequently to several processing plants. I was able visit the homes 
of a number of my father's workmates over the course of my research 
and from these discussions find other respondents. 
In the case of the union, I was able to inteNiew on two occasions an 
officer of the South Island federation who had also seNed as a union 
appointee on the Court of Arbitration. Further, my extensive 
involvement in the mid 1980s, with an employment campaign 
sponsored by the Canterbury Council of Trade Unions, had introduced 
me to three officials of the Canterbury-Westland branch of the union. 
These men spoke to me often, providing me with copies of the Award 
and various other 'position papers'. They also allowed me, in 1991, to 
attend union meetings at two processing plants. 
It was my contact with union officials in Christchurch that first allowed 
me to visit the processing plants. On the basis of overtures made to 
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the presidents of the union on site and the support of officials in 
Christchurch I first visited , in 1991, the PPCS plant at Belfast and the 
Fortex plant at Seafield. In each case, I checked into the plant spoke 
briefly with the union official on site, and was then shown around the 
plant by a supeNisor in the company of a number of other visitors. 
These 'package tours' were a source of considerable amusement to 
the workforce. On both occasions I was able to talk with the local 
unionists after the completion of the plant tours. 
My network of friends and family was also significant to the process of 
documentary research. A relative worked in the library of the 
Christchurch Press, the South Island's largest daily newspaper, and 
through her support I had access to nearly a century of journalist's 
articles about the industry. These were catalogued as topics, 
including entries for the union, strikes, firms, takeovers, the Meat 
Producers' Board and the Minister of Agriculture. Similarly, my 
acquaintance with Joanne Neilson (a graduate of the Department of 
Sociology) allowed me access to the very extensive archives of her 
late father, John Neilson. This material included speech notes, 
company reports, letters, minutes of meetings and submissions to the 
Minister of Agriculture. Sorting this material to provide a time-line of 
events at Waitaki was a major endeavour in 1991-1992. Joanne 
Neilson also introduced me to a senior manager in the defunct firm. 
My contacts with the union had allowed me into two plants but to 
extend my studies I wanted to secure access to plants (and firms) 
through the approval of management. In this regard, I adopted the 
simple procedure of sending a letter requesting a visit to the managers 
of six plants in the South Island. In each case their response was 
affirmative. I was unable for personal reasons to visit the Riverlands 
plant in Marlborough, but I did get to inteNiew and obseNe staff at 
the PPCS plants at Belfast and Canterbury, the Alliance plant at 
Kaiapoi, and the Fortex plants at Seafield and Silverstream. Such 
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willingness of production managers to let a social scientist into their 
factory is obviously not the norm for most researchers. Indeed much 
of what is written about the organisation of work is accomplished 
covertly or from the 'outside' precisely because researchers are 
barred from the factories (Fuccini and Fuccini, 1990). 
I attended several meetings held by processing firms, including the 
1991, 1992, 1993, annual general meetings of shareholders in Fortex 
and, in 1994, the official liquidation of the firm. I also attended four 
meetings of farmer-shareholders in Alliance and PPCS for the mid 
Canterbury and North Canterbury districts in 1990 and 1992. At each 
of these functions I introduced myself to the meeting and after the 
formalities did my best to make further contacts. My most significant 
contact made at this stage was with a director of one of the co-
operatives and member of the Board. 
I returned to Fortex, in 1993, with the formal backing of the Institute of 
Social Research and Development and the brief to produce a 
summary of the new forms of industrial relations used by the firm (Perry, 
Davidson and Hill, 1995). Once at Seafield I was invited by the plant 
manager to obseNe its operations and to inteNiew workers, supeNisors 
and production managers over three consecutive days. In this 
respect, I was the beneficiary of a far-reaching sponsorship that gave 
me privileges to obseNe and talk with individuals, all of whom were 
the subordinates of this manager. 
The contrast between these two methods of gaining access to 
research sites is worth opening up. If the informal arrangements 
allowed me to pursue a form of 'sponsored' research as a set of 
favours asked of one person by another, the formal arrangements 
were very different. Access through formal procedures requires the 
construction of a plausible story line (Goffman, 1989) and the location 
of effective sponsors who hold significant and powerful positions. Katz 
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(1992) has speculated on the reasons for sponsorship by such persons 
in facilitating his study of Sears. He draws no clear conclusions as to 
why a very busy and very senior manager would want a researcher 
such as Katz to examine to process of restructuring Sears. I am likewise 
at a loss to explain why the plant manager at Seafield sponsored this 
particular piece of research. I suspect that he had more than an 
inkling of the marketing problems then confronting Fortex and wanted 
to see what an 'informed' outsider might have to say about the firm. 
However, I have no idea of his motives for entering into what at times 
felt very much like a game, that he had set up for himself. 
As Pahl (1995) notes of research interviews, in some cases it is not clear 
who is conducting the interview, the researcher or the interviewer. This 
observation was one that plagued my own research. Coming to 
terms with the knowledge of those interviewed led me to an historical 
sociology (Wierviorka, 1992) grounded in questions derived from 
fieldwork. 
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